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Abstract
Acts of violence involving civilian aircraft and airline facilities, as w ell as air 
travellers have been exploited by terrorist and others since 1931. This form  of 
international terrorism is more than an attack on the rights of the innocent and 
rule of law. It constitutes a great threat to global peace. Although such attacks 
represent a small percentage of total terrorist incidents, it is clear that acts of 
violence directed at c iv il aviation are not lim ited by geographical or political 
boundaries. As escalating threats to c iv il aviation have caused great concern to 
the international community without regional exception, governments have 
introduced security measures against such attacks. The deterrent or diversionary 
effect of tight security programmes have been reflected in a perceptible shift of 
terrorist attention to easy targets and other forms of attack. However, 
governments and the c iv il aviation industry have failed to keep ahead of 
changing threats. They upgraded their security capabilities to tackle only the 
known methods of terrorist attacks. This short-sighted approach is the most 
serious concern fo r the safety of c iv il aviation. It cannot be emphasised too 
strongly that both the nature and the level of the security threat change frequently 
and must be monitored constantly in order to foresee possible danger and to 
consider how to cope w ith such threats. The international community must not 
allow the perpetrators of aviation terrorism to get so far ahead of the w orld's 
aviation security system. To achieved this aim, aviation authorities must develop 
long term plans to tackle teiTorist activities against c iv il aviation. This w ill be a 
monumental task. However, where there is a whl, there is a way.
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION
"Tlie closure of a single major international airport anywhere in the world by 
a teiTorist bombing or hostage drama is capable of disrupting the entiie 
global c iv il aviation system, producing overloads in some places and 
underloads in others, late or cancelled flights, planes without passengers and 
passengers without planes, uneaten meals, and idle crews”.*
"While technological advances have produced a remarkable degree of safety 
in air travel, unparalleled by any other means of transport, criminal attacks 
against airlines have posed a man-made threat fo r which there aie no simple 
technical solutions'".^
I - l,  In troductory Comments on Research Program
The idea fo r this research came to the cuixent w riter in 1987 when two North 
Korean teixorists blew up the Korean Ah Lines Flight 858, killing  115 innocent 
people. When did aviation terrorism begin? W lio  exploited it? What were the 
vaiious types? What were the phases and cycles? What was being done to 
prevent it? What s till needed to be done?
1 Neil C. Livingstone, "The Impact of Technological Innovation", in U ri 
Ra'anan et al, H ydra,oI Carnage: The International Linkages of Terrorism and 
Other Low-Intensity Operations. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 
1986, P. 138
2 Eugene Sochor, The Politics of International Aviation. London: Macmillan 
Press, 1991, P. 144
This reseai'ch was undertaken from A p ril 1989 to A p ril 1992 at the University 
of St. Andrews, Scotland under the supervision of Professor Paul W ilkinson. 
The firs t d ifficu lt problem encountered during this research was a shortage of 
information owing to the reluctance of authorities to provide any information on 
this subject, on the plausible but unconvincing basis that: "Silence in this area is 
certainly golden. Say as little  as possible and never reveal anything about your 
security measures or anti-skyjacking techniques.”  ^ W ith this tendency, aiiiine 
officials do not want to reveal details by their responses simply because they do 
not want to give terrorists any additional information, I have sent numerous 
letters requesting research materials from  c iv il aviation authorities in many states, 
but I have not had answers to my letters, apart from  five. One of them said, "We 
are very sorry fo r not being able to inform  you about your requirements since it 
is a confidential matter." This reflects the d ifficu lty involved in gathering 
information in this subject. However, the libraries of the Universities of St. 
Andrews, Aberdeen and Dundee as w ell as the RISCT special library provided 
invaluable research material. In addition, the Inter-Library Loan(ILL) system of 
the British Library Document Supply Centre provided much needed assistance.
1-2. Literature Review
There is much useful information on the origins and the historical 
development of violence directed against the safety of c iv il a v i a t i o n ,  ^ but a
3 H. H. A. Cooper, "Aviation: Soft Underbelly Of The Corporate W orld", 
Chitty's Law lo u rna l Vol. 28,1980, P. 161
^ James A iey, The Sky Pirates. New York: Scribners, 1972; E. B lair and W . R. 
Capt. Haas, Odyssey of Terror. Nashville, TN.: Broadman, 1977; Peter Clyne, 
An Anatomy of Skyjacking. London: Abelard-Schuman, 1973; Edward F, 
Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events. _1_9_68-1979.
complete historical survey of aviation terrorism does not exist. Though many
papers on the problems of aviation terrorism in America and M iddle East have
been found,^  it is impossible to find a comparative analysis of the regional
variations in aviation terrorism worldw ide including that occurring in Eastern
European, Asian, African and Latin American states,
A  great number of descriptive and critical analyses have been devoted to the
international conventions and the various agreements concerning aviation
terrorism.® There are also many excellent books and articles dealing w ith
London: Aldwych Press, 1980; Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean 
M. Murdock, IntemWonal Terrorism, in the J .S8.Qs:...A Chionology of  Events, 
Volume I 1980-1983. Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1989; David G. 
Hubbard, W inning Back the Sky, Dallas,TX: Saybrook Publishing Company, 
1986; David Phillips, Skyjack: The Story of A ir Piracy. London:George G. 
Harrap & Co., 1973; Christopher Dudly, "Hijacking and Terrorist Attacks 
against A ircraft and A irport Installations", Journal of the Insurance Institute of 
London. Vol. 65, 1976-77; Richard Clutterbuck, Living w ith Terrorism. 
London: Faber and Faber, 1975; Temple B. Ingram, Jr., "Are A irport Searches 
s till Reasonable?", Journal of A ir Law and Commerce. Vol. 44, 1978; J. T. 
Daily, "Skyjacking: Problems and Potential Solutions - A Symposium - 
Development of a Behavioral Profile fo r A ir Pirates", Villanova Law Review. 
Vol. 18, 1973; R. L, Fick, J. I. Gordon and J. C. Patterson, "A ircraft Hijacking: 
Criminal and C ivil Aspects", University of Florida Law Review. V ol. 22, 1969; 
W . F. Buckley, "The Skyjacker Problem", National Review, V ol 24, 1972; A. 
Beristain, "Terrorism and A ircraft Hijackings", International Journal of 
Crim inology and Penology. Vol. 8, 1970; C. Moorehead, "Terrorism in the A ir", 
New Society. Vol. 72, 1985
5 Edgar O"Ballance, Language of Violence: The Blood Politics of Terrorism. 
California: Presidio Press, 1979; Peter Snow, Leila" s H ij ack W ar! London: Pan 
Books, 1970; N. Novick and J. Starr(ed), Challenges in the Middle East. New 
York: Praeger, 1981; J. B. W olf, "A Mideast Profile: The Cycle of Terror and 
CounterteiTor", International Perspectives. Vol. 2, 1973
b Edward McWhinney, Aerial Piracy and International Teirorism: The Illegal 
Diversion of A ircraft and International Law. Dordrecht: Martinus N ijhoff, 1987; 
A. Abramovsky, "M ultilateral Conventions fo r the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure and Interference w ith A ircraft, Part I: The Hague Convention, Part II: 
The Montreal Convention and Part III: The Legality and Political Feasibility of a 
M ultilateral A ir Security", Columbia Journal of International Law. Vol. 13, 1974 
and Vol, 14, 1975; Sami Shubber, Jurisdiction over Crimes on Board A ircraft.
aviation security problems and solutions to preventing hijacking and the 
sabotage bombing of aircraft in flig h t/ Many writers, however, failed to provide 
a perspective of such attacks. For instance, very few writers have pointed out 
the possibility of missile attacks against c iv il aviation aircraft in fligh t which is 
considered as a great potential threat in  the neai* future.
Many of the books and articles on the problems of aviation terrorism are 
very superficial, insubstantial and overlap w ith others. More specific and 
accurate materials on this subject can be found by referring to the standards and 
guides published by governments and international organizations. The U.S.
Hague: Martinus N ijhoff, 1972: R. G. Bell, "The U.S. Responses to Terrorism %
Against International C iv il Aviation", ORBIS. Vol. 19, 1976; Gerald F.
FitzGerald, "Toward Legal Suppression of Acts against C iv il Aviation",
International Conciliation. No. 585, November, 1971; Sami Shubber, "A ircraft 
Hijacking under the Hague Convention 1970-A New Regime?", I.C.L.Q .. Vol.
22, 1970; C. S. Thomas and M. J. K irby, "The Convention fo r the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of C iv il Aviation", I.C .L.Q .. 1973; M. E.
Fingerman, "Skyjacking and the Bonn Declaration of 1978", California Western 
International Law Journal. Vol. 10, 1980; A. E. Evans, "A ircraft Hijackings:
What is to be done?", American Journal of International Law. Vol. 67, 1973; Bin 
Cheng, "The Hague Convention on Hijacking of A ircraft 1970: The Legal 
Aspects", Aeronautical Journal. Vol. 76, 1972; R. J. McGrane, "A  Search fo r an 
International Solution to the Problem of A ircraft Hijacking", Auckland 
University Law Review. Vol. 2, 1975; R. P. Borle, "Jurisdiction over Crimes 
Committed in Flight: An International Convention", American Criminal Law 
Q.uartcr ly , Vol. 3,1984
^ Kenneth C. Moore, A irport. A ircraft and A irline Security. California: Security 
W orld Publishing Co., 1976; Frederick C. Dorey, Aviation Security. London:
Granada, 1983; Robin E. Hül, Problems of International Cooperation to 
Improve Standards of Aviation Security w ith.Rgfei:mice.io the Passenger, Ph.D.
Thesis, University of St. Andrews, November 1990; Steven Ashley, "Can 
Technology Stop Terror in the A ir?", Popular Science. Vol. 227, November,
1985; Paul W ilkinson, The Lessons of Lockerbie. Conflict Studies, No. 226,
December, 1989; F. C. Dorey, "Security at A irport Terminals", A irport 
Technology International. 1989; L. Z. Freeman, "Aviation Security Training is a 
Necessity", ICAO Bulletin Vol. 34, 1979; J. Mendale, "Aviation Safety and I
Security: Problems and Possible Solutions", ICAO Buttetin Vol. 42, 1987
Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Administration, w ith its w orld­
wide activity, is very w ell placed to accumulate information needed by security 
specialists. The FAA's Office of C iv il Aviation Security tracks aviation terrorism 
incidents worldwide and it publishes its findings and recommendations on a 
regular basis fo r public use. Unlike the aviation authorities in many other states, 
the FAA is veiy quick to shaie their data w ith the c iv il aircraft industry at large 
and makes every effort to respond to public requests fo r information. One such 
publication is their annual review of crim inal acts against c iv il aviation. This 
work details the sabotage bomb attacks against c iv il aviation and maintains 
records of aircraft hijackings as w ell as other significant crim inal acts against 
c iv il aviation worldwide. The information of the FAA has provided valuable 
background data on security systems, statistics and chronology.
1-3. Reasons fo r the Thesis
The international air transportation industry provides a vita l communications 
link which brings prosperity to many states in our modern age. This invaluable 
link has not only been threatened by terrorism and other factors, but also by 
failures in the aviation security system. Airlines have been one of the most 
attractive targets in the eyes of a terrorist fo r several reasons including 
particularly the international and symbolic nature of aviation, and the potential of 
multi-governmental involvement which can inevitably generate wide publicity. 
Acts of violence against c iv il aircraft have been committed since the earliest days 
of c iv il aviation history. The firs t attack against c iv il aircraft dates back to the 
early 1930s. Since then, aircraft hijackings and other forms of attacks against
c iv il air transport operations have become one of the most serious challenges to 
the safety of flying.
The number of direct victims of aviation teiTorism is, in a statistical sense, 
small compared to the human loss resulting from natural disasters and accidents. 
From 1984 to 1988, throughout the world, 752 people were killed and 136 
people were injured in attacks against c iv il aviation in the form  of aircraft 
hijackings and sabotage bombings of aircraft in flight.® In the same period, in the 
United Kingdom alone, a total of 1,597,067 casualties occurred in road 
accidents.® In addition, terroristic attacks directed against c iv il aviation represent 
but a small percentage of the total of international terrorist incidents. For 
example, in 1989 alone, a record of 528 international terrorist incidents were 
reported.*® The impact of aircraft hijackings, sabotage attacks upon airborne 
aircraft and attacks on airline facilities, however^  have been far greater than any 
other types of attacks on civilian population anywhere, in terms of the political, 
economic, and psychological cost. Aviation terrorism tends to focus on highly 
dramatic acts, whose impact goes far beyond the act itself. There appears to be 
an almost unique quality about c iv il aviation which focuses public attention on 
aircraft hijackings and sabotage bombings much more than does violence in a 
more static situation. In fact, aviation terrorism has proven to be an effective 
tactic when utilised by terrorists fo r generating mass impact and attracting wide 
mass media coverage. This was clearly demonstrated by the TW A 847 hijacking 
of June 1985. Aviation terrorism is not only a concomitant feature of the 
development of international c iv il aviation but also of political upheaval
8 U.S. Department of Transportation, Criminal Acts Against C iv il Aviation: 
15S9, P. 6 and 12
^ Annual Abstract of Statistics. No. 126, London: HMSO, 1990, P. 196 
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989. P. 1
throughout the world. It is not suddenly going to cease or disappear. It is 
unlikely that terrorists are going to stop aircraft hijacking. Furthermore, aircraft 
hijacking is only one of the methods by which international terrorism expresses 
itself. Sabotage bombing, kidnapping, armed attacks are also means of terrorism, 
and they need not depend on the presence of a commercial aircraft. The 
employment of violence against certain airlines, w ith the intention of 
discouraging people from  using them, is undertaken frequently to attack the 
national interest of a state. In fact, no other industry in the world has ever been 
under such violent and sustained terrorist and other criminal attack as that 
endured by the aviation industry over the past three decades. This was clearly 
demonstrated after the attacks in Rome and Vienna airports, and the Pan Am 103 
disaster. It is also a form  of terrorism which presents a great threat and a degree 
of personal risk to private citizens and crew members as w ell as others who 
operate in the air transport system. A large number of deaths and fatal injuries 
occuiring in c iv il aviation industry have been attributed to such attacks. 
Teixorists are not concerned about the threat to human rights, property, the 
integrity of sovereign states or w orld peace. They are only intent upon 
undermining and destroying them.
As the numerous domestic and international incidents of violence directed 
against c iv il aviation aircraft, airline facilities, and innocent airline passengers 
and crews continue to increase, aviation terrorism, which has all the elements of 
terrorist crime, requires to be taken seriously. Dealing w ith aviation tenorism 
has become a problem of some magnitude and urgency, and is increasingly 
recognized as a challenge to the international community. However, the lack of 
political w ill and cooperation between governments, national and international 
organisations, and airlines, the unwillingness of some states to enforce the 
recommendations of international conventions concerning aviation crime, and
the inadequate training of security staff constitute the current reality of the 
situation w ith regard to combatting aviation terrorism. In this respect, it is 
necessary to evaluate the current problems of acts of violence against c iv il 
aviation w ith a view to tackling such attacks. This led the w riter to this subject.
1-4, Thesis Outline
The content of this work consists of 6 Chapters, Following this introductory 
Chapter, to foster a better understanding of what has been done to air 
transportation, a brief history and the nature of aviation terrorism w ill be 
presented in Chapter II. This Chapter describes the complete historical 
development of violence against c iv il aviation and defines the forms of aviation 
terrorism and classifies aviation terrorists according to their motives. Chapter I I I  
analyses and describes the variations of aviation terrorism by geographical 
regions. The w riter examines the problems, trends of aviation terrorism and 
responses of governments to such acts of violence in this Chapter. In Chapter 
IV , two different types of acts of violence against c iv il aviation w ill be examined 
in order to study the specific problems of aviation security and international 
responses. Chapter V discusses the new and potential threat to c iv il aviation in 
the future which is drawn from the study of previous Chapters. In  this Chapter, 
the w riter examines the special threat of missile attack on c iv il aviation. Chapter 
V I examines the ways in which the international community have reacted to such 
attacks. This Chapter also takes a global view of aviation terrorism. Finally, the 
concluding Chapter w ill be presented.
CHAPTER I I
AV IATIO N  TERRORISM: ITS NATURE AND DEVELOPMENTS
"That the world is awaie of the problem is cleai* from  the many statements of 
government leaders, academic observers, and journalists. It is recognized 
that acts of tenorism pose many threats to the existing order. Perhaps the 
most significant dangers are those relating to the safety of ordinary people, 
the stability of the state system, the pace of economic development, the 
acceptance of the rule of law, and the expansion of democracy".*
IL L  Introduction
This Chapter is a survey. It deals w ith the principal forms of attack against 
c iv il aviation and the classification of the various types of offenders in order to 
identify their characteristics. A t the same time, as one w riter said, "Only the past 
can provide us w ith some clues about what can be expected in the yeai'S come",^  
and in order to draw a general outline on this subject, this Chapter describes the 
brief history of attacks against c iv il aviation. Tlie history of aviation teiTorism is 
not a jumble of unrelated incidents. There have been a number of distinct phases 
and cycles. Tliroughout this Chapter, it is the intended to establish the main 
patterns of the attacks.
1 Y. Alexander and Herbert M. Levine. "Prepare For The Next Entebbe", 
Chitty's Law Journal. Vol. 25, No, 7, 1977, P. 240
2 C. J. Visser, "C ivil Aviation Remains Vulnerable to Terrorism", Flight Safety 
Em indAm , 1988, P. 3
IÏ-2 . Development o f International C iv il A viation
On December 17, 1903, the W right brothers made their firs t powered, 
sustained and controlled aircraft fligh t in the firs t flying machine in history to 
have practical potentialities/ Since then the development of aircraft has brought 
human history into new era. The year 1908 was an mmus inà'abllîs in aviation 
liistory, fo r the W right brothers made their firs t fligh t in public and the firs t w ith 
a passenger was made on May 14, by W ilbur W right, taking C.W. Furnas; and 
the firs t passenger fligh t in Europe was made by Farman, taking A i chdeacon, on 
May, 24.4
The firs t international fligh t took place in 1909 when the French p ilo t Louis 
Blériot crossed the Channel from  France to England. But until the outbreak of 
W orld W ar I, the aeroplane was regarded by most authorities, both technical 
and business, as having potential usefulness only fo r sporting or m ilitary 
purposes.^  The popularity and importance of flying became greatly extended in 
the public mind, and air transport became a universally accepted mode of travel 
from  1919. The firs t c iv il airline fo r passengers started on February 15, 1919, 
when the German "Deutsche Luftreederei" opened a service between Berlin, 
Leipzig and Weimar.® After some pioneering passenger flights from  May to 
August in 1919, the w orld ’s firs t régulai', scheduled, international, daily, 
commercial passenger and goods ah' transport service began on August 25
3 Charles H. Gibbs-Smith, The Aeroplane: An Historical Survey of Its Origin 
and Development. LondomHer Majesty's Stationary Offices, 1960, P. 42
4 Ib id, P. 59
5 R.E.G. Davis, A H istory of the W orld's Airlines. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964, P. 3
^ Chai'les H. Gibbs-Smith, op.cit, P. 98
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between London and Paris/ A ir transport then spread eixatically and 
sporadically throughout Europe, and a number of other airlines were opened in 
1919, including the Dutch K.L.M .. International routes were firs t established in 
the states of Western Europe where, as a result of theii* lim ited geographic area, 
aircraft had to cross national boundaries in order to be used economically/ In 
the United States, where the firs t demand was fo r internal routes across its vast 
territory, mternational airline services were not inaugurated until almost ten 
years after those in Europe/ Interwar years were a great pioneering period, 
crowned by the opening of regular transatlantic air services in 1939. Thus, by 
the outbreak of W orld Wai* II, most major international routes had been 
established, and a network of airlines connected the continents. The era after 
W orld W ai' I I  has witnessed a revolutionary development in international 
aviation.*® Ah' Transportation made a further step in 1952 when the firs t jet 
ah'liner was put into service by British Overseas Ahways 
Corporation(B.O.A.C.), and it quickly demonstrated the passenger appeal of jet 
travel.** Ah' transport today encompasses some 1600 airports linked by a 
gigantic cobweb of routes used by about 950 commercial carriers operating 12
7 Ibid, P. 99
^ Christer Jonsson, International Aviation and The Politics of Regime Change. 
London: Frances Pinter Ltd, 1987, P. 26
^ J.C. Cooper, The Right to Fly. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947, 
P. 17
Christer Jonsson, op.cit, PP. 26-27
11 Keith Hayward. Government and British C iv il Aerospace: A  Case Study in 
Post-War Technology Policy. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983, 
P. 19
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b illion  flights every year. The growth of international scheduled air h anspoil is 
illustrated by the increase in number of passengers carried: 12
Table I I  I.
G rowth o f G lobal Passenger F low  
(1935-1985)
Year No. of Passengers Passenger/Kilometres
1935 4.6 million 918 million
1945 13.2 million 8000 million
1955 68 million 61,000 million
1965 177 million 198,000 million
1975 534 million 697,000 million
1985 891 million 1,360,000 million
During 1986, the w orld ’s international scheduled airlines carried a total 938 
m illion passengers and 14.7 m illion tonnes of cargo on some 15 m illion flights. 
Estimated traffic fo r 1996 is 1.5 b illion  passenger jouineys.^ ^ The social impact 
of this immense increase in international m obility is incalculable. Diplomacy has 
been transformed as leaders are able to meet in person rather than entrusting 
negotiations to delegates; this has tended to produce a style of leadership 
marked by the individual’s ability as a solo performer. Business travel accounts 
fo r by far the greater part of passenger/kilometres flow n, but the ease w ith 
which people of even moderate income can fly  to holidays abroad has radically 
altered the public perception of the world; the global village' is, of course, very 
dependent upon telecommunications but it would never have become a reality 
without air transport on its present scale.
■1
-Î
-1
1
The Longman Encyclopedia. London: Guild Publishing, 1989, P. 19 
13 Ibid,
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II-3 . Defining the Forms o f Attack against C iv il A viation
As international air traffic has become principal means of interstate 
transportation, c iv il aviation could hardly avoid selection as an easy target of 
international terrorism. Since February 1931, when Peruvian revolutionaries 
hijacked a Pan Am F7 Ford Trim otor fo r use in dispersing propaganda, there 
have been w ell over 700 recorded aircraft hijackings and 90 sabotage attacks on 
airborne aiicraft. Although overall incidents against c iv il aviation are gradually
The air transport system is one of the great success stories of the 20th 
century, epitomizing the growing role of ah services in facilitating national and 
international m obility and expediting worldwide trade. Unfortunately, this high 
profile and consequent vulnerability air transportation on occasion makes 
airliners targets of hijacking and other forms of attack promoted by terrorists 
and others. Although international c iv il aviation has become a popular means of 
interstate transportation, its vulnerability to violence and interference was not 
generally realised until a 1947 hijacking incident. In  July of that year, three 
Rumanian army officers hijacked a Rumanian civilian aircraft carrying ten 
people to Canakkale province in Turkey and requested political asylum. One of 
the crew members was shot dead fo r refusing to p ilot the aircraft to Turkey, The 
officers were taken into custody, but the seven civilians were freed.^ ^ Thereafter, 
aircraft to some people not only became a popular means of transportation, but 
also a tool fo r escaping, kidnapping, blackmailing, or consummating bizarre f
notions.
^4 Edward F. Mickolus, Im n snaiiQiaa l Terrorism; A Chronology of  Events 
1969-1979. London: Aldwych Press, 1980, P. 22
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diminishing, it is important to note that there have been indiscriminate attacks 
such as m id-ail' sabotage bombings and attacks on airport terminals and airline 
offices. In terms of aviation terrorism, three main categories can be classified. 
These are aircraft hijacking, sabotage bombing of airborne aircraft, and attack on 
airline facilities and their users.
II-3 -1 . A ircra ft H ijacking
The expressions ‘skyjacking’, ’unlawful seizure* and air piracy* are now 
synonymous w ith the term hijacking, although an authoritative international 
definition of the crime is hard to find. The term aerial piracy', though sometimes 
used to delineate the act of illegal seizure of an aircraft in flight, does not convey 
its essential chaiacter. Aerial piracy’ is not piracy in the classical sense, or as 
defined in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.^  ^Piracy is covered in 
Article 14 to 22 of that convention. Article 15 states as follow s:
Piracy consists of any of the follow ing:
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, 
committed fo r private ends by the crew or the passengers of a 
private ship or a private aircraft, and diiected:
a. On the high seas, against another ship or aiicraft, or against 
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
b. Against a ship, aircraft, person or property in a place outside 
the jurisdiction of any state;
14
Alona E. Evans, "A ircraft Hijacking: Its Cause and Cure", American Journal I
of Internatipnal Law. 1969, P. 223; See also, Sami Shubber, "Is Hijacking of 
A ircraft Piracy in International Law?", British Year bogk of International Lavy.
Vol. 43, 1970, P. 193; Peter M. Jacobson, "From Piracy on the High Seas to 
Piracy in the High Skies: A  Study of A ircraft Hijacking ”, Cornell Internatiopal 
Law Journal. Vol. 5, 1972, PP. 161-187 and George R. Constantinople,
"Towards a New Definition of Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident”, V irginia 
Journal of International Law. Vol. 26, 1986, PP.723-756 !
Geneva Convention, Article 15, A J.LL., P. 842 
Edwaid F. Mickolus, op.cit, P. 102 
18 Ibid. P. 393
1  ^ James A. A  ey, The Sky Pirates. London: Ian Allan Ltd, 1973, P. 97
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(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of 
an aircraft w ith knowledge of facts making it a private ship or 
aircraft;
(3) Any act of inciting or internationally facilitating an act described in 
sub-paragraph 1 or 2 of this article.
There have been few recorded incidents when the term aerial piracy' could 
have been applied fa irly  to aircraft hijackings. For example, on November 6,
1968, a Philippine Airlines twin-engined plane flying from  Aub to Manila was 
liijacked by four men who killed one passenger and wounded another, while 
robbing everyone.*^ And on June 10, 1973, a Nepalese Airlines Tw in Otter on a 
domestic fligh t from  Birantnagai' to Katmandu w ith eighteen persons on board 
was hijacked to Forbesganji, India, by three hijackers armed w ith guns. The 
plane was caiTying a Nepal State Bank shipment of 3 m illion India rupees, worth i
approximately $400,000, which the group seized. The trio  escaped into the 
jungle in a waiting jeep.^ »
These cases, however, are exceptional. Robbery and pillage only rarely 
feature in aviation terrorism. Today's aviation terrorist is not the pirate of old 
nor the truck hijacker of today. Yet the aviation terrorist does come close to 
both. He holds people to ransom, and he is a thief of time and services.
Although the aviation terrorist’s motive may not be material gain in the sense of 
pockets fu ll of loot, he does rob others fo r his own gain.^ ’  As aircraft hijacking 
did not become a common phenomenon until the late 1960s, no customary 
international legal definition of hijacking has been developed up to the present.
Michael Aaionson, "The Tenorism or Freedom Fighting?", A M inefield in 
International Relations. November, 1986, Vol. 8, P. 628
21 Edwaid Mcwhinney, Aerial Fhaey atid International Terrorism: The I llegal 
Diversion of A ircraft and International Law. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: 
Martinus N ijho ff Publishers, 1987, PP. 7-8
22 Maratha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism", Comparative Politics. A pril, 
1981, P. 381
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Since there are so many sim ilarities between hijacking and piracy, the term |
'aerial piracy’ has been frequently applied to hijacking. The intent is to exploit 
illegal and criminal control over the aircraft and its passengers. Innocent 
passengers aie subjected to torment, w orry and danger fo r long periods, 
constantly under threat from  the teiTorists’ revolvers, grenades and plastic 
explosives, and some cases the passengers aie brutally murdered.^ ® The term 
"aircraft hijacking" has been defined concisely by Edward Mcwhiimey in the 
follow ing way:
"The forcible diversion of an aircraft in flight, against the w ill of its air
crew" 21
Modernization produces an interrelated set of factors that significantly 
predispose the aviation industry to acts, just as increased complexity at all levels 
of society and economy creates opportunities and vulnerabilities. Sophisticated 
networks of transportation and communication offer m obility and the means of 
publicity fo r t e r r o r i s t s .2 2  In addition, since W orld W ar II much more reliable, |f
smaller and more deadly automatic weapons have been developed. They are I
compact, easy to conceal and have greater killing  power. For example, the 
Austrian made Glock 17, a 9-mm automatic pistol made almost entirely of 
plastic, is easy to disassemble and therefore easy to hide in luggage passed I
24 Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Terrorists: Their Weapons. 
Leaders and Tactics. London: Facts on File, 1979, P. 7
25 David G, Hubbard, Winning Back the Sky. New York: Saybrook 
Publishing Company, 1986, P. 32
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tlirough aiiport s c a n n e r s .^ ^  As the world's technological capacity has improved, 
one terrorist can carry a great deal of hidden death with him.
The advent of the jumbo jet which is totally under the control of the captain 
and his crew on flight deck who are responsible for the hves of several hundred 
passengers confined within a vulnerable cell flying several miles high has 
provided the tenorist with the ideal target. In fact, on the operational side, 
aeroplanes are convenient containers of hostages. On international flights, the f
majority of the hostages w ill usually share the nationality of the airliner, thus 
providing a direct challenge to that government. At the same time, the presence 
of hostages of other nationalities w ill involve other governments as well. In this 
situation, tenorists usually have additional advantage. Once terrorists are able to 
threaten the flight crew, they have virtually achieved control of the aircraft.^ -* j
Since once a plane is airborne it is isolated from the possibilities of counter­
action or rescue by military or police forces. Aviation technology has achieved
such excellence that safety in travel is taken for granted. However, hijackers 4Î
'4-have come to regard aircraft as the easiest places in the world to execute a |
crime.25
Another factor also prepared the way for aircraft hijacking to become a 4)
popular crime. The speed of travel and instant communications which can bring
23 Rushworth M. Kidder, "W hy Modern Terrorism? Three Causes Springing 
from the Seeds of the 1960s", in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed). International 
Terrorism: Characteristics. Causes. Controls. London: Macmillan Education Ltd,
1990, P. 137 4;■I
pf
the actuality of terrorist incident into everybody’s home are important factors. 
Modern communication aids the terrorist in his seaich for publicity by making 
possible detailed, on-the-spot coverage of his acts even in remote parts of the 
world.26 Any international flight would involve a wide variety of nationalities 
and many states are inevitably involved legally, politically and emotionally in 
solving the problem of aircraft hijacking. Aircraft hijacking naturally draws 
worldwide public attention.^ ^ Frank Brenchley observed, ’’Without the oxygen 
of publicity terrorists would not so often bother to breathe the outside air’’.2»
Finally, the aeroplane has the capability of crossing political boundaries very 
easily, and is ahnost uncontrolled unless the people on the ground are w illing to 
shoot the plane down. Thus aircraft hijacking had from the beginning a strong 
potential for political exploitation. A ll the circumstances combined to make 
aircraft hijacking a useful tool of international terrorism.
The following Table 2 on the next page presents a general picture of the 
changing proportion and development of aircraft hijacking.2’
2b Andrew J. Pierre, ’The Politics of International Terrorism ”, QRBIS. Vol. 19, 
1975-76, P. 1257
27 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State(Second Edition). London: 
Macmillan Education Ltd, 1987, P. 224
28 Frank Brenchley, Living w ith. Terrorism: The Problem of A ir Piracy. 
Conflict Studies, No. 184, P.ii
29 Data are drawn from U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Aircraft 
Hijackings _and Qther_Acls Against C ivil Aviation Statistical and Narrative 
Reports. Updated: January 1. 1986 (Hereafter Narrative Reports); U.S. 
Department of Transportation, FAA, Criminal Acts against C ivil Aviation: 1986- 
1990
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Table II-2
Aircraft Hijackings Worldwide 
(1931-1990)
19
Year No. of Incidents
1931 2
1931-1946 0
1947 1
1948 7
1949 6
1950 4
1951 1
1952 2
1953 1
1954-1955 0
1956 1
1957 0 s
1958 8
1959 6
1960 9
1961 11
1962 3
1963 1 .!
1964 2
1965 5 'Ï
1966 4
1967 6
1968 35
1969 85
1970 74
1971 55
1972 57
1973 22
1974 20
1975 18
1976 15
1977 31
1978 25
1979 23
1980 38 f1981 29
1982 30
1983 33 .r
1984 26
1985 26
1986 13
1987 13
1988 15
1989 16
1990 43
Total 821
2 0
The overall incidence of aircraft hijackings is diminishing gradually, although 
some recent serious cases of this form of international teiTorism have been 
attempted such as the TW A 847 hijacking in 1985 and Kuwait Airways 
hijacking in 1988. Experience has proved that despite increased security 
precautions, it is still possible to smuggle arms on board aircraft. Indeed the 
more people being processed before the flight, the more likely it is that tenorists 
can evade the security checks. There have also been instances of ground crew, ^
cleaners and caterers planting weapons on board aircraft so that terrorists, who 
pass the security checks clean, have their guns and grenades waiting for them.
This is precisely what happened when a Palestinian terrorist group hijacked an 
Olympic Airways plane flying from Beirut to Athens on July 22, 1970, in order 
to secure the release of fellow terrorists jailed in Greece. The weapons were 
smuggled on board by cleaners at B e iru t.It is also worthwhile to note that 
hasty superficial searches are unfortunately all too common in many 
international airports. An instructive incident took place in May, 1972, when 
Sabena Airlines flight 517 was hijacked by four terrorists of Black September 
including two female terrorists. The female terrorists hid hand grenades in their 
cosmetic boxes and detonators in their special brassieres.^i In addition, as 
Rodney Wallis, the former director of security of lATA, observed, 
"Complacency brought on by the monotony of the work and where the chance 
of successfully identifying a terrorist is perhaps more remote than finding a pearl 
in a restaurant oyster. "22 There is always the factor that after checking so many
30 Dobson and Payne, op.cit, P.7
31 Edward F. Mickolus, op.cit, PP. 313-314
32 Rodney Wallis, "Aviation Security", Paper for Discussion at University of ?
St. Andrews, October 10, 1991, P. 21 4
people and bags without finding anything, security officers tend to get 
somewhat complacent.
We can see trends of aircraft hijacking ranging from the flight of Eastern bloc 
refugees in the 1940s and 1950s, to the evolution of Palestinian acts in the 1960s 
and 1970s. This propensity for trends to develop could account, in fact, for the 
re-emergence of aircraft hijackings in the 1980s. The motive force behind this 
latest upsurge might be identified as the phenomenal successes of the pro-Iranian 
Shia fundamentalist tenorists of Hezbollah in the hijacking of a TW A airliner to 
Beii'ut in 1985 and a Kuwait Airways aircraft to Iran, which subsequently went 
on to Algeria in 1988.
Governments and aviation authorities adopted the view that the popularity of 
aiicraft hijacking as a terrorist side-show diminished simply because frequent 
repetition took away some of its shock value and the method became old 
fashioned. This was a total miscalculation. Despite the decline of overall aircraft 
hijackings, it remains a serious problem.
II-3-2. Sabotage Bombing of Airborne Aircraft
The number of aiicraft hijackings reached its climax in 1969 with eighty-five 
incidents. Since then, there has been a gradual decline, sixteen aircraft hijackings 
having been reported for 1989. The reasons for this decline are increased world 
attention to aviation security and increased world-wide emphasis on anti­
terrorist measures. However, this encouraging decline in aircraft hijackings has 
been accompanied by an increase in the number of indiscriminate acts of 
sabotage bombing against airborne aircraft. In fact, sabotage bombing of 
aii'borne aircraft is not new at all. The first incident of this form of aviation
21
terrorism took place on May 7, 1949, when a Philippine A ir lines DC3 crashed 
into the sea between Daet and Manila, killing all thiiteen people aboard. A  time 
bomb had been delivered to the plane by two ex-convicts who were hired for 
the job by a man and woman who wei'e attempting to k ill the woman’s 
husband.33 After this initial incident, there have been 93 such attacks until 1990. 
As a result of such attacks, in all 2,187 people have been killed.
The following Table II-3 on the next page illustrates the current development 
of a serious trend towards the greater use of sabotage bombings of airborne 
aircraft and reveals that this form of aviation terrorism has caused many 
fatalities.3^
33 Edward F. Mickolus, op.cit, P. 28
34 Data are drawn from the Report o f the Presidents Commission on Aviation 
Security and Terrorism. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990, and Narrative 
Reports, op.cit; U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Criminal Acts Against 
C ivil Aviation: 1990,
2 2
Table II-3
Sabotage Bombing of Airborne Aircraft 
(1949-1990)
Year No. of Incidents No. of Killed
1949 2 36
1950-54 2 0
1955 2 60
1956 1 0
1957 2 1
1958 0 0
1959 1 1
1960 2 47
1961 0 0
1962 1 45
1963 0 0
1964 1 15
1965 1 52
1966 1 28
1967 4 66
1968 1 0
1969 4 33
1970 9 84
1971 2 25
1972 7 114
1973 5 92
1974 5 161
1975 4 1
1976 5 168
1977 1 0
1978 3 5
1979 2 0
1980 1 0
1981 3 2
1982 2 1
1983 2 112
1984 2 0
1985 7 390
1986 3 20
1987 1 115
1988 2 287
1989 2 278
1990 0 0
Total 93 2187
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ît is worthwhile noting that there is a very important distinction between 
conventional bombings and explosive devices placed aboard aeroplanes. The 
sabotage attacks of airborne aiicraft aie much more serious. Even though 
bombing at aiiline facilities may cause several casualties, there is no basic 
difference in terms of modus operandi and consequences from other terrorist 
bomb attacks in public places. However, the sabotage bombing of airborne 
aircraft cause a large number of casualties as a result of explosive devices mostly 
designed to explode in mid-flight. For example, the mid-air bombing of Korean 
Airline flight perpetrated by North Korean agents in November 1987 resulted in 
115 casualties,^ ® December 1988 mid-aii* bombing of Pan Am 103 above 
Lockerbie, Scotland resulted in 270 casualties including 11 on the ground at 
Lockerbie in what was one of the world’s worst ever air disasters,and in 1989 
two mid-air bombings of the French UTA airliner over Sahara and the 
Colombian Avianca airliner over Bogota resulted in the loss of 171 and 107 
innocent lives.^^ Moreover, sabotage bomb attacks against c ivil aviation have 
special advantages for tenorists. In a successful bomb attack, it is not likely that 
the perpetrators w ill be identified easily. For example, if Hindawi had conducted 
his operation of El A1 sabotage bombing with success, who would have 
suspected one of the victims, let alone a pregnant woman, to be the carrier of the 
fatal explosive.
35 The Korea Herald, January 19, 1988
36 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Tenorism. 1988, March, 1989, 
P. 51
3*7 Report oLthe President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, 
op.cit, P. 161
24
88 North Atlantic Assembly, Sub-Committee on Ten orism, Draft Final Report. 
November 1988, P. 22
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This form of brutal attack against innocent civil aviation needs a far higher |
level of sophistication than the other forms do, particulaiiy when the aiiiines 
have the proper security measures. Teirorists have taken advantage of all kinds 
of peculiai* methods and means like the selection of naive travellers who are 
unknowingly carrying explosives, and are supposed to die with the other 
passengers. This has also included the use of special explosives such as Semtex, 
elaborate methods of disguise that pass normal luggage security checks, 
barometric pressure-operated detonators that activate the explosives when the 
aiicraft reaches a predetermined altitude, and sophisticated trigger mechanisms 
such as radio signals instead of diiect wire connections.^* In particular, the 
development of Semtex is one of the greatest concerns at this stage. The Czech- 
made Semtex, the best known of the plastic explosives and frequently used by 
teiTorists, is extremely difficult to detect by most currently employed security 
screening systems and by vapour sniffers as a result of its lack of odour and 
very low vapour pressure at normal temperature and pressure. It can be shaped 
to fit into radios, or formed into thin sheets in luggage. On 22 March 1990, 
Czechoslovakia's new president Vaclav Havel, revealed that the former 
Communist government of Czechoslovakia sold more than 1,000 tons of Semtex 
to Libya's Colonel Gaddafi, armourer and paymaster to some of the world's 
most vicious terrorist organizations. He also revealed that Libya had refused to 
hand back any of the explosive, which is manufactured at a plant outside Prague.
Many people were shocked by the amount of the explosive shipped to the 
unstable Gaddafi. Most of it is aheady in the hands of terrorist organizations 
thi'oughout the world. It is known that 200 grams of Semtex is enough to blow
up a jumbo jet like the one at Lockerbie. This means that world terrorism has 
enough Semtex to last 150 years.®  ^ For the sophisticated reasons, mentioned |
above, sabotage bombing of aii'borne aircraft has almost all of the time been 
committed by teiTorist organizations which have received state sponsorship, or 
directly by state inteUigence services.'*®
The destruction of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie and UTA over Niger have 
demonstrated that such attacks aie the biggest terrorist threat that the 
international community confronts at the current stage. W ith the recognition that :|
the security measures which were developed in the early phases of modern 
terrorist activity do not provide adequate protection against terrorist bombs, 
reseai'ch into explosives detection has been accelerated in the last decades to 
tackle the problem. Although several new techniques have been developed, they 
also have failed to provide a complete answer. Further serious problems, 
however, arise from the passive approach of the civil aviation authorities. Most ^
of the ten orist bomb attacks have been conducted sporadically and so time is 
gained for alarm to subside. As the last episode fades from the public 
consciousness, efforts to provide effective security measures normally decline, 
until the next disaster when public demand for better security sharply rise. How 
many more innocent passengers have to die at the hands of terrorists before the 
authorities start to act effectively? It is no use closing the stable door after the 
horse has bolted. i
89 The Daily Telegraph, March 23, 1990; The Sunday Post, May 27, 1990; The 
Daily Mail, Maich 23, 1990
40 Ariel Merari, "International Terrorism and C ivil Aviation", in Inter:
International Terrorism 1987. Jaffee Centre for Strategic Study, University of I
Tel Aviv, Israel, 1989, P, 74
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II-3-3. Attack against Airline Facilities and Their Users
Airline facilities increasingly have come under attack as pre-boarding security 
procedures render aircraft hijacking more difficult to initiate, prompting a move 
in many cases to easier targets. The same "soft-target-attractiveness" has resulted 
in increasingly frequent attack upon airline facihties including airline offices 
which are located in major foreign cities apaii from airports. Attacks against 
airline facilities can be categorised into two main types: bombings of airport or 
airline offices and armed assaults against passengers. The following Table IT4 
illustrates the development of such attacks.^ ^
Table II-4
Attack against Airports and Airline Offices 
(1975-1990)
Year Airport Airline office Total
1975 7 4 11
1976 5 8 13
1977 8 13 21
1978 6 7 13
1979 8 23 31
i # b 7 32 39
1981 9 20 29
1982 7 21 28
1983 6 21 27
1984 6 9 15
1985 8 19 27
1986 5 16 21
1987 5 10 15
1988 6 9 15
1989 5 1 6
1990 5 3 8
Total 103 217 320
41 Data are drawn from Nairative Reports, op.cit; U.S. Department of 
Transportation, FAA, Worldwide _Significant_Criminal Acts Involving C ivil 
Aviation. ■1981-1985 and Criminal Acts Against C ivil Aviation. 1986-1990
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The most notorious terrorist attack at an airport took place in 1972 with the I
bloody assault on passengers at Lod Airport in Israel by Japanese terrorists. The |
terrorists began to hurl grenades toward a milling crowd in the custom house 
and opened fire with submachine guns which they had calmly removed from 
theii' luggage and assembled. Twenty-eight innocent persons were killed and .4
more than seventy were wounded in the assault, many of whom turned out to be 
Puerto Rican pilgrims on their way to visit the Holy Land.^ ^ This incident 
shocked the world both in its ferocity and its international quality. Since then, %
I
the total number of terrorist attacks against airline facilities and their users has |
gradually increased. This form of brutal attacks provides an indirect indicator of 
the threat to civil aviation aircraft, which terrorists would attack directly if 
security measures were less stringent. For instance, aviation terrorists have 
difficulty in getting near El A1 airliners, but they frequently attack El A1 airline 
offices.
Most of the efforts invested in securing civil aviation have focused on 
airliners to halt the problem of aircraft hijacking and sabotage bombing of 
airborne aircraft. As a result, airports and airline offices are still almost as 
exposed to tenorists attacks as they were two decades ago. Though uniformed 
security staff maintain a conspicuous presence at international airports, they 
hardly constitute a detenent factor against highly trained terrorists who intend to 
plant a bomb in airport areas open to the general public. Moreover, it was 
demonstrated during the attacks at Rome and Vienna airports that security staff 
are not adequately trained to deal effectively with a surprise armed assault.
Security conditions at airline offices are even worse. W ith a very few exceptions 
no security measures have been taken to deal with such attacks. It is not
a - ................    ^    ... '1
surprising therefore to note that 320 attacks against airline facilities were 
recorded between 1975 and 1990. This statistic illustrates that the occurrence of 
such attacks is a matter of grave concern to the safety of c ivil aviation. The 
international community should now recognize that such attacks, which pose a 
great danger not only to the safety of passengers but also to the safety of 
persons at airports serving international c iv il aviation, could undermine the safe 
and orderly conduct of c iv il aviation for all states. For the purpose of deterring 
such acts of violence against airline facilities, there is an urgent need to introduce 
appropriate security measures.
II-4. Brief History of Aviation Terrorism 
II-4-1. The Early Years
The fii'st recorded attack against c ivil aviation occurred on February 21, 
1931, when a group of Peruvian revolutionaries hijacked a mail aircraft, a Pan 
American F-7 Trimotor, for use in dispersing propaganda leaflets.^ ^ The second 
took place two days later, also in Peru, fo r a similar purpose.'»  ^After these initial 
attempts no further aircraft hijackings occurred until the end of W orld War II, In 
the post W orld War I I  period, communists gained control of the Eastern 
European states. For the political dissident in these states, the best route to 
freedom was to flee to neighbouring Western states. For example, on May 5, 
1948, three men and two women, all anti-communists, hijacked a
43 Edwaid F. Mickolus, op.cit, P. 8
44 Colonel CeiTO ordered Elmer Faucett to fly  over Aiequipa and drop 
government newsletters. See, Ibid, P. 8
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45 Ibid, P. 25
45 Temple B. Ingram, Jr., "Are Airport Searches Still Reasonable?", J.A.I ..C... 
1978, P. 132; Richard Clutterbuck, Living with Terrorism. London:Faber and 
Faber Ltd, 1975, P. 95, Edgar O’Ballance, Language of Violence: The Blood 
Politics of Terrorism. California: Presidio Press, 1979, P. 67; Paul Wilkinson, 
Terrorism and the Liberal State. London: Macmillan Education Ltd, 1987, P.225
4? Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational TeiTorism, op.cit, P. 45
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Czechoslovakian domestic commercial flight from Brno, Moravia, to Ceske,
Budegovice to the U.S. zone of Germany, landing in Munich, where they 
requested political asylum.*®
At the early stage, nearly all of the successful hijackings were committed by 
persons trying to escape from communist bloc states.*® Aircraft hijacking was 
simply another means of escaping to freedom, like coshing a border guard, 
stealing a loixy, hiding on a train, swimming a river, or walking through a wood.
Hijackers were usually granted political asylum. And at the time, most of 
hijacking were regarded in the west with some sympathy. This tendency, in fact, 
encouraged hijacking from the East to West.
On the one hand the motive for hijacking in its early years was the desire to 
gain political refuge status but on the other hand there were also other motives.
In 1958, Raul Castro who could claim to be the father of the modern crime of 
aircraft hijacking began to exploit hijackings for political purposes. In that year,
Raul Castro's Column 6, a group of Cuban revolutionaries, hijacked a Cubana 
Airlines DC3 and landed at a camouflaged rebel airstrip to harass President i
Batista’s internal communications two weeks before Cuba's presidential 
elections.*' This was the first instance of using aircraft hijacking as a guerrilla 
tactic.
1
1"
:î
J-1IFollowing the Fidel Castro take over of Cuba, 1959 and 1961 saw a number g
of aiicraft hijackings by refugees seeking to flee from Cuba to the United States. 
Generally the escaping Cubans would commandeer aiicraft and fly  the ninety 
miles to Florida where they would seek asylum. This situation was reversed 
when the first hijacking of a U.S. plane began on May 1. 1961. National Airlines 
flight 337 was hijacked to Havana by Antulio Ramirez Ortiz. The hijacker was 
taken away by Cuban soldiers, and the plane and passengers were briefly 
detained and then released.** This was followed by a period of refugees 
alternately hijacking aircraft from Cuba to America and of American aircraft to 
Cuba.*® In the following years until 1967, there were 12 instances of attempts to 
hijack American aircraft to Cuba including 3 private charter planes.®® The 
character and motivations of these hijackers were various: there was a father-son 
team who merely did not want to stay in the United States any longer; a couple 
of Cuban exiles who had been charged with crime and were fleeing from the 
law.
48 Ibid, PP. 51-52
49 Richard Clutterbuck, Living W ith Terrorism. London: Faber and Faber, 
1975, P. 95
60 U.S. Department of Transportation, Aircraft Hijacking and Other Criminal 
Acts AgainiSt £ iv il Aviation Statistical and Narrative Report. Updated: January 1. 
1986, Federal Aviation Administration(F.A.A.), Office of C ivil Aviation 
Security, May 1986
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11-4-2. The Change in Complexity and the Epidemic Growth of Aviation 
Terrorism Beyond Control
Terrorist attacks upon international c ivil aviation in the form of aircraft 
hijacking began to flourish in the late 1960s. There have also been many acts of 
sabotage on aiicraft and aviation facilities. In 1968, the number of aircraft 
hijackings jumped dramatically. In that year there were thirty-five such 
incidents. This increase continued in 1969 when there were eighty-five recorded 
aircraft hijacking attempts world wide which was almost the same total as 
hijacking attempts for the whole period 1931-1967. Professor Paul Wilkinson 
pointed out two major new breeds of aviation terrorists active from 1969 as 
below:®^
1. United States criminals seeking ransom or escape from the law
2. Palestinians employing hijacks as a political weapon in desperation as a 
means of publicising their cause and avenging Arab defeat in the 1967 war
The sudden surge of aircraft hijackings^that hit the United States almost hke a 
craze in 1968-69, were committed by criminals after ransom and they were 
generally arrested and convicted or handed back for trial, others were mentally 
unbalanced and some claimed to be political refugees and asked fo r asylum. 
Over half of the total aircraft diverted to Cuba between 1968 and 1970 were 
United States aircraft. This dramatic situation w ill be discussed in the following 
Chapter in detail.
By this time the focus on aircraft hijacking had long since passed from the 
Caribbean to the Middle East, and chief exponents have been the Marxist
61 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, op.cit, P. 225
32
62 Alona E. Evans, "Aircraft Hijacking: What is being done?", American 
Journal Of International Law. 1973, P. 644
63 Edward F. Mickolus, op.cit, PP. 105-106, and PP. 113-114
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Popular Front for the Liberation of P a le s t in e .® ^  The hijacking by the group i
known as PFLP began in 1968, after the Arab defeat in the 1967 war, which f
deprived them of nearly all their land bases for "Fedayeen" raids across Israel’s 
borders. They initially made an assault on Israeli citizens and aircraft. However, 
the P.F.L.P. does not restrict its list of targets to Israel. The first aircraft hijacking 
by the Palestinian teiTorist organizations occuiTed on July 22, 1968 when a El A1 
aircraft was hijacked. Aviation terrorism by Arab terrorist groups was not 
fought only in the air. After the success of the first aircraft hijacking, the PFLP {
shifted their efforts to attack El A l aircraft on the ground in European airports; 
one at Athens in December 26, 1968, and another at Zurich in February 18,
1969, killing one Israeli in each case and wounding a number of others.®® This 
incident was followed by some 30 acts of aviation terrorism committed by 
Palestinian terrorist groups until 1972.®* These had their counterpart in political 
aircraft hijackings by such factions as the Eritreean Liberation Front, the 
Japanese Red Army, the Kashmiri National Liberation Front and the Thai Black i
September as well as Iranian Communists and Philippine Maoists.®®
In the context of the Mediterranean and Middle East, especially after the 
resumed Arab-Israeli military conflict of June, 1967, aviation terrorism seems to 
have developed merely as one means, among a number of available alternative, 
competing means, for tiying to achieve political objectives without recourse to
j
64 Ariel Merari and Shlomi Elad, The International Dimension of Palestinian 4$
Terrorism. J.C.S.S. Study No.6, 1986, pp. 109-110
66 Alona E. Evans, op.cit, P. 645
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34
direct military action or military confrontation, with all the risk of a further 
disastrous defeat that any such military action might seem to involve. The 
advantage of aircraft hijacking, in this respect, as a weapon for achieving major j
national objectives by non-military means, has been the usually small 
expenditure of money and energy and lives that such action seems to have 
involved.®®
The escalation of attacks against c iv il aviation at this stage was also mainly 
due to the fact that there seemed to be no coherent defence against such attacks 
as the world aviation industry was faced with the gigantic task of checking |
individually the millions of passengers who travelled each year.®'
J
II-4-3. The decline?
Over the past few yeais, there has been an overall decline in reported attacks 
against civ il aviation throughout the world. Increased attention to airport and Î
aviation security and the implementation of anti-terrorism measures by a number 
of states may have contributed to this decHne. Nonetheless, civil aviation 
continues to be an attractive taiget fo r terrorists, or individuals with other 
criminal motives, because of its high profile and vulnerability as an unparalleled 
attention-getting device.®*
A- j;".. .
68 David G. Hubbard, Winning Back the Sky. Texas: Saybrook Publishing 
Company, 1986, P. 37; U.S. Department of Transportation, Criminal Acts 
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Because the United States experienced an epidemic of aircraft hijacking, 
mainly by Cuban exiles, between 1969 and 1970, measures were taken including 
rigourous searches and the introduction of sky-marshals. Between 1974-1978, 
there were relatively few hijackings in the United States, with an average rate of 4
only eight per year. The number of incidents world wide has shown similar 
fluctuations.
From 1981 to 1985 there was almost the same total of aircraft hijackings 
every year worldwide. In 1986 and 1987, there were 13 hijackings each world­
wide. This worldwide total was the lowest number of hijackings in the last 
decades. On the contrary, in recent times, deaths and injuries due to hijackings 
have reached a high point. For example, ninety-one people were killed and 178 
were injured during 1986.®® In 1988, there were 15 aircraft hijackings world­
wide. While this total indicates a slight increase over the totals reported during 
1986 and 1987, it nevertheless represented a substantial decrease from the total 
world-wide aiicraft hijackings which occurred in 1984 and 1985. However, this 
downward trend burst like a bubble once again in 1990, as significantly more 
aircraft hijackings occurred than during any previous years in the 1980s. There 
were 43 aircraft hijackings worldwide. Although the dramatic increase in 1990 
was the result of a sizable number of hijackings in the former Soviet Union I
arising from the political and social unrest, this upward trend demonstrates that 
the potential for aircraft hijacking remains very high.
4
In addition to aircraft hijacking, the use of explosive devices by terrorists for 
the sabotage bombing of aircraft in flight has posed a serious threat to c iv il 
aviation since early 1980s. The destruction of Pan Am Flight 103, in 1988, by an 
explosive device was a tragic example of the gravity of this threat. The average 
number of such incidents per year has not fluctuated significantly, however, the 
average number of persons killed in each incident has steadily increased.
Various brutal attacks have been directed also against airline facilities and their i
users.
II-5 . Classification of Aviation Terrorists
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Who are the aviation terrorists and what are their motives? An aviation 4|
ten orist may be as young as sixteen®® or as old as seventy-four.®* He or she may 
be a dropout from everyday life, a political fanatic, a common criminal and 
extortionist, a malcontent, a mentally deranged person, or rebel w ith or without 
a cause.®2 He or she usually acts alone, although there have been several 
instances of two, three or four. In some cases, the hijacker has been
•1
60 On November 11, 1965, Thomas Harvey Robinson, sixteen years old, 
attempted hijacking U.S. National Airlines to Cuba., Edward F. Mickolus, 
Transnational Terrorism, op.cit, P. 68
61 On August 14, 1969, John Scot Mccreery, who was born on August 14, 
1895, attempted hijacking U.S. Eastern Airlines flight. This is a hijacking 
attempt by the oldest recorded hijacker.. Ibid, P. 128
62 Alona E. Evans, "Aircraft Hijacking: Its Cause and Cure", American Jopmal 
of International Law. 1969, P. 700; A. Abramovsky, "The Constitutionality of 
the Anti-Hijacking Security System", Buffalo Law Review. Vol. 22, 1972-73, P. 
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J
accompanied by members of his f a m i l y A n  aviation terrorist just does not fit 
neatly into any single category. It is difficult for us to see a single definite pattern 
to w liic li an aviation terrorist may conform. Given the incidence of aviation 
terrorism, one must necessarily inquire as to who the aviation terrorists aie and 
why they make attempts to attack c iv il aviation. Broadly speaking, aviation 
teiTorists fa ll into three main categories: political terrorists, asylum seekers, and 
criminal extortionists.
In 1969, U.S. National Airlines flight was hijacked to Cuba by Jorge 
Carballe Delgado. He was accompanied on the plane by his wife, a newborn 
baby and two sons. See, Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational Ten*orism, op.cit, 
P. 131
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II-5-1. Political Terrorist
This category of aviation terrorist is dedicated to a political goal which he 4
sees as one having transcendent merit. The aim of Palestinian terrorist 
organizations has been to gain political salience for the Palestinian cause. By 
making their goal appear viable to other Arab States, they have received 
financial and political support from Arab states that support, or feel compelled to ^
support, their cause. The aviation terrorist of this type seeks attention and 
publicity fo r his cause. The world becomes his stage as the contemporary media 
enables him to dramatize his goals effectively, and his attempt to win over public 
opinion. A  display of determination and devotion to the cause focuses world 
attention upon it and may increase sympathy. After the most spectacular aircraft |
" Ihijacking by Palestinian terrorists in September 1970, known as Hijack Sunday I
when three airliners were hijacked to Dawson's Field in Jordan, although this |
1
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International Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 4, PP. 335-336
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acts caused a wave of revulsion all over the world, many people began to ask: 
who are the Palestinians? what do the Palestinians want? and what is the 
Palestinian problem?®  ^ Without terrorist acts the Palestinian problem would 
presumably have attracted scant attention and would have occupied a lower 
position on the international agenda than it is recent years.®^
Political terrorists also attempt to destroy support for the established political -1
leadership and debilitate the authority of the state by destroying normality, 
building feelings of distrust and hostility towaid the government among the 
target State's population and damaging the economy in the target States.^
Attacks on civil aviation aircraft, airports and airline offices have sought to 
curtail air travel and tourism as a consequence of psychological disruption and 
the spread of fear. After the terrorist attacks at the airports in Rome and Vienna 
in 1985, the tourist industry suffered losses from many tourist cancellations in 
Italy. The losses were believed to reach $300 million.®^ The losses of other 
States could be similar to Italy.®* Once again, this situation became worse at the 
height of the Gulf crisis. The airline industry has been in deep financial trouble 
since the Gulf conflict. Although airlines are trying to find ways to increase the
number of passengers through improved service, the importance of ensuring a 
high standard of security to prevent attacks by teiTorists cannot be ruled out.
Sometimes the intent is to bring about release of imprisoned terrorists in 
foreign gaols. Ahcraft hijacking appears to be a useful method of securing the 
release of terrorists.®* These hijackers hold the passengers of the aircraft hostage 
while bargaining for the release of their imprinsoned colleagues. According to 
U.S. Department of Transportation, there have been 26 such hijacking incidents 
world-wide from 1977 to 1988.^ ® This tactic has been frequently used by Middle 
Eastern teiTorist organizations including the PFLP and Hezbollah.
The overall number of politically motivated terrorist attacks in the form of 
aircraft hijacking have gradually decreased. However, this trend has been 
accompanied by an increase in the number of sabotage attacks since the early 
1980s, The following Table IT5 on the next page illustrates the current 
development of a worrying trend towards the greater use of sabotage tactics by 
political terrorists.
Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, op.cit, P. 246; Richard 
Clutterbuck, Kidnap. Hijack and Extortion. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 
1987, P. 57; Andrew J. Pierre, op.cit, P. 1225; Narinder Aggarwala, "Political 
Aspects of Hijacking", in Narinder Aggarwala, Michael J. Fenello and Gerald F.
FitzGerald(ed). A ir  Hijacking;. An Ifltgmational Perspective, International
Conciliation, No. 585, November 1971
U.S. Depaitment of Transportation, Criminal Acts against C ivil Aviation: 
1,986 and 1988. PP. 17-26 and PP. 21-25
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Table H-5
Significant Sabotage Attacks by Political Terrorists 
(1983-1990)
Date Target Type of Incident
07/15/1983 Paris Orly Airport Bombing
09/23/1983 Gulf Air B-737 Explosion In Flight
03/10/1984 UTA DC-10 Explosion In Flight
08/31/1984 Kabul Airport Bombing
06/23/1985 Air India B-747 Explosion In Flight
12/27/1985 Rome Airport Armed Attack
12/27/1985 Vienna Airport Armed Attack
04/02/1986 TWA B-727 Explosion In Flight
05/03/1986 Air Lanka L-1011 Explosion On Ground
09/14/1986 Kimpo(SeouI) Airport Bombing
11/29/1987 KAL B-707 Explosion In Flight
01/03/1988 BOP Air Bandeirante Explosion In Flight
12/21/1988 Pan Am B-747 Explosion In Flight
09/20/1989 UTA DC-10 Explosion In Flight
11/27/1989 Avianca B-727 Explosion In Flight
The most unmanageable component of the politically motivated aviation 
terrorism is ideological Professor Paul Wilkinson correctly observes on this 
problem:
"... Fanatically determined revolutionary terrorists are prepared to take 
much higher personal risks for their cause, often to the point of sacrificing 
their own lives. ... the more desperate a revolutionary group becomes for 
publicity or tactical success, the more it w ill be tempted to throw caution 
to the winds and bring off a daring terrorist coup Very often a fresh 
hijack or airport attack is undertaken as an act of vengeance for an earlier 
defeat or failure, and to show that the terrorists are still determined to 
wage wai' until final victory.
Paul Wilkinson, op.cit, P. 247
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Kozo Okamoto, one of the members of Japanese Red Aim y who fired machine 
guns and threw hand grenades at passengers aixiving from A ir France flight in 
May 1972, once said:
"When I was child, I was told that when people died they became stars. I 
did not really believe it, but I could appreciate it. We three Red Army 
soldiers wanted to become Orion when we died. And it calms my heart 
to think that all the people we killed w ill also become stars in the same 
heavens. As the revolution goes on, how the stars w ill multiply!
This image affords considerable insight into the beliefs and emotions which 
made Okamoto’s mission of terror possible. Besides revealing the 
revolutionary's attitude towards his victims, it illustrates a view of his own death 
which permitted him to accept such an assignment. Ideological belief about 
death and the judgement of history made it possible for terrorists to perform a 
nearly suicidal terrorist act.
Political terrorist acts against c ivil aviation aie a grave threat in Western 
Europe, the Middle East, and increasingly Africa and Asia have frequently been 
deeply involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some Middle Eastern States, such 
as Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Libya, have provided safehavens to terrorists for 
their own gain.^  ^por example, Libya released the five members of the Japanese
Patricia G. Steinhoff, "Portrait of a Terrorist: An Interview with Kozo 
Okamoto", Asian Survey. Vol. 16, July-December, 1976, P. 842; Yoshihiro 
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Asian Survey. Vol. 13, Januaiy-June, 1973, P. 339
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Office of the Secretary of State, January 1989, P. 2; Yonah Alexander, State 
Sponsored Tenorism, The Centre for Contemporary Studies, Occasional Paper, 
No. 3, June, 1986, PP. 9-11; Paul Wilkinson, op.cit, P. 246; Bruce Hoffman, 
Recent Trends and Future prospects of Iranian Sponsored International 
Terrorism. RAND Report 3738-USDP, March 1990
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It should be remembered that the harvest of justice can not be produced from 
seeds that have not been sown in peace.
Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational Ten'orism, op.cit, PP. 398-340
Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, op.cit, P. 246
Paul Wilkinson, "Wanted: An International Criminal Court", The Observer: 
W orld Press Service for Schools. December 1986, P. 17
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Red Army who hijacked and blew up a Japanese airliner in July, 1973 at 
Benghazi, Libya.^^ This is, in part, one of the factors which makes it extremely 
difficult to eradicate political terrorist acts against civil aviation.^ ®
Because of the incidence or at least the threat of aviation terrorism which has 
been mounting in recent years as a result of the apparent spectacular political 
success of several early attempts, aviation terrorism by the political terrorists is 
the most difficult to control. For an effective reduction in the scale of aviation |
tenorism to be achieved, resolution of the key political conflicts in the 
international system is required. In the words of Professor Paul Wilkinson:
"We must also make progress in negotiations and diplomacy to resolve 
some of the underlying conflicts in the international system that inevitably 
fuel violence. For example, a settlement of the long and bitter conflict i
between Israel and the Arab states on the Palestinian Issue is a long way off. 4
Even if  we were to achieve it by some miracle of diplomacy. Middle East 
terrorism would not be eradicated. But at least it would be substantially 
reduced. Instead of despairing young Palestinians in the camps flocking to 
ten’orist groups like the Abu Nidal movement, their energies could be 
channelled into creating and developing their own homeland."^®
II-5-2, Asylum Seeker
This category of aviation terrorist has comprised those who claim political 
motivation for their acts and are w illing to take enormous risks to escape from a 
political or social system that they detest. Included in this group have been left- 
wing revolutionaries, such as the Black Panthers of the United States and Latin 
American militants; as well as radicals and right-wing politicians and opponents 
of Communist and fascist systems. Also included in this category are those 
individuals who aie denied the right to leave a particular State to settle 
elsewhere, for example, Soviet Jews.^ ^
This type of attack on civil aviation was the characteristic form of hijack from 
Eastern Europe after W orld War II and it again became prevalent in the spate 
of Cuban hijacks in 1958-1962.^ * When Fidel Castro established his Cuban 
revolutionaiy government in 1959, Cuban political dissidents fled the State as 
soon as he seized power. By the early 1960s, many Cuban airlines had been 
hijacked to the United States by these dissidents. The U.S. government acting in 
accordance with its political ideology and humanitaiian considerations, granted 
asylum to Cuban hijackers whether they had caused loss of lives or not. In the 
Western Hemisphere, a similar situation took place as Communists took over the 
Eastern European states. Thousands of dissidents fled their states to go to the 
non-Communist states by whatever means of transportation were available. 
From 1947 to the 1950s, there were a number of aircraft hijackings in which 
airliners were diverted from Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Poland to Turkey, West Germany, Italy Austria, Greece, Sweden,
"7^  Narinder Aggai wala, op.cit, P. 12
Richard Clutterbuck, Living with Terrorism, op.cit, P. 95; James A. Arey, 
The Sky Pirates. London: Ian Allan Ltd, 1973, PP. 50-74
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Denmai'k and Switzerland. Neai’ly  all the hijackers were granted asylum. f
Generally, Western democratic states were quite sympathetic to this form of 
aviation terrorism arising within Communist states. Actually they did not take 
any legal action against the hijackers, and granted political asylum. This 
tendency made it difficult to have universal agreement about extradition.'*
According to U.S. Department of Transportation there have been 29 such 
incident between 1977 and 1988.*®
IT5-3. Criminal Extortionist and Escapee
This category includes people who dream of making a big fortune at one 
stroke and thus could be identified as criminal sky looters. A ll aviation terrorists, 
actually, aie criminals by both moral definition and the laws of every State.
Whatever their motives, they are committing a crime when they commit an act 
against civil aviation. But a large number of hijackers in this category are people 
who have already had a previous conviction. A considerable number of the 
hijackers of United States registered aircraft to Cuba were criminals, suspects 
fleeing from the law, or people who had extorted ransom. Among these are g
individuals who, because of theii* mental condition, have been stimulated to 
attempt aircraft hijacking after hearing about a hijacking or after seeing films of 
aircraft hijackings or bombings. For example, when D. B. Cooper parachuted 
from a hijacked Northwest Airliners' aircraft with $200,000 extortion money in
Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, op.cit, P. 245
U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Criminal Acts against C ivil 
Aviation: 1986. PP, 17-26 and 1988, PP. 21-25
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November 1971, the media coverage of the event was sensationalised and given 
prominence out of all proportion to the act. A  song written about this incident 
became popular in Washington, and T-shirts and bumper stickers were 
marketed within seventy-two hours of Cooper’s jump.*^ In seven months five 
others imitated D. B. Cooper.*' From 1967 to 1972 there were 167 aircraft 
hijackings to Cuba, well over 50 per cent of them from the United States.*^  The 
Cuban authorities granted asylum to the incoming hijackers, with some 
exceptions at first. But since a large number of these hijackers were actually 
criminals who had extorted ransom money, the Cuban authorities began to treat 
the unwelcome criminal extortionists and escapees from the law harshly.*^ Since 
the adoption of the U.S.-Cuba Hijack Pact*® in 1973, aircraft hijacking between 
the two states has drastically decreased.
Besides aircraft hijackings to other states there were hijackings that took 
place entirely within the national boundaries of the United States. These 
hijackings were generally carried out for money extortion. On June 4. 1970,
31 Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory. Tactics, and Counter- 
Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, P. 78: See also, 
Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism, op.cit, PP. 287-288
32 David Phillips, Skyjack: The Story of A ir Piracy. London: George G. 
Harrap and Company Ltd, 1973, P. 184
33 U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. and Foreign Registered Aircraft 
hijackings: Updated: January 1. 1986, F.A.A. Office of C ivil Aviation Security
34 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and Liberal State, op.cit, P. 246; Richard 
Clutterbuck, Living with Terrorism, op.cit, P. 97
35 On February 15, 1973, the United States and Cuba signed a memorandum of 
agreement regarding the return of hijackers of ships and aircrafts, which was to 
be in force for five years. Upon Cuban Premier Castro,s denunciation of the 
agreement on October 15, 1976, the treaty became nullified on April 15, 1977. 
See, Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism, op.cit, P. 374
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IW A  B-727 was hijacked on a domestic flight and $100 million ransom was 
demanded. The attempt was foiled and the hijacker was captured.*® It is very 
fortunate that aiicraft hijacking by this type of person is not a great problem any 
more. There were only 3 aircraft hijackings for extortion during the last decade.
II-6 . Conclusion
In this Chapter, it has been noted that acts of violence involving civil aviation 
are not a new phenomenon. The high profile and vulnerability of air 
transportation makes airlines a target for the hijacker or saboteur's bomb, actions 
promoted by terrorism or other motives. The incidence of aviation terrorism is 
not high in a statistical sense, either when looking at civÜ aviation history as a 
whole or at the milhons of flights now operated annually. Any actual or 
attempted aircraft hijacking and other forms of attacks, however, threatens safety 
in an international transportation system where safety is paramount. This has led 
the civil aviation industry and governments to make efforts to tackle this 
problem. To foster a better understanding of what has been done and what 
remains to be done in combatting acts of violence against air transportation, the 
following Chapter w ill examine a regional variations of aviation terrorism and 
problems of aviation security.
36 Ibid, PP. 182-184
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CHAPTER III
AVIATION TERRORISM: REGIONAL VARIATIONS AND
RESPONSES
"No airport security measures can be 100 per cent effective. Terrorists 
always find ways around them. They know how to exploit human reluctance 
to employ rigorous security measures; they can find sympathizers who w ill 
smuggle arms on board airplanes before take off; and they w ill find countries 
where their activities are not only tolerated but also praised.
"Governments of certain of the major aviation powers have recognized the 
potential danger emanating from points in Africa and Asia as can be seen by 
their developing co-operative aid programmes designed to improve security 
at such locations. Such governments are acting to integrate security 
programmes of the airports into which their registered aircraft fly  with the 
major centres on the national carrier's network. It is a good example of 
international co-operation. They must be very careful however not to 
overlook the security needs of their own airports. It does happen."'
* * *
III-l. Introduction
Following from previous Chapter’s analysis of the nature and general 
development of acts of violence against c iv il aviation, this Chapter deals with the 
variations of attacks on c iv il aviation by geographical region. It also focuses on 
the major problems of aviation terrorism which are now being faced by the 
international community under the current system. W ith the success of aviation 
security measures in the West, terrorists have directed their efforts toward
 ^ Terrorism: The need for global action. The Observer. W orld Press for 
Schools. November 1985, P. 6
2 Rodney Wallis, "Aviation Security", Paper for Discussion at St. Andrews’ 
University, October 10, 1991, P. 20
alternative spheres of operation. As a result, the Third W orld states' airlines 
have been exposed to frequent attacks in recent years, though the airlines in 
Western states still remain a vulnerable target. The following Table I I I- l.  
illustrates this trend.^
Table III 1.
Aircraft Hijackings By Geographical Locations 
(1985-1990)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total
Western Europe 1 2 0 1 0 4
North America 1 1 0 0 3 5
Middle East 3 2 2 1 1 9
Eastern Europe 2 2 2 5 27 38
Latin America 1 1 4 2 5 13
Asia 1 1 4 3 4 13
Africa 0 0 1 2 3 6
Total 9 9 13 14 43 110
HI-2. Aviation terrorism in the USA
W ith the most comprehensive aviation network in the world, the United 
States has been the principal victim of aviation terrorism since 1961, when the 
first U.S. aircraft was hijacked. In fact, more than 40 per cent of the acts of 
violence against c iv il aviation around the world have involved American 
aircraft. When recognition of the threat of aviation terrorism first arose in 1968, 
the United States started to develop extensive measiues to prevent aircraft 
hijacking and other attacks against air transportation. These measures involved
3 Data are drawn from U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Criminal Acts 
Agamsl.C.iyil.AYiatic>ni 1990
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1the FAA, FBI and local law enforcement authorities working in close 
cooperation with the aiiiine operators. However, the U.S. still suffers from the 
thieat to the safety of c ivil aviation.
Analysis of attacks against U.S. airlines going back three decades and 
covering the years during which the hijacking of aircraft in the United States has 
been a serious threat, has identified the major cause. In more than 60 per cent of 
aiicraft hijackings since 1961, the hijackers have made going to Cuba their goal. 
Most of the hijackers have been refugees from Cuba seeking to return. To 
understand the problems of attacks against civil aviation within the United 
States, it is important to look at the situation of such attacks in Cuba.
ÏII-2-1. The Early Years
There is always greater probability of aircraft hijackings whenever there are 
internal armed clashes and extreme political changes within a state. During 1958 
and 1959, the final stage of Fidel Castro’s revolution against Fulgencio Batista 
Zaldivar's dictatorship, the revolutionary forces made use of aircraft hijacking as 
one of theii' tactics. In that year, they were responsible for four hijacking 
attempts against Cubana Airlines.'* The first of these incidents occurred on April 
9, 1958, when Castro’s rebel forces hijacked a Cubana aeroplane, flying on an 
internal flight from Havana to Santa Clara, Cuba, to Mexico.® Another incident
4 US Department of Transportation, Aircraft Hijackings and other Criminal Acts 
Against C ivil Aviation Statistical and Narrative Reports (hereafter Narrative 
Reports), Section D US and Foreign Registered Aircraft Hijackings, Updated to 
January 1, 1986, Washington D.C.: FAA, May 1986
5 Edward F. Mickolus, Tiansnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events. 
1968-1979. London: Aldwych Press, 1980, P. 42
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occurred two weeks before Cuba’s presidential elections on October 22, 1958, 
when Castro’s Column 6  hijacked a Cubana airlines DC-10, flying from Cayo 
Mambi to Moa Bay, and forced it to land at their camouflaged aiistrip.® Similarly 
after Fidel Castro’s takeover of the government of Cuba, there were 13 hijacks 
from 1959 to 1961 involving Cubans fleeing from Cuba to the United States.' 
During this period, most of the final destinations of the hijackers were the United 
States and the hijackers usually were welcomed and granted political asylum by 
the U.S. government. One of the best example of these particulai' incidents 
occuned on October 29, 1960, when a Cubana DC-3, flying from Havana to the 
Isle of Pines, was hijacked by nine men who diverted it to Key West. A Cuban 
guai'd on boaid resisted, and a gunfight broke out in which he was killed and the 
pilot, copilot, and two passengers were wounded. The copilot who landed the 
aiicraft was in league with the hijackers. The hijackers were greeted as heroes 
by anti-Castro Cuban exiles and hailed by the American press as oppressed 
people who had escaped to freedom.* This factor might have encouraged the 
hijackings from Cuba to the United States at an eaiiy stage. One writer criticised 
this tendency in the following terms:
"... In pailicular, in the period 1959-60, we(America) repeated this enor in 
connection with skyjackers who fled from Cuba to Miami. The original 
errors were probably made by army men who were much influenced by the 
whole phenomenon of men breaking through the iion curtain. They 
undoubtedly could not foresee the possibilities in the situation or have any 
knowledge of the history of piracy.*
6  NaiTative Report, op.cit, P. 45
7 Ibid
3 Edwai'd F. Micklous, op.cit, P. 50
^ David G. Hubbard, The Skyjacker: His Flights of Fantasy. New York: Collier 
Books, 1973, P. 228
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This situation was overshadowed by the subsequent and more notorious reverse 
flow  of hijacks from the United States to Cuba. The following Table III-2  
illustrates a general development of US aircraft Ihjackings.^ ®
Table III-2
U.S. Registered Aircraft Hijackings 
(1961-1990)
Total No. of US No. of Successful No. of Unsuccessful
Year Aircraft Hijackings Aircraft Hijackings Aircraft Hijackings toto Cuba Cuba
1961 5 3 1
1962 1 1 0
1963 0 0 0
1964 1 1 0
1965 4 0 2
1966 6 0 0
1967 1 1 0
1968 22 18 1
1969 40 31 6
1970 27 14 1
1971 27 10 5
1972 31 6 1
1973 2 0 0
1974 7 1 0
1975 12 0 1
1976 4 0 0
1977 6 0 1
1978 13 6 3
1979 13 2 41980 22 13 4
1981 8 1 2
1982 10 3 2
1983 19 14 0
1984 7 3 0
1985 5 1 0
1986 4 6 0
1987 4 2 6
1988 2 1 6
1989 2 1 0
1990 4 1 0
Total 300 126 36
10 NaiTative Reports, op.cit
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The first aiicraft hijacking originating within the United States occurred on 
May 1, 1961, when Antulio Ramirez Ortiz, who used the name of Elpirata 
Cofrisi, spelling out the name of an eighteenth-century Spanish pirate, hijacked 
National Aiiiines flight 337, flying from Maiathon in the Florida Keys to Key 
West, and forced it to fly  to Havana. The hijacker was aiTested by Cuban 
soldiers, and the aircraft and passengers were briefly detained and then released. 
On November 11, 1975, Ramirez was anested in Miami by FBI and sentenced 
to twenty yeai's for the first hijacking of a US aiicraft.^' This incident was 
followed by the hijacking of Eastern AiiHnes flight 202, flying from Miami to 
Tampa, on July 24, 1961.^' These initial incidents engendered grave anxiety 
about the futuie trend of events. The anxiety became more intense when Castro 
held the hijacked aircraft in retribution for the impoundment of several Cuban 
aiicraft previously hijacked to the United States. The latter were held under 
claims brought against the Castro government by private businesses holding 
pre-revolutionaiy assets in Cuba. Tlie great concern over aviation teiTorism 
developing within the United States was well founded. After an initial peak in 
1961, an epidemic wave of aviation tenorism stalled in 1968. A  total of 35 
aiicraft hijackings took place world-wide in that year, and more than 40 per cent 
of aiicraft hijackings occuned within the United States. Cuba was the final 
destination of 12 hijacking incidents. The worst year in aviation history was 
1969. In that year, 85 hijacking attempts were recorded world-wide, including 
40 attempts against US aiicraft. Cuba still remained the preferred destination of 
hijackers. Thirty-one US registered aircraft were flown to Cuba during that yeai\ 
Between 1970 and 1972, 76 US registered aircraft hijackings occuned. During
11 Edward F. Mickolus, op.cit, PP. 51-52
12 Ibid, P. 52
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tliis period, a new lactic was introduced. In November 1971, D.C. Cooper 
hijacked a Northwest Airlines aircraft and demanded extortion money. The 
hijacker paiachuted from the aiicraft and disappeared with $2 0 0 ,0 0 0  extortion 
m oney.T h is  incident spawned similar parachute extortion attempts. There 
were more than 10 such attempts from December 1971 to December 1972.^ ^
A  guise of political terrorism was adopted in the United Stales in several 
hijacking attempts by self-identified members of the Black Panther Organization. 
For instance, on June 3, 1972, a male and a female hijacked a Western Ahiines 
aiicraft, flying from Los Angeles to Seatle. The hijackers demanded $500,000 
and flew to Algiers, where they asked fo r asylum. Nearly two months later, on 
July 31, 1972, five hijackers claiming to be Black Panther party sympathizers 
took over a Delta Airlines aircraft, flying from Detroit to Miami. They demanded 
$1 m illion and flew to Algiers, where they were taken into custody but freed 
later. 1®
In late 1972, there were two significant aviation terrorism incidents which 
had a great impact on the decision by the US government to implement total 
screening for all passengers and cabin luggage. On October 29, four aimed men, 
who were charged with the murder of policeman during an attempted bank 
robbery on October 25, 1972, hijacked an Eastern Airlines aiicraft on the 
ground at Houston airport and forced the pilot to fly  to Havana. The hijackers 
killed a ticket agent and wounded a maintenance man when they forced theii* 
way into the aircraft.^ ® On November 10, 1972, a Southern Airways aircraft,
^3 Edward F. Mickolus, op.cit, PP. 287-288
14 Ibid, PP. 293, 295, 296, 297-298, 307-308, 313, 325, 328-329 and 330-332
15 Ibid, 334
16 Keesing’s Contemporary A idiives, A pril 9-15, 1973, P. 25827
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flying from Birmingham to Montegomery, Alabama, was hijacked by three 
wanted criminals who forced the pilot to fly  to nine different locations in three 
stales before finally landing in Cuba. During the hijacking crisis, the hijackers 
demanded $ 1 0  million, ten parachutes, and stimulants to keep the four crewmen 
alert. To show their determination, the hijackers forced the pilot to fly  to 
Toronto, and threatened to crash the aircraft into the Oak Ridge atomic facility if 
their demands were not met. The aiicraft landed several times to refuel at 
different places. At Orlando, the FBI shot out the tyres of the aircraft. In 4
retaliation, the hijackers shot the copilot and forced the pilot to circle over Key 
Biscayne where they unsuccessfully demanded to talk by radio to President 
Nixon who was relaxing after his re-election victory. After an ordeal of 26 
hours, the hijackers finally ordered the pilot to return to Cuba for the second 
time and released the hostages. '^
After these serious hijacking incidents, both the Cuban and US governments 
issued statements on November 15, 1972, expressing their desire to negotiate an '#
agreement to curb aircraft hijackings, and proposing that negotiations to this end 
should be conducted through the Swiss government. The Cuban statement called 
for a broad agreement with the United States covering not only aerial hijackings 
but also all forms of violence affecting the two states. In its declaration the 
Cuban government stressed that it had absolutely no wish, nor did it desire in 
any way, that Cuban teiTitory should be used as a refuge by persons responsible 
for common criminal acts that might occur in any part of US territory.^* The 
Cuban government reiterated on November 17 its desire for immediate ^
17 Ibid, PP. 25827-25828 
13 Ibid, P. 25828
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negotiations with the United States on anti-hijacking measures. On November 
20, the State Department announced that the Cuban government had accepted 
formal proposals for negotiations, and that Cuba and the United States had 
agreed in principle that the proposed agreement should cover hijackings of 
ah'craft as well as of ships.^ * As a result of the negotiations, an agreement 
(officially a "memorandum of understanding") between them on the prevention 
of hijacking, both aerial and maiitime, was signed by the United States and 
Cuba, on February 15, 1973. The agreement provided for the punishment of 
persons seizing airliners or vessels of either state with the intention of finding 
sanctuaiy in the other.'® The Article 1 states as follows:
"Any person who hereafter seizes, removes, appropriates or diverts from its 
normal route or activities an aircraft or vessel registered under the laws of 
one of the parties and brings it to the territory of the other party shall be 
considered to have committed an offence and therefore shall either be 
returned to the party of registry of the aircraft or vessel, to be tried by the 
courts of that party in coiTormity with its laws, or be brought before the 
courts of the party whose territory he reached for trial in conformity with its 
laws for the offence punishable by the most severe penalty according to the 
circumstances and seriousness of the acts to which this article refers.
At the same time, the agreement provided for the consideration of the political 
defense but made no exception for acts of extortion or violence committed by a 
hijacker in the course of a political offence. Article 4 states as follows:
"The party in whose temtory the perpetrators of the acts described in Article 
(1) arrive may take into consideration any extenuating or mitigating 
cii'cumstances in those cases in which the persons responsible for the acts 
were being sought for strictly political reasons..." "
19 Ibid
20 U.S. Department of State Bulletin, March 5, 1973, P. 261
21 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, A pril 9-15, 1973, P. 25828
22 Ibid
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The effectiveness of the agreement as a means of controlling aiicraft hijacking 
soon became appaient. Only one U.S. aiicraft was hijacked to Cuba between 
1973 and 1976. Although the agreement failed to affect offences committed prior 
to its conclusion, 11 hijackers whose offences were committed from 1961 to 
1973 were returned to the United States from Cuba, diiectly or indiiectly.'^ The 
agreement was renounced by Fidel Castro on October 15 1976, effective from 
April 15, 1977, on the grounds of alleged U.S. complicity in the sabotage of a 
Cuban aiicraft.'* However, Castro subsequently indicated that he would 
continue to cooperate with the U.S. on matters relating to aiicraft hijacking. For 
the first time ever, Cuba on September 18 1980, handed over to the United 
States two men who had the previous day hijacked to Cuba a Delta Aiiiines B- 
727 with 114 people on board. Although the 1973 U.S.-Cuba anti-hijacking 
agreement had been unilaterally abrogated by Cuba in 1977, the Cuban 
government warned on September 16, 1980 that henceforth anyone hijacking to 
Cuba would receive a heavy prison sentence or would be handed over to the 
United States.'® At the same time, the U.S. government wanted to renew the 
agreement between two states, mainly because Cuba is the major destination for 
American hijackers. This illustrates the potential utility of such an agreement as a 
deterrent to aiicraft hijacking.
Meanwhile, the US government received a surge of criticism from Congress, 
the press and the US Ah Lines Pilots Association (ALFA) after the incidents,
23 Alona E. Evans, "Aircraft and Aviation Facilities", in Alona E. Evans and 
John F. Murphy, Legal Aspects of International Terrorism. Lexington: 
Lexington Books, 1978, P. 26
24 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, January 7, 1977, P. 28132
25 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, December 5, 1980, P. 30610
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and announced new security requhements, to be effective in thirty days, on 
December 5, 1972. Airport operators were directed to station armed law 
enforcement officers at passenger check points, seai'ch all carry-on items, and 
screen all passengers with electronic devices as a condition to boarding.'® These 
developments produced a precipitous drop in the hijacking of US passenger 
aircraft. There were 26 such incidents in 1972, but only 2 in 1973 and 3 in 1974.
Not all of the aiicraft hijackings in the United States have been initiated by 
criminals, persons wishing to return to Cuba, or by mentally unbalanced 
individuals. On September 10, 1976, a TW A B-727 aiicraft, flying from New 
York to Chicago with eighty-six passengers and seven crew members, was 
hijacked by six Croatian nationalists. The hijackers boaided at La Guaidia and 
claimed to have had gelignite bombs with them on board the aircraft. The 
hijackers thieatened to blow up the aiicraft if  theii' demands to publicize the 
declaration: "Free Croatia" and disburse leaflets over major cities in the United 
States and abroad were not met. The hijackers had also planted a bomb, which 
exploded while a bomb expert was trying to remove it, in a locker at Grand 
Central Station in New York, to make theii' demands more credible. The 
hijacked aiicraft flew to Canada and then to Gander, Newfoundland, where the 
hijackers released 33 passengers and proceeded to Iceland for refuelling. The 
hijacked aircraft, escorted by an TW A B-707, took off for London where the 
707 dropped propaganda leaflets over the city. More propaganda leaflets, given 
by the hijackers to the freed passengers, were dropped from a helicopter over 
Montreal. TW A B-707 also dropped leaflets over Paris before landing with the
26 Department of Transportation News, Office of the Secretary Press Release, 
December 5, 1972
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B-727 at Chai'Ies de Gaulle Aii’port. The hijackers suirendered and returned to 
New York to face murder and ail* piracy charges."
III-2-2. The Current Picture
W ith the increased threat of hijacking, 100 per cent screening of passengers 
and their carry-on luggage was introduced in the United States early in 1973. 
Since then such attacks have fallen below the rates of the 1969-1972 years, 
although there were 11 in 1980 and 17 incidents in 1983. From 1980 to 1983, 
there were 54 aircraft hijackings. This upturn in aircraft hijackings in the United 
States resulted as an after-effect of massive influx of Cuban refugees to the 
United States from the Cuban port of Mariel in 1980.'* From April to June 
1980, it was reported that 114,475 Cubans had arrived in the United States by 
boat, joining some 500,000 Cubans already in Florida and 25,000 other 
refugees.'* Since then more than 50 per cent have had Cuba as a final 
destination. In the space of one week in August 1980 six US aircraft were 
hijacked to Havana by Cuban refugees who were discontented with life in the 
United States. In the first incident an A ir Florida B-737 aircraft, on a flight from 
Miami to Key West was hijacked by a man, who threatened the pilot with a bar 
of soap disguised as a bomb; the aircraft then proceeded to Havana where the
27 Edward F. Mickolus, op.cit, PP. 644-646
23 Ail* Transport Report, "U.S. Hijackings; The Major Cause and Cure", 
October, 1983, P. 1
29 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, September 19, 1980, PP. 30474-30475
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30 U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Worldwide Significant Criminals 
Acts Involving C ivil Aviation: January-December 1980. P. 13
31 Ibid
32 Ibid, P. 14
33 Ibid
34 A ir Transport Report, op.cit, P. 5
35 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, September 19, 1980, P. 30475
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hijacker sunendered to Cuban officials.^ ® Tlnee days later, another Ah Florida 
aircraft on the same route with 74 people on boaid was hijacked by seven 
Cubans who, by tlireatening to ignite a jar of petrol forced the pilot to fly  to 
Havana where the liij ackers were taken into custody by the Cuban authorities.®*
A  day later, on August 14, a National Ahhnes Aircraft, flying from Miami to San 
Juan, Puerto Rico, was hijacked by two Cubans to Havana.®' Despite increased 
security measures, on August 16, tlnee US aircraft of Eastern Airlines, Republic 
Aiiiines and Delta Airlines, were hijacked to Havana by Cubans. In all these 
incidents the hijackers made tlieh demands by using thieateniiig gestures which 
suggested that they possessed inflammable liquids.®®
In response to the increase in ahcraft hijackings by Cuban refugees, ahiines 
introduced some extraordinary security measures in cooperation with the FAA.
The measures included the use of an FAA behavioural profile to spot potential 
hijackers, special processing fo r passengers meeting the profile, and upgrading 4
of screening equipment where needed.®* The Federal Aviation Administration 
also announced the use of armed sky marshals on selected flights.®® In addition, 
the FAA added scrutiny for flammables. In fact, hijacking by Cuban refugees as 
a means of returning to Cuba occuiTed at a time when improved weapon
detectors were being used on boaiding passengers and state-of-the-ait X-ray 
machines for caiTy-on luggage were detecting with increasing accuracy virtually 
all attempts to smuggle hand-guns or other weapomy aboaid ahcraft.®® This 
gave rise to the use of containers of flammable or allegedly flammable liquids by 
Cuban refugee hijackers,®'
Aircraft hijackings to Cuba in early 80s were a symptom of the Cuban 
refugee problem. The Cuban refugee problem caused a costly impact in many 
other aieas, ranging from welfare and housing costs to crime control. However, 
hijackings to Cuba were the most dramatic and visible symptoms of the refugee 
problem. The Cuban refugees departed without documentation and with no right 
to return. Some of them regaided hijacking as the only way of returning to their 
state. This group was encouraged by the previous successful hijackings.
W ithin the United States, the total number of aiicraft hijacking and other 
forms of attacks against civil aviation has diminished and remained low since 
1983. In 1989, only two aiicraft hijackings occuired. However, it is unlikely 
that such attacks w ill cease altogether. This was demonstrated by the slight 
increase of hijacking incidents in 1990.
III-2-3. The U.S. Responses
As acts of violence against c iv il aviation emerged as a serious threat, the 
United States has developed a comprehensive strategy for dealing with this 
problem. In the international sphere, the U.S. government has taken an active
36 A ir Transport Report, op.cit, P. 2
37 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, September 19, 1980, P. 30475
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33 Note, "Export Controls And The U.S. Effort To Combat International 
Terrorism", Law and Policy In International Business. Vol. 13, 1981, PP. 521- 
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role in many multilateral efforts to combat aviation teiTorism. In fact, the United 
States has joined other states attempting to develop international norms thiough 
the United Nations. At the same time, the United States has also endeavoured to 
remove underlying grievances in certain areas of concentrated ten orist activity.
For example, the U.S. administration have pailicipated actively in negotiations 
designed to resolve territorial disputes in the Middle East. Despite these various 
efforts, the U.S. government has been largely unable to halt terrorist attacks 4
against civil aviation through international agreement.®*
This lack of success in the international sphere has promoted the U.S. 
authorities to resort to the development of various kinds of security and policy 
measures to prevent acts of violence against c ivil aviation. At the early stage in |
the war against aviation terrorism, the U.S. government hoped that aircraft 
hijacking could be stopped by legal measures. It accepted the airlines' 
contention that passengers should not be alarmed or inconvenienced by highly 
visible security measures. In fact, there were only 9 aiicraft hijackings between 
1961 and 1967. Thus, the U.S. government seemed to have largely ignored the 
possibility of aircraft hijacking on a large scale on the pretext of travelling 
public's convenience. However, since the increased threat of aircraft hijacking 
which ai'ose in the United States in 1968, the U.S. government have been on the 
leading edge of aviation security activities. The government has pioneered the 
development of technical measures to prevent acts of violence against its aii iines 
by working in close cooperation with airlines and airport operators. The result is 
an aviation security programme which has become the model for much of the 
rest of the world.
- Ï.
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One of the achievements at the early stage was introduction of the profile 
system. As a result of the tremendous increase in hijacking attempts during 1968, 
the FAA established a task force in October of that yeai’ to consider a unified 
method of dealing with the problem of hijacking. Initial efforts were devoted to 
a study of the embarkation points and destination of the hijacked aii'craft to 
determine whether these might reveal any pattern. In addition, Dr. E. W. Pickrel, 
an FAA psychologist, examined the backgrounds and behavioural chai acteristics 
of those who had caiTied out or attempted to caiTy out hijackings to see if they 
exhibited a discernible behavioural pattern. The result of this effort was the 
"passenger profile" system which was designed to identify potential hijackers 
thi'ough observation and inteiTogation prior to boaiding their ahcraft.^^ This 
programme initially received a mixed reaction from aviation industry. Airlines 
that had suffered from such attacks recognized the necessity for preventive 
measures and were ready to cooperate. However, airlines that had not been 
affected were less enthusiastic. One writer described the reason for this negative 
attitude in the following terms:
"They felt that the introduction of such a program would have an adverse 
effect on travellers. It would negate the image that the airlines had sought to 
build up of ail' travel as a completely safe, pleasurable experience".^ ®
The reaction of passengers, however, was largely positive. The majority of
passengers overlooked whatever inconvenience resulted from the programme,
simply because they recognized that surveillance was for their safety. At the
same time, the effectiveness of the profile system has been proved over the last
W illiam  A. Crenshaw, Terrorism and the Threat to the C ivil Aviation. Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Miami, May 1978, PP. 85-86
“^ 9 Michael J. Fenello, "Technical Prevention of A ir Piiacy", in Narinder 
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two decades in the United States. By 1973, it was determined that 95.5 per cent 
of ail' passengers would be cleared as not being potential hijackers. 
Consequently, it is easy to identify the remaining 4.5 per cent of passengers for 
closer scrutiny. When combined with these and other security measures such as 
total screening of passengers, the passenger profile system has produced good 
results in low  risk situations.
In spite of success, it is difficult to see that this particulai' system is a 
successful method when it is applied to politically motivated terrorists. The vast 
majority of attacks against U.S. civ il aviation have been committed by simple 
refuge seekers and mentally unbalanced individuals. The passenger profile 
system was originally designed to prevent the specific problem of hijackings by 
Cuban refugees whose main aim was not political. This profile system was easy 
to apply and requiied no special training for security staff whose role was 
merely to detect potential hijackers to Cuba. However, this system exhibited 
deficiencies in the detection of politically motivated and highly trained ten orists. 
The writer's former colleague. Dr. Robin E H ill made the following observation:
"The easily identifiable form of threat being faced by aiiports along the 
eastern seaboard of the United States at that time allowed profiling to take the 
form of simple questions and observations aimed at finding hijackers whose 
principal objective was not political and so were unable to be classified 
within the parameters of terrorism '.^i
W ith the recognition of tliis problem, the FAA with FBI assistance researched 
the possibility of developing new profiles that could be applied to sophisticated 
tenorists. As a result of this effort, teiTorist profiles for use in high tlu'eat areas 
were produced. It was reported that the results of these new profiles were
Robin E. H ill, Problems of International Cooperation to Improve Standards 
of Aviation Security w ith Reference to the Passenger. Ph.D. Thesis, University 
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promising, although the profiles aie more complicated and requiie more 
infrastructure support, training, and a more highly skilled security s t a f f
In addition to the passenger profile programme, it was also announced in 
1968 that the FAA would develop a team of specially trained flight inspectors 
who would be assigned to flights on a random basis/^ It is very interesting to 
note that, in fact, the FAA deputized twenty of its Flight Standards Branch 
employees as U.S. mai shals in 1962 and utilized them on boaid designated high- 
risk flights.^* The U.S. government kept this fiis t Sky Mai'shal program secret. 
This decision was consistent w ith the low-profile policy that governed the anti­
hijacking program until 1968. Following the Dawsons Field hijacking incident in 
September, 1970, the U.S. Customs Service, following a presidential diiection, 
liiied 1,500 Sky Mai'shals fo r use on both domestic and international flights.'*^ 
The Sky Maishal programme, which was terminated in 1972, was strongly 
opposed by the civil aviation industry and even many security experts 
expressed their worries concerning the introduction of such a practice for safety 
reasons. They argued that the use of armed sky mai'shals during the hijack 
situation in flight lead to "shoot-outs between guai'ds and tenorists, with great 
danger to passengers from flying bullets and a near certainty that the outer fabric 
of the ah'craft would be punctured, with all the risks of decompression and so
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on which that must enlail."^^ Gayle Rivers, a counter-terrorist specialist 
described the worst situation which could aiise as follows:
"If a teiTorist in a plane is holding a grenade from which the pin has been 
removed(which he would usually do only if  he intended to detonate it) and a 
gun in his other hand, even with my close-quarter combat training I ’d have a 
real problem. I couldn't shoot him from a distance because his grenade hand 
would open, the lever would spring open automatically, and the grenade 
would go off."^^
It is highly controversial whether aimed sky maishals on civilian aiicraft 
contribute to the safety for the flying public or not. Although it cannot be denied 
that such a practice has acted as a deteirent, there aie significant lessons to be 
leained from the Iraqi A ir Flight 163 incident of 1986. During the hijacking 
situation, the terrorists were conlronted by six undercover Iraqi armed security 
officers, a gun fight reportedly took place and at least two grenades were 
detonated, causing severe damage to the aircraft. The aircraft crashed while 
attempting an emergency landing in Saudi Arabia. As a result of the shooting, 
explosions, and the crash, 65 people were killed and more than 40 others were 
seriously injured.^ ® In this case, the existence of sky marshals contributed to 
loss rather than the preservation of life. In this respect, some security experts 
argued that it would be infinitely safer to tighten up aiiport security to the point 
where potential hijackers could not get aboard aircraft. One writer even 
concluded that it is better to obey tenorists' instructions than risk an airborne
45 Frank Brenchley, "Living with TeiTorism: The Problems of Ah Phacy", 
Conflict Studies. No. 184, P. 4
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gun-battle.'*’  On the contrary, Israel's experience shows that such a practice can 
produce a good result. In fact, Israeli aimed sky marshals have been largely 
successful and have contributed to a reduction in the number of attempted 
hijackings upon aircraft on which they are employed. Consequently, the 
employment of sky maishals should not be totally ruled out. However, it should 
be a last resort. In order to minimize the danger, this practice should be carefully 
applied in terms of the selection and training of sky marshals. Furthermore, 
special consideration should be given to the weapons of sky marshals. For 
example, it is known that El A1 sky marshals cany small-calibre handguns armed 
with low-velocity cartridges to avoid bullets damaging the aircraft.
Meanwhile, once again, in 1980, the FAA introduced the Federal A ir Marshal 
Programme(FAM), which created a force of highly trained aviation security 
professionals who work closely with the airlines and the flight crews. Following 
the TW A 847 hijacking crisis in June 1985, the International Security and 
Development Cooperation Act (Public Law 99-83), which established an 
explicit statutory basis for the F AM programme, was enacted. FAM's still 
continue to provide security coverage on selected flights operating in especially 
sensitive areas.^ ®
One of the most effective aviation security measures developed by the United 
States is the preboarding security programme of total screening of passengers 
and inspection of luggage which was instituted on January 5, 1973 under the
49 Edgar O'Ballance, Terrorism, in the 1980s. London: Arms and Armour, 
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59 U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Semi-Annual Report to Congress 
■QD_ the. Effectiveness Qf, the__Civil Aviation Security Program. July 1-December 
31, 1986 and January 1, 1988-June 30, 1988
66
FAA C ivil Aviation Security Program.^ ^ The idea of the system was derived 
from the fact that the possibility of hijackers and theh weapons getting aboard 
should be prevented at the boaiding gate by 1 00  percent screening and seaiches. 
In fact, many previous incidents demonstrate that once a aircraft is airborne with 
teiTorists on board, the aircraft and its passengers are isolated from effective 
counter-measures.^ ^ The preboarding security system employed prior to 1973 
which consisted of the application of a profile w ith selected screening of suspect 
passengers proved insufficient as a control measure to contain the increasing 
hijackings and the Sky Marshal program was broadly criticised. This program 
was expanded to a selective screening system for checked luggage, following 
the bomb explosion at La Guardia airport on December 29, 1975.^  ^ Initially, the 
proposal to undertake a total screening program was not generally supported by 
the American public, the airlines or the airports. In fact, when the programme 
was proposed, there were negative reactions from both the government and the 
aviation industry who said this could not be done. In a sense, such a reaction 
was understandable, given the millions of people, the luggage and the flights 
involved and, for U.S. society, the unprecedented nature of the personal 
inspections contemplated.^^ However, it has been proved that the security
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system has worked remaikably w e ll Paul Wilkinson explained the reason for 
the success of this program as follows:
"The secret of making the checks acceptable to the travelling public was to 
ensure that adequate staff and machines were available to check passengers 
very rapidly, thus ensuring that any delays that occur happened at the check­
in desk or through unavoidable technical, weather, or air traffic control 
holdups and not at security. The airports and airlines cooperated to make the 
new system work, initially because they had no other choice".^^
From 1973 to 1988, 9.5 billion persons were processed thiough Airport 
Security Screening systems and more than 10 billion pieces of carry-on luggage 
were inspected. This resulted in the detection of over 38,600 fh*eai*ms and nearly 
19,000 related arrests. The FAA estimated that 118 aircraft hijackings and related 
crimes may have been prevented.^ ® The number of aiicraft hijackings originating 
in the United States shows the effectiveness of the programme. In 1973, the yeai' 
after its introduction, the total of U.S. aircraft hijackings dramatically dropped 
from 26 to 2. Richard Clutterbuck described the success of the programme thus: 
"It showed that ’impossible' problems could be overcome
Since then hijackings have fallen below the rates of the 1969-1972 period, 
although there were 21 incidents in 1980 and 17 in 1983, largely an outgrowth 
of the Mai'iel boatlrft that brought a massive number of Cuban refugees to the
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United States in 1980. Otherwise, the U.S. aircraft hijackings in the years from 
1973 to the present have ranged from 2 in 1973 to a high of 11 in 1979. The 
original screening system worked relatively well in detecting handguns and 
knives. Hijackers then became more sophisticated and started to use small 
quantities of gasoline or explosives to hijack aircraft. This trend was seen within 
the United States in the early 1980s. In spile of the effective screening 
programme, aircraft hijacking and other forms of attack on civil aviation have 
continued in the United States. This indicates that terrorists still find ways to 
sneak firearms or explosives aboaid aircraft. It is interesting to note that there 
have been considerably more than 100 U.S. registered aircraft hijackings since 
the introduction of the preboarding passenger screening programme. At the 
same time, FAA officials regularly evaluate its effectiveness by trying to smuggle 
mock weapons through airport security and on to the aircrafts. In 1987 20 per 
cent of the attempts to spirit make-believe bombs and other weapons on to 
aircraft succeeded.^ * This fact demonstrates that this security measure is not a 
total answer to preventing terrorist attacks against c iv il aviation.
In addition to the various security measures, the U.S. Congress implemented 
the Hague Convention by enacting the Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974. This law 
amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 by redefining the special jurisdiction 
of the United States and modifying the offence of aircraft hijacking to conform 
to the requirements of the Hague Convention. Aside from the criminal 
provisions of the act, it gives the President authority to suspend air services 
between the United States and any state which is acting in contravention of the 
Hague Convention. The Act also empowers the Secretary of Transportation to 
assess the security precautions maintained at aiiports of nations with whom the
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United States has a bilateral ah transportation agreement or whose airlines have 
obtained a foreign air carrier permit from the United States. If the security 
measures at these respective airports are deemed by the Secretaiy to be 
inadequate, notice is to be given to the foreign authority. The Act further 
provides that the Secretary of Transportation, subject to the approval of the 
Secretary of State, may agree to withhold, revoke, or impose conditions on the 
operating authority of the airlines of any nation whose security measures are not 
improved after notice of inadequacy has been given to the foreign a u th o r ity .^ ^  In 
the same year, the United States extended its extra-territorial powers still further 
under the U.S. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which conferred on 
U.S. Courts in respect of tenorists, jurisdiction if either the offender is found in 
the United States, or the offender or a hostage is a U.S. Citizen, or the United 
States government is the object of the terrorists’ attack. In addition, under the 
terms of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1985, the Secretary of 
Transportation is authorized to withhold or revoke the authorisation to operate 
in the United States of any foreign airline which fails to meet the minimum 
security standai'ds.^ ®
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The aviation security community, in the United States, have faced new 
challenges since the eai'ly 1980s. The nature of the threat to U.S. civil aviation 
changed from one of aiicraft hijacking to a sophisticated sabotage bomb tlireat. 
Unfortunately, unlike its action in the early 1970s to protect against aiicraft 
hijackings, the U.S. government did not acquhe the development and 
implementation of a comprehensive civil aviation security system to protect 
against sabotage attacks in flight. According to aviation security experts, the 
cuiTent security system is not sufficient to prevent another Pan Am 103 
tragedy.®! issac Yeffet, fonner diiector of security for El Al, who inspected and 
appraised seven of the biggest and busiest airports in the United States in the 
wake of the Lockerbie disaster, described the problem of aviation security in the 
United States as follows:
"There is no airline security in the United States. What little is being done to 
protect passengers is not done well. The U.S. carriers are spending enough 
money, but they aie not spending it on the right things. The carriers fo llow  
FAA regulations, but these aren't tough enough. Security pays for itself in 
decreased insurance fees and increased ridership, but airline executives have 
made security a low  priority. There is no reason to believe this w ill change 
until there is a major disaster at an American a irp ort" .® ^
According to the report of the Conde Nast Traveler News Unit, any kind of 
inspection of checked luggage was occasional and random on international 
flights. Security for U.S. domestic flights is even more lax than on international 
flights.®  ^This reality was demonstrated and criticized by Yeffet:
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"It allows luggage to go directly to the belly of the plane without being X  
rayed, without opening the bag, without making sure that the passenger w ill 
be on the plane too. A  passenger wearing a T-shirt that says, Abu Nidal, the 
15th of May Organization, as long as he has a ticket, can even have his 
luggage loaded beneath the cockpit uninspected... At La Guardia I was able 
to place my suitcase on the United Airlines Flight 67 to O’Hai'e without ever 
showing a ticket or getting on the plane. I took American Airlines to Chicago 
instead and picked up the bag. I f  Lockerbie tells us anything, it is that airlines 
must match luggage to passengers. If, fo r any reason, a piece gets on airplane 
without its owner, it should be taken off immediately no matter what the 
delay or inconvenience to passengers."®^
This problem is not limited to only one airport in the United States. Several other 
airports also have a similar problem. It may be unfair to make a comparison with 
the El A l seciu'ity operation. United Airlines, TW A and American Airlines aie 
200 times bigger than El Al. Many experts agree that the El A l type of boarding 
process would be slowed to a level which would be unacceptable to both the 
civil aviation industry and the American public. However, the passive approach 
to ah' safety might stem from the fact that the U.S. ahlines are too fai* removed 
from the front line of terrorism to be concerned. One of the FAA officials 
expressed his point of view which gives a shock to the cuiTent writer:
"Terrorists aie not very common in the U.S. We do not have Abu Nidal 
running around the streets of New York or Detroit. We have a problem 
overseas, and that's where extraordinary(security) measures exist. I f  we 
were to have any indication from intelligence agencies that there is a 
domestic thieat, we would make changes overnight".®®
This concept is very dangerous. Even if tlneat information is received, 
insufficient time may exist to develop an adequate security response given the 
cunent state of the civil aviation security system protecting U.S. ah* caiTiers. As
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was demonstrated in the eai'ly 1980s, when a lai'ge number of American airlines 
were hijacked by Cubans, domestic airlines are still exposed to such attacks. At 
the same time, it is very important to note that ten orists are likely to start taking 
aim at softer targets. The United States must not make the mistake of staying one 
step behind the tenorists. To eradicate acts of violence against c ivil aviation, 
civil aviation authorities have to stay one step or even two steps ahead of the 
tenorists. Further specific evidence of serious lapses was provided by 
journalists in the U.S who easily penetrated security baniers that were 
supposedly tightened up after the Fan Am 103 incident. For example, at John F. 
Kennedy Airport, U.S. a television reporter and a camera-man spent 20 minutes 
inside the off-limits aiiside aieas where cargo was being loaded before security 
staff picked them up.®® These loose and uncontrolled systems should not be 
acceptable m the United States.
One of the fundamental problems in American aviation security is over 
reliance over technology. One writer describes this aspect as follows:
"...the American approach has been to rely heavily on technology, and 
because its many airports and heavy air traffic has been virtually untouched 
by the political terrorists, it has not concentrated on the human side of 
security."®^
The airlines invest millions on security equipments such as metal detectors and 
X-ray macliines, but little on the people who operate it. It should be remembered 
that the modern technologies can only assist the security personnel, but they 
cannot make a judgements. Only highly trained security personnel can do that. 
The lack of required security training is the reality in the United States. One
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writer criticised the inadequacy of the U.S. training program in comparison with 
Israeli rules on this subject as follows:
"Perhaps the most glaring deficiency in the current U.S. civil aviation 
security system is the lack of required security training. Only the security 
training for the flight crews and the Ground Security Coordinator’s position 
is required to have specific hours of security training. Others involved in the 
security system, e.g., X-ray screeners, etc., are not required to have any 
specific amounts of training to perform a security function. Subject matter is 
also loosely defined, so loosely as to be totally ineffective. By contrast, the 
Israeli aviation security system invests four to five weeks in each individual 
involved in the application of theii* security system before allowing the 
. individual to apply their security measures. Contrast this with the total 
absence of any required number of training hours, and the inadequate 
definition of the security subject matter, and you can get a sense of the real 
inadequacy of the U.S. security system. Two U.S. aircarriers operating in 
Europe, and now a third following the Pan Am 103 tragedy, have 
implemented portions of the Israeli security system. Regrettably, these 
airlines still only provide approximately eight to ten days of initial security 
training. Taken in its totahty, the lack of required training, both in the number 
of hours and the subject matter, is the single most glaring deficiency in the 
U.S. civil aviation security system."®*
Under the current training program, it is certainly impossible to obtain security 
personnel who have been trained to an adequate standai'd. This was 
demonstrated by the conversation between a female security officer and a 
security expert:
"Explosives," she said.
"Do you know what Semtex, C-4, or PLX looks like?" I asked 
"Not really," She replied honestly enough.®’
This may be exceptional. Unfortunately, this is the reality in civil aviation 
security. At American akports security personnel are there only to operate the
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machine, but the responsibility is the machine’s. In addition, the pay and 
employment conditions of security staff aie very poor. This discourages high 
quality people from applying. Under the cunent employment conditions, most 
of the security officers in the United States aie constantly looking for better 
employment elsewhere.^ ® Americans place the security of aiicraft in the hands of 
poorly trained, underpaid, unmotivated, overworked contract employees. It 
must be recognised that machines can never hope to keep a step ahead of 
ten orists. The only detenent is capable, dedicated and knowledgeable people, 
who are proud of thek jobs, and awaie of thek fu ll responsibility.
The actual, and perceived failures of the civil aviation security system, in fact, 
invite additional attacks. As tenorists perceive that security systems are not 
adequate, they increase thek focus of attention on the vulnerable aviation 
security system.
III-2-4. Closing Remarks
An extraordinary effort by the U.S. government has coped successfully with 
the thieat of aviation teiTorism, reducing the annual number of hijackings and 
sabotage attacks. At the same time, in designing efficient security measures for 
the safety of civ il aviation, the experience of the United States provides a useful 
guideline for aviation security in the international community and its civil 
aviation industry. However, the government's response to terrorism has been a 
series of unrelated actions and enactments. Unfortunately, these lack a 
coordinated locus to prevent or deter teiTorism. Although the tightening of 
akport security has reduced the threat of aviation terrorism, this security system
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is not impregnable. Under the cuiTent system of aviation security, a concerted 
attack against U.S. airlines and airports by politically motivated terrorists would 
probably cause complete confusion and chaos. The success of the United States 
in preserving the security of c ivil aviation has been commendable, but it is not 
enough. At tliis point, the U.S.A. has to rethink the concept of airport security 
and re-evaluate its security system. The essential lesson of the U.S. experience in 
the war against aviation terrorism is that point defense of the latest target alone 
w ill not suffice. Unless the broad prospects of aviation terrorism are addressed, 
the U.S. government w ill remain one step behind the terrorists.
III-3. Middle Eastern Aviation Terrorism
It is generally accepted that the main source of the attacks against c ivil 
aviation has originated from the Middle East. Since the late 1960s, a significant 
portion of the attacks have been conducted by Palestinian groups. In addition, 
Shia fundamentalist groups have been identified as one of the main perpetrators 
in recent years. The most woiTying factor concerning aviation ten'orism rests not 
in its frequency, but in its other characteristics. Not only did the incidents carried 
out by Middle Eastern groups have the tendency to be more spectacular and 
more lethal, they were almost exclusively international rather than domestic. This 
combination has made them the source of considerable international friction. 
W ith the adoption of a political and diplomatic strategy by the PLO for the 
Palestinian cause, aircraft hijacking and other form of attacks against civil 
aviation have decreased since mid-1970s. The Palestinian hijack wave, however, 
has been followed by other Middle Eastern groups.
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III-3-1. Palestinian Case
The advent of attacks by Middle Eastern teiTorist groups on civil aviation is 
deeply related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Over the last two decades, it has 
become evident that militant Palestinian movements are still playing a central role 
in the international terrorist community. The Palestinian terrorists are motivated 
by nationalism and their grievance is deeply rooted in history, arising from the 
settlement of those whom they regard as aliens in their state. They have a much 
more sophisticated organization than any of the other terrorist groups, using a 
world network of support to exert political blackmail and attract publicity for 
thek cause. Before turning to the subject of Palestinian aviation terrorism, it is 
necessaiy to take a look at the continuous Aiab-Israeli confHct over Palestine 
and to understand how this conflict developed, since the problems of Palestinian 
aviation terrorism can not be fu lly understood without knowledge of the early 
history of Palestine.
III-3-1-1. Historical Background
Historically, as the Arabs see it, the Israeli people have no real right to 
Palestine. They left in 70 A.D.’"!, and for eighteen and a half centuries there were 
very few of them there. The Arabs have been there since before 700 A.D. even 
though they lived under Turkish rule for about 500 years until 1918. It is 
worthless to argue about who has the real right to own Palestine, because it has 
been conquered repeatedly by the Romans 2,000 years ago, by the Arabs 1,300 
years ago and by the Ottoman Turks 500 years ago. They, in turn, were driven
71 This date, like other date of biblical events, is approximate.
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out by the Allied Aimies in 1918. The Allies made ambiguous and conflicting 
promises, on the one hand to restore Aiab rule, on the other hand to found in 
Palestine a national home for the Jews.^ ^
At the outbreak of W orld War I, Arab nationalists thought they had a choice 
of two courses of action: to cast their lot with the Turks in the hope of achieving 
autonomy and some self-government as an ultimate reward, or to support the 
Allies in the hope of acquiiing complete independence. Once the Ottoman 
Empiie joined the Central powers in the wai', Britain saw the advantages of an 
A'ab revolt. Not only would it weaken Turkey m ilitaiily by depriving her of 
Arab manpower, but Arab forces could be used to augment the Allied armies in 
the Neai' East.'^  When the Aiabs cooperated with the British Ai'my in driving 
out the Turks, they were promised, through Sir Hemy McMahon and others, 
that after liberation they would be able to govern thek lands in an aiea bounded 
on the north by a line from Mersin-Adana to the Persian frontier, on the east by 
Persia and the Persian Gulf, on the south by the Indian Ocean, and on the west 
by the Red and Mediterranean seas.^  ^ Meanwhile, on November 2, 1917, the 
British Government issued the Balfour Declaiation, which was supported by
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Lloyd George, Winston Churchill and others, enunciating Britain's support for 
the establishment of a "National Home" in Palestine for the Jewish people/® 
Britain’s confhcting promises and policies ultimately led to strife between Aiabs 
and Jews and to endless troubles in Palestine. At the San Remo Conference of 
April 25, 1920, the Victorious powers of W orld Wai* I, acting as the Supreme 
Council of the League of Nations, decided to place Palestine in the British sphere 
of influence. On July 24, 1922, the League of Nations approved the final draft of 
the Palestine mandate and incorporated the Balfour Declaration into the 
document. It chaiged the mandatory power, Britain, with placing Palestine under 
such political, administrative and economic conditions as would secure the 
establishment of the Jewish "National Home"^ ®
During the Mandate, the British government did its best to control the flood 
of Jewish immigrants, initially from Russia and Eastern Europe. As anti- 
Semitism intensified in the social disorganization after the First W orld War and 
the Second W orld War saw a holocaust wrought by Nazi Germany in which six 
million Jews were put to death in the gas chambers of Eastern Europe, the 
remnants who survived clamoured to leave Europe and to come to a "National 
Home" in Palestine. This sudden surge of immigrants intensified pressures 
which triggered a revolt. The number of immigrants in 1933 was triple that of 
the preceding year. As a result of the massive increase in the numbers of Jewish
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immigrants into Palestine, there were severe outbreaks of violence by the Arab 
community from 1935 to 1938.”  Meanwhile, exposed and vulnerable in their 
isolated agricultural settlements and harassed by Aiab terrorists, the Jewish 
settlers developed a defence organization, known as Haganah.
In 1945, after the British Government had rejected President Truman's call 
for the admission of 100'000 Jewish displaced persons from Europe to 
Palestine, the Jewish population in Palestine reacted with armed opposition to 
the Mandate authorities. The Irgun Zvai Leumi(IZL), an aggressive Jewish 
terrorist organization, demanded that the Jewish National Home should include 
not only all of Palestine, but also all that is now Jordan. When it was made clear 
that this was inconceivable, they launched a series of guerrilla attacks on the 
British Ai'my.^ ®
By early 1947, the British Government realized that neither a negotiated 
settlement nor an equitable compromise could be found for the conflicting Aiab 
and Jewish claims to Palestine. Unable to resolve the problem, and lacking the 
resources or determination to maintain the Mandate indefinitely by force, the 
British announced, on February 18, 1947, that they would turn over the 
Palestine problem to the newly formed United Nations.”  On May 15, 1947, a
77 John W. Amos, Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist 
Movement. New York: Pergamon Press, 1980, P. 6; Edgai* O'Ballance, 
Language of Violence: The Blood Politics of Terrorism. Calhomia: Presidio 
Press, 1979, P. 18; Hassan Bin Talal, Palestinian Self-Determination: A  Study of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. London: Quater Books, 1981, P. 19; Richard 
Clutterbuck, op.cit, P. 77
78 Richard Clutterbuck, op.cit, P. 77; Chaim Herzog, op.cit, 232; Edgar 
O'Ballance, op.cit, P. 19; George Rosie, The Directory of International 
Ten orism. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Co., 1986, P. 138 and 149
79 W illiam B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, Ann Mosely Lesch, The Politics of 
Palestinian Nationalism. California: University of California Press, 1973, P. 46
80
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine(UNSCOP) was established and 
in the ensuing months, UNSCOP examined several possible solutions and finally 
recommended the partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one 
Arab, within economic union.*® The pai tition of Palestine was opposed not only 
by the Palestinians, but also by the indigenous Orthodox Jews of Palestine who 
lived on good terms with their Arab neighbours.®! It soon became obvious that 
partition could not be accomplished peacefully, but would rather depend on the 
outcome of fighting between the Jews and the A  abs. Immediately after the UN 
General Assembly passed the paiiition resolution in November 29, 1947, there 
were repeated teiTorists acts including the Deir Yassin massacre.®  ^As a result 
of the clashes, by the time the Mandate ended on May 15, 1948, neai'ly 200.000 
Palestine A  abs had become refugees.®^
A te r the British withdrawal, a new dimension in the fighting was the 
intervention of a small number of regular army troops from suiTounding A  ab 
states, most notably Egypt and Trans-Jordan. In 1954, after President Nasser 
came to power in Egypt, A ab  guerrillas intensified raids into the State of Israel, 
which was proclaimed by the Jews on May 14, 1948, on the eve of the 
termination of the British Mandate over Palestine. This led to the Americans,
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British and French jo intly deciding not to supply aims to Egypt unless these 
attacks were discontinued. Therefore, Nasser promptly signed an aims deal with 
Russia. The U.S. Government retaliated by reversing thek decision to finance 
the Aswan Dam through the W orld Bank. On July 26, 1956, President Nasser 
thereupon announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal and this action, 
together with the Fedayeen raids, led to the Suez Wai* in that year. The Israeli 
A  my occupied the whole Sinai Peninsula including the Gaza Strip, from which 
they withdrew reluctantly under the promise that the United Nations Emergency 
Force would ensure freedom of passage through the Straits of Tkan.*^
A ter the Suez war, guerrilla attacks intensified, and from 1965 some 
incidents took place along the Jordanian-Israeli lines. The Israeli Government 
retaliated with raids into Jordan. The Syrians then began to attack agricultural 
settlements overlooked by the Golan Heights. In retaliation, Israel made ak 
strikes against Syrian military targets and border villages. This Israeli ak strike 
led the A  ab states quickly to pledge thek support to Syria, and the Egyptians 
moved a large army into the Sinai Desert, ordering the United Nations 
Emergency Forces to leave. On May 22, 1967, Nasser announced that the Straits 
of Tkan would be closed, thereby cutting off Israel's unique access to the Indian 
Ocean thiough the Gulf of Aqaba. This was the cause of the war. The Israelis 
attacked Egypt, Syria and Jordan in June and within six days Israel had taken
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the whole Sinai Peninsula, West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and the Old 
City of Jerusalem. The war was a total victory for Israel, *®
The defeat in the wai* with Israel accelerated the development of a Palestinian 
national movement free from the control of the A ab states. The immediate 
lesson of the defeat was that Israel could not be destroyed by conventional wai' 
undertaken by existing A ab regimes. Consequently, the Palestinian 
organisations came to the conclusion that they had to caiTy on the tenorist 
struggle outside Israel, thus initiating the era of international terrorism by the 
PFLP, which pioneered its use as a political weapon. The initial tactic of 
international tenorism was aiicraft hijacking and holding passengers and crew 
members hostage in order to attain political aims.
H I-3 -1-2. Analysis of Palestinian Aviation Terrorism
Since the A ab defeat in the June 1967 wai’, international terrorism by 
Palestinians has had a fundamental impact on the international affairs. This has 
derived not so much from the proportion of acts carried out by Palestinians 
within the total framework of all international tenorist activities but from the 
innovative nature of the acts themselves. International terrorism against civil 
aviation is the most notable example. A campaign of aviation terrorism stemming 
from the Middle East has been characterised by a series of sporadic but 
spectaculai* incidents executed by mainly Palestinian terrorist organizations 
against the Israeli aiiline, El Al, as well as those of selected Western states. 
Aviation terrorism became a deliberate tactic following the A ab  defeat in 1967
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wai% to widen the conflict against Israel. What is important in the aviation 
ten orism campaign is the assumption that by striking boldly in the international 
aiena, and by then linking their actions dnectly to specific political demands, 
Palestinians could call world attention to the Palestinian political problem. As 
George Habash observed:
"We think that killing one Jew fai* from the field of battle is more effective 
than killing a hundred Jews on the field of battle, because it attracts more 
attention."*®
This was demonstrated once again in explaining the PFLP's decision to attack an 
El A l aircraft at Zurich in 1969. Habash said that such attacks, even if repeated a 
thousand times, would not bring about the liberation of Palestine but the 
operation was justified in terms of the worldwide public attention for the 
Palestinian cause.*^  Besides seizing civil aircraft the teiTorists have shot up El A l 
airliners at Western airports, planted bombs in El A l offices and even sabotaged 
aircraft in flight. The following Table IIT3 illustrates the general development of 
aviation ten orism by the Palestinian terrorists.**
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Table HI-3
Palestinian Aviation Terrorism 
(1968-1984)
Year Arab Aircraft 
and Passenger 
Attack
Israeli Aircraft 
and Passenger 
Attack
Non-Israeli 
Aircraft and 
Passenger 
Attack
Total
1968 0 2 0 2
1969 0 2 2 4
1970 0 3 7 10
1971 6 2 0 8
1972 1 i 3 5
1973 0 4 4 8
1974 0 0 5 5
1975 1 2 0 3
1976 0 2 2 4
1977 1 0 1 2
1978 0 1 0 1
1979 6 1 0 1
1980 6 i 0 1
1981 6 0 b 0
1982 0 0 0 0
1983 1 0 0 1
1984 0 0 0 0
Total 10 21 24 55
To begin with aircraft hijacking was the speciality of the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine(PFLP), led by George Habash. W ithin the context of 
employing the strategy of international teiTorism, the PFLP defined its enemy 
very carefully. The enemy includes not only Israel, but also the Zionist 
movement, world imperialism led by the United States and A ab  reactionaiy 
tendencies represented by feudalism and capitalism.*’  This definition of the 
enemy provided the practical legitimization for international terrorism. Habash 
had not picked on akcraft hijacking simply as a grandiose means of pubhcizing 
his group and the Palestinian problem. He saw it as an opportunity to deal
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Israel's economy an effective blow. Israel, suiTounded by A  ab states, depended 
on El A l to maintain its link with friendly states. El A l was founded as one of the 
fii'st acts of newly born State of Israel in 1948 when the Israel's population was 
a mere 600,000. By 1968 El A l had established itself as one of the largest 
international ahlines, relative to the size of the state. But El A l was vulnerable 
because of the nature of its air routes. These were determined by the fact that 
Israel was hemmed in hostile A ab  states, and this blockade cut her off from the 
international ak traffic flows. To Habash, El A l was the symbol of Israel abroad, 
the flag-cairier which flaunted the permanence of a state the Aabs refused to 
recognize. In this view, El A l akcraft emerge as a prefeixed target as they belong 
to the enemy. At the same time. Western akports where El A l akliners operate 
also became legitimate targets. Habash hoped that he could reduce significantly 
the considerable contribution the akline made to Israel’s income from tourism by 
akcraft hijacking, by shooting up El Al, by taking passengers hostage, by 
blowing them out of the sky, by attacking them in terminals, by deterring people 
from flying El A l and by deterring them from even visiting Israel at all.’®
The fkst act of aviation tenorism by the Palestinian terrorist organizations 
occuned in 1968. Until then this form of international ten orism had been largely 
limited to Cuba and the United States. On July 23, an El A l Boeing 707 was 
hijacked over the Mediterranean by anned Palestinian Aabs while on a 
scheduled flight from Rome to Tel Aviv. The hijackers attacked twenty minutes 
after take off, by tlireatening to blow up the plane with grenades and forcing it to 
land at Algiers' Dai' Al-Bayda Akport. The 23 non-Israeli passengers were 
immediately released, but the 22 Israelis on boai'd were detained by the Algerian
90 David Phillips, Skyjack: The Story of A k Pkacy. London: George G. 
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Government.®! A statement was issued in Beiiut the same day by the PFLP, 
claiming responsibility for hijacking the airliner.®  ^The Algerian Government had 
no advance knowledge of the hijacking, but it had no cause for surprise at being 
chosen as a haven. Algeria was one of the most vocal Ai*ab states in denouncing 
Israel and she maintained that the Palestinian problem was one that could be 
solved only by armed struggle.®  ^While Palestinian terrorists were not the fii st to 
hijack an aiicraft for political purposes, this fiis t initial aiicraft hijacking by the 
PFLP was the fiis t example of the use of hijacking for the purpose of political 
blackmail. The PFLP's motive was to exchange the Israeli hostages for Arab 
terrorists held by the Israeli Government. On July 29, a joint six-man delegation 
representing tliree Palestinian terrorists organizations, PLO, PFLP, and Al-Fatah, 
had gone to Algiers to persuade the Algerian authorities to hold on to the airliner 
and to release the Israeli passengers and crew only in return for more than 1,000 
Ai'ab terrorists held in Israel.®'* Meanwhile, 10 of the detained Israelis had been 
released by the Algerian authorities on July 27, but 12 male Israelis were still 
detained. In this situation, the Israeli Government appealed to the United Nations 
and to the International C ivil Aviation Organization(ICAO) to use their good 
offices to effect the return of the passengers and the plane. As a result of the 
failure of intense diplomatic activity, plans for an ah' boycott of Algeria from 
August 18 were announced by IFALPA on August 13 and promises of support 
for the ah' boycott came from the International A ir Transportation Federation.®®
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In the wake of IFALPA*s air boycott announcement, the Algerian Foreign 
Minister said that Algeria wished to find a satisfactory solution to this delicate 
problem after stressing that Algeria had nothing whatever to do with the 
hijacking.®*» On September 1, 1968, under an arrangement negotiated by the 
Italian Government, the seven Israeli crew and five male passengers, who had 
been detained in Algiers were released with the airliner. The PFLP criticized 
Algeria for releasing the hostages without consulting them. But it was a success 
for the PFLP, because it was announced in Israel on September 3, 1968 that 
Israel had informed the International Red Cross that it was releasing 16 Aiab 
teiTorists as a gesture of gratitude to the Italian Government for its efforts in 
negotiating the release of the Israeli airliner, aircrew and passengers.®  ^Naturally 
the first hijacking operation was regarded as a great victory by the Palestinian 
teiTorist organizations. The most significant outcome of the hijacking was that 
the Palestinians observed that, regardless of how outraged world reaction was 
to the hijacking, outrage did not go beyond words. Thus, Palestinian terrorists 
were encouraged to further pursue new acts of international terrorism.
W ith this success behind it the PFLP decided to launch a campaign of ten or 
and destruction against El A1 itself, its aircraft, its airline facilities and their users 
in order to hit Israel economically and disrupt this lifeline. The PFLP justified 
itself in killing civilians on the following grounds:
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"We have no control over the land that was stolen from us and called 
Israel.,.; whoever goes to Israel should ask for our permission... Our struggle 
has barely begun, the worst is yet to come. And it is right for Europe and 
America to be warned now that there w ill be no peace until there is justice 
for Palestine... We w ill never agree to a peace settlement."®»
There was also another reason. The PFLP wanted to eliminate El A1 which was 
and is the carrier of the Israeli national flag, the symbol of the existence of the 
state abroad, visible at any time at international airports.®®
The attacks on c iv il aviation were not limited only to the skies. In addition to 
aircraft hijacking, the Palestinian tenorist organizations initiated two other forms 
of operation against c iv il aviation. These were attacks against aircraft and theii* 
innocent passengers on the ground, and the sabotage bombing of aircraft in the 
ail*. W ith the introduction of anti-hijacking security measures by the Israeli 
government after the success of the first operation of aircraft hijacking, the PFLP 
shifted theii' efforts to attacking Israeli airliners on the ground; one at Athens 
airport on December 26, 1968,!»» and another at Zurich on February 18, 1969.!»! 
The incident at Athens brought a fresh crisis in the tense Middle East situation. 
Two days later Israeli commandos raided Beirut international airport in 
retaliation for the Athens attack and destroyed 13 Arab airliners, the damage
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being estimated at over £1 5 ,0 00 ,0 0 0 .This action by the Israelis provoked a 
world reaction and led the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution 
condemning Israel for the attack.!®  ^ Although depicted by the Israelis as a 
glorious achievement showing the A i abs how their long arm could reach out to 
punish, Israeli action was in another respect counter-productive. It brought the 
weakness of the Lebanese government and army to the notice of the Fedayeen, 
thus encouraging them to expand in Lebanese teixitory,!®^
After these incidents, Israelis reinforced their security precautions on El A1 
aircraft, installing lockable bullet-proofed cockpit doors and aimed sky 
marshals.!®  ^ Therefore, the PFLP had to adopt and select a soft target. Non- 
Israeli aii'liners were selected as targets due to the absence of special security 
measures at the airports and the lack of security personnel aboard the plane. On 
August 29, 1969, two members of the PFLP hijacked a TW A flight, flying from 
Los Angeles to Tel A viv and forced it to land in Syria.!®» This was the first time 
it had struck at an airline other than El Al. The reason for this was political. The 
PFLP statement said that the United States was drawn into the PFLP's aerial war i
because ol her support for Israel and for having sold arms and Phantom jet- 
fighters to Israel.!®  ^The Syrians made use of this incident to obtain the release
. i
on October 12, 1969, of 13 Syrians held by Israel and also the two hijackers. 
Miss Leila Khaled and Salim Assawi. Leila Khaled later underwent three plastic 
surgery operations to conceal her identity so that she could attempt another 
mission.!®»
Aiicraft hijacking also came to be used by the Palestinian organizations as a 
means of winning the release of tenorists airested in previous missions. What 
the PFLP had learned from the previous years of hai assing civil aviation was 
that aiicraft hijacking provided hostages who could be traded in exchange for 
the release of Palestinian tenorists from jail. An incident of this type happened 
on July 22, 1970, when the six PFLP tenorists hijacked an Olympic Aii'ways 
aeroplane, canying 47 passengers and 8 crew members from Beii'ut to Athens 
and demanded the release of seven Arab tenorists who were being held in 
Greece for the attack on an El A l aiiliner on December 26, 1968, for the 
attempted hijacking of a TW A flight on December 21, 1969 and also for the 
attack on the El A l office in Athens.!®® Tln ough the mediation of the International 
Red Cross official, Andre Rochat, it was announced by the Greek Government, 
on the day of the incident, that all Arab terrorists detained in Greece would be 
released within one month and the Greek Government also announced that it had 
been received assurances from the Aiab diplomats that Greece would never 
again be used for tenorist activities.!!® The submission by the Greek authorities
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in this incident encouraged ultimately a number of similai' occuiTences of this 
kind, and the use of the tactic quickly spread to non-Palestinian aviation 
tenorists.
Meanwhile, the tactics of sabotage bombing of aiicraft by the Palestinians 
first appeared at first on Februaiy 21, 1970. The Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) blew up a Swissair 
plane, killing all 38 passengers and 8 crew, en route from Zurich to Tel Aviv, 
and made a similar but abortive attack on an Austrian Airlines aiicraft that same 
day.!!! Following these incidents, the Israeli Paiiiament adopted a resolution 
calling upon all governments, international associations, airlines and pilots' 
organizations to combat teiTorism directed against international c iv il aviation.ü^
The most spectacular Palestinian attack in the history of aviation terrorism 
took place on September 6, 1970, since then known as "Hijack Sunday ". The 
PFLP ten orists hijacked TW A B-707 en route from Frankfurt to New York over 
Belgium and diverted to Dawson's Field neai Amman, Jordan. Shortly 
thereafter, a Swissair DC-8, flying from Zurich to New York was liijacked and 
also forced to fly  to Dawson’s Field. Minutes later, two hijackers attempted to 
seize an El A l B-707, flying from Amsterdam to New York. Israeli security 
guaids on boaid killed the male hijacker, Patrick Aiguello, and overpowered the 
female hijacker, Leila Khaled, who already had one successful hijacking of a 
TW A flight to Damascus in 1969 to her credit. Leila Khaled was turned over to 
the British authorities when the El A l aeroplane landed at Heathrow airport in 
London. Later the same afternoon, a Pan Am B-747, also bound from
111 Keesing’s, March 7-14. 1970. PP. 23867-23868
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Amsterdam to New York, was hijacked and diverted to Beirut. Though the 
aii'port was surrounded by Lebanese police and armoured vehicles, the 
Lebanese authorities were powerless to inteivene as the akport's control tower 
had been seized by the PFLP teiTorists."® According to the PFLP spokesman, 
the hijackings had been aimed at the Middle East peace talks between Egypt and 
Israel to which the Palestinian tenorist organizations were opposed; that the 
hijacking of U.S. aiiliners was a symbolic blow against what was called an 
American "plot to liquidate the Palestinian cause" by supplying aims to Israel; 
and that the Swiss akliner was selected as a target to reinforce the terrorist’s 
demands for the release of three terrorists held in Switzerland for the February 
1969 attack on an El A l aiiiiner at Zurich aii'port.“  ^ Meanwhile, the Pan Am 
Jumbo jet hijacked to Bekut was diverted to Cako, because it would have been 
impossible for the plane to land at the Dawson’s Field where the TW A and 
Swiss akliners had akeady landed. On arriving at Cako Akport, the passengers 
and crew were released and the hijackers blew up the plane. A statement from 
PFLP headquarter said that the Jumbo jet had been blown up in Cako as a 
protest against Egypt’s acceptance of the Middle East cease-fke agreement. In 
the mean time, at the Dawson’s Field, all women and children except Israeli 
women and children were allowed to leave Dawson's Field for Amman. A 
statement issued by the PFLP in Amman said that it would hold as hostages 
those passengers who were of American, British, Israeli, Swiss and West 
German nationality until its demands were met. The demands were the 
immediate release of tlnee tenorists by the Swiss Government, the release of the
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Ai ab woman hijacker, Leila Khaled and the retuiii of the body of her accomplice 
within 72 hours, and the release of three Arab terrorists who were being held for 
the Munich akport attack by the West German Government, as well as an 
unspecified number of terrorists held in Israel.“ ® Through the special mission of 
the ICRC, headed by M, Andre Rochat, negotiations thus began with the Swiss 
and Germans initially being willing to deal unilaterally with teiTorists to free thek 
own nationals, but the British Government refused the PFLP demand. Instead, 
the British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, set to work to persuade the other 
Western Governments concerned to act together on the principle that states 
should not deal individually with the PFLP. Only in that way did all the hostages I
stand a chance of being freed. Hence, on September 8, the Berne Five was 
formed.!!® In this situation, to improve thek negotiating position with Britain, the 
PFLP hijacked a British Overseas Akcraft Corporation(BOAC) flight VC-10, 
flying from Bombay to London on September 9 and forced it to land at 
Dawson’s Field.ü^ Meanwhile, the Jordanian army was besieging the airfield #
but held back while various groups of passengers were released on various 
days, starting with 127 women and children, then 21 Ai'abs, and so on until 
eventually only 54 out over 400 originally kidnapped remained in PFLP control.
They were split up into groups and were held by the PFLP in refugee camps 
and the tlii'ee akcraft were then blown up one after the other. The 54 remaining 
hostages were finally either released or rescued by Jordanian army. When all
. A -M i
hostages were safely returned, the British, Germans and Swiss, as promised 
during the negotiation, released the seven tenorists including Leila Khaled."»
Even though the PFLP achieved their objective, these spectaculai* hijackings 
caused a wave of revulsion all over the world and a major set-back for the 
Palestinian tenorist organizations. Dawson’s Field had been chosen deliberately 
as the base for the hijacking because of the near autonomy enjoyed at the time 
by the PLO in Jordan and, to a lesser degree, to make a rescue operation more 
difficult. This multiple hijack operation was one of the reasons for the Jordanian 
C ivil War. Angered by the incident within his state and fearful of a stronger 
PLO if left unchecked, King Hussein of Jordan decided to rid himself of his 
dangerous unwelcomed guests and unleashed his aimy on the Palestinian 
terrorist bases."® After ten days of heavy fighting in Amman, mediation efforts 
by other A i ab Governments, and in particulai' by President Nasser of Egypt, a 
truce was brought about, which was signed in Cairo on September 27, 1970. As 
a result of the C ivil Wai' the Palestinian organizations suffered heavy^ casualties 
and lost Jordan as a base for operations. It was in mourning for this defeat that 
a group of young militants from A l Fatah formed the Black September 
Organization(BSO). Thereafter, the Palestinian terrorists organizations 
concentrated thek attacks mainly against the Jordanian akhne, Alia.!^» The fkst
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hint of the trouble ahead came when a bomb exploded in an Alia Boeing 707 
after it landed at Madrid on August 23, 1971. The tai'get was Hussein's mother.
Queen Mother Zien, who had boaided the jet at Amman but deplaned in 
Istanbul."! On September 8, 1971, as if  to mai'k the first anniversary of 
Dawson's Field and to remind King Hussein that the Palestinian Organizations 
had not forgotten their black September, a member of A l Fatah hijacked an Alia 
Caravel to Libya while flying from Beirut to Am m an.H ussein became aware 
of danger signals, and Alia, like El A l, began to carry security guards to protect I
itself against Arab tenorists. In the following months, they baffled two more 
hijack attempts on September 16 and October 4, 1971."®
The Palestinian terrorist organizations have also used their foreign terrorist 
group allies. The tactic of utilizing personnel from other tenorist groups was a 
method by which Israeli security could be penetrated. By 1972 Israeli security 
was extremely tight. However, the security was degined to detect Arab 
ten orists. A  perfect example of this occuned at Lod Akport on May 8, 1972, 
when three members of the Japanese Red Army(JRA), who had landed with 
many other passengers on an A k France plane aniving from Rome, suddenly 
flung hand-grenades and opened fke indiscriminately with automatic weapons al 
the scores of passengers in the crowded aiTival hall. Twenty-five were killed, 
including 17 from Puerto Rico, and scores were injured. Of the tlnee JRA 
terrorists canying out the massacre, one committed suicide, another was killed, 
and the thkd, Kozo Okamoto, were captured. Subsequent investigation
disclosed that all tliree had close links with the PFLPT^* The PFLP issued a 
statement in Beirut on May 31 claiming "complete responsibility for the brave 
operation" launched by one of its special groups, and Kozo Okamoto admitted 
that he and the two dead ten orists had acted on behalf of the PFLP."^ The PFLP 
instigated JRA tenorists to avenge the raid on the Sabena aircraft.
It is worthwhile to note that the Lod airport attack had been made to coincide 
with the fifth  anniversary of the AiabTsraeli war of 1967. One of the tenorist 
organizations' tactics is their attempt to link actions to specific events in order to 
reinforce the propaganda value of the incident. They act on fixed dates, for 
example, the anniversaires of oppressive events, revolutionary anniversaries or 
other important political occasions. Palestinian tenorist organizations have also 
timed their actions to sabotage impending political developments not to their 
liking, or to register opposition to developments they o p p o s e . For example, 
after the October 1973 war, in the December of that year, the Arab National 
Youth Organization(ANYO) attacked a Pan Am aiiiiner at Rome Akport. As a 
result of this attack, thirty two people were killed and eighteen wounded when 
five Aiabs sprayed it w ith machine-gun fke. They then seized a Lufthansa 
akcraft with six hostages at Rome ah*port and forced it to take off fo r the Middle 
East. However, they were refused permission to land by every Aiab state.
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including Libya, which physically blocked the runways to prevent them from 
doing so. Finally, they landed in Kuwait where they surrendered to the Kuwait 
a u t h o r i t i e s . Under interrogation, the tenorists revealed that the real plan was 
to assassinate UN Secretary General Waldheim and Henry Kissinger who were 
supposed to aiTived at Bekut Akport, and the aim of tliis attack was apply to 
pressure and thus achieve cancellation of a Middle East Conference due to the 
open in Geneva the following day, December 19."» Again, the tenorists of the 
ANYO hijacked a British Aii'way VC-10 in Dubai on November 21, 1974."® 
This incident followed Yask Arafat UN speech on November 14 to embanass 
both Yask Arafat and the PLO by demonstrating Palestinian opposition to any 
policy of moderation.!®»
The popularity of akcraft hijacking as a terrorist tactic diminished at least in 
pail because frequent repetition took away some of its shock value. At the same 
time, akcraft hijacking was losing favour due to the success of security 
measures. In addition, under the leadership of Yask Ai afat, the PLO began to 
stress political and propaganda achievements, notably in obtaining the mandate 
of the 1974 Rabat Arab summit to be the "sole representative" of the Palestinian 
people and in gaining widespread recognition in the United Nations and other 
international organizations.!®! As the PLO sought to refurbish its image, its
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terrorist activities declined. In fact, in 1974, Yask Arafat condemned akcraft 
hijacking as counter-productive and the PLO repeatedly stated that those 
responsible for such actions would be brought to trial before Palestinian 
tribunals.!®2 This in part contributed to reduce a substantial number of such 
attacks.
Akcraft hijacking by Palestinian terrorist organizations, however, continued 
to occur at intervals because it remains an unparalleled attention getting device 
for thek cause. On June 27, 1976, an aeroplane belonging to A k France, flying 
from Tel Aviv to Paris with 259 people, including twelve crew members, was 
hijacked shortly after it had taken off from Athens by an armed group of three 
men and a woman calling itself the Che Guevaia cell of the Haifa section of the 
PFLP. After landing at Benghazi in Libya, where one hostages was released, the 
plane proceeded to the akport at Entebbe, Uganda where President Id i Amin 
was clearly expecting it."® After the hijackers had been joined by six further 
ten orists, they demanded the release of 52 terrorists including Kozo Okamoto 
held in Israel for the 1972 Lod Akport massacre.^ ®* The Israeli Government had 
meanwhile held consultations and had appointed a special committee to deal 
with the question of how to react to the hijackers’ demand, and announced that it
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was ready to begin negotiations."^ W ith no hope of a negotiated settlement, and 
after intense planning and intelligence gathering, Israeli Government launched a 
bold rescue operation. On July 3, they dispatched their highly trained anti- 
ten'orist force, Sayaiet Maktal, in three Hercules C-10 transport aircraft, via 
Nairobi, to Entebbe. They landed at Entebbe Airport a few minutes after 
midnight on July 4, and the commandos poured out and chai'ged straight for the 
terminal building, detaching flank guaids to intercept Ugandan aimy 
reinforcements and deal with Ugandan soldiers firing from the control tower. 
During the operation Israeli forces killed all the hijackers and twenty Ugandan 
soldiers. Even though one Israeli soldier and four hostages were killed, the 
operation was highly successful.!®® The Entebbe rescue operation was a 
watershed because it marked the first long-distance anti-tenorist strike to rescue 
hostages and gave hope that other such operations would prove feasible.!®  ^The 
most dramatic reaction to the aviation terrorism so far has undoubtedly been the 
Israeli Entebbe rescue operation.!®* The policy adopted by Israel from the outset
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rejected any form of compromise with terrorism. The Israelis have always 
believed in the policy of "an eye for an eye", and have officially adopted the 
policy of massive retaliation. Although the Entebbe rescue operation did not 
totally eradicate this form of international terrorism,!®® it is clear that the Israeli's 
decisive action profoundly shook the Palestinian terrorist organizations and 
secured the additional desirable effect of deteiring further attacks.
Although the level of aviation terrorism attributable to Arab terrorists has 
been kept down to a reduced level since the late 1970s, the thieat of such 
violence still remains. More sinister than the number of attacks by Palestinian 
terrorists in recent years is the change in thek nature. Since early 1980 a series of 
demonstrative attacks featuring indiscriminate massacre have occurred. This 
change in the nature of the attacks was reflected by the increase in the number of 
victims. On 23 November, 1985, Palestinian terrorists of the Abu Nidal 
Organization(ANO), a most dangerous terrorist group led by Sabri al-Banna, 
which has targeted civilians indiscriminately in its terrorist operations, hijacked 
an Egyptak flight, carrying 98 passengers and 6 crew members. The hijackers 
demanded to be flown to Libya or Tunisia but agreed to land in Malta. After 
landing, the two wounded flight attendants and eleven women were released. 
Maltese officials refused to supply fuel unless all passengers were released. The 
hijackers then threatened to k ill a passenger every ten minutes, and a total of five 
persons were shot and thrown off the akcraft. After over 22 hours of 
negotiating, Egyptian Commandos stormed the akcraft. During this operation, 
the hijackers thiew hand grenades and a fke erupted on the akcraft. As a result
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of the incident a total of 60 people were killed and 35 people were injured.!^ ® 
Another brutal act of aviation terrorism by the ANO took place on December 27, 
1985. The ANO teixorists attacked Rome and Vienna airports with machine-guns 
and grenades. As a result of those attacks 17 people, including four terrorists, 
were killed, and 120 people injured.!'*! The ANO claimed responsibility for the 
massacres and they justified them as military attacks in retaliation for Israel's 
bombing of PLO headquailers in Tunis in October 1985. In addition, one of the 
reasons that prompted the ANO to organize the massacres at Rome and Vienna 
undoubtedly had to do with the lenient attitude taken by the Italian and Austrian 
governments towards the PLO, with which Abu Nidal considers himself at war. 
The attacks drew widespread condemnation from most states, including Italy 
and Austria that had been the most pro-Palestinian. !‘*^  The Israeli government 
issued a series of statements warning of unspecified military retaliation for the 
attacks.!^ ®
International teixorism in the forms of akcraft hijackings and sabotage attacks 
against c iv il aviation by Palestinian tenorist organizations has kept the 
Palestinian problem at the forefront of world attention and brought the 
Palestinian issue on to the international agenda. Attacks against civil aviation by 
Palestinian tenorist organizations, however, have increased the conflict in the
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Middle East and have made peaceful settlement extremely difficult. The 
employment of international terrorist tactics to achieve their political goals has 
resulted in an escalating cycle of violence. This has moved the Israeli 
government to adopt a hard line position. Moreover, the Palestinians have lost 
the ability to justify the morality of their actions by making indiscriminate attacks 
on civil aviation. Although the frequency of the Palestinian terrorist attacks 
against c ivil aviation has decreased since late 1970s, attacks against soft taigets 
such as airline offices continue to occur, mainly by groups belonging to the 
"rejectionist group". Recent attacks at Rome and Vienna airports in 1985 and the 
abortive El A l sabotage bomb attack in 1986 show that the Palestinian war 
against c ivil aviation continues without end.
III-3-1-3. Principal Palestinian Terrorist Groups That Have Conducted 
Attacks On Civil Aviation Targets
III-3-1-3-1. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine(PFLP)
The PFLP was established under the leadership of George Habash as a 
merger of three formerly independent groups, the Aiab Nationalist Movement's 
Heroes of Return, the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the 
Ahmad Jibril's Palestine Liberation Front, after the Arab defeat in the June 
1967."* The PFLP followed a Maixist-Leninist ideology, terminology and 
slogans and saw itself a part of a world revolutionary force with such allies as 
the Cubans, Chinese and North Koreans, but less so the Soviets because they
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were advocating a political settlements*^ The objective of the PFLP is to create 
an image of the Palestinian struggle as part of the world-wide revolution. 
Habash said once, "We must recognize that our revolution is a phase of world 
revolution: it is not limited to recognizing Palestine""®
The failure of the implementation of guenilla w aif are and consequent losses 
in manpower that developed in the wake of the June 1967 war were the main 
factors that gave rise to the PFLP launched tenoristic operations. The PFLP 
established itself eaify on as one of the most violent tenorist organizations. It 
concurrently sought to establish strong ties to other Maixist revolutionaiy 
organization such as the Irish Republican A im y (IRA), the German Bader- 
Meinhoff group, and the Japanese Red Ai'iny (JRA)."^ Habash strongly 
favoured well-publicized attacks on civilian taigets, and the PFLP reputation for 
ruthlessness was built on that strategy. Following the fii st aircraft hijacking of an 
El A l aeroplane to Algeria in July 1968, the PFLP engaged in a series of 
spectacular aviation terroristic campaigns including the Dawson's Field 
hijackings in September 1970 and Lod akport massacre in May 1972. The PFLP 
justified such operations by saying that they keep the Palestinian problem alive 
and make the world conscious of its existence.!*» However, such operations
145 Aiyeh Y. Yodfat and Yuval Arnon-Ohanna, PLO Strategy and Politics. 
London: Groom Helm, 1981, P. 25; Jillian Becker, Ibid; Helena Cobban, The 
Palestinian Liberation Organization: People. Power and Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984, PP. 140-152
^46 Interviews with Yask A i afat and George Habash, Maich 1972, in Fallaci, 
Ijitervisie con Ja S^ona, oiitd by Clake Sterling, The Ten or Network: The Secret 
Wai of International Terrorism. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981, P. 
121
147 Aiyeh Y. Yodfat and Yuval Ainon-Ohanna, op.cit, P. 26
148 Ibid,
104
III-3-1-3-2. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)/Fatah Revolutionary Council
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harmed the Palestinian organizations more than they helped them. For example, 
the multiple hijackings in September 1970 afforded justification for attacking 
them.
Moreover, George Habash has a powerful attachment to operations within 
Israel. After the PFLP had submitted to strong pressure from the PLO f
mainstream led by Yasir Arafat in 1975 and stopped aircraft hijacking, Habash 
said: "Our military action abroad is auxiliary action, compared to our military 
action in the occupied lands, which form the basic and principal focus of our 
revolutionary struggle."!*® The theory of Habash was to take advantage of the 
characteristics of terrorism as a tactic, avoiding direct confrontation with Israel 
by choosing an weak arena. The PFLP’s leaders reached the conclusion that a 
combination of activities both within and outside the state of Israel constituted 
the correct organizational response to the new m ilitaiy situation.
This terrorist organization was established in the late 1973 under the 
leadership of Sabri A l Banna, who was once the Fatah representative in Iraq. 
The Abu Nidal Organization, a rejectionist and extremely violent Palestinian 
terrorist group, split from Fatah in late 1973 when Yasir Arafat decided to 
restrict terrorism solely to Israeli targets in Israel and the occupied territories. 
After the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Abu Nidal became increasingly 
opposed to the ideological and political stance adopted by Arafat and his
105 .
supporters whom he considered moderate.!^ » The ANO opposes all efforts 
toward political reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The group contends 
that both inter-Ai'ab and intra-Palestinian teixorism are needed to precipitate an 
all-embracing Aiab revolution that alone can lead to the liberation of occupied 
Palestine. Abu Nidal determined to fight any effort at moderation by continuing 
international ten orist operations.
ANO initially operated from Iraq, under the aegis of the Iraqi government 
until the end of 1980, when Iraq played a decreased role in the functioning of the 
ANO as a result of the Iraqi government putting limitations on the group’s 
activities. Since then this group has been sponsored by Syria from 1981 to 1987, 
and Libya has continued to give support to the ANO to this day."^ ANO 
developed rapidly as an effective terrorist organization, operating under a 
vai'iety of names, such as the Abu Nidal Faction, Black June, Black September 
and A i ab Revolutionary Brigades, appropriate to specific targets. For example, 
under Iraqi influence during 1977-78, it concentrated on Syrian taigets, using the 
name Black June Organization (BJO)."® The first teixoristic act by the ANO
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against a civil aviation target took place on September 23, 1983 with the 
sabotage mid-air bombing of an aeroplane belonging to Gulf A ir. On that 
occasion the ANO used the name Aiab Revolutionary Brigades (ARB), a name 
used by the ANO for attacks on Kuwaiti, Jordanian and UAE targets.^" This 
organization was also responsible for attacks on Rome and Vienna airports in 
December, 1985, and the hijacking of a Pan Am airliner to Karachi, Pakistan, in 
September, 1986.
III-3-1-3-3. Black September Organization (BSC)
The Black September Organization (BSO) was created in 1971, and took its 
name from the debacle that took place in Jordan in September 1970, when King 
Hussein of Jordan turned his army against the Palestinian organizations driving 
them into exile in Lebanon, Syria and Ii aq.!^ ® It was primarily conceived out of 
the desire to overthrow King Hussein's regime in Jordan and revenge the defeat 
of September 1970 at his hands."® Unlike any other organizations, the BSO, 
rather than operating within an overall ideological framework, aimed to regain 
the lost honour of the Palestinian people."^
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The first operation of the BSO was the assassination of the Jordanian Prime 
Minister, Wasfi A l Tal, on November 28, 1971. Since then, the organization had 
been identified with acts of teixorism involving assassinations, letter bombings 
and attacks on c iv il aviation taigets. The most spectacular terrorist attack by the 
BSO was the Munich Olympic Massacre in September 1972. This incident was 
followed by the hijacking of a Lufthansa akliiier on October 29, 1972. Two 
tenorists of the BSO hijacked a Lufthansa akliner flying from Damascus to 
Frankfurt and obtained the release of the three surviving tenorists who had been 
captured during the Munich massacre operation."» Another act of violence 
against c ivil aviation attributed to this group was the attack at Athens in August 
1973, killing 5 people and injuring 55 others. As a result of a PLO decision to 
suspend tenorist operations, the Black September Organization ceased its 
operations in late 1974."®
III-3-1-3-4. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General 
Command(PFLP-GC)
PFLP-GC was established by Ahmad Jibril in 1968, when he took his 
faction, the former Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), out of the PFLP following 
a series of internal disputes. Jibril, who was an officer in the Syrian aimy, was 
interested in developing conventional military capabilities to complement PFLP- 
GC tenorist operations. !®» The PFLP-GC believes that the Palestinians should
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aim to liberate the whole of mandate Palestine by means of aimed struggle 
alone.!®! In its early days, the organization conducted intermittent raids into 
Israel and was responsible fo r a number of international tenorist attacks, 
including the destruction of a Swissair aircraft and an explosion on boai'd an 
Austrian aiiiiner, in 1970. Recently, a number of PFLP-GC members, who 
possessed a cache of weapons, including barometric pressure bombs 
constructed for use against aeroplanes in flight, were anested in Germany in 
October 1988.!®  ^ Subsequently, there have been widespread allegations, 
vehemently denied by Jibril, that the PFLP-GC was responsible for the 
destruction of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in December 1988."®
Particularly worrisome is the fact that the PFLP-GC possess sophisticated 
weapons in its arsenal such as Soviet SA-7 anti-aiixraft missiles and RPG-7 
rockets, and light aircraft such as motorized hang gliders and ultralights.!®* As a 
result, there is no doubt that the PFLP-GC is one of the most dangerous and 
tlneatening organization for the future.
H I-3-1-4. The Israeli Responses
Palestinian terrorist attacks against c ivil aviation presented a great challenge 
to Israel, as well as to the rest of the world. As a principal victim of Palestinian
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terrorism, the Israeli government has introduced many effective passive 
measures to prevent aviation terrorism and to reduce the effects of such attacks. 
Moreover, Israel generally has refused to negotiate with teixorists or to meet 
thek demands. However, Israel's passive counter-measures have not been 
sufficient to terminate aviation tenorism. The controversial issue arose whether 
Israel should respond to aviation teixorism just as she had to terrorists attacks 
within Israeli teixitory - namely, by striking at thek bases. This issue has never 
been satisfactory resolved.
In fact, in the late 1960s, the Israeli government adopted a policy of m ilitaiy 
retaliation against Palestinian teixorist attacks. Following the El A l akcraft 
hijacking to Algiers and the attack at Athens akport, Israeli commandos attacked 
Bekut akport and destroyed several civilian akcraft. The Bekut akport attack 
was decided upon because Israel assumed that the responsibility for the 
Palestinian tenorist operations against Israeli taigets fell on Arab governments 
which had provided support to Palestinian teixorist organizations. The response 
of the international community following the Israeli action was largely negative, 
which had an important impact on the Israeli government. As an act of military 
reprisal, it failed to prevent international tenorism.
In Israel’s battle against aviation teixorism committed by Palestinian 
teixorists, thek main response was the introduction of preventive security 
measures. The wave of akcraft hijacking in the late 1960s resulted in placement 
of armed security guaids on all El A l akcraft, the installation of electronic 
detection devices at akports and the stationing of Israeli security staff at foreign 
akports served by El A l akliners. i®® The best known, and possibly most
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stringent, security measures are those undertaken by El A l airlines. Security for 
Israeli akliners is divided into two distinctive components: akport and akcraft.
At all El A l points of depaiiure, passengers aie usually asked to arrive two 
aiid half hours before flight time fo r the luggage security procedures and 
intenogations. While all luggage is physically searched for weapons and 
explosive devices, passengers aie asked a list of pre-reheaised questions. These 
questions include: What is the purpose of your trip? Is this luggage yours? Did 
you pack it yourself? Do you carry any electronic devices? Has anyone given 
you anything, a paicel, a letter or gift?. The answers, if the security officers have 
any suspicions, are cross-checked by telephone with the family or the friends of 
passengers."® If complete security is still not guaianteed, the passenger or 
potential terrorist can expect to be seaiched once again and even denied access 
to the akcraft. In addition to high-technological security devices, the Israelis 
have developed the safety of thek aklines tlirough the employment of labour 
intensive security systems. The routine instigated by El A l exemplifies Israel's 
belief in human ability over modern secuiity devices. One writer advocates 
Israel's system because:
"While a metal detector can indicate if  a passenger is cairying gun, and an X- 
ray machine can detect a hidden gun or hand-grenade in a travel bag, and 
while new expensive machines can detect the odour and chemical signature 
of plastic explosives, they do have very real limitations. Only a specially 
trained individual can detect the nervous sweat of a man carrying a pistol, 
grenade, or a sophisticated bomb"."^
166 Gayle Rivers, The War against the Terrorists: How to W in it. New York: 
Charter Books, 1986, P. 58
167 Samuel M. Katz, Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against 
Teixorism. London: Arms and Armour, 1990, P. 72
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The effectiveness of the Israeli security system for El A1 was demonstrated on 
April 17, 1986, when a pregnant Irish woman named Ann Marie Murphy was 
aiTested at Heathrow airport in London. In fact, a Palestinian terrorist, Nazii’ 
Hindawi, tried to destroy El A1 Flight 016 in mid-aii* with 373 people on board 
by a sophisticated plastic bomb hidden in the luggage of his g iii friend, Murphy, 
without her knowledge. During the typical check-in process, Israeli security staff 
questioned Murphy as to the reason fo r her trip to Israel. Not being a Jew, being 
cleai'ly pregnant and travelling alone, Murphy ai'oused great suspicion. After 
admitting that the baby’s father was a Jordanian-born Palestinian, Nizai' 
Hindawi, who wanted to avoid El A1 because he was a Palestinian, the El A1 
security staff searched her luggage, and discovered 1.5 kilograms of Semtex 
attached to a sophisticated detonating device. Consequently, the whole story of 
the abortive bomb attack against El A1 was revealed to the world. In this case, 
there is no doubt that the systematic El A1 security system saved the lives of 
innocent passengers and crew members.
Once on boaid, the security only increases. Israelis take extreme security 
measures to protect then national ahlines in flight. These included aimoured- 
plated reinforcement of the fuselage and all caigo aieas, intended to secure the 
pressurized ahcraft against an explosion or a mid-ah shootout. It was 
demonstrated that this precaution was successful in August 1972, when a bomb 
went off in an El A1 ahcraft just after taking off from Rome aiiport. The damage 
was appaiently limited and the aiicraft was able to return to Rome aiiport 
without any ca su a lty .N o w  the Israelis go a step further. After a thorough 
initial seaich, luggage and other cargo aie placed inside armoured altitude 
chambers. The ah is then pumped out of these armoured casings, simulating the
168 Samuel M. Katz, Ibid, P. 73
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decrease in almospheiic pressure in the luggage hold as the aircraft ascends. If 
any bag contained an explosive that relied on air pressure rather than time delay, 
it would go off harmlessly in the armoured container.M oreover, it is also 
known that, as a counter-measure against missile attack, the Israelis use 
electronic infra-red deflectors to thwart heat-seeking SAM missiles. In addition, 
at Lod airport in Israel, passengers aie taken by bus to aircraft pai'ked on the 
field, which provides better security for aiicraft. The massive security measures 
which Israel has applied to El A1 aiilines might be considered extreme, but the 
measures seem to have helped make El A1 safe from aviation teiTorism.
W ith the success of El A l's security system, many experts have suggested that 
aiilines and airports should fo llow  the direction taken by El Al. However, it is 
proper to note that El A l is a unique airline for the following reasons: i)Under 
the constant tlireat of violent attack, the Israeli government demands constant 
vigilance to protect El Al, the symbol of Israeli identity, from attack by hostile 
Arab states and extreme Palestinian terrorist organizations, ii) El A l is a small 
international carrier w ith only around twenty aircraft in its fleet, and the airline 
has few destinations to service. Consequently, El A l is able to dispatch its own 
highly trained security teams at any depailure point, iii) As Israel has only one 
international aiiport, this allows it to achieve El A l's operational centralisation at 
Ben Gurion airport in Tel Aviv, iv) El A l obtains unpai alleled state support and 
intelligence infomation can easily be fed into its advanced secuiity system since 
El A l is a state-run aii'line. For these reasons, El A l was and is able to develop its 
own unique security systems. In a sense, it is impossible to apply El A l type 
total security systems to a major airline offering a broader range of flights from 
fai* more airports. Tlie adoption of slow and labom-intensive El A l security
Gayle Rivers, op.cit, P. 58
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systems may bring about problems such as aiiport congestion and may also 
disconcert. Professor Paul W ilkinson obseiwed:
"If all aviation authorities were to introduce military-style security of the type 
utilised by El Al, the whole c iv il aviation system would rapidly seize up".^^“
Furthermore, my former colleague. Dr. Robin H ill, points out that:
"Hie accelerating surge of passenger pressure w ill make it umealistic and 
practically impossible fo r El A l's slow and steady methods to be adopted as 
common procedures because the time factor involved would result in 
unconscionable levels of terminal congestion".
Although there is no doubt that E l A l's security system is a model example for 
the safety of civil aviation which other airlines might follow, it is unlikely that, 
with the expected expansion of passenger tlnoughput in the next decade, the 
adoption of the entire package of El A l's security measures is applicable to the 
aviation niaiket in general. The size and complexity of the operation at major 
aii'ports, and the enormous numbers of passengers and luggage passing thi ough 
means that it would be impracticable to fo llow  all security procedures to El A l 
standards. The fact that there is no effective combination of techniques which 
ensure passenger convenience and swiftness of operation poses a dilemma for 
the decision makers. In this respect, the design of aviation security fo r the future 
should not slow down the progress of passengers tlirough the various controls. 
Under the present circumstances, however, it is likely that many other aiiiines 
could gain benefits by emulating El A l's security systems. In emergency 
situations where greater attention must be given, by the adoption of El A l type 
security methods, many airlines can produce good results for the safety of c ivil 
aviation. This was demonstrated during the Gulf crisis. The Western
Paul Wilkinson, The Lessons of Lockerbie, op.cit, P. 15 
171 Robin E. H ill, op.cit, P. 217
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governments and airline industry possess the accumulated knowledge and the 
technology but not the w ill to enforce the tight security measures of El Al.
III-3-2. Other Cases
As the quest for a Palestinian homeland has gradually gained a certain 
credibility and respectability, the aim to get worldwide public attention for the 
Palestinian problem has been abandoned. This has resulted in reducing the 
number of attacks on civil aviation by the Palestinian groups.
Other Middle Eastern Muslim terrorist groups, however, began to adopt 
aviation terrorism as their lactic on a large scale from the late 1970s. Since 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came into power in Iran in Februaiy 1979, 
ten'orism has been employed as a tool of foreign and interior policy by 
revolutionary Iran. The phenomenon gained impetus in the early 1980s, when 
the Hezbollah organization started to operate in Lebanon and in the international 
arena, and Shia terrorism became one of the most prominent expressions of 
international terrorism. A variety of tactics including aircraft hijacking have 
come to be associated with Iranian-sponsored international terrorism. During the 
1980s, Shia terrorists were involved in at least 13 aircraft hijacking incidents. In 
most cases, aircraft hijackings developed into serious crisis situations involving 
many states. Diverse states thus have been confronted with complex political 
and diplomatic challenges associated with attacks against c ivil aviation by Shia 
terrorist groups. The challenges have been connected with the fact that the 
initiators and supporters of the teiTorist attacks were other sovereign stales. 
Moreover, the systematic employment of hijacking tactics and the high lethality 
of the attacks have provided great dilemmas for the targeted states, which have
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of the attacks have provided great dilemmas for the taigeted states, which have 
had to cope with intense public pressure to safeguard the hostages.
The ah’craft hijacking by Shia fundamentalist groups was launched in late 
1970s. When the Shia Muslim leader. Imam Musa Sadr, disappeaied in August 
1978 while on a visit to Libya, Amal, which was founded in mid-1970s in an 
attempt to ensure adequate representation for the Shia population in Lebanon, 
began to launch actions against Lebanese leftists and Libya. The disappearance 
of Musa, in fact, prompted Amal to launch a campaign of aircraft liijackings to 
gain the release of its leader. The fiis t attack occuned on January 16, 1979, 
when a Middle Eastern Ahlines(MEA) was hijacked by six members of Amal. 
The hijackers demanded the release of theii* leader and a news conference was 
held in Beirut by hijackers to publicize their d e m a n d . This incident was 
followed by more than 6 other ah'craft hijacking attempts with the same aim of 
releasing Imam Musa Sadr. This series of aircraft hijackings by Amal failed to 
cause a great impact on international affahs possibly because of the mysterious 
ch'cumstances around the disappeai ance of its leader.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah which was established in early 1983 under the 
influence of Islamic revolution in Iran launched its aviation terrorism campaign 
against moderate Arab states and the West. Its fiis t operation was the successful 
hijacking of an aeroplane of Ah France to Teheran. The hijackers demanded the 
release of Lebanese prisoners in French prisons and the withdrawal of French 
troops from Chad and Lebanon.The next major operation by Hezbollah was 
the hijacking of a Kuwaiti Ahlhies aeroplane to Telnan in 1984. The hijackers
^72 U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Worldwide Significant Criminal 
AcisTnvQlvmg C ivil Aviation: January-December 1979. P. 1
173 U.S. Depaiiment of Transportation, FAA, Worldwide Significant Criminal 
Acts Involving C ivil Aviation: Januai y-December 1983. P. 16
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attacks against U.S. and French installations. Kuwaiti authorities refused to meet 
this demand and the hijackers were overpowered by Iranian security forces.^ ^  ^
Like previous hijackings by Amal, the aim of releasing 17 Lebanese prisoners 
featured on several occasions including another Kuwaiti aircraft hijacking in 
1988.1^ 5 As one of the most sophisticated terrorist organizations, Hezbollah 
provides a great threat to civil aviation. This has been demonstrated by incidents 
such as a TW A 847 aircraft hijacking in 1985, which w ill be discussed in 
Chapter IV  in detail. More recently, in the wake of the assassination of 
Hezbollah leader. Sheikh Abbas Musawi, by Israeli forces in February 16, 
1992,1^ ® it is not difficult to anticipate that terrorist action aimed at revenge w ill 
be escalated by Hezbollah. At Musawi's funeral, Hezbollah vowed that they 
would avenge.i^ ^ This suggests a strong indication that Hezbollah might revert to 
international tenorism including attacks against civil aviation in reaction to the 
death of their leader. In fact, a revenge operation was begun on March 7, 1992, 
when the top security officer, Ehud Sadan, at the Israeli embassy in Turkey was 
killed by Hezbollah terrorists who planted a bomb in his car. Hezbollah claimed 
responsibility for this attack. A  caller on behalf of the Islamic Revenge 
Organisation told one newspaper that "We have given an answer to the 
I s r a e l i s . I t  is believed this was a reference to Israel's assassination of
^74 U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Worldwide Significant Criminal 
Acts Involving C ivil Aviation: January-December 1984. P. 17
175 por more information and useful analyses on this incident, see Robin E. 
H ill, op.cit, PP. 56-94
176 The Times, February 17, 1992
177 The Guardian, February 18, 1992
178 The Sunday Times, Mai'ch 8, 1992
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Musawi. Another much more serious and destructive car bomb attack against an 
Israeli embassy to avenge Israel’s killing of Musawi occurred on March 17, 
1992, in Buenos Ahes, A i gentina. As a result of the attack, 29 people were killed 
and more than 240 people were injured. Hezbollah also claimed 
responsibility.
In addition to the threats by Shia Muslim ten orists, it is extremely important 
to note that the recent Gulf conflict maiks a point of divergence in international 
terrorism as targets include airports and civil airliners.^ *® When civil aviation 
was thieatened by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf Wai*, 
both the nature of the threats and its targets were cleai\ Although the intention to 
use international terrorism as an auxiliary weapon in the Gulf Wai came to 
nothing thanks to the combined efforts of the coalition governments, there is still 
a danger.^ ®  ^The prime taigets aie the carriers and airline facilities belonging to 
high profile states such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, 
Germany and France. Furthermore, in the wake of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the 
new conspicuously pro-Western allegiance of moderate Ai ab states brings forth 
new targets. The civil aviation of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia as well as 
Kuwait, all of which actively support the U.S. and U.K.-led alliance, may be 
tai'geted due to the Arab political divisions following the Gulf crisis. The aii’ports 
in the major Western states, however, aie unlikely to be the main targets for the 
sophisticated tenorists, although they w ill continue to be at considerable risk. 
There is a great possibility that terrorists would find and exploit the weak links 
in the international aviation network. In this respect, a major enhancement of
^79 The International Herald Tribune, March 21-22, 1992 
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counter-teiTorist measures should be concentrated on the vulnerable ahports in 
Africa, Asia and the Mediterranean states.
III-3-2-1. The Responses of Middle Eastern States
As Middle Eastern states, principal supporters of the various Middle Eastern 
tenorist organizations, have recognized that they aie also exposed and 
vulnerable to aviation terrorism, some of the moderate Aiab governments 
including Kuwait, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have taken a hard line policy in 
combating aviation terrorism since the late 1970s. However, it is important to 
note that some of the A i ab states such as Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya continue to 
maintain close relations with Palestinian and Shia tenorist organizations and 
provide dhect and indirect support to them. Since the late 1970s, as Kuwait has 
emerged dramatically as a victim of the aviation tenorism campaign, the 
government of Kuwait has staiied to take firm  policy of "no compromise" 
towai'd the tlireat of aviation terrorism. This firm  stand was demonstrated in 
December 1984, when a Kuwaiti airliner was hijacked by Shia tenorists. The 
hijackers demanded the release of the 17 prisoners jailed in Kuwait for bomb 
attacks against U.S. and French installations. The hijackers forced the pilot to 
land in Teheran where over the next 6 days the terrorists beat, tortured, harassed 
at least six passengers and eventually killed two Americans.However, the 
Kuwaiti Government showed great determination in refusing to release the 17 
prisoners. Even when the Iranians finally moved in and ended the ordeal, the
182 Time, December 17, 1985, PP. 24-26; U.S. Department of Transportation, 
FAA, Worldwide Significant Criminal Acts Involving C ivil Aviation: January- 
December 1984. P. 17
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Kuwaiti authorities thanked the Iranian authorities, but still refused to allow any 
of the 17 prisoners to be freed.
Kuwaits* "no compromise" policy was severely tried during the hijacking 
crisis in 1988, when a Kuwaiti Airways B-747 flying between Bangkok and 
Kuwait was hijacked by terrorists over Strait of Hormuz and diverted to Mashad 
in Iran. During a two-week period, the plane flew to Larnaca in Cyprus and 
finally to Algiers. The 122 passengers aboard included 3 distant members of 
Kuwaiti royal family. The hijackers shot two Kuwaiti soldiers at Larnaca; they 
threatened to blow up the plane; they got one of the royal personages to call on 
the Kuwaiti Government to release the 17 prisoners. However, none of these 
threats worked. The Kuwaiti Government maintained a firm  policy of not 
yielding to terrorism. One Kuwaiti newspaper supported the government's 
policy by reporting: "Even if they k ill all the hostages there are on the plane, we 
w ill never, ever release the killers who aie here in Kuwait The hijackers, 
eventually, were forced to leave Algeria empty handed. In this case, there is no 
doubt that the determination of the government of Kuwait, and the fact that there 
was no sign of it ever changing its policy against terrorists brought this exploit 
to an abrupt end. This affair provided an unequivocal warning to teirorists that 
further hijackings against Kuwait would be of no effect. Despite continuing 
threats from Shia terrorists, the Kuwaiti authorities remained steadfast in their 
refusal to release the 17 Kuwaiti prisoners. After the Iraqi invasion, the prisoners 
either escaped or were released.
As a result of adopting a hard line policy in dealing with the hijackers, the 
Kuwaiti Government also became involved in a number of international counter-
183 Winnipeg Free Press, April 15, 1988
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teiTorism efforts. For example, in November 1988, the Kuwaiti Cabinet 
endorsed the international convention on acts of violence at c ivil airports.'®^
Like Kuwait, since the late 1970s Egypt has taken a firm  counter-tenorism 
stand and has called fo r stronger international cooperation to combat teiTorism, 
including improved shaiing of terrorism related information and stiengthened 
international protocols dealing with arrest, extradition, and prosecution of 
tenorists. In the early stage, to deter aircraft hijacking, Egypt established a 
special counter-terrorism unit, known as Saiqa("lightning"), in the late 1970s.‘®® 
However, the reputation of Egypt’s anti-tenorist unit does not stand veiy high 
due to two disastrous assaults. In February 1978, two Palestinian terrorists 
gunned down a close friend of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in Cyprus. After 
the killing, the two tenorists took several hostages. Some of the hostages were 
released in return for safe passage to the aiiport at Laniaca where an ahcraft of 
Cyprus Ah'ways was put at their disposal. After flying around the Middle East 
and being refused permission to land in numerous states, the ahcraft returned to 
Cyprus. In the meanwhile, Egypt had dispatched 100 members of Saiqa to 
Cyprus, though the Cypriot authorities had been informed a group of negotiators 
was on its way. Despite the fact that negotiation had aheady progressed to a 
level where the freeing of the hostages was appaiently imminent, the Saiqa 
attacked the hijackers, resulting in a fhefight with Cypriot forces. The incident 
resulted in 15 deaths and 22 injuries. The two teiTorists released then hostages
184 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Ten orism: 1989. P. 13
1^5 Leroy Thompson, The Rescuers: The W orld's Top Anti-Terrorist Units. 
Devon, U.K.: David & Charles Publisher, 1986, P. 167
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and surrendered to the authorities.*®® The second abortive operation was even 
more of a disaster. On November 23, 1985, an Egyptian aircraft carrying 92 
passengers was hijacked by Palestinian tenorists and landed in Malta. Tliis time. 
Force 777, Egypt’s cuirent anti-tenorist unit, was sent to Malta to cairy out a 
rescue operation if needed. In this case, the Maltese agreed to the rescue 
operation. The Egyptian anti-terrorist unit was on the ground for 11 hours 
waiting for orders to go in, but did not seem to have used the time gathering 
intelligence about the whereabouts of the hijackers and theh armament despite 
the availability of released hostages and the possibility of using surveillance 
devices. Five passengers had been shot prior to the Egyptian assault, which 
would certainly justify going in. However, the rescue operation went badly 
wi'ong, due to its hasty planning. Force 777 entered tlnough the baggage 
compaiiment but the opening of the door in the belly of the aiicraft triggered a 
warning buzzer and light in the cockpit. During the struggle, the hijackers tlnew 
hand grenades and a fhe erupted on the aeroplane. As a result of the violence a 
total of 60 people were killed, including 2 of the hijackers, and approximately 35 
people were injured.*®^
The stonning of the hijacked Egyptian ahiiner at Malta abruptly reminded the 
world of the high cost of an emerging international consensus for a hard line 
policy toward teiTorism. The publicity given to such commando feats as the 
1976 Israeli raid at Entebbe, and West Germany’s 1977 rescue operation at
186 Edwai'd F, Mickolus, op.cit, PP.774-775; U.S. Depaitment of 
Transportation, FAA, Significant Worldwide Criminal Acts Involving C ivil 
Aviation: January-December 1978. P. 2;
^87 Time, December 9, 1985, PP. 6-8; Leroy Thompson, op.cit, P. 168; U.S. 
Department of Transportation, FAA, Worldwide Significant Criminal Acts 
Involving C ivil Aviation: January-December 1985. P. 21; Richard Clutterbuck, 
Kidnap. Hijack and Extortion. London: Macmillan Press, 1987, P. 195
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Mogadishu, Somalia, may have inflated international expectation. The 
international community, however, has to be awai’e that such methods heighten 
the risk to hostages. According to a study by the California-based RAND 
Corporation, 79% of all hostage deaths in ten orist situations occur during rescue 
operations.*®® Another problem is that terrorists can leani new techniques from 
them clashes with anti-teiTorist forces. One sign of that learning process is that 
would-be airline hijackers now tend to be much more heavily armed than they 
were in the past. It is now cleai’ that ten orists anticipate such operations and set 
up specific defences against them. At the same time, the recent strategy adopted 
by tenorists, primarily Aiab fundamentalists, whereby they are w illing and 
eager to sacrifice them own lives enormously complicates anti-tenorist 
operations. Using a show of m ilitaiy force to convince them that their position is 
hopeless does not facilitate them suiTender; instead, it inflames them fanaticism. 
Although some experts doubt that force w ill ever prevent acts of tenorism, the 
best argument for the increased use of anti-tenorist units rests in their deterrent 
effect. Despite the loss of 58 innocent lives, the strong determination of the 
Egyptian government towaid tenorism underscored the principle that tenorists 
must be punished whatever the price. In this sense, Egypt’s bold action received 
strong backing across Europe, in Israel and in a number of Arab states. But what 
long-term impact the bloody incident on Malta w ill have on the growing war 
against tenorism still is uncertain. Although the Egyptair affair triggered further 
sober discussion on this matter, it is cleai* that there w ill be many more losses if 
the international community does not act. I f  the international community 
vacillates, ten orists w ill gain the upper hand.
188 U.S. News & W orld Report, December 9, 1985, P. 30
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After this incident, training assistance for the anti-terrorist unit has been given 
by GSG-9, GIGN, and U.S. experts at the request of the Egyptian Government. 
In addition, in cooperation with the United States and other Western states, 
Egypt has taken steps to strengthen its anti-aviation terrorism capabilities. These 
include increased training and education for security officers involved in civil 
aviation security, improved aviation security procedures and safeguards at 
Cairo's international airport.***
Saudi Arabia, to cope with aviation terrorism, also established an anti-terrorist 
unit in 1971. It has received extensive training from GIGN, GSG-9 and U.S. 
anti-terrorist experts. In addition, following the cover up in the late 1970s of the 
hijacking and burning of a Saudi aircraft, the Saudi Government introduced the 
programme of sky marshals and more emphasis has been put on training anti- 
tenorist forces to retake a hijacked airliner.**® Especially since the early 1980s, 
Saudi Arabia has continued to place a strong emphasis on upgrading its counter- 
tenorism capabilities. W ith this in aim, Saudi security officials continue to 
cooperate with Western security agencies on information exchange and training 
programmes. A t the same time, in August 1988, the Ulema, the nation's highest 
judicial authority, issued a religious decree declaring sabotage, including aircraft 
hijacking and airplane bombing, as a major crime punishable by death.*** The 
Saudi Government’s concern regarding international terrorism deepened in the 
face of continued attacks from Iran and new tlneats from Iraq at the onset of 
Gulf crisis. In March 1990, the Saudis took steps to identify illegal residents and
^89 U.S. Depaiiment of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988. PP. 11-12
190 Leroy Thompson, op.cit, PP. 161-162
191 U.S. Depai’tment of State, Patterns of Global Teirorism: 1988. P. 17
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to either regularize theii* status or deport tliem.**^ Tliis process was accelerated 
during the Gulf crisis.
Ill-3-6. Closing Remarks
Tenorism has been a prominent feature of politics of the Middle East, and 
laige scale atrocities have been committed in pursuit of some political, religious 
or other ideological goal. Aviation terrorism has its place among the means 
employed by the Middle Eastern terrorists groups. Whatever the underlying 
motives, the taigets of Middle Eastern tenorists aie in part predictable. The 
groups consider Israel to be theii- archenemy and the Western governments to 
be Satanic regimes. Because some of the Middle Eastern terrorist groups have 
chosen civil aviation as one of their targets, the airlines of these states are put at a 
considerably higher level of risk. Judging from previous experience, many 
incidents have involved the release of imprisoned terrorists. This suggest that 
any states which detain Middle Eastern tenorists in prison are in a potential state 
of threat. For example, Kuwaiti airlines did not attract particular attention prior to 
1982. After the Kuwaiti government had 17 members of the Hezbollah sentenced 
and jailed for the attacks on the U.S. and the French installations, the airline 
became a target. In this respect, the international community must keep h ack of 
political developments in order to foresee possible danger and to tackle the 
problem. Without this effort, democratic states w ill remain a vuhierable target to 
terrorist attacks because of their open societies and ease of movement across and 
within their frontiers. In paiiiculai’. West European, African and Asian states are 
at high risk from aviation terrorism spilling over from the Middle East.
192 U.S. Depaiiment of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990. P. 29-31
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IÏI-4 . The Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
III-4 -1 . Soviet Union
The scope and nature of aviation tenorism in the former Soviet Union is still 
obscure because it has been fundamentally secret or covert up to now. The acts 
of violence against civil aviation in the Soviet Union were played down, mainly 
because such spectacular incidents on newspaper front pages might inspire 
further attempts. It had long been government policy in the former Soviet Union 
to give brief, contemptuous, back-page treatment, or more normally no publicity 
at all to all acts of violence with political overtones so as not to put ideas into the 
heads of politically disenchanted individuals who might be stimulated by the 
efforts of others to duplicate such acts. Tlie abbreviated accounts of ahcraft 
hijackings that have filtered down to the public suggest that no one but a fool 
would attempt the seizure of a Soviet aircraft. There were military guai'ds at 
Soviet airports and any hijack attempt would be followed by retribution at its 
most severe.**  ^However, it seemed that none of these factors discouraged acts 
of violence against the Soviet civ il aviation. It is cleai' that the Soviet Union 
experienced substantial aviation tenorism. It was reported that 27 Soviet c ivil 
aviation ahcraft were hijacked in 1990 alone, mainly by youths seeking asylum 
in Western European states.***
The fh'st confhmed aircraft hijacking incident in the Soviet Union occurred 
August 21, 1960, when a man and a woman attempted to hijack a domestic flight
^93 James A. Arey, The Sky Pirates. London: Ian Allan, 1973, PP. 191-192 
194 U.S. Depaiiment of State, Patterns of Global TeiTorism: 1990. P. 13
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but were overpowered by crew members.*** Since then, Soviet c iv il aviation has 
been exposed to similar attacks. The following Table HI-4 shows the extent of 
aircraft hijacking in the former Soviet Union.**®
Table 111-4
Aircraft Hijacking in the Soviet Union 
(1960-1990)
Year No. of Incidents
1960-1964 2
1965-1969 1
1970-1974 6
1975-1979 5
1980-1984 5
1985-1989 8
1990 27
Total 54
In the early yeais, the Soviet Union did not show much concern fo r aviation 
teiTorism because it had not suffered from serious threat of such attack. The 
Soviet Union did not take pai*t in the 1963 Tokyo Convention. However, in 
1970, it showed an interest in the subject and took part in the conference 
proceedings at the Hague. It was obvious that this change of attitude demanding 
strong action against aviation terrorism was, in fact, derived from the fact that 
the Soviet Union had suffered three such incidents before the Hague 
Conference.**^ In the early 1970s, there were several aircraft hijacking incidents 
which led the Soviet Union to introduce domestic measures against such attacks.
195 Edward F. Mickolus, op.cit, P. 52
196 Data aie drawn from Narrative Report and U.S. Department of 
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One of the serious incidents during this period occuiTed on October 15, 1970, 
when an Aeroflot aircraft with 52 people was hijacked to Turkey by a 
Lithuanian truck driver and his son. The hijackers suixendered to the Turkish 
authorities and requested pohtical asylum. The Soviet authorities immediately 
demanded extradition of the hijackers, but the Turkish government refused the 
Soviet request by saying that the two states had no extradition agreement and 
that Turkey considered this a political crime, for which extradition does not 
apply.*** After the incident the Soviet Union announced the institution of a new 
security policy, in which two thousand aimed guaids would be assigned to 
travel on Soviet aircraft flying near Soviet borders or from airports from which 
an ahcraft might be hijacked. Another five hundred detectives would be posted 
at ahports to check passengers and luggage before boarding.*** In addition, 
during the meeting of the United Nations in 1970, the Soviet official strongly 
emphasized the urgent need to stop ahcraft hijacking, and to regaid such acts as 
serious criminal offences.^ *® In this nanow frame of reference, the Soviet Union 
was trying to refuse political recognition of individuals involved in attacks 
against Soviet c iv il aviation.^ ®* Domestically, with the recognition of the threat of 
attack against civ il aviation in the eaily 1970s, the Soviet Union introduced 
several steps to protect itself from aviation terrorism. A  Decree of the
198 Edwai'd F. Mickolus, op.cit, PP. 225-226; James A. Ai‘ey, op.cit, PP. 194- 
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199 Ibid, P. 226
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Praesidium was enacted on January 3, 1973. It provided a penalty of tliree to ten 
yeai's for ahcraft hijacking, up to fifteen years if a threat of violence existed or 
accident resulted, and fifteen yeai s or death if death or serious injury resulted.^ ®  ^
Two months later in March 1973, the Principles of Criminal Legislation of the 
USSR and the Union Republics were revised to include ahcraft hijacking.^ ®* At 
the same time, the Soviet Union signed anti-hijacking agreements with Iran in 
August 1973 and Finland in August 1974. The agreements emphasized the return 
of the hijackers and the political defense was ruled out regardless of what the 
motives of hijackers might be.^ ®*
In spite of these efforts against aviation terrorism at an early stage, the former 
Soviet Union was a frequent victim of aviation tenorism. One of the most 
serious incidents occuned December 2, 1988, when four armed Soviet gangsters 
hijacked an Aeroflot flight to Israel. According to the official Soviet account, the 
hijack drama had begun on December 1, 1988, when the gang commandeered a 
busload of Soviet school children at gun point neai* the city of Ordzhonikidze, in 
the Caucasus Mountains. The gang and then hostages then drove to an aii'port 
near the town Mineralnye Vody, about 750 miles south of Moscow, where they 
entered into 22 hours of negotiations with the authorities. The gang thieatened to 
k ill the children and then teachers unless they were given an aircraft and allowed 
to fly  out of the Soviet Union. At the same time, they demanded a more than $2 
million ransom in cash. According to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, a plane was
202 Cunent Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1973, P. 7
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provided in order to save children's lives.^ ®* The Soviet Union's policy had 
always been to refuse any negotiations with hijackers. Usually special anti­
terrorist forces have been employed to bring about a conclusion to ahcraft 
hijackings. On this occasion, the Soviet Union acquiesced to the hijackers' 
demand for an ahcraft and no attempt was made to stop the ahcraft from taking 
off. In fact, the Soviet Union had come under public criticism in Mai'ch 8, 1988, 
when nine people died, including five hijackers, and 20 people were injured, in 
the storming of a hijacked ahcraft by anti-teiTorists troops. The death to ll raised 
questions in the Soviet media over the authorities' handling of the hijack 
incident.2®® The hijackers had originally asked to go to any one of the 
noncommunist states, including Pakistan, Iraq, and South Africa as well as 
Israel, that did not have an extradition treaty with the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
Union decided to ask the Israeli authorities to allow the liijacked ahcraft to land, 
because Israel, with the strong stand against international tenorism, was 
considered to be the state most likely to hand back the hijackers, especially at a 
time when it was anxious to improve relations with the Soviet Union and see 
diplomatic relations restored.^ ®  ^ Meanwhile, the Israelis decided to allow the 
ahcraft to land because of the great possibility that the hijackers might be Jewish 
refusnik.2®* An Israeli fighter ahcraft shadowed the hijacked ahcraft when it was 
in Israeli ahspace. Hundreds of Israeli troops were at a military airfield outside 
Tel Aviv when the ahcraft landed. The hijackers, believing that they could not
205 The Times, December 3, 1988
206 Facts on File, May 13, 1988, P. 348
207 The Independent, December 3, 1988
208 Facts on File, December 9, 1988, P. 905
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be extradited, suireiidered and released the flight crew, about 10 minutes after 
landing. The Israeli Defence Minister, Mr. Yitzhak Rabin, stated that Israel was 
suspicious about the hijackers' motive, and he made it clear that there was no 
question of them being sent back to the Soviet Union until Israel had been given 
some satisfactory answers. Under Israeli law the hijackers could face charges 
which caixy long terms of imprisonment, and there would be no need to hand 
them over if any questions remained unanswered about the affah.^ ®*
After interrogation of the hijackers, it was obvious that the hijackers had 
assumed they would be granted automatic asylum simply because they had 
escaped from the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviet Union, which has 
taken a strong line against international ten orism since Gorbachev’s accession to 
power, asked for the return of the hijackers, and the Israeli authorities 
recognized that this might enable Israel to seize the opportunity to unblock some 
of the diplomatic channels which had prevented normal relations between two 
states.^ *® Consequently, the Israeli government decided to send the liijackers 
back to the Soviet Union, reportedly after extracting a promise that they would 
not be sentenced to death.^ ** The leader of the hijackers, Pavel Yakshiyants, was 
sentenced to 15 years in prison, and thi*ee others were each given 14-yeai' prison 
sentence. A fifth  man who had helped to plot the hijack but had not taken part 
was given a three-year prison sentence.^ *  ^According to the report of the Times, 
Israel's swift return of the Soviet hijackers was frequently cited by the Soviet
209 xbe Tunes, December 3, 1988
210 The Times, December 5, 1988
211 Ibid
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government as a good example of the way in which such attacks should be 
treated.^ **
In the turmoil of 1990, when the former Soviet Union was falling apart as a 
result of economic, political and nationalist pressures, violence against civil 
aviation in the Soviet Union dramatically increased. In that yeai', Soviet aircraft 
were involved in 27 hijacking incidents. The motivation behind the hijackings, in 
most cases, was a desiie to escape from the Soviet Union. A ll of the hijackers 
who landed in the Soviet Union were aixested by Soviet authorities. The 
hijackers who succeed to divert aiicraft out of the state were also airested by the 
authorities of the state in which they landed and most of them were returned to 
the Soviet Union.^**
The recent upturn in the number of attack against c ivil aviation in the Soviet 
Union illustrates that political and social turmoil resulting from the disintegration 
process of multi-national states like Yugoslavia has wide ranging implications 
for aviation terrorism. This might be a major factor in future tlneat against c ivil 
aviation in this region.
III-4-2. Eastern Europe
m-4-2-1. The Early Years
As the Iron Curtain was created in Eastern Europe after the Second W orld 
War, acts of violence against c iv il aviation occuixed behind it. Aviation
213 The Times, December 5, 1988
214 U.S. Depaiiment of Transportation, FAA, Criminal Acts Against C ivil 
Aviation: 1990. P. 16
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teiTorism in this region originated from the social, economic and political 
tuimoil. In Eastern Europe, aircraft hijacking remained a simple means of 
transportation. The object of such acts has always been identical, political 
asylum. In fact, there was no ahcraft hijacking fo r extortion, The fact that ahcraft 
have the capacity of crossing a hostile border has attracted people who were 
under persecution in this region. The fhst recorded attack against c ivil aviation 
in Eastern Europe took place on July 25, 1947, when three Rumanian aimy 
officers hijacked a Rumanian civilian aircraft and forced the crew members to 
fly  to Turkey where the hijackers requested political asylum.^ ** Shice then East 
European states have frequently suffered from attacks against civil aviation 
which reflected a disturbed social and political climate. Resulting from political 
turmoil in Eastern Europe, there were 18 aircraft hijacking incidents from 1947 
to 1953.2*® A ll of the hijackings except tliree, the objective of which are 
unknown, were committed by persons trying to escape from the Soviet sphere 
of influence. The Table III-5  in the following page demonstrates the early 
development of this type of aircraft hijacking,^**
215 Edward F. Mickolus, op.cit, P. 22
216 NaiTative Report, op.cit
217 Data aie drawn from Narrative Report
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Table III-5
Aircraft Hijacking in Eastern Europe 
(1947-1969)
Date Airline Nationality Destination Objective
06/25/1947 Rumanian Turkey Political Asylum
04/06/1948 C zechoslovakian Germany Political Asylum
05/04/1948 Czechoslovakian Germany Political Asylum
06/04/1948 YuRoslavian Italy Political Asylum
06/17/1948 Rumanian Austria Political Asylum
06/30/1948 Bulgarian Turkey Political Asylum
01/04/1949 Hungarian Germany Political Asylum
04/29/1949 Rumanian Greece Political Asylum
09/16/1949 Polish Sweden Political Asylum
12/09/1949 Rumanian Yugoslavia Unknown
12/16/1949 Polish Denmark Political Asylum
03/24/1950 C zechoslovakian Germany Political Asylum
03/24/1950 C zechoslovakian Germany Political Asylum
03/24/1950 Czechoslovakian Germany Political Asylum
08/11/1950 C zechoslovakian Germany Political Asylum
10/17/1951 Yugoslavian Switzerland Political Asylum
06/26/1952 Yugoslavian Italy Political Asylum
03/23/1953 Czechoslovakian Germany Political Asylum
07/13/1956 Hungarian Germany Political Asylum
06/02/1958 Czechoslovakian Austria Unknown
07/08/1959 Yugoslavian Italy Unknown
10/19/1969 Polish Germany Political Asylum
11/20/1969 Polish Austria Political Asylum
In the eai'ly stage, such incidents usually involved complicity between the 
crew members and a group of friends. For instance, on April 6, 1948, seventeen 
people, including the pilot and two crew members, seized and flew a 
Czechoslovakian domestic aircraft to the U.S. Zone of Germany, where they 
requested political asylum.2*» Another such incident occurred on October 17, 
1951, when a Yugoslavian Airlines plane was hijacked to Zurich by the pilot 
and copilot who requested political asylum for themselves and their families. 
The hijacker claimed that they were no longer able to endure the regime of
218 Edwai'd F. Mickolus, op.cit, P. 25
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communist t e n o r . 21* The most significant aircraft hijacking incident, involving 
eight crew and sixteen passengers in the plot, who feaied persecution because of 
theii' previous service in the RAF and then* Roman Catholic religious beliefs, 
occuiTed on March 24, 1950, when three Czechoslovakian ahcraft were 
hijacked to the U.S. Zone of Germany. On landing in the U.S. Zone of 
Germany, all the hijackers and passengers were welcomed and treated as guests 
by U.S. Ah' Force. The U.S. government rejected Czechoslovakia’s demand for 
extradition and dismissed allegations of ill treatment of the p a s s e n g e r s .2 2 0  i n  the 
eai'ly stages, hijackers were usually granted political asylum and no punishment 
was meted out. One writer described this situation as follows: "Hie fact that 
crew and passengers were killed in the course of some of the incidents was of 
minor interest to a public more inclined to regaid the hijackers as heroic freedom 
f i g h t e r s " . 221 This tendency, in fact, may have encouraged hijacking from the 
Eastern states to the Western states.
After the initial peak of aircraft hijackings in Eastern European states, their 
occuirence in flights from Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, and 
Hungary, was contained until the late 1960s. There were only 5 such recorded 
incidents from 1954 to 1969. This downward trend in the number of such 
incidents reflected the intensified political security measures, including travel 
restrictions, imposed after the Hungaiian uprising of 1956.222 Since 1970, the
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majority of aviation tenorism incidents in Eastern Europe have occuned in 
Czechoslovakia and Poland.
IIÎ-4-2-2. Czechoslovakia
In the beginning of 1970s, after a long period of inactivity, attacks against 
civ il aviation occuned once more, largely in Czechoslovakia. The main 
motivation fo r ahcraft hijacking was the seeking of political asylum. The upward 
trend reflected the social and political situation. The following Table III-6  
illustrates this development.223
Table III-6
Czechoslovakian Aircraft Hijacking 
{1970-1990)
Date Destination Objective
05/05/1970 Austria Political Asylum
06/08/1970 West Germany Political Asylum
08/08/1970 Austria Political Asylum
12/10/1970 Unknown Unknown
04/18/1972 West Germany Political Asylum
06/08/1972 West Germany Political Asylum
10/28/1976 West Germany Unknown
10/11/1977 France Political Asylum
02/06/1978 West Germany Political Asylum
05/10/1978 West Germany Political Asylum
05/17/1978 Unknown Unknown
05/29/1978 West Germany Unknown
02/18/1983 Unknown Unknown
05/26/1989 Undefined, Western 
Europe
Unknown
Years War. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Ltd, 1990; Geoffrey Hosking, A 
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Meanwhile, in the late 1960s, a significant event occurred in Czechoslovakia, 
known as the Prague Spring, which might explain the reappearance of 
Czechoslovakian aircraft hijackings after a long period of inactivity. In 1968, 
Alexander Dubcek and other Communist intellectuals tried to reform their State's 
economic and political structures.^ ^^  The reform movement arose from the 
unique circumstances existing in Czechoslovakia, the most westernized and 
industrialized state to fall under communism, and the only functioning 
democracy in Eastern Europe before the second World War. The initial impetus 
for reform was the economic stagnation of the early 1960s. Additional pressure 
for reform manifested in the demands for rehabilitation of those punished in the 
Soviet-instigated purges of the 1950s and for a freer cultural life.^ s^ This was 
greeted with great suspicion elsewhere in the Eastern bloc. The Soviet Union 
led a Wai'saw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, in August 21 1968, to prevent 
continued deviation from the Communist norm, and to install an acceptable pro- 
Soviet regime in power. 226 As a result of the invasion, a Ihii'd of the communist 
party’s members were expelled from the party. It was also reported that more 
than 2000 Czechoslovakian people left their state after the Soviet occupation.227 
This turmoil extended to the first anniversary of the invasion, in August 1969. 
Huge demonstrations in Prague were broken up by police with great brutality.
224 Keesing’s Contemporaiy Archives, May 25-June 1, 1968, PP. 22711- 22716, August 31-September 7, 1968, PP. 22885-22896
225 Barbara P. McCrea, Jack C. Plano, and George Klein, The Soviet and East 
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Tanks patrolled the city, and the government proclaimed emergency laws 
suspending all civil rights and giving the police extreme powers. In the 
disturbances, five people were killed by the police and more than 1,300 people 
were arrested.^ ®^
In this political situation in Czechoslovakia, people who wanted to escape 
from their state, attempted to exploit aircraft hijacking as one of their getaway 
methods. On June 8, 1970, eight aimed hijackers seized a Czechoslovakian 
internal flight and forced the pilot to fly to West Germany. The hijackers asked 
for political asylum, saying that they could not tolerate economic and political 
conditions in C z e c h o s l o v a k i a . ^ ’  However, on September 16, 1970, prison 
sentences ranging from eight months to two and half years were passed on the 
eight hijackers. Later, only the tlnee main offenders were actually sent to 
prison.23« Another Czechoslovakian domestic aii'craft, flying from Prague to 
Kosice with 27 passengers, was hijacked by a Czechoslovakian aimy officer, 
Colonel Vladimii* Rehak, and his two sons on August 8, 1970 and diverted to 
Vienna, where they asked for political asylum.^ i^ Colonel Rehak stated that he 
had been a supporter of Dubcek's liberal reforms before the Waisaw Pact 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, that a special commission had been set up to 
investigate his alleged counter-revolutionaiy activities, and that he had decided 
to escape to the West with his sons.^ z^ These hijackers were also sentenced by
228 Keesing's Contemporary Aichives, October 4-11, 1969, P. 23594
229 Keesing's Contemporaiy Aichives, February 20-27, 1971, P. 24460
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an Austrian couil on February 17, 1971, for unlawful seizure of an aiixraft, 
infringing the personal liberty of the passengers, and illegal possession of a 
weapon. At the same time, the hijackers were ordered to be deported from 
Austria at the expiration of their sentences, but were told they would not be sent 
back to Czechoslovakia, although Rehak pleaded not guilty to the chaiges 
brought against him, adducing political persecution as his motive for seizing the 
aii'craft.2^^
In the early stages, most of the hijackers from Eastern bloc states were 
welcomed. However, from the eaiiy 1970s, the response of the Western states 
was in contrast to that which appertained to eaiiier hijackings. This tendency 
derived from an understanding of the growing tlneat of such incidents. In spite 
of the various means of dealing with aviation terrorism by Western states, 
aii'craft hijackings by Czechoslovakians have been committed sporadically due 
to the unstable social and political situation. A paiticulaiiy interesting incident 
occurred on October 28, 1976, when a Czechoslovakian domestic aircraft was 
hijacked to West Germany where the hijacker sunendered. The 
Czechoslovakian authorities requested the return of the hijacker who had been 
taken to prison, claiming that he was sought for the murder of his brother. The 
West Germans refused Czechoslovakia's request because of the absence of an 
extradition treaty with Czechoslovakia.^ -^* Another similar incident occuned on 
October 11, 1977, when a Czechoslovakian aiiliner was hijacked by two 
hijackers to Frankfurt where they sunendered and requested political asylum.^ s^ 
According to the Czechoslovakian news agency, one of the hijackers faced
233 Ibid
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m-4-2-3. Poland
As in Czechoslovakia, the reappearance of aircraft hijacking in the early 1970s 
was deeply involved with the social and political turmoil. According to Brunon 
Holyst, Director of the Institute of Crime Problems, in Warsaw, Poland, there 
was a total of 20 attacks against aircraft during 1970 in Poland.^ ®^ This abrupt 
upward tendency, in part, originated from the socio-political situation. The 
following Table III-7 shows the development of Polish airline hijackings. From 
the late 1960s to the early 1970s, the social situation deteriorated and became 
more aggravated by the political situation. The Polish people were enraged by 
price fluctuations and the methods of conducting the administration by the 
political bureau of the United Polish Worker’s Party. This was a time of general 
instability with strikes and demands for urgent change in economic and political 
structure.239 Under this situation in Poland, discontented people resorted to
236 Ibid
237 Ibid
238 Brunon Holyst, "The Abduction of Polish Airlines "LOT" Planes", Violence. Aggression and Terrorism. Vol. 3, No. 1, 1989, P. 123
239 Patrick Brogan, op.cit, PP. 55-58
charges at home of failure to pay alimony.^ ®^ Like previous incidents, the 
hijàckérs were sentenced for endangering airline tra n sp o rta tio n .^^?  : ;
After the upward trends of hijacking in Czechoslovakia during 1970s, such 
incidents have been contained up to now. Since 1980, only two attempted 
hijackings have been recorded.
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aircraft hijacking as one of their getaway methods from their state. On June 5, 
1970, a Polish domestic airliner, flying from Waisaw to Gdynia with 23 
passengers, was hijacked by a man, armed with grenades. The hijacker, who 
asked for political asylum, forced the pilot to fly to Copenhagen where he was 
taken into custody by the Danish authorities and charged with unlawful 
detention of an aeroplane, endangering public transport and causing danger to 
the lives of others.^ ®^ Another Polish domestic airliner was hijacked by five man 
to the Danish island of Bornholm on August 19, 1970. The hijackers also 
requested political asylum.?^ ! After the peak of hijacking in the early 1970s, such 
incidents were contained until 1980. From 1971 to 1980, only five Polish aircraft 
hijackings were recorded. The Table III-7 in the following page shows this 
development.?'*?
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Table III-7
Polish Aircraft Hijackings 
(1970-1990)
Date Destination Objective
06/05/1970 Denmark Political Asylum
06/09/1970 Unknown Unknown
08/07/1970 West Germany Unknown
08/19/1970 Denmark Political Asylum
08/26/1970 Austria Unknown
11/04/1976 Austria Unknown
04/24/1977 Unknown Unknown
10/18/1977 Austria Unknown
08/30/1978 West Germany Political Asylum
12/04/1980 West Germany Political Asylum
01/10/1981 Western Europe Political Asylum
07/21/1981 West Germany Political Asylum
08/05/1981 West Germany Unknown
08/11/1981 West Germany Political Asylum
08/22/1981 West Germany Political Asylum
09/18/1981 West Germany Political Asylum
09/22/1981 West Germany Political Asylum
09/29/1981 West Germany Unknown
04/30/1982 West Germany Political Asylum
06/09/1982 West Germany Unknown
07/24/1982 Unknown Unknown
08/25/1982 West Germany Political Asylum
11/22/1982 West Germany Political Asylum
08/28/1986 Unknown Unknown
05/15/1987 West Germany Unknown
09/08/1987 Unknown Unknown
The political situation in Poland had become more unstable in the 1980s. By 
the mid-1970s, the Polish economy had been increasingly impoverished by the 
increase in oil prices and a worsening world economy. The food prices were 
being boosted to the sky, yet wages remained frozen. In this wretched economic 
situation, the discontented Polish workers under the leadership of Lech Walesa, 
with the full support of intellectuals in Eastern Europe, demanded the reform of 
the Polish economic and political systems.?^ ? As the Polish government lost
243 Keesing’s Contemporaiy Aichives, February 20, 1981, PP. 30717-30721
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control over the state, a state of martial law was imposed on December 13, 1981. 
During the following five months, more than 10,000 people were anested by the 
police.?^  ^This turmoil in Poland continued until the late 1980s,
In part this political situation was the cause of the outbreak of aiixraft 
hijacking in 1980s, Under the persecution, large numbers of Polish people 
continued to leave Poland by unofficial means, either by defection while visiting 
foreign states or by more diiect means such as diverting aircraft to Western 
democratic states. The discontented Polish people used aircraft hijacking as a 
means of escape from their state. For example, on August 22, 1981, a Polish 
airline, LOT, domestic flight was hijacked by a Polish male, armed with a 
dummy hand grenade, to West Berlin’s Tempelhof aiiport. Tlie hijacker, who 
asked for political asylum, claimed that he was banned by the government from 
leaving the state after an abortive attempt to reach the West via third states in 
1979, and that he was a Solidarity messenger and had acted as a stewai'd at 
demonstrations, where he had been photographed by the security police.?^ * 
Despite his claims of political persecution, on January 19, 1982, he was 
sentenced to five and half years by German court.?^ ® Another such interesting 
incident occuned on September 18, 1981, when twelve Polish students, 
including tlnxe female students, hijacked a LOT aiixraft and diverted it to West 
Berlin, where they asked for political asylum.?^ ? According to Brunon Holyst, a
244 Keesing's Contemporary Aichives, October 8, 1982, PP. 31733-31742
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total of 8 criminal attacks against civil aiixraft took place during 1981, This 
figure shows a great increase in such incidents compared with previous yeai's. 
During 1980, there was only one such incident. This upward trend of attacks 
made the Polish government take counter-measures. On May 27, 1982, Poland’s 
News Agency, PAP, reported that, in order to forestall further hijackings, 
security guaids on all LOT domestic flights were in future to caixy firearms.?^ ® It 
was subsequently reported on July 24, 1982, that an attempt by 11 people to 
hijack a Polish airliner had failed.?^ ® However, this was not a complete solution, 
with five hijackings occumng in 1983, two in 1984, 3 in 1986, and 6 in 1987?^ ®
III-4-3. The Responses of the Soviet Union and Eastern European States
The Soviet attitude toward acts of violence against civil aviation during the 
1960s and 1970s was laigely negative. They regarded international teiTorism as 
legitimate when applied by national liberation movements, at least if it was 
directed against the Western states. However, from the early 1980s, there was a 
Soviet hard line policy toward terrorism. The Soviet Union recognized, with the 
increase of international tenorism against Soviet targets, that terrorism did more 
harm than good. Consequently the Soviet authorities concluded that the Soviet 
Union could benefit from international cooperation against international 
terrorism.
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In recent yeais, the Soviet Union increased its efforts to combat domestic and 
international terrorism, both of which have become of increasing concern to the 
Soviet authorities. In 1990 alone, it was reported that Soviet nationals attempted 
at least 27 aiixraft hijackings.?^  ^ In general, Soviet authorities have made 
vigorous attempts to investigate such incidents and to prosecute the individuals 
involved. The Soviet Union requested and obtained the extradition of several 
hijackers, and several other extradition requests aix pending.?^ ? Israel's swift 
return of the hijackers of a Soviet aiixraft in 1988 was repeatedly cited by Soviet 
media as an example of the way in which hijacking incidents should be 
treated.?^ ? In addition, Soviet authorities continue to pailicipate in bilateral 
exchanges with the United States and several West European states on a broad 
range of counter-ten orism issues.?*^  The agreement on human rights which was 
signed by the Soviet Union in Januaiy 1989 is one of the recent signs of 
progress towaid building an international consensus linking between the former 
Soviet Union and the West. The agreement contains a provision condemning 
terrorism as unjustifiable under any ciixumstaiices and calls for fiimiiess in 
response to demands, strengthened international cooperation, tighter national 
controls over groups that perpetrate acts of teiTorism, and extradition or 
prosecution of persons responsible for teiTorism.?^ ® In addition, the Soviet
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Union ratified the Montreal Protocol in April 1989, dealing with combatting 
violence at international aii'ports and has supported efforts within ICAO to 
further enhance the security of civil aviation.
The Soviet Union, especially, took an increasingly firm stand against 
terrorism and expressed a new and specific interest in combatting international 
terrorism following Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to power. Gorbachev 
proposed that the development of effective ways of combatting international 
teiTorism be made part of a comprehensive international security system in his 
speech to the Congress of the Communist Pai’ty of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 
1987.?s? He also called for the creation of a U.N. body to investigate acts of 
international teiTorism,?®® At the same time, the Soviet Union condemned specific 
international terrorist acts against the West. In response to the September 5, 
1986, Pan Am aircraft hijacking at Kaiachi, Pakistan by the Abu Nidal 
Organization, which resulted in killing 22 innocent people and injuring 125, the 
Soviet Union issued the following critical statement:
"No matter what the motives of the people who are committed this evil deed, 
there is no justifying it... A resolute stop must be put to teixorism of all 
sorts... These criminal actions must not be allowed to end people’s lives, jeopardize the normal course of international relations, severely exacerbate some situation or other, or engender v i o l e n c e " .
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There are also other signs that the Soviet Union intended to solve the 
problem of aviation terrorism through international cooperation. In January 
1989, following Israeli cooperation with Soviet authorities and the return of 
hijackers immediately after they had landed in Israel, Soviet authorities 
expressed KGB willingness to work even with the CIA, the British Intelligence 
Service, the Israeli Mossad, and other services in the West on this matter.?®® 
While expanding counter-teiTorism issues with the West, the Soviet Union 
continued with their preference for broader, less concrete multilateral efforts 
against terrorism. This reflected reluctance to take specific actions against state 
sponsors with whom the regime maintained advantageous diplomatic relations, 
such as Cuba, North Korea, Libya, and Syria.?®i
Meanwhile, with the increasing threat of violence against civil aviation in the 
eaiiy 1970s, some of the East European states took a hard line policy for 
combatting aviation terrorism including the formation of special anti-terrorist 
units. Poland, for example, created an anti-terrorist unit in 1974, called "Tlie 
Safeguarding Department", under the order of the Prime Minister. This unit 
performs guard duty over the safety of civil aviation at all airports in the state.?®? 
Despite its efforts terrorist attacks increased, and consequently the Polish 
authorities introduced the Sky Marshal programme for use on both domestic and 
international flights in 1981. Although they achieved a deterrent effect, this 
programme was terminated in 1985 for safety reasons.?®?
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As East European governments have recognized that those measures, 
mentioned above, aie temporaiy, they have gradually turned theii' efforts for 
combatting aviation tenorism to active cooperation with the West, However, it 
is important to note that until late 1980, East European governments continued to 
maintain close relations with vaiious teiTorisl organizations including the FLO 
and provided direct or indii ect support to them. Such support usually was given 
under the pretext of aiding "national liberation movements" and ranged from 
permitting transit for known terrorists to providing arms, explosives, training, 
funding, safehaven, and political encouragement.?®-* Poland, for example, had 
pennitted the Abu Nidal organization to operate trading offices from theii* 
territory for several yeai's until, in the face of international concern, they closed 
them down in 1987.?®^  In addition, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaiia condoned 
tenorism by diiectly or indhectly supporting North Korea against chaiges of 
responsibility for the destruction of KAL 858 in November 1987.?®®
In recent yeais, however, with the realization that they are also equally 
exposed and vulnerable to aviation ten orism, governments in this region have 
changed their approach to terrorism. In 1987, Bulgaria sponsored an 
international conference on tenorism and supported work on counter-ten orism 
by the Balkan foreign ministers at their conference. The conference condemned 
the hijacking of Kuwait Aiiways in April 1988.?®? In addition, the Bulgaiian 
government ratified the Tokyo Convention in August 1988 and was accepted in
264 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of International Terrorism: 1983-1989
265 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of International Terrorism: 1987. PP. 39- 40
266 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of International Teixorism: 1988. P. 48
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that yeai' as a member of INTERPOL, the international police body, which 
should allow for greater cooperation on counter-terrorism.?®® Since the fall of 
theii' Communist regimes in 1989, the policy of many East European states has 
dramatically shifted from tolerance of, or even support for, teixorist 
organizations to active cooperation with the Western states on counter-teiTorism 
issues. For example, in March 1990, Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel 
revealed that the former Communist government had exported 1,000 tons of 
Semtex explosive to Libya.?®® This was the first official acknowledgement that 
sales of such magnitude had taken place. Meanwhile, Yugoslavia has continued 
to take a more active stance against international terrorism in recent yeai s. The 
Yugoslav government condemned teixorist action and has played a positive role 
within the United Nations. In addition, Yugoslav security services have 
cooperated actively in international teiTorist investigations.??® This new approach 
suggest there is a real possibility of building an international consensus. The 
changing policy against teixorism in East European states is due in pail to a 
growing recognition that international teixorism including attacks against civil 
aviation represents a danger to themselves. Yugoslavia had long suffered from 
sporadic and generally minor outbreaks of teixorism by extremist emigre groups 
hostile to the Communist regime. Although there were no significant domestic 
ten'orist attacks against civil aviation in recent years, offices of Yugoslav 
Aii'lines in Brussels and Sydney suffered from bomb attacks. At the same time, it 
is important to note that a new development in Yugoslavia has been the 
appeaiance of aimed groups, often connected with tensions that aie rampant
268 U.S. Depailment of State, Patterns of International Terrorism: 1989. P. 35
269 The Daily Telegraph, March 23, 1990
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among the vaiious national groups in the state. This development poses a 
potential tln eat to civil aviation.
III-4-4. Closing Remarks
The problem of aviation secmity in this region is that many airports do not 
adopt the necessaiy security measures. In some airports, there is a limitation in 
the use of electronic detectors to check out passengers and luggage because of 
inappropriate aiiport construction. In addition to the lack of high-technological 
security equipment, the security equipment is outdated, in most cases, or not in 
full working order due to its long period of use and lack of proper 
maintenance.??! One of the major difficulties in providing adequate security 
measures appeal's to be the expense involved. The liquidity difficulties and the 
poor supply of hai'd cunency, in fact, prevented investment in high technology, 
as in the Third World states.
So far, acts of violence against civil aviation have not become a great 
problem in the newly democratised states of Eastern Europe. However, 
democratization, the concomitant loosening of governmental control over 
society, and the resulting changes in government security structures may make 
some of the states of the region more vulnerable to the domestic tlneat of 
aviation terrorism. In addition, the disintegration of multi-national states in the 
former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have wider ranging implications for civil 
aviation security. It is also important to note that new threats are stemming from 
the eruption of ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union. Under the political 
and social turmoil, there is one certainty, and that is that the high profile civil
271 Brunon Holyst, op.cit, PP. 131-132
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aviation indusüy will be in the frontline. Furthermore, many airports in this 
region lack the resources to provide an effective security system. This suggests 
that aircraft hijacking and other forms of attack may increase in scale in the near 
future owing to the increase in international air tiansportation in this region. 
These trends are not only limited to the East Europen states. The following 
sections also examine the problems of aviation teixorism in other regions.
III-5. Asian States 
III-5-1. The Early Years
In the early stages, most of the significant attacks against civil aviation were 
committed by people who were seeking political asylum in Western states. 
Besides these early incidents of seeking political refuge, there were tluee cases 
of a different nature which occuned in Asian states. The first attack against civil 
aviation in Asia occuned on July 16, 1948, when a Cathay Pacific Catalina, 
flying from Macao to Hongkong, was hijacked by a group of Chinese criminals. 
Wong lo, the leader of the hijacking plot, had originally planned to land the 
aircraft in the Peail River estuaiy and hold the crew members and passengers to 
ransom. However, the plot did not succeed, as the crew members resisted. As a 
result of the clash between the crew members and hijackers, the pilot was killed. 
Then the aircraft crashed into the sea despite the fact that one of the hijackers, 
who was an experienced pilot, had attempted to regain control of it. All on 
board were killed, except one of the hijackers.??? This was the first instance of a
272 Edward F. Mickolus, op.cit, PP. 26-27
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criminally motivated hijacking in the history of aviation, and also the first airliner 
to crash as a consequence of aircraft hijacking.
The first sabotage bomb attack against civil aiixraft in flight also occuned in 
Asia on May 7, 1949, when a Philippine Ah Lines aircraft crashed into the sea 
between Daet and Manila, with no survivors among the thirteen people on 
board. A time bomb had been planted on the aiixraft by two ex-convicts who 
were hiied by a man and woman who were attempting to kill the woman's 
husband who was a passenger.??? This was the beginning of the most serious 
attacks against civil aircraft in aviation history. The first incident, in history, of a 
criminal aircraft hijacking perpetrated by a fugitive from the law also occurred in 
Asia. On December 30, 1952, a wanted criminal hijacked a Philippine Air Lines 
aircraft to Amoy in the People's Republic of China. However, just before the 
plane was about to land at Amoy, it was intercepted and forced to land on the 
Nationalist-held island of Quemy, four miles from Amoy, by a fighter aircraft of 
the Nationalist Chinese Air Force, which risked being shot down by anti-aircraft 
bursts from the Communists.??^  The following Table III-8 below shows the 
development of attacks against civil aircraft in Asian states in the early stages.??^
273 Ibid, P. 28
274 Ibid, P. 33
275 Data are compiled from U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Aircraft 
Hijackings and Other Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation Statistical andNairative Report: Updated to Januaiy 1, 1986; Edward F. Mickolus, 
Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events. 1968-1979. London: Aldwych Press, 1980; Keesing's Contemporaiy Aixhives
152
Table III-8
Aviation Terrorism in Asia 
(1948-1969)
Date Type of Attack Airline
Nationality
Objective or Destination
07/16/1948 Hijacking Hongkong Extortion
01/30/1949 Hijacking Taiwanese Unknown/China
05/07/1949 Sabotage Bombing Philippine To kill husband
12/30/1952 Hijacking Philippine Escape from law/China
02/16/1958 Hijacking South Korean North Korea
04/10/1958 Hijacking South Korean North Korea
11/06/1968 Hijacking Philippine Robbery
08/05/1969 Sabotage Bombing Philippine Suicide
12/11/1969 Hijacking South Korean North Korea
12/22/1969 Sabotage Bombing Vietnamese Unknown
Unlike the pattern of events in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, attacks 
against civil aviation generally possessed a criminal character from the 
beginning, although in South Korea under the social and political tunnoil after 
the Korean Wai% communist sympathizers hijacked three Korean National 
Airlines between 1958 and 1969. Until 1969, hijackings and other forms of 
attacks against civil aviation were not a serious problem in Asia. However, from 
the eai'ly 1970s, such attacks have posed great problems in Asian states, 
particularly in Japan and the Philippines. The Table 111-9 illustrates the general 
development of attacks against civil aviation in this region.??®
276 Data aie drawn from U.S. Depailment of Transportation, FAA, Aiixraft 
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Table HI-9
Aviation Terrorism in Asia 
(1970-1990)
Year No. of Hijacking
No. of Explosions on 
Aircraft and Airline 
Facilities
1970 4 2
1971 4 1
1972 1 2
1973 2 2
1974 7 2
1975 4 5
1976 4 1
1977 8 3
1978 4 2
1979 3 1
1980 2 0
1981 4 0
1982 6 2
1983 3 7
1984 5 4
1985 4 4
1986 1 8
1987 1 5
1988 4 5
1989 3 1
1990 4 0
Total 78 56
HI-5-2. Japan
There were no recorded aiixraft hijackings or other forms of attack against 
Japanese aii'lines until the late 1960s. However, Japanese civil aviation has been 
exposed to such attacks since 1970, The following Table III-10 shows this 
development.???
277 Data are compiled from U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Aircraft 
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Table IIMO
Japanese Registered Aircraft Hijacking 
(1970-1990)
Date Airline Objective/Destination
03/31/1970 Japan Airlines North Korea
08/19/1970 All Nippon Airways Suicide
05/13/1971 All Nippon Airways North Korea
11/06/1972 Japan Airlines Extortion/Cuba
07/20/1973 Japan Airlines Prisoner Release
03/12/1974 Japan Airlines Extortion
11/23/1974 All Nippon Airways North Korea
04/09/1975 Japan Airlines Extortion
07/28/1975 All Nippon Airways Hawaii
01/05/1976 Japan Airlines Free ride to Tokyo
03/17/1977 All Nippon Airways Criminal Escape
03/17/1977 All Nippon Airways Unknown
09/28/1977 Japan Airlines Prisoner Release/Extortion
11/13/1979 Japan Airlines USSR
The fii'st incident involving a Japanese aircraft occuned on Maixh 31, 1970, 
when a Japan Airlines (JAL) aiixraft with 7 crew members and 122 passengers 
was hijacked by nine extremist left-wing students, brandishing Samurai swords 
and daggers and who were in possession of home-made bombs and demanded 
to be flown to Pyongyang, North Korea in an attempt to set up a base for "the 
world-wide revolution".??® The hijackers were identified as members of the 
Japanese Red Army (JRA), known as Seikigunha, advocating the violent 
overthi'ow of the Japanese government and of the existing political system.??®
Narrative Report: Updated to Januaiy 1, 1986; Edwaid F. Mickolus, 
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After refuelling at Fukuoka, where 23 passengers including 12 children and 10 
women were released, the liijacked aiixraft flew on to North Korea, but just after 
crossing the 38th parallel changed course and landed at Kimpo International 
Airport, Seoul, South Korea.?®® When the aircraft landed at Seoul, the South 
Korean authorities did everything possible to disguise the airport and to lead the 
hijackers to believe that they were in North Korea.?®? This hoax attempt failed 
when the hijackers asked for portraits of Kim Il-Sung. The hijackers then 
threatened to blow up the aiixraft if any attempts to end the hijacking were 
made.?®?
During the negotiation at Kimpo International Airport, the hijackers accepted 
two symbolic hostages, Japanese deputy minister of Transportation, Shinjiio 
Yamamura and a socialist member of the Japanese Diet, Sukeya Abe, in 
exchange for the passengers and the aiixraft flew to North Korea.?®? The 
hijackers explained the hijacking as an attempt to express solidarity with North 
Korea and to draw attention to and to dramatize the economic and political 
collusion of Japan with the United States, and the South Korean government 
against both North Korea and oppressed South Koreans.?®^  In North Korea, the
Ariaü. Survey, Vol. 13, 1973, PP. 336-346; Patricia G. Steinhoff, "Portrait of a Terrorist: An Interview with Kozo Okamoto", Asian Survey. Vol. 16, 1976, PP. 
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hijackers were given political asylum by the communist government. At the 
same time, the North Korean authorities said that the hijackers would not be 
returned to Japan.?®^  The aircraft and two symbolic hostages returned to Japan 
on April 6, 1970.?®® This was the first dramatic attack by the Japanese Red Army 
and after the hijacking this group turned increasingly toward direct attacks.
Prior to this incident which was the longest recorded aiixraft hijacking to that 
date, Japan had neither a defined provision in the Criminal Code to deal with 
such attacks against civil aviation, nor proper aviation law to guide the 
commander of the aircraft during the critical situation. However, this incident 
aroused instant response from the Japanese government which hurriedly 
adopted the various legislative measures necessary for the suppression of such 
attacks against civil aviation.?®? In addition, Japan proceeded to ratify the Tokyo 
Convention of 1963 on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aiixraft. The Japanese Diet amended relevant national legislation to implement 
the Tokyo Convention in the domestic sphere.?®* Additionally, Japan enacted a 
law specially governing the unlawful seizure of aiixraft, known as Law 
Concerning Punishment for Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft and Similai' Crimes, on 
May 18, 1970.?®®
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Prior to the JAL aircraft hijacking, the Japanese Customs Authorities did not 
adopt a strict procedure for the checking of airline passengers because of the 
principle which they termed "a high regal'd for human rights’’,?®® However, a 
great outcry for proper security measures to protect innocent passengers from 
aviation terrorism ai'ose from the Japanese public at laige led by the Japanese 
press. As a result, the Japanese government enhanced security measures 
including a check of passengers before they boarded an aircraft.
The next major incident occurred on September 28, 1977, when a Japan 
Airlines aii'craft flying from Paris to Tokyo was hijacked shortly after departing 
from Bombay by five members of the Japanese Red Army, armed with guns, 
grenades and plastic explosives. The hijackers forced the pilot to fly to Dacca, 
Bangladesh, and demanded the release of nine radicals detained in Japanese 
prisons, along with a $6 million ransom.?®? The hijackers also denounced the 
Japanese Emperor as a war criminal and accused the Japanese government of 
concealing scandals, such as the Lockheed bribery case.?®? During the 
negotiations, the hijackers threatened to kill the passengers one by one and 
blow up the aircraft if their demands were not met. The Japanese government 
surrendered to the hijackers' blackmail, and agreed to provide the ransom and 
the release of prisoners, which led to an insoluble dilemma.?®? On the one hand.
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by releasing the prisoners on demand, the Japanese government unbalanced the 
doctrine of the rule of law while, on the other hand, it justified its action by 
maintaining that flouting of law was inevitable to save the lives of the 
hostages.?®^  The decision of the Japanese government to release the prisoners 
was heavily criticized, particularly because six of the nine prisoners were flown 
to Dacca with the ransom on October 1, Japanese Law Day.?®® In Dacca, the 
hijackers released 106 hostages in exchange for money and the prisoners.?®® On 
October 2, the hijacked aircraft with 36 hostages, 5 hijackers and their released 
prisoners flew to Damascus, Syria and Kuwait, where 17 hostages were 
released, and finally landed in Algeria, where the hijackers released all hostages 
and sunendered to the authorities.?®?
After the resolution of the JAL hijacking, a great controversy aiose over the 
Algerian decision to grant the hijackers asylum, as well as the Japanese 
agreement to capitulate. After the rejection of landing permission by ten nations, 
Japan agreed to Algerian demands not to press for the return of the hijackers or 
ransom, which caused the resignation of the Japanese Justice Minister, Hajime 
Hukuda, who took full responsibility for the decision.?®* Following strong 
public protest, the Japanese government asked Algeria to extradite the terrorists 
and return the ransom.?®® However, the Algerian authorities rejected the
294 Fai' Eastern Economic Review: Asia 1988 Yeai'book, P. 206; The Times, September 30, 1977
295 Ibid; Edward F. Mickolus, op.cit, P. 730
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Japanese requests,?®® At the same time, to deflect increasing international 
criticism of its becoming a haven for terrorists, Algeria defended its policy by 
saying that negotiating with teixorists saves innocent lives and that it was honour 
bound to abide by agreements made with the hijackers.?®?
Wlien faced with the threat of attack against civil aviation, Japan's situation 
was no different from that of any other state. Until the JAL hijacking of 1977, 
Japan had suffered 13 such incidents, the cumulative effect of which brought 
Japan to the realisation that strong security measures to cope with aviation 
tenorism were required. After the resolution of the JAL hijacking, the Japanese 
government and JAL announced that they would be implementing new anti­
hijacking security measures. Under a new set of measures designed to thwart the 
activities of Japanese terrorists, 5,600,000 valid passports were withdrawn and 
replaced with new documents. The decision to do this was taken after 
discovering that the Japanese terrorists were canying false passports.?®? In 
addition, the Japanese police discovered that the hijackers, with their fireaims 
concealed in tins of biscuits, had boarded the aircraft at Bombay airport. 
Consequently, the Japanese Cabinet decided to introduce a strict system for the 
inspection of the luggage and personal belongings of air travellers and Japan 
Airlines introduced a double system of checking passports and luggage at 17 
international airports.?®?
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Since 1980, there have been no aiixraft hijackings involving Japanese civil 
aviation up to the time of writing, thanks to proper security measures. However, 
attacks against aiiline facilities have increased since 1983. In fact, as pre- 
boai'ding security procedures rendered aiixraft hijacking more difficult to 
initiate, soft taigets such as airports and aiiline offices have come under 
increasing attack in Japan as in other states. The Table III-11 shows this 
development in the 198Ds.?®^
Table HI-11
Attacks against Airline Facilities in Japan 
(1981-1990)
Year Airport and Airline Office
1981 0
1982 0
1983 1
1984 3
1985 11
1986 0
1987 0
1988 3
1989 1
1990 0
Total 19
Table III-11 shows that attacks against aiiline facilities dramatically increased in 
1985. All of the attacks, which occuired at New Tokyo International Aiiport, 
were radical reactions to the approval of funds for the expansion of New Tokyo 
International Airport.
394 Data aie drawn from U.S. Depaitment of Transportation, FAA, Worldwide 
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m-5-3. The Philippines
Like Japan, the Philippines has sporadically suffered from aircraft hijackings 
and sabotage bombings since the late 1940s. From 1949 to 1969, there were 
only two aircraft hijackings and two sabotage bombings in flight. Since then, 
however, attacks against Phillipine civil aviation have gradually increased. The 
Table III-12 below shows the development of such attacks from 1970.^ ®^
Table III-12
Attacks against Philippine Civil Aviation 
(1970-1990)
Date Type Objective Casualties
04/21/1970 Sabotage Bombing Unknown 36(K)
06/02/1970 Sabotage Bombing Unknown 1(K), 12(1)
09/16/1972 Sabotage Bombing Unknown 0
10/11/1973 Hijacking Unknown 0
02/25/1975 Hijacking Escape from law 0
06/03/1975 Sabotage Bombing Unknown 1(K), 45(1)
10/07/1975 Hijacking Unknown 0
04/07/1976 Hijacking Release of prisoners 
/Extortion
0
05/21/1976 Hijacking Extortion 13(K), 14(1)
08/18/1978 Sabotage Bombing Unknown 1(K), 3(1)
07/12/1980 Hijacking Extortion 0
05/21/1982 Hijacking Unknown 0
One of the most dramatic attacks against Phillipine civil aviation occurred on 
April 7, 1976, when a domestic Philippine Ahhnes (PAL) aeroplane, flying from 
Cagay de Oro to Mactan, with seventy two passengers on board was hijacked
Data are compiled from U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Aircraft Hijackings and Other, Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation Statistical and 
Nmalive... Report: Updated to January 1, 1986; (Significant) _Worldwide Criimnal Acts Involving Civil Aviation. 1974-1985: and Criminal Acts Against 
Civil Aviation. 1986-1989: Keesing’s Contemporary Archives
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to Manila by three members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a 
Muslim secessionist group that had been fighting government forces in the 
southern Pliilippines since 1972.^ ®® The hijackers demanded a ransom of 
$300,000 and the release of several political prisoners. At the same time, they 
threatened to kill all the hostages if their demands were not met.^ ®^  During the 
negotiation at Manila aii'port, however, the Philippine authorities refused to hand 
over a ransom and to release political prisoners under any ciicumstances.^ ®® In 
this situation, the hijackers took off on April 9, leaving all but 11 crew members 
and the Vice-President of PAL.^ ®® After flying via Kota Kinabalu and Kuala 
Lumpur to Bangkok, where the hijackers released several hostages,®^ ® they took 
off in a another PAL ahcraft for Libya, stopping at Kaiachi on April 12. On 
ai'riving at Benghazi, Libya, on April 13, the hijackers asked to speak to Colonel 
Muammai' Gaddafi and were granted political asylum after tlueatening to blow 
up the aii'craft and kill the hostages. Shortly thereafter, the hijackers released the 
hostages and suirendered to Libyan authorities.®^ ^
Another serious incident took place about six weeks later. On May 21, 1976, 
six men claiming to be members of the MNLF hijacked a PAL flight with 103 
passengers. The hijackers, armed with pistols and grenades, forced the pilot to 
fly to Zamboanga in the Philippines, where they demanded a ransom of
306 The Times, April 8, 1976
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$375,000 as well as another aiicraft to fly them to Libya.®!® During the 
negotiation, the Philippine authorities offered amnesty to the hijackers if they 
released all hostages, while refusing to pay ransom or provide an ahcraft. 
However, the hijackers refused a peaceful settlement. At this point, a special 
hijacking task force, known as AVESCOM, instituted by the Philippine 
government in 1972 stormed the ahcraft.®!® Unfortunately, this operation failed 
owing to insufficient piepaiation. During the rescue operation, the hijackers 
exploded grenades, which caused many casualties. As a result 16 people, 
including 3 hijackers, were killed and 19 people were injured.®" It was reported 
that the hijackers had smuggled the weapons on board in their clothing.
III-5-4. People's Republic of China
The scope and nature of aviation terrorism in China, like that in the Soviet 
Union, is obscure. However, some sources indicate that China has also suffered 
from problems of aviation teiTorism.®!^  The attacks against Chinese airlines have 
been known to the Western states since 1982. The Table III-13 shows this 
development.®!®
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Table IÏI-13
Aircraft Hijackings in People’s Republic of China 
(1982-1990)
Date Objective/Destination
07/25/1982 Taiwan
05/05/1983 Political Asylum
06/25/1985 Unknown
05/12/1988 Political Asylum
04/24/1989 Taiwan
12/16/1989 Political Asylum
10/02/1990 Taiwan
12/06/1990 Unknown
The first confirmed attack against civil aviation in China occuned on July 25, 
1982, when five young men who had commandeered a Civil Aviation 
Administration of China(CAAC) aircraft, flying from Xian to Shanghai, were 
overpowered by the crew and passengers.®!^  The Chinese government 
introduced security checks on all internal flights in November 1981, checks for 
passengers on international flights having commenced seven months eaiJier. It 
was reported that their introduction of security checks came after an 
unconfirmed incident in 1981 in which a lone hijacker attempted to divert a 
CAAC domestic aircraft to Taiwan.®"
The fii'st recorded successful hijacking of a CAAC aircraft out of China 
occuned a year later. On May 5, 1983, five men and a woman hijacked a
Acts Involving Civil Aviation. 1981-1985: and Criminal Acts Against Civil 
Aviation. 1986-1989: Keesing's Contemporaiy Ai'cliives
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CAAC domestic aircraft, flying from Shenyang to Shanghai, and the hijackers 
forced it to fly to South Korea and landed at an army base near Chuncheon.®!®
After landing at Chuncheon, the hijackers held the 92 passengers and 5 crew |
members until they finally surrendered to the South Korean security forces, ?
requesting political asylum in Taiwan.®®® On May 5, the Chinese authorities 
demanded that the South Korean authorities should immediately return the 
passengers with the hijacked aircraft and hand over the hijackers. On May 7, the 
director of the Civil Aviation Administration of China, Shen Tu, arrived in Seoul 
with a delegation for direct negotiations with the South Korean authorities to 
return the aircraft, passengers and crew.®®! During the negotiations, the Chinese i
delegation was in a dilemma. Although this hijack incident was dissimilai’ in 
nature, it was galling for China that this should have happened only a week or 
two after a pilot in the Taiwan Air Force had flown his reconnaissance ahcraft to 
China and asked for political asylum.®®® After three days of talks, the South 
Korean authorities agreed to return the aircraft, passengers and crew. However, 
the South Korean government decided to allow the hijackers to remain in South 
Korea (as no extradition treaty existed between the two states), but put the 
hijackers on trial in its own court under South Korean domestic law, rejecting a t
Chinese request that they be repatriated.®®® The South Korean authorities %
defended then decision by saying that "No Western States have returned
319 The Times, May 6, 1983
320 Ibid
321 The Times, May 6 and 8, 1983.
322 The Times, May 9, 1983
323 Ibid: Keesing's Contempoi'ary Archives, May 1984, P. 32862
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hijackers" and the South Korean government exercised its right to try them in 
accordance with international agreements and practice.®®^  The passengers, crew 
members and the hijacked aircraft returned to China on May 10 and 18, 1983.®®® 
Meanwhile, on May 18, the six hijackers were found guilty of violating South 
Korea's aviation safety law, illegal possession of fiiearms and violating 
immigration law and were given sentences ranging from four to six years, a 
subsequent appeal being dismissed.®®® The Taiwanese government expressed its 
strong dissatisfaction and deep regret over the decision to uphold the sentences 
on the hijackers and said that it would take measuies to secure then early 
release.®®® The Chinese government also complained that the sentences given to 
the liij ackers were too lenient and not in conformity with the Hague Convention 
of 1970 which provides that each Contracting state undertakes to make the 
offence punishable by severe penalties.®®*
After resolution of the incident, CAAC officials said that the crew of the 
national airline had received orders to resist hijackers if the safety of the 
passengers was assured. Mr. Shen Tu, director of the CAAC, admitted that there
324 The Times, May 9, 1983
325 The Times, May 10 and 19, 1983
326 xhe Times, June 2, July 19, August 19 and 26, 1983
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were some shortcomings in aviation security procedures, and promised they 
would be tightened up.®®® In spite of the Chinese government's efforts to prevent 
such attacks, security inspection procedures at Chinese airports are still poor.
This was demonstrated in October 1990, when a domestic aircraft belonging to 
Xiamen Airlines was hijacked by a young Chinese male. Shortly after the aiicraft 
took off from Xiamen in Fujian Province, the hijacker forced his way into the 
cockpit. He threatened the crew with an explosive device, which he claimed 
contained 15.4 pounds of explosives, and forced the pilot to fly to Taiwan.
Chinese authorities granted the pilot permission to refuel at Hong Kong and 
continue on to Taiwan. Furthermore, the authorities cleared the aircraft to land at 
any foreign or domestic airport, but the pilot decided to land at Baiyun Airport, 
the flight’s intended destination. When the hijacker belatedly realised where the 
aircraft was landing, he attacked the pilot causing him to lose control of aircraft, 
which first struck an empty China Southwest Airlines B-707 and then a loaded 
B-757 awaiting take-off before bursting hito flames. This crash resulted in the 
deaths of 128 persons and more than 50 others were injured.®®" This incident 
caused great concern about the safety of civil aviation. i|
"I
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ni-5-5. The Responses and Problems of Aviation Security
When faced with the problem of attacks against civil aviation, Asian states 
are not isolated. In an attempt to tackle the problem, the governments in Asia 
have adopted measures to prevent and deter acts of violence against civil 
aviation. All Asian governments except Burma and Taiwan are now parties to 
international conventions which define acts of violence against civil aviation as 
offences and recommend the arrest, investigation and extraditions of offenders. 
These conventions have paved the way for many Asian states to pass anti- 
hijacking and sabotage laws. At the same time, with the recognition of the 
threats, many governments introduced specific preventive and counter-measures 
including Sky Marshal and airhne screening procedures to detect firearms and 
explosives. However, civil aviation security procedures in Asian states are 
mostly inadequate. According to a report by lATA which has caiTied out a 
survey programme of international aiiports to identify weakness in respect of 
aviation security defences, there are several security loopholes in this region. 
One of the reports dealing with an aiiport in Asia described the fundamental 
security problem as follows:
"The airport had, for the most part, an adequate fence with access points 
controlled by security staff. There was, however, a problem caused by the presence of two villages situated just outside the perimeter. Access to these 
villages could only be obtained by the inhabitants entering the aii'port 
thi'ough "controlled" pedestrian gates and walking close to and sometimes 
across the runway. Furthermore, the villagers grazed cattle and other livestock on the lush grass inside the perimeter and cut grass and reeds for their personal use".®®!
331 Rodney Wallis, "Aviation Security", Paper for Discussion at University of 
St. Andrews, October 10, 1991, PP. 13-14
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This might be a extreme situation in one of the poor states in this region, but it is 
by no means exceptional. In addition, after an Austrian Air Lauda aircraft 
exploded over central Thailand killing 223 people in May 1991, a review of 
Asian airports revealed that there is much to be concerned about with regard to 
the safety of civil aviation in Asian states. Although the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, which sets minimum international safety standards, 
requii'e X-ray or hand inspection of all the checked luggage,®®® not all airports in 
this region compelled airlines to conduct X-ray checks on luggage. The 
requiiement for X-ray checks at the height of the Gulf crisis was introduced at 
major aiiports in Asian states after the waining of the U.S. State Department, 
suggesting that Asian stales might be vulnerable to Middle Eastern teiTorist 
activity linked to the Gulf crisis. With relaxation of the Gulf crisis, the 
requiiement was dropped and a number of smaller aiiiines eliminated the X-ray 
luggage searches.®®® This passive attitude to airport security might bring another 
disaster in this region. Although some major aiiiines in Asia undertake tight 
security procedures, most of the small Asian aiiiines aie reluctant to expend 
money on aviation security measuies because it would cut into their profits.®®^
It is disturbing to note that even in the least well-equipped airports in this 
region, there are many loopholes. In 1988, a Kuwait aiiiiner was hijacked after 
teiTorists had smuggled guns on board at Bangkok, Thailand. Apparently the 
guns were concealed in the hijackers' shoes, and were not registered by the 
metal detectors that hijackers walked thiough because the detectors were not
332 Bangkok Post, May 30, 1991
333 The International Herald Tribune, May 28, 1991; The Independent, May 29, 1991; The Scotsman, May 30, 1991
334 Bangkok Post, May 30,1991
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III-5-6. Closing Remarks
According to the ICAO, the largest traffic growth is in the Asia/Pacific region 
with increases averaging about 9 per cent annually, well above the world 
average. ICAO expects this growth to continue to the point where the region will 
account for 39 per cent of the world's passenger traffic by the year 2000,
335 The Independent, May 28,1991
336 The Independent, May 28, 1991
337 Bangkok Post, June 2, 1991
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sensitive all the way to the ground.®®^  Although this limitation is inherent in the 
equipment, manual searches by security personnel to detect such smuggling of 
guns in that way can overcome this problem. It was reported that security 
ai'ound parked ahcraft is also light. A golf course that is open to the public runs 
between the two runways at one of the Thai airports, and there are no fences to w
stop people wandering from the fairways up to the airport terminal.®®® %
Furthermore, insufficient training of security officers is also one of the 
problems in this region. For example, it was reported that a two-part explosive 
package was closely examined by security staff at Bangkok aii'port, but allowed 
on to the aircraft because security officers did not recognize what the package 
actually was. This led to a Thai aiicraft hijacking by Bunnese students in 
1990.®®® In addition, the low salaiies paid to security staff in this region have 
rendered the staff more susceptible to coiTUption that could in turn allow 
penetration of airport security.
‘Î
compared to 19 per cent in 1986.®®* However, the civil aviation security 
measures, which cuixently exist to ensure safety, are largely inadequate. The 
general problem of aviation terrorism in Asia has been compounded by lack of 
technological know how, outmoded security equipment, inadequate training of 
security staff and human failure during passenger screening. However, the most
serious problem is the passive attitude of some airlines and governments to t
'1aviation security. In this situation and in conditions as they exist at present,, there I
is no doubt that civil aviation in this region will remain a vulnerable target.
III-6. Latin American States
It is generally accepted that acts of violence against civil aviation are not 
limited to the major western stales. Tliough the problems of aviation terrorism in 
Latin American states are virtually unknown in the West, the extent of aviation 
terrorism experienced in Latin America is substantial. In fact, it is interesting to 
note that Latin America is the birthplace of aviation teirorism. As mentioned 
earlier, the first aircraft hijacking in civil aviation history occurred in Peru in 
1931. The following Table III-14 traces the development of aircraft hijacking in 
this region.®®®
338 "Airport Congestion - A Special Repori, ICAO Bulletin, January 1989
339 Data are drawn from U.S. Department of Transportation, Narrative Report 
and Criminal Acts Involving Civil Aviation: 1986-1990
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Table HI-14
Aircraft Hijackings in Latin American States
(1931-1990)
Year No. of Incidents
1931-1933 2
1956-1960 15
1961-1965 5
1966-1970 66
1971-1975 30
1976-1980 15
1981-1985 22
1986-1989 7
1990 5
Total 167
The Table III-14 shows that well over than 70 per cent of aircraft hijackings 
occurred prior to 1975. This illustrates that most of the aircraft hijackings were 
related to the political umest during that period. However, a large number of 
incidents have occurred in the last 15 years and violence against civil aviation 
still poses a threat in this region. After the first aircraft hijacking in 1931 in this 
region, such attacks contained until the eaiiy 1960s. From the late 1960s, many 
states in this region started to suffer from the attacks, particularly Colombia, 
Cuba, Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela(see Table III-15).®"
340 Ibid
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Table 111-15
Aircraft Hijacking By State
(1931-1990)
Name of State No. of Incidents
Colombia 51
Cuba 22
Venezuela 15
Brazil 14
Mexico 14
III-6 -L  Colombia
Colombia is one of the states which has suffered from frequent aircraft 
hijacking. In fact, more than 50 per cent of the aiicraft hijackings in this region 
occuired in Colombia. The first such attack against Colombian Airlines occurred 
on August 6, 1967, when an Aerocondor DC-4 was hijacked to Cuba by five 
pro-Castro guerrillas who were granted political asylum by Castro. All 
passengers and crew members were released the next day by the Cuban 
government.®*! A month later, a similai' incident took place. After these initial 
attacks, aircraft hijacking increased on a large scale. There were 13 aiicraft 
hijackings in 1969. The following Table III-16 illustrates this development.®*®
341 Edwai'd Micklous, op.cit, P. 77
342 Data aie drawn from Natfative Report and Criminal Acts Involving Civil 
Aviation: 1986-1990
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Table m  i 6
Aircraft Hijacking In Colombia
(1967-1990)
Year No. of Incidents
1967 2
1968 3
1969 13
1970 4
1971 4
1972 1
1973 1
1974 4
1975 1
1976 2
1977 0
1978 1
1979 0
1980 1
1981 2
1982 3
1983 0
1984 0
1985 6
1986 0
1987 0
1988 2
1989 1
1990 0
Total 51
As in Eastern Europe, aircraft hijacking in Colombia reflects the social and 
political climate, Colombia’s long tradition of political violence goes back to 
1840, when revolts by local caudillos against central government power gave 
rise to a two-year civil wai*. Another inter-provincial, civil war occuixed in the 
early 1860s, and dozens of localized conflicts were recorded throughout the 
remainder of the century, A civil war costing about 100,000 lives took place in 
1899-1902. The period from the late 1940s to the mid-1950s was known in 
Colombia as La Violencia, During this period about 180,000 Colombians were
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killed in acts of violence, some attributed to banditry and local disputes but 
mainly to a civil war between conservative and liberal factions. In the 1960s and 
1970s thousands more lost their lives as a result of left wing gueixilla warfare 
and official and unofficial counter-insurgency activities, including killings by the 
drug industry death squads.®*® During this social and political turmoil, more than 1
50 per cent of the ahcraft hijackings took place. In this period, left-wing guerilla 
organization started to exploit aircraft hijacking for theii* political ends. For 
example, on March 5, 1968, an Avianca DC-4 flying from Riohacha to 
Baianquilla was hijacked to Cuba by three members of the National Liberation 
Army(ELN), a left-wing revolutionary group influenced by the Cuban 4
revolution and by liberation theology.®** The hijacking of Colombian passenger ï
aircraft by guerrilla movements increased steeply during the second half of 
1968, and continued at a still more accelerated rate in early 1969. Most of the 
hijacked aircraft were diverted to Cuba and in all these cases the Cuban 
authorities permitted the return of the passengers in another aircraft, but insisted 
on the sepai'ate return of the hijacked aiicraft and demanded full payment for the 
cost of accommodating the passengers and of landing and other charges, with 
often considerable delays in the settlement of such incidents and great extra 
expense to the airlines affected.®*® In addition to the aircraft hijacking by 
guerrilla organizations, the Colombian people, fearing civil wai', hijacked aiicraft 
as a means of transportation to a non-war zone. For example, on May 31, 1970, 
an Avianca aircraft was hijacked by a couple with their five cliildren.
346 John Richard Thackrah, Encyclopedia of Teixorism and Political Violence. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987, PP. 12-13
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After the initial peak of aircraft hijackings in Colombia, such attacks were 
laigely contained until 1980. Aircraft hijacking, however, posed a thieat once 
again during the social and political unrest in the early 1980s. Before the 
Presidential and Congressional elections in the spring of 1982, left-wing guerrilla I
activities had been intensified. With the intention of bringing about a negotiated î
settlement with guerrilla movements including M-19, a new left-wing urban |
guerrilla movement, which claimed that it was prepared to discuss a cease-fire.
President Turbay Ayala set up a consultative peace commission of leading 
public figures in October 1981 and worked for the introduction of a general 
amnesty. Tliis effort failed, however, to make any substantial impact due to 
opposition from the guerrilla movements which demanded a full amnesty. The 
Colombian government refused to suspend the sentences imposed on guenillas 
for political crimes.®*®
During the amnesty negotiations, seven M-19 guerrillas, apparently in 
support of M-19‘s call for a general amnesty for their leader, Sr Jaime Bateman, 
who had received a 30 years sentence for rebellion, sedition and other crimes, #1
hijacked a Colombian ahline Aerotal B-727 on a internal flight from Bogota to 
Pereira. The hijackers demanded that their leader be allowed to contest the 
presidency. They forced the pilot to return to Bogota where they asked to talk to 
a journalist and a member of the commission involved with negotiating an end 
to guerrilla activity in Colombia. After returning briefly to Bogota and 
threatening to blow up the aircraft, the hijackers flew to Cali, where 47 
passengers were released. The aircraft was subsequently damaged late on 
Januaiy 27 when Colombian troops tried to storm it. All but two of the hostages
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were freed on the next day in exchange for a safe passage and the hijackers were 
flown to Cuba where they surrendered to the Cuban authorities.®*®
After the elections, the new President, Delisario Betancur Cuartas, continued |
with efforts to achieve a truce with the guerrilla groups. An amnesty was 
declared in November 1982, and was accepted by about 2,000 guerrillas. After 
long negotiations between the government and the guerrilla leaders, a cease-fire 
was declared in May 1984, and most of the guerrilla groups had come to an 
agreement with the government by August which permitted them to engage in 
electoral politics without disbanding or disarming their forces. Sporadic 
violence continued, however, some of it related to the drug trade rather than to 
politics. An amnesty law passed by Congress in May 1985 allowed for the 
reintegration into civilian life of guerrillas accused of political offences other 
than kidnapping, extortion and murder outside armed combat, but in June the M- 
19 movement announced that the truce was at the end. Together with smaller 
groups it resumed armed activities, while the larger guerrilla groups including 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(FARC) maintained their support 
for the peace process.®** This social and political turmoil continued until late 
1980s.
In this unstable political situation, though specific data is not available, it was f
reported that there were 8 aircraft hijackings, largely by the left wing, in 
Colombia in 1985 and two in 1988. As in other states, problems of aircraft 
hijacking in Colombia, have in fact decreased. However, a sabotage bomb attack 
on a Avianca aircraft in November 1989, which resulted in the total destruction
:........    -  V , .  . ■ . r,  -.r J i -  . , ,  . . . . . .
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of the aircraft and the death of all passengers, demonstrated that attacks against 
civil aviation still pose a great thieat. On November 27, 1989, Avianca Flight 
203 exploded shortly after take-off from El Dorado International Aiiport in 
Bogota, Colombia. The aircraft was on a domestic flight between Bogota and 
Cali. The wreckage was strewn over several miles across two hillsides near 
Socha.®*® Forensic evidence indicated that an improvised explosive device had 
been placed under a seat in the passenger compaiiment. The location of the 
device over the central fuel tanks appaiently caused the explosion to initiate a 
fuel file and resulted in the subsequent disintegration and crash of the aircraft.®®"
Hours later, a person telephoned the Caracol radio network saying that the f
Extraditables, a group of cocaine traffickers linked with the Medellin cailel, had 
put the bomb on the plane because, he said, police informants were on board.®®!
While there is no fii*m evidence in the public domain to prove this theory, it is 
certainly within the realm possibility. After the assassination of Luis Carlos 
Galan, a leading candidate for the 1990 presidential election, by the Medellin 
drug cartel, the Colombian government launched massive raids on the 
headquaiiers and laboratories of the Medellin bai ons, causing severe damage to 
the drug cartel. At the same time, moves were made to enact a law on extradition 
of suspected drug traffickers to the United States.®®® There is a great possibility 
that, in retaliation to this government action, the drug cartel tai'geted a civilian 
aiicraft causing tiemendous psychological impact.
III-6-2. Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil
In addition to Colombia, other states such as Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela and 
Brazil have experienced a substantial number of aiixraft hijackings. As discussed 
in the previous section, most of the acts of violence against civil aviation in Cuba 
occuned prior to the mid-1960s. Over the last two decades, there were only two 
attacks against Cuban civil aviation, Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil also suffered 
from sporadic aiicraft hijacking prior to the 1980s. There remains, however, a 
considerable a threat of acts of violence against civil aviation today.
The first ahcraft hijacking in Venezuela occuned on November 27, 1961, 
when an Avensa DC-6B was hijacked by five men to the Netherlands Antilles. 
Like Colombia, most of the aircraft hijackings in Venezuela have arisen as a 
result of the unstable political situation. In January 1958, after the dictatorship of 
the centre-left Accion Democratica(AD-Democratic Action) regime of Romulo 
Gallegos was overthrown by a populai' revolt, Accion Democratica took up the 
reins of power once again under the leadership of Romulo Betancort. As a result 
of this, extra-parliamentary protests, organized by splinter groups of the AD, 
began in 1960. In 1962 the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional(FALN- 
Armed Forces of National Liberation) began a guerrilla campaign including 
kidnappings, robberies and aircraft hijackings in conjunction with Movimiento 
de Izquierda Revolucionaria(MIR-Revolutionary Left Movement) in order to 
disrupt the 1963 elections. Approximately a month before the elections, six 
members of the FALN hijacked an Avensa akline aircraft flying from Ciudad 
Bolivar to Caiacas. Hijackers armed with machine guns forced the pilot to circle 
Ciudad Bolivar while they dropped propaganda leaflets telling its citizens not to 
vote in the national elections. They then diverted the aircraft to Port-of-Spain,
1 8 0
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Trinidad, where they were arrested.®®® With the political unrest, it was reported 
that there were three more aircraft hijackings in the late 1960s. Such attacks also 
occuned in the early 1970s. On May 18, 1973, four left-wing guenillas hijacked 
a domestic Avensa Convair 580 with 37 passengers and five crew members. 
This time, the hijackers demanded the release of 79 political prisoners from 
Venezuelan jails. They thieatened to blow up the plane unless their demand was 
met. However, the Venezuelan government announced its refusal to discuss the 
demand of the terrorists. The hijacked aircraft was flown via Mexico City to 
Cuba, where the hijackers were granted political asylum.®®*
Political umest in this state continued until eaily 1980s. The left-wing 
movements including Bandera Roja(BR-Red Flag) and Comando Ramon 
Emeterio Betance(CREB-Ramon Emeterio Betance Commando), which had 
been involved in violent incidents in the eaiiy 1970s, were again involved in 
kidnappings and hijackings in the late 1970s and 1980s. The most spectacular of 
those incidents occurred on December 7, 1982, when tln ee Venezuelan domestic 
aircraft, an Aerovias Venezolanas(Avensa) B-727 aiicraft and two Linia 
Aéropostal Venezolana(Aéropostal) DC-9 aiicraft, were hijacked to Cuba by 
CREB guenilla group members, armed with submachine guns, pistols and hand 
grenades. The hijackers demanded the release of 23 alleged political prisoners in 
Venezuela and a ransom of $10,000,000. They also appealed for solidarity with 
the guenillas of El Salvador and distributed leaflets on behalf of the Comandos 
Internacionales Manuel Rojas Luzardo(CIMRL-Manuel Rojas Luzardo 
International Commandos. The route taken was by way of the Netherlands 
Antilles, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Panama, where about half of the
353 Edward F. Mickolus, op.cit, P. 61
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hostages were released, the hijacked aircraft then flew to Cuba, where the 11 
hijackers were taken into custody by Cuban authorities. All the remaining 
hostages and the aiicraft were returned safely to Venezuela. The Cuban 
government pointed out that the aircraft had landed in Cuba for purely technical 
reasons and announced in a note to the Venezuelan authorities on December 9 
that the hijackers would be tried under the Venezuelan-Cuban anti-hijacking 
convention of July 1973.®®®
The first aircraft hijacking in Brazil occurred on October 8, 1969, when a 
Brazilian Cruzeiro do Sul Caravelle flying from Belem to Manaus was hijacked 
to Cuba by six men aimed with submachine guns and nitroglycerin.®®* Most of 
the aiicraft hijackings in Brazil occurred from 1969 to 1970. This incident 
reflected the political and social unrest during this period. After the leftist 
President Joao Goulart was deposed by a right-wing military coup which 
installed a government under General Humberto Castelo Branco in April 1964, 
Brazil remained under effective military rule for tlie next two decades. In fact, 
the Castelo Branco regime and the succeeding military government kept a tight 
grip on the state and met with little effective opposition from political or guerrilla 
movements. However, left-wing organizations such as Alianca Libertadora 
Nacional(ALN) led by Cailos Marighella and Vanguarda Popular 
Revolucionai'ia(VPR) led by Cailos Lamarca engaged in limited guerrilla 
warfaie in the late 1960s and early 1970s. During this period, the military 
government was accused of many breaches of human rights, involving inter alia 
the disappeai'ance of hundreds of members of left-wing organizations and
355 U.S. DepaiJment of Transportation, FAA, Worldwide Significant Criminal 
Acts Involving Civil Aviation: January-December 1981. PP. 20-21: Ciaian O Maolain, op.cit, P. 256; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, April 23, 1982, P. 31451
356 Edward F. Mickolus, op.cit, P. 141
182
357 Edwai'd F. Mickolus, op.cit, P. 192
358 Ibid, P. 99
183
9
political detention. In this political situation, guerrilla organizations adopted 
aircraft hijacking as a tactic to release their members from prison. For example, ;i
on July 1, 1970, four members of the ALN, armed with machine guns and 
revolvers, attempted to hijack a Cruzeiro do Sul Caravelle flying on the Rio-Sao 
Paulo-Buenos Aires route with 34 passengers and 3 crew members to Cuba.
One of the hijackers shot the pilot in the legs, but he still managed to fly back to 
Rio. When the hijackers discovered where they were, they demanded to be 
allowed to take off again, threatening to kill the passengers one by one. ^
However, the President of Brazil gave the order that the hijacked aircraft was 
not to leave. Under this order, air force policemen immobilized the aircraft by 
shooting out the tires and thirty armed officers stormed the aircraft successfully. ÿ
The hijackers claimed that they were going to use the passengers as hostages for 
the release of political prisoners but were arrested before their demands could I
be met.®®® After the initial peak of aircraft hijacking in 1969 and 1970, such 
attacks have been contained under the effective military rule. In fact, there were 
only three such incidents between 1973 and 1990.
The first aircraft hijacking in Mexico occurred on October 6, 1968, when an 
aircraft of Aeromaya Airlines was hijacked to Cuba by an Argentine citizen 
residing in Mexico.®®* As in many other states in this region, most of the aircraft 
hijacking in Mexico reflected social and political unrest. After 50 years of 
relative calm under the government of the Partido Revolucionario #
Institucional(Institutional Revolutionary Party-PRI), serious disturbances broke 
out in Mexico in 1968. A student strike developed into a full-scale revolt against 
the ruling PRI by various left-wing guerrilla movements which remained active
359 Ibid, PP. 358-359
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during the 1970s. In this unstable situation, some of the left wing guemlla 
groups adopted aircraft hijacking as a tactic to achieve their goal. For instance, sf
on November 8, 1972, four members of the Armed Communist League hijacked 
a Mexicana de Aviacion B-727 flying from Monterrey to Mexico City with 104 
passengers. The hijackers demanded the release of five of theh colleagues who 
had been anested in November 1972 during a police search, 4 million pesos, 
two machine guns with ammunition and a doctor to accompany a wounded 
prisoner. All demands were met by the Mexican government and the hijackers 
forced the pilot to fly to Cuba, where they were granted political asylum.
Mexico requested extradition of the hijackers and prisoners but the Cuban '
government refused on the grounds that their action was political.®®® This aircraft 
hijacking led the Mexican government to negotiate with the Cuban government 
on this matter. This effort by Mexico produced an agreement with Cuba on the 
prevention of aerial piracy in 1973.®*" Judging from the statistic of aircraft 
hijacking in Mexico, although the agreement was not a complete answer to the 
problem of aiicraft hijacking, it was in a large measure successful. In fact, 
between 1974 and 1982, there was only one aircraft hijacking on May 16, 1978, 
when two men who claimed to be canying a suitcase full of dynamite seized an 
Aeromexico. The men allegedly hijacked the aircraft to obtain publicity and to 
assure justice against Mexico’s cheating doctors. The aircraft landed safely at 
Mexico City where both hijackers surrendered to the authorities.®*! In 1983, 
there were two hijacking attempts. In both cases, the hijackers were l|
..:î
overpowered by the security forces. Since then, aiicraft hijacking has been 
largely contained, up to present, though in 1988, there was one incident.
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ÏII-6-3. The Responses and Problems of Aviation Security
In some Latin American states, acts that may be characterized as terrorist, 
including aircraft hijacking and related attacks on civil aviation, are prosecuted 
under the relevant provisions of a state's criminal laws or penal code. 
Unfortunately, not every State’s legislation is comprehensive enough to cover 
aircraft hijacking or other attacks against civil aviation.®*® The effectiveness of 
this legislation lies in its deteneiit value. This is demonstrated by the 
apprehension and prosecution of offenders. However, many states in the region 
do not have a capacity to deal with this problem, owing to the weak structure of 
government which aiises from social and political unrest. On November 26,
1989, the Colombian government announced new anti-terrorist measures, 
including the immediate airest of suspected teirorists, life imprisonment for 
teiTorists involved violent attacks, and an increase in the fighting strength of the 
militaiy and police.®*® In response, one of the Colombian officials pointed out 
the reality as follows: ’’They(tenorists) have aheady shown they are willing and 
able to kill people any time and any place. The government cannot fight that’’.®** I
365 Lester A. Sobel(ed), Castro's Cuba in the 1970s. New York: Facts on File, 
1978, P. 16; Keesing's Contemporaiy Archives, August 27-September 2, 1973, P. 26068
366 Lester A. Sobel(ed), Ibid, P. 17
367 Keesing's Contemporary Aichives, August 27-September 2, 1973, P. 26068
368 Alona E. Evans and John F. Murphy, op.cit, PP. 20-21
In an effort to control the aircraft hijacking threats, the Mexican government 
concluded an agreement on the prevention of aerial and maritime piracy with the 
Cuban govermnent on July 6. The agreement obliged states to which planes or 
ships were hijacked to either prosecute the hijackers or return them to the state 
of departure. However, it allowed both states to grant asylum to hijackers when 
they appealed to be in real and imminent danger of death or of being deprived 
of their liberty for clearly political reasons, and had no other way of gaining I
safety. The agreement also required each state to punish severely any person 
who conspired or took part in an attack on aiicraft travelling to or from the other 
state.®*® A similar agreement on the prevention of aerial hijacking between Cuba 
and Venezuela was signed in July 1973. This agreement followed the hijacking 
of a Venezuelan airliner on May 18, 1973, which was mentioned above.®** The 
conclusion of the agreement between Venezuela and Cuba signified a 
rapprochement between the two governments, as in previous years Venezuela 
had repeatedly called for joint American action against Cuba’s alleged support 
for guerrillas in Venezuela and interference in the latter’s internal affairs.®*® In ?
addition, an agreement on the prevention of aircraft hijacking was concluded by 
Colombia with Cuba on July 22, 1974.®*® The usefulness of these agreements as i
a means of controlling aiicraft hijacking is problematic. In fact, information 
about the return of hijackers from Cuba to Venezuela is not available. Similarly,
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there is no information about the effectiveness of the agreements between Cuba 
and Colombia. The decline of aircraft hijacking in Latin American states must be 
ascribed to hard line policy on this problem.
To deter aircraft hijacking, some of the states in this region established special 
counter-ten orism unit. For example, the Venezuelan government formed a anti­
terrorist unit, known as the Special Intervention Brigade, which was formerly a 
counter-insurgency unit that assumed Hostage Rescue Unit(HRU) duties in 
1978. The unit was deployed in July 1984, when it carried out a successful 
assault upon an Aéropostal aircraft which had been hijacked. All of the hijackers 
were killed and 79 passengers were rescued.^ *»® There is no doubt that this 
successful operation secured the additional desirable effect of detening further 
hijacking attempts. In addition, Colombia has two special units, known as 
GAJDA.These units work at airports and are trained in the anti-hijacking role. It 
is known that Chile has a highly secret unit, known as FACH. This unit is trained 
in the anti-hijacking and sky marshal role.^ ®^
It is generally accepted that the rescue operation is not a complete answer for 
problem of aircraft hijacking, although it does produce a deterrent effect. The 
most important factor is the implementation of effective security measures in the 
aii'ports to stop the hijackers and then weapons getting on boaid. It is 
depressing, however, to note that there are many problems of aviation security 
in this region. With the dramatic increase in the number of aircraft hijackings, 
some of the Latin American governments in the 1970s effected numerous 
security measures. These measures were not successful. At the early stage, most
Leroy Thompson, op.cil, PP. 155-156; U.S. Department of Transportation, 
FAA, Worldwide Significant Criminal Acts Involving Civil Aviation: January- December 1984, P. 10
Leroy Thompson, Ibid, P. 153 and 157
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of the hijackers managed to pass through the security checks and get aboard the 
aircraft with weapons.^ ^^  In addition, until recently, some of the Latin American 
states did not employ tight security precautions such as passenger screening 
check on domestic flights. For instance, only after the VASP airliner hijacking on 
September 29, 1988, were the Brazilian authorities reported to be implementing 
the screening of passengers on domestic flights.^ ^^  jviore specific information 
about the reality of civil aviation security in Latin American states is not readily 
available. Judging from the fact that ahcraft hijackings and other forms of attack 
against civil aviation continue, it may be concluded that aviation security is not 
effective in this region. To halt the attacks against civil aviation, Latin American 
states must evaluate their security problems and find effective measures.
IIL6-4. Closing Remarks
Although the detailed facts about acts of violence against Latin American civil 
aviation aie little known in Western Europe, it is cleai* that the Latin American 
states have suffered from such attacks because of the unstable social and 
political situation which pertains there and which is inevitably the potential 
source of attacks against civil aviation. Unfortunately, counter and preventive 
measures in this region aie not effective in halting such attacks. This was 
evidenced by several attacks involving civil aviation in recent yeais. In 
Colombia, for example, two politicians were killed, one at the El Dorado Aiiport
James A. Arey, op.cit, P. 209
U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 1988. P. 37
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on March 22, 1990 and the other aboard an Avianca flight departing from 
Bogota, on April 26, 1990.^ 73 In Peru, two sabotage bomb attacks occuned at 
the Jorge Chavez International Aii'port in Lima.^ ^^  Despite the low level of 
ten orist activities against airlines, airports and passengers, there is no doubt that 
civil aviation will remain an attractive taiget to both ten orists and criminals. Tlie 
most serious concern is over the capabilities of the major guerrilla groups and 
nai'cotics tiaffickers, who have demonstrated a high level of operational 
sophistication and weaponry including even surface-to-air missiles. Although 
not specifically directed against civil aviation taigets in this region, the potential 
tlneat of missile weaponry should not be ruled out.
III-7. African States
Acts of violence against civil aviation are not confined to the states of the 
Middle East, Europe, and the United States of America. The African states have 
been also affected since 1960s. The following Table III-17 traces the general 
view of hijacking against African states’ registered aircraft.^ ^^
U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Criminal Acts Against Civil 
Aviation: 1990. PP. 30-31
374 Ibid, P. 35
375 Data are drawn from U.S. Department of Transportation, Narative Report. 
(Worldwide %nificant) Criminal Acts Involving Civil Aviation, 1974-1990. Edward F. Mickolus, op.cit, and Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean 
M. Murdock(ed), International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events. Iowa: Iowa University Press, 1989
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Table III 17
Aircraft hijackings in Africa 
(196M 990)
Year No. of Incidents
1961-1968 3
1969 5
1970 5
1971 3
1972 3
1973 1
Î974 1
1975 0
1976 2
1977 1
1978 0
1979 3
1980 0
1981 1
1982 2
1983 3
1984 1
1985 1
1986 1
1987 1
1988 1
1989 2
1990 2
Total 42
Thirty years after the first aircraft hijacking in Peru, the first such incident in 
Africa occuned on November 10, 1961, when six heavily armed members of the 
Portuguese exile group Frente Antitotalitario hijacked a Transportes Aeros 
(Portuguese ahcraft), flying from Casablanca to Lisbon. The hijackers forced the 
pilot to chcle Lisbon, where they dropped thousands of leaflets urging rebellion. 
Although the hijackers were expelled to Senegal from Tangier where they were 
held by the authorities, they were finally granted political asylum by Brazil.^ ^^
376 Edward F. Mickolus, op.cit, P. 56
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378 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 4-11, 1969, Vol. XVII, 1969- 1970, P. 23604
379 Ibid
380 Ibid
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Similarly, at the height of Nigerian Civil War in April 1967 five sympathizers 
of the Republic of Biafra hijacked a Nigerian aircraft, flying from Benin City to 
Lagos, and diverted it to Enugu, the capital of the self-styled Republic of 
Biafra.In addition, on August 11, six Ethiopian students and an officials of 
the Ethiopian Ministry of development, armed with revolvers and knives, 
hijacked an Ethiopian aircraft and diverted it to Khartoum in Sudan, where they 
asked for political asylum. The Sudanese police returned the hijackers to the 1
Ethiopian authorities.^ *^ Another Ethiopian aircraft hijacking occurred on 
September 13, 1969, when three armed men hijacked an Ethiopian aircraft and 
forced it to Aden in South Yemen, where one of the hijackers was shot and the 
others were taken into c u s t o d y ybe Arab Liberation Front for Eritrea (ALEE) 
announced that it was responsible for the hijacking and would undertake further 
operation to undermine the Ethiopian economy.^ **
As in the case of aircraft hijacking in the Middle East, the majority of aircraft 
hijackings in African states have been used as a tactic to achieve political or 
ideological aims. On August 31, 1970, three Algerian men, who wished to 
obtain political asylum in Albania, hijacked an Algerian airliner on a domestic Ï
flight. However, the Albanian authorities refused to allow the airliner to land.
Subsequently, the hijackers diverted the aircraft to Dubrovnick, Yugoslavia, |
381 Edwai'd F. Mickolus, op.cit, P. 206
382 Keesing's C o n te m p o ra r)^  Archives, February 20-27, 1971, V o l. X V I I I ,  
1971-1972, P. 24460
383 Edward F. Mickolus, op.cit, P. 364
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where they asked for political asylum.3«i Another politically motivated incident 
occurred on January 22, 1971, when an Ethiopian Aii'ways airliner on a internal 
flight with 23 passengers was hijacked by four members of ALEE who had 
carried out an earlier Ethiopian aircraft hijacking to Benghazi.^ ®^
Sometimes, the demand of the hijacker was the release of prisoners. On 
December 8, 1972, one of most the serious incidents involving an African state 
occuiTed. Seven students, all members of the ALFE, hijacked an aiicraft 
belonging to Ethiopian Airlines and demanded the release from prison of fellow 
members of the Front. When the intention of the hijackers was announced, 
security guards on board the aMiner immediately opened fire killing six of the 
hijackers. One of the hijackers, however, exploded a hand grenade which 
damaged the engine and rudder of the aircraft, and resulted in 11 injuries. The 
aircraft landed safely in Addis Ababa.^ *^
Similarly, under the continuing strained relations existing between Egypt and 
Libya since 1973, three armed Aiabs hijacked a domestic Egyptian ahcraft as it 
left Cairo ahport on August 23, 1976 and diverted it to Luxor instead of the 
hijackers’ original destination, Libya, owing to the shortage of fuel. The 
hijackers demanded the release of five prisoners, including three Libyans «
sentenced in July 1976 for planning to kill the former Libyan Minister, Major 
Meheishi, who had been granted political asylum, and a Palestinian terrorist I
awaiting trial after being arrested on August 6, 1976, following an unsuccessful 
attempt in Cairo to assassinate the former South Yemen Prime Minister,
Mohammed Ali Haithem. However, this hijacking incident terminated when the 
hijackers were aixested after a successful rescue operation by Egyptian 
commando in the guise of mechanics.^ ®^  The Egyptian Prime Minister asserted 
that the hijackers had acted on the orders of Colonel Gadafi and had been 
promised a total of $250,000 if they brought the aircraft to Libya successfully.^ ®^
Another such attempted hijacking occurred on January 12, 1979, when three #
Tunisians hijacked an Air Tunisia domestic flight and diverted it to Tripoli. The 
hijackers, armed with pistols and grenades, demanded the release of a Tunisian 
Union leader and a former Tunisian Foreign Minister. At Tripoli, the ahcraft was 
refuelled and took off only to return again to Tripoli, where the hijackers 
suixendered to authorities after a takeover lasting 13 hours.
In some cases, the aim of aircraft hijacking was to make a politico-ideological 
statement. For instance. On February 26, 1982, five hijackers claiming to be 
members of the Tanzanian Revolutionary Youth Movement, seized a Tanzanian 
Airways domestic flight and forced the pilot to divert the ahcraft to Nahobi in 
Kenya, Jedda in Saudi Arabia, Athens in Greece, and finally Stanstead in the 
United Kingdom. The hijackers, accompanied by theh families, demanded the 
resignation of the Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, During some 24 hours of 
negotiations, a British police negotiator promised to publish a list of hijackers' 
demands and the hijackers demanded to talk to Tanzanian and British officials 
restating theh demands and threats. However, British officials persuaded the 
hijackers to surrender.^ ®®
384 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, August 12, 1977, Vol. XXIII, 1977, P. 28500
385 Ibid, P. 28501
386 Edwai'd F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean M. Murdock(ed), op.cit, P. 258
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The nature of aviation tenorism in African states has not only been limited 
simply to the form of aircraft hijacking. In addition to ahcraft hijacking, there 
have been other forms of attack against civil aviation, such as sabotage bombing 
and missile attack. The following Table III-18 shows the development of such 
attacks.
Table III-18
Significant Sabotage Attacks against Civil Aviation in Africa
(1966-1990)
Date Event Casualties
11/22/1966 Explosion of Aden Airways in flight 28(K)
06/30/1967 Explosion of Aden Airways at Aden Airport
03/11/1969 Attack on Ethiopian Airlines at Frankfurt 
Airport
03/14/1970 Explosion of United Arab Airlines 2(1)
04/08/1975 South African Airlines hit by small arms fire
05/24/1978 Explosion of Kenyan Aircraft in flight 4(K)
09/03/1978 SAM-7 Missile attack on Rhodesian Airliner 48(K)
02/12/1979 SAM-7 Missile attack on Rhodesian Airliner 59(K)
02/14/1979 Armed attack on Air Rhodesian Aircraft
02/14/1979 Rhodesian Airport shelled
10/13/1981 Attack on Air Malta at Cairo Airport 2(K) 8(1)
01/11/1984 Explosion at Zaire Airport
10/03/1984 Explosion of UTA in Chad 27(1)
05/05/1987 Sudanese Aircraft shot down
03/01/1988 Explosion of BOP(South African Airliner) 17 (K)
09/19/1989 Explosion of UTA over Niger 171(K)
The fhst sabotage bomb attack against an African ahcraft occuned on 
November 22, 1966, when an Aden Ahways ahcraft was affected by an 
explosion which destroyed the ahcraft near Aden, The explosive device was 
detonated in a hand luggage ai ea on the port side of the passenger cabin after the
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aircraft reached six thousand feet. As a result, all 28 people on board were 
killed,^ ®^  Although, a similar such attack occurred on March 14, 1970, when a |
United Aiab Ahlines ahcraft was blown up, sabotage attack was not considered 
a serious problem until the late 1970s in this region.
In the late 1970s, some guerrilla organizations exploited a new tactic, surface- 
to-ah(SAM) missile attack against civil aviation. This form of attack in Africa 
took place on September 3, 1978, when, under the growing intensity of internal 
warfare between the Rhodesia Transitional Government, which was established 
in April 1978, and Patriotic Front,^ ®® the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary 
Army (ZIPRA) under Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union 
(ZAPU) shot down a Rhodesia Ah Viscount ahliner, on a flight from Kaiiba to 
Salisbury, with SAM-7 (Strela) rocket. As a result of the attack, 30 people were 
killed in the crash and 10 of the 18 survivors were shot dead by gueiTillas.^ ®® It i
was reported that the missile used by guerrillas had been supplied by the Soviet 
Union and Cuba.^ ®^ Two more Rhodesian ahliners were shot down by SAM-7 
in February 1979, and 59 people were killed.^ ’i Another missile attack occurred 
in Sudan on August 16, 1986, when a Sudan Airways ahcraft was shot down 
over rebel-held southern Sudan, killing all 57 people aboard.®®^  Several missile
387 Edwai'd F. Mickolus, op.cit, P. 72
388 Keesing's Contemporary Aichives, February 9 and April 27, 1979, PP. 
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389 Ibid, P. 29440-29441
390 Ibid
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attack incidents indicated that terrorist and guerrilla groups had already adopted 
the SAM as part of their armouries. This type of attack against civil aviation will 
be discussed in detail as a potential future thi*eat in Chapter V.
One of the most serious acts of violence against civil aviation in Africa 
occuned in September 19, 1989, when a UTA DC-10 ahliner was destroyed in 
mid-ah over Niger’s Tenere desert, killing all 171 people on board. The UTA 
began its journey in Brazzaville, Congo and made a stop in N’Djamena, Chad. 
Less than an hour after it had departed from N'Djamena, the ahcraft suddenly 
disappeared in calm weather without making any radio distress calls.^ ®^  The 
wreckage of the ahcraft was found the next day and the fact that the debris were 
scattered over an area of more than 60 miles, indicated that the explosion was 
very powerful and occurred at a high altitude.^ ®^  Subsequently, French officials 
determined that the crash was caused by an explosion and later announced that 
the type of bomb used in the attack was similar to that used in the bombing of a 
Pan Am 103 flight over L o c k e r b i e . ^ ® ^
A day after the incident, callers in London and Paris claimed that Islamic 
Jihad had bombed the UTA in retaliation for Israel's abduction of Sheikh Obeid, 
a Shia cleric taken forcibly by Israeli commandoes from his home in southern 
Lebanon in late July 1989 and jailed in Israel. In addition, they warned France 
to exchange no more information regarding Sheikh Obeid with the Israelis, and 
demanded the release of Sheikh Obeid.^ ®® In responding to these claims, French
393 The International Herald Tribune, September 20, 1989
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officials said that they could not authenticate the calls because Islamic Jihad 
usually made its claims in statements in Aiabic to news agency in Beirut and 
included photographs of Western hostages.^ ®' A few days later, on September 
24, 1989, a note delivered to the offices of a news agency in West Beiiut by the 
Clandestine Chadian Resistance, claimed responsibility for the UTA bomb 
attack, and said that "the struggle would continue until the complete withdrawal 
of all military forces from Africa".^ ®® French officials could not exclude this 
claim because a Chadian group had claimed responsibility for a bomb attack in 
Chad on Aii* France in 1984.
Meanwhile, Professor Paul Wilkinson precisely predicted the possibility of 
Libyan involvement in the following words: "In view of Gaddafi’s humiliating 
defeat during his intervention in Chad in 1982 there is clearly a real possibility 
that the Libyans instigated this tenorist attack against a French taiget”.^®® 
Wilkinson’s shai'p prediction turned out conect. A year after the incident, the 
conclusions of an inquiiy into the UTA bombing were reported by the French 
weekly Le Point to have been suppressed. According to the Times, the report 
had established Libyan and Syrian involvement in the sabotage bombing, but 
the report had been withheld to avoid upsetting French diplomatic links with 
Libya and Syria.^ ®® It was reported that the crash was caused by a bomb cairied 
on board by a Congolese national, Appolinaire Managatany who had close links 
with the Libyans.^®! In addition, according to the investigation report of the
397 Ibid
398 Keesing's Contemporaiy Aichives, September 1989, P. 36910
399 Paul Wilkinson, Lessons of Lockerbie, op.cit, P. 7
400 Tbe Times, September 4, 1990
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1Peoples’ Republic of the Congo, the Congolese government confirmed that the 
UTA disaster was the result of a crime committed by Libyan terrorists. This 
attack was the implementation of a plan which Libya had been developing since 
1986 as a part of a series of actions within the framework of the conflict between |
Libya and Chad, with French involvement. Libya’s goal was to strike against f
France at the very heart of its presence in Chad, and to escalate the conflict 
between Libya and that state.^ ®^  Finally, twenty-four months later, a French 
investigation team indicated that high-level Libyan officials, including Musa 
Kusa, vice minister of Foreign Affaiis, and Abdalla Sanoussi, second in 
command of the Libyan foreign intelligence service and Gadafi's brother-in-law, I
were involved in the attack.^ ®^  Subsequently, in October 1991, France issued 
anest wairants for four Libyan suspects in connection with the UTA 
bombing.^ ®  ^ In addition, the U.N. Security Council ordered Libya to hand over 
to France the four Libyan suspects and the two Libyans alleged to be 
responsible for the Lockerbie bombing to either the United States or the United 
Kingdom. As Libya defied the Security Council's deadline to extradite the 
Libyan suspects, on April 16, 1992, sanctions were imposed against Libya, ^
which are still in force.-*®®
402 Peoples’ Republic of the Congo, Ministry of Defence and Security,
"Investigation Report”, Brazzaville, June 3, 1990, in Libyan Sponsored ?f
Terrorism Exclusive Evidence. How They Do It: Names. Dates and Places,
Political Warfaie, No. 19, November 1991
^93 Xavier Raufer, "Libya’s Global Apparatus" in Ibid, P. 3
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The improvement of security systems at major international airports means 
that terrorists can be expected to switch the entry points of bombs to more 
vulnerable Third W orld states. In the case of UTA disaster, Brazzaville, Congo 
was the entry point fo r the bomb.
^96 Patrick Edobor Igbinnovia, "Terrorist Aircraft Hijacking and Sabotage in 
African States", International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal 
Justice. 1986, vol. 10, No. 1, P. 87
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III-7-1. The Responses and Problems of Aviation Security
After the Pan Am 103 disaster over Lockerbie, the security measures were 
put into effect at many international airports. However, the UTA incident 
highlighted that such measures for the safety of c ivil aviation were limited if 4
terrorists could attack the system tlirough vulnerable airports. The critical 
weakness of aviation secmity which manifests itself at many aiiports in less 
developed states was demonstrated by UTA disaster.
In an attempt to tackle the problem, African governments have adopted 
measures to reduce the number of attacks against c ivil aviation. Most of the 
African governments aie now pailies to international conventions, which have 
paved the way for many of the states in this region to pass anti-aircraft hijacking |
laws, to refuse landing rights to hijacked aircraft and to implement airline 
screening procedures to detect weapons,^ ®® In addition, 23 states in Africa 
contributed to efforts to improve the worldwide level of safeguai'ding civil 
aviation by pailicipating in the first major inter-state civil aviation security 
technical assistance project undertaken by ICAO in the eai*ly 1980s.
Furthermore, fellowships were also given to appropriate African officials to
- i " . . ■-  j
407 ”ICA0 actively pressing wordwide aviation security programme", ICAO 
Bulletin. July/August, 1982, P. 70
408 The Times, November 17,1989
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St. Andrews, October 10, 1991, P. 18
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attend training courses at the East African School of Aviation(EASA) in Nairobi,
Kenya and L ’Ecole Africaine de Météorologie et de l'Aviation civile(EAMAC) 
in Niamey, Niger
Despite these efforts, many airports in African states, however, have no 
fundamental aviation security measures. It is known that there aie no fences 
around most of the airports in this region. Some African airports are used as 
paths by inhabitants for gaining access to neighbouring villages. Villagers near 
the Kano airport in Nigeria, fo r example, often cross the runaway as a short-cut 
to gain access to the surrounding villages.-*®® Furthermore, Rodney Wallis, the S
former International A ir Transport Association’s Director of Security, precisely |
pointed out the reality of aviation security in this region as follows;
"At a certain African airport, security managers found gaps in the 
comparatively new perimeter fence. The missing wire was located a few 
miles from the airport serving very effectively as a holding pen for cattle.
Locally, nobody appeared too alarmed or surprised by this".^ ®®
In these circumstances, it is very difficult to prevent unauthorised people coming 
into the airport. This might be in one of the poor states in Africa, but it is by no 
means exceptional. Rodney Wallis once again described the problem of aviation 
security at another African airport as follows: .1
"Consider events at yet another African airport where young sales boys were ,
reported as regularly hawking their wares on the tarmac as passengers were j
boarding their aircraft, at times following prospective customers into the 
cabin. More alaiming were reports received from captains at yet another
airport on the African continent that their aircraft were robbed during the 
taxiing procedure! Gangs approached the aircraft at points away from the 
main buildings, both during take-off procedures and ^ter landing but when 
the aiicraft were stationary or only just moving and opened the cargo doors 
to steal the contents!
This reality destroys the concept of coordinated defences for the civil aviation i
industry. Although the governments in Africa recognise the serious threat of 
aviation teiTorism, they lack the resources to give priority to aviation security.
They simply cannot afford the outlay required to provide themselves national 
aviation security systems. One of the Chadian officials described the reality in 
African states as follows:
"We do not have the money to buy an exha machine for the hospital, let 
alone an X-ray fo r the airport".
The UTA disaster demonstrated that while such inadequacy of civ il aviation 
security exists in poor states, it w ill be impossible for the richer states to ensure 
the security of then civil aviation industries. It should be remembered that 
tenorist organizations are eager to find the easy way to place bombs and 
operatives into the civil aviation system. There is no doubt that the failure to take 
adequate global aviation security measures gained the UTA disaster a place in 
aviation history. In recent years, some aviation security experts have expressed 
a great concern over airport security in African states which offers easy access 
to terrorists. It is clear that the weakness of aiiport security in Africa poses a 
major threat to the safety of c ivil aviation at the present time. However, there is 
no sign of improvement.
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III-7-2. Closing Remarks 4JActs of violence against c ivil aviation in African states are small in number "S
when compared to those directed against the USA, West European and Middle %
Eastern states. However, most African airports are regarded by terrorists as soft #iand easy targets for their operation because there are no proper security |
measures. The problem of acts of violence against civil aviation in African states 
has been compounded by deficiency of technological know how, outdated 
security equipment, defective training of security officers, and inappropriate 
facilities in African airports.^‘2 this respect, without international efforts to 
extend and enhance global aviation security and to provide the means for even 
the poorest states in Africa to set up reasonable aviation security systems. It is 
difficult not to imagine that acts of violence against civil aviation in Africa may
begin on a large scale in near future. 11
i
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III-8. Conclusion
As has been examined in this Chapter, acts of violence against c ivil aviation 
are not limited by geographical or political boundaries. In addition, no airline in 
the global village is exempt from such attacks. In the very early stage, there was 
little to be learned from the acts of violence against civil aviation, for they 
followed no discernible pattern and, geographically, were widely scattered. The 
motivation for the attacks could be identified as falling into two categories:
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asylum seeking in Eastern Europe and extortion in the West. Until politically 
motivated terrorists adopted the tactic for their political ends, attacks against civil 
aviation were often seen in a positive light as a means of escape from the 
totalitarian regimes behind the iron curtain. This attitude gradually changed when 
aviation terrorism took a dangerous new turn. Civilian passenger aircraft were 
hijacked by politically motivated terrorists who were usually w illing to sacrifice 
themselves for whatever cause they subscribed to. The long-term motivation of {
political terrorists is the furtherance of pohtical objectives. To achieve long-term |
aims they often employ short-term tactics such as publicity for their cause, 
political blackmail, extortion of money, humiliating or discrediting a government 
or corporation, or coercing it to change its policies. In the Middle East, Western 
Europe, Latin America, and increasingly in Africa and Asia, the threat of acts of 
violence against c ivil aviation is posed by politically motivated terrorists. For I
example, civil aviation has become a military target in the Middle East conflict, 
and new extortion demands by teiTorists for changes in a nation’s foreign 
policies create agonizing dilemmas for governments whether directly or 
indirectly involved in the conflict. As political unrest continues around the 
world, it can be expected that the multi-operations of the civil aviation industry 
w ill bear the brunt of terrorist violence as the perpetrators w ill regard them as a 
attractive target.
Despite the increasing magnitude of the threat to the international community 
of attacks against c ivil aviation, no international consensus has been developed 
on how to approach aviation terrorism. Multilateral efforts to establish measures |
to combat acts of violence against c iv il aviation have failed to secure the support 
of many Third W orld states such as Libya, Syria, Iran and E aq which advocate 
terrorism as a method of achieving national liberation. Political solutions were 
sought, but it was realized that the goal of international agreement would be
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difficult and that the prospects for its rapid accomplishment were very poor and 
probably unattainable. Consequently, the international community, led by states f
having major civil aviation interest, had to develop comprehensive preventive 
and counter measures. Internationally the deterrent or diversionary effect of 
security measures have been reflected in a perceptible shift of terrorist attention 
to soft targets or other forms of attack. For example, the high level of aviation t
security provided by the Israeli government fo r its national airline and airline î
facilities has denied easy access to Arab terrorists despite their high propensity 
to infiltrate and attack. Unfortunately, this has translated into a high risk for other 
flag carriers. The trend toward attack upon Third W orld states attests in part to |
the effectiveness of anti-aviation terrorism measures being taken by states which 
have major civil aviation industry. This implies that even with the best security 
system for countering aviation terrorism, if there is any single loophole, terrorist |
w ill find and exploit it.
The tightening of airport security in major civil aviation states has greatly 
reduced the threat, but this security system is not impregnable. The following 
Chapter w ill examine the specific problems concerning the safety of civil 
aviation through the case studies in selected incidents.
- — £—
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CHAPTER IV j
CASE STUDIES IN SELECTED INCIDENTS
* * *
"Many passengers do not apparently realise that aviation terrorism acts 
now vie with technical failure and pilot error as a major cause of fatalities 
in civil aviation. Moreover, when a case of technological failure, freak :
weather conditions or pilot error occurs, there is a real chance of at least î
some of the passengers and crew getting out alive. Mid-aii' sabotage 
bombing at high altitude is a total catastrophe: no one has a chance of :|
getting out alive"
"Use of sophisticated timing and other devices by terrorists and which 
were capable of evading discovery during screening process w ill :!
demand responsive action by aviation security specialists".^
 ^ Paul Wilkinson, "The Lessons of Lockerbie", International Security Review. 
January/February 1990, P. 23
2 Rodney Wallis, "Baggage Security", FAA’s Fifth International C ivil Aviation 
Security Conference, October 24-27, 1988, P. 2
IV-L Introduction
This Chapter w ill focus on two different types of attacks against c iv il aviation 
in order to analyse both the threat and the response to that attack and to identify |
specific problems relevant thereto. Although many cases of acts of violence 
against civ il aviation could be used to illustrate the problems and difficulties |
encountered by civil aviation security, the responses made to counter that 
violence, and the threat to which the international community is subject, the 
following two case studies suffice to provide an invaluable and critical analysis.
At the same time, this Chapter is designed to provide a useful outline of the 
future prospects facing international responses to aviation terrorism.
IV-2. TW A 847 Hijacking
The hijacking of the TW A 847 in June 1985 showed the international 
community that commercial aircraft and the aviation industry in general would 
remain a target of terrorists for as long as they sought to achieve their objectives 
by terrorizing the innocent in order to emasculate the mighty. This should have 
been predicted since aircraft hijacking had earlier been shown to have all the 
elements necessary to make it a useful medium for terrorists. They can use the 
passengers as hostages for bargaining purposes and good media coverage is 
almost always assured. The significance of the TW A hostage crisis is that 
passengers and aircraft became mere pawns in the larger game of international 
crisis. Governments have become the principal taigets and attacks against 
airlines have become a major tenorist tactic. Unlike any previous incident, the 
hijacking of TW A 847 was a very complicated and confusing event because of 
the lack of effective authorities w ith whom the involved parties could deal. In 
fact, the Lebanese authorities had no real influence with which to control the 
hostage crisis owing to the unstable political situation. Consequently, the TW A 
crisis was resolved primarily by diplomatic means between the states concerned 
rather than by negotiation diiectly with the hijackers. The situation showed that 
the procedures developed over previous decades to deal w ith this type of 
situation proved inapplicable. A t the same time, the event presented considerable 
dilemmas for the United States and Israel through the hostage crisis. Although 
hijacking by politically motivated tenorists had been contained since the late
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1970s, the TW A incident provided a salutary reminder that the serious thieat of 
this type of aircraft hijacking can never be unterestimated. After a chronological 
survey of the facts of the incident, the actions and intentions of the pailies 
involved in the hostage crisis are presented. In addition, this case study 
embodies a review of the possible suggestions pertaining to these problems 
which may serve to deter and prevent such a form of aviation terrorism in the 
future.
IV-2-1. The Facts of the Incident
On June 14, 1985, a Trans W orld Aiilines (TWA) flight 847, canying 153 
passengers and crew, was hijacked shortly after take off from Athens en route to 
Rome by two Shia Muslim ten orists aimed with a pistol and hand grenades.^  
The hijackers intended to force the pilot to fly  to Algiers, Algeria. However, 
when told by the captain that the aircraft did not have sufficient fuel to fly  to 
Algiers, the hijackers then changed their destination to Beiiut where 17 
American women and 2 children were released.'* At Beirut International Airport, 
officials did not want to get involved in a hijacking crisis, and so they blocked 
the airport runway with buses and other obstacles. The hijackers and captive 
pilot, however, had no choice but to land in Beii ut because of shortage of fuel.® 
On landing at Beirut aiiport, the hijackers demanded the release of more than 
700 detainees, mostly Lebanese Shias but also including Palestinians who had
3 For fu ll story of this incident, see John Testrake, Triumph Over Tenor on 
Flight 847. Sussex, UK: Kingsway Publications, 1987; The Times, June 15, 
1985
4 John Testrake, Ibid, P. 70 
3 The Times, June 15, 1985
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9 The Shia detainees in A tlit camp in Israel were the remainder of the original 
contingent of 1,200 prisoners driven in blacked-out buses south across the 
boarder on April 2,1985, the day before the closure of the Ansar prison camp in 
southern Lebanon. The Israeli action was confirmed internationally as being in 
breach of the fourth Geneva Convention covering the treatment of prisoners in 
the time of war.; see The Times, June 15, 1985
7 The Daily Telegraph, June 17, 1985; The Times, June 17, 1985
8 The Times, June 15, 1985
9 The Times, June 16, 1985
19 The Daily Telegraph, June 17, 1985; Newsweek, June 24, 1985, P. 13; 
Keesing's Contemporary Aichives, Januaiy 1986, P. 34130
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been transfened from southern Lebanon at the beginning of April 1985, to the 
A tlit detention camp in north-east Israel.® At Beiiut the aircraft was refuelled as 
the hijackers had ordered and took off for Algiers, on the same day, with up to 
10 more tenorists who had joined the aircraft on its arrival at Beirut/ After five 
hours of negotiations between the hijackers and Algerian negotiators, 
accompanied by U.S. embassy officials, at Algiers airport, the aircraft took off §
late that day fo r Beirut again. Twenty passengers, including 17 women and 2 
children had been freed minutes before.® In Beirut, the hijackers asked to speak I
to an Amal official. However, the Amal militia made no response.® To show 
their seriousness, the hijackers responded by murdering an American passenger, 
a U.S. Navy diver, and throwing his body onto the taiinac.i® Moments later,
Amal officials and their body-guaids boarded the plane. As negotiations 
proceeded, the hijackers asked that all airport lights be turned off. In fact, they -|
wanted darkness in order to bring aboard about ten additional terrorists with %
arms and ammunition as reinforcements and to remove some passengers with 
Jewish-sounding names to a secret place controlled by Hezbollah in order to
'■■I
it
iprevent any future rescue operation/^ The hijackers also demanded that A li 
Aiwa, who had been aiiested at Athens ahport after his two accomplices had 
commandeered the TW A 847, be released by the Greek authorities and brought 
to Algiers. Otherwise, they tlireatened that they would k ill all seven Greeks on 
the plane.^ 2
On June 15, the aircraft took off from Behut airport and landed at Algiers for 
a second time. Soon after the TW A 847 landed in Algiers, two Algerian officials 
came aboard fo r negotiations which were evidently successful. The hijackers 
released 67 hostages including seven Greek passengers in exchange for the 
release by the Greek authorities of an accomplice of the hijackers, A li Atwa who 
had been arrested at Athens a irpo rt.T ha t evening, the hijackers announced that 
if  their demands were not met by the following morning, they would fly  to an 
unspecified destination, and destroy the aircraft with its remaining passengers.
However, on June 16, the aircraft flew for the third time to Beirut airport. 
The hijackers demanded to see M r Nabih Beni, the leader of the Amal M ilitia 
and the Justice Minister in the fragmented Lebanese government, for 
negotiations.!® The hijackers' repeated emphasis on seeing officials of Amal, the 
mainstream of the Shia organization, in fact, suggested not only that they were 
seeking a negotiated settlement but also that their motivation may have been
11 Time, June 24, P. 28; The Times, June 17, 1985
12 The Times. June 17, 1985
12 The Times, June 17, 1985; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Jan. 1986, P. 
34130
14 The Times, June 17. 1985
15 Time. June 24.1985. P. 28
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essentially political rather than ideological. The hijackers also urged the 
International Committee of the Red Cross facilitate the release of the Shias in 
Israel and to do so expeditiously before it would be too late. The hijackers 
warned ominously that the next communique would be their last.!®
In Beii ut, the remaining hostages were taken off the ahcraft, split into groups 
and driven into the city under the supervision of Amal, the mainstream Shia 
Muslim political and military force, after M r Nabih Berri had agreed to a request 
by the hijackers to conduct negotiations on their behalf.!^ M r Nabih Berri 
announced, on June 17, that all the hostages had been transferred by the Shia 
militia from the TW A 847 to an undisclosed location in Beirut city for security 
reasons.!* jje  also indicated that he was responsible for the hostages, and that 
the American hostages were being guarded by his own Amal men as well as by 
the hijackers. At the same time, he made it cleai' that he could only guarantee the 
safety of the hostages as long as negotiations continued for the release of Shia 
detainees in Israel, and that hostages' release could only be achieved after the 
detainees were also free.!®
As a gesture of generosity, on June 18, M r Berri released tliree of the 
hostages and promised that the others would be freed in 24 hours if Israel 
returned the Shia prisoners to Lebanon. At the same time, he sympathised with 
the hijackers, saying that the Shia Muslim prisoners were as innocent as the
Ibid
17 The Guardian, June 18, 1985
18 The Times, June 18, 1985
19 The Guai'dian, June 18, 1985; The Times, June 19, 1985
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%Americans hijacked on the plane, yet the U.S. Government did not intervene to 
help them.2®
On June 22, the Shia militia waimed that its mediation efforts in the TW A 
hijack crisis would end in a few days unless Israel agreed to free the Shia 
prisoners. The warning came amid rising tension as unidentified wai' planes flew 
over Beirut and as the Amal leader Nabih Berri accused the United States of 
preparing for military action. A t the same time, Amal insisted that it was not 
behind the hijack and became involved only after the original hijackers 
thi'eatened to shoot more passengers unless Berri agreed to act as a mediator.^! 
Anial's veiled threat to withdraw from the crisis was clearly designed to put 
more pressure on the U.S. administration. W ith the situation in Beirut still in 
deadlock, angry exchanges between Israel and the United States intensified. 
Israel accused the Reagan administration of attempting to influence public
opinion against Israel, while publicly urging Israel not to give in to the hijackers' 
d e m a n d s .22 On the other side, the United States accused Israel of violating the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, which covers the treatment of prisoners, when it 
moved the Shias out of southern Lebanon.^ ®
Under strong pressure from United States, Israel announced, on June 23, that 
it would release 31 Shia prisoners, but denied that the move had any connection 
whatsoever with the TW A hijacking.^^ An Amal official reacted to the
20 The Times, June 19, 1985
21 The Observer, June 23, 1985
22 The Sunday Times, June 23, 1985
23 Newsweek, July 1, 1985, P. 16
24 The Times, June 24, 1985
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announcement by saying that so fai' there were no plans to release any of the 
hostages in return for the 31 Shias.^ s President Reagan also said that the release 
of prisoners by Israel was nothing to do with the hostages' release.^ ® The TW A 
hijack crisis appealed to be destined for a period of deadlock after the Amal 
movement's refusal to consider Israel's release of 31 prisoners as a mechanism 
which might be used to lead to the eventual freeing of the hostages.
In what it insisted was an umelated move, the Israeli government, on June 
24, freed 31 prisoners.^ ^ During the ensuing five days there were intense and 
lai'gely clandestine contacts between Syrian and Iranian officials and 
representatives of Amal and Hezbollah, between the U.S. and Syrian 
governments and U.S. and Israeli leaders.^ » Among those personally involved 
were M r Beni, Shaikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of 
Hezbollah, the group alleged to have hijacked the aii'craft, President Assad of 
Syria and Hojatolislam Hashemi AH Akbar Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the 
Iranian parliament, who on June 25 condemned the hijacking and said that Iran 
would have attempted to prevent it, had the Iianians had advance knowledge.^^ 
However, some reports suggested that the Hezbollah group which originally 
hijacked the TW A was paii of a pro-Iranian movement that received much of its 
funding thi ough the Iranian Embassy in Damascus.^ ®
25 The Guardian, June 24, 1985
2b The Daily Telegraph, June 24, 1985
22 The Guardian, June 25, 1985; The Times, June 25, 1985
28 The Times, June 24 and 26, 1985
29 The Times, June 26, 1985 
80 The Times, June 24. 1985
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81 The Financial Times, June 27, 1985
82 The Times, June 26, 1985
88 The Daily Telegraph, June 29, 1985 
84 The Times, June 29, 1985
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In this context, a hostage who had become ill was freed on June 26. At the 
same time, M r Berri offered to transfer all the hostages under his control to a 
Western embassy, specifically mentioning the French, Swiss and Austrian 
Embassies, in Beirut, pending the release of the Shia prisoners.^i Mr Beni's 
intention appeared to be to shift at least some of the responsibility for the safety 
of the hostages. In fact, this suggestion by M r Berri followed the warning of the 
United States, on June 24, that if diplomatic moves faüed, it would consider 1
other measures, including attempting to cut off goods and services to Beirut.^^ In |
addition, it seemed also likely that M r Berri, iiTitated by President Assad's 
pressure, merely wanted to embarrass the Syrian leader.
On June 27, Syria pledged that it would help to end the ordeal of the TW A 
hostages after M r Berri had failed to reach agreement to move the hostages to 
the French Embassy in Beirut. Syrian officials said that Syria was ready in |
principle to receive the passengers from the hijacked a ircraft.Another plan to 
resolve the American hostage crisis seemed to appear, on June 28, as U.N. 
officials tried to arrange for the near-simultaneous release of Shia prisoners by ^
Israel and the transfer of 39 hostages in Beirut to Syria. But Amal officials 
indicated that they would still much prefer the hostages to be moved to a 
Western embassy in Beirut.^^
On June 30, escorted from Beirut by Lebanese Shia gunmen and then by t
squads of Syrian military police, the remaining 39 American hostages, including
the four who had been held by Hezbollah, were driven to freedom and safety in 
Damascus, from where they were flown to Frankfurt.^^ Theii* release followed a 
personal guarantee from President Assad to Mr Berri that the A tlit detainees 
would shortly be set free. The guaiantee was reportedly based on assurances 
which President Assad had received to this effect from the U.S. administration, 
which in turn had received confirmation from the Israeli government that the 
release of A tlit detainees would take place in the near future.^* It was believed 
that President Assad also secuied an assurance from the U.S. administration that 
neither they nor the Israelis would carry out retaliation against the Shias in 
Lebanon. In what had been seen as an undertaking not to retaliate, the U.S. 
State Department had announced on June 29 that it respected Lebanese 
sovereignty and supported the preservation of security and stability in the 
State.37
On July 3 a further 300 A tlit detainees were released into southern Lebanon. 
Israeli officials said that their release had been delayed as a result of the TW A 
hijacking. The remaining 435 detainees were released in batches of about 100 
each on July 24, August 13 and 28, and September 10, 1985.^ «
One of the most troubling aspects of the plight of the TW A hijacking was that 
it was the thiid hijacking that had occuixed in the region within thiee days from 
June 11 to 14, and the second one apparently engineered by Lebanese Shias. In 
earlier times, Arab hijackers tended to be a Palestinian, from one or other
35 The Times. M y  1, 1985
36 Ibid
37 Keesing's Contemporary Ar chives, January 1986, P. 34130
38 Ibid; Tire Daily Telegraph, July 4, 1985; The International Herald Tribune,
August 14, 1985; The Times, August 29 and September 11, 1985
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89 The International Herald Tribune, June 12, 1985; The Guardian, June 12, 
1985; The Daily Telegraph, June 12, 1985
40 The Times, June 13, 1985;
41 Ibid
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factions of the PLO, attempting to advance or at least dramatize the Palestinian ^
cause. The politicisation of Lebanon’s Shia Muslim community was one of the 
most significant and most troubling consequences of the Israeli invasion. The |
first hijacking had begun on June 11, 1985, when six Shia terrorists armed with 1
automatic weapons and explosives, stormed aboard a Royal Jordanian Airlines 
B-727 aircraft carrying 74 people at Beirut airport. They overpowered the 
Jordanian security guards, then ordered the pilot to fly  to Larnaca, Cyprus.^ ^
The political implications behind the hijack were extremely serious. It was, in 
effect, an act of overt aggression against the Jordanian Government and against 4
those other Arab states which supported Yasir Arafat’s leadership of the PLO.
The hijackers condemned not only Jordan but also the Arab League for their 
criticism of the Shia Muslims besieging the Palestinian camps in Beirut, and 
demanded the evacuation of all armed Palestinians from the Beirut camps, which 
had themselves been under siege by Shia Muslim Amal militiamen for 24 days.'*®
In fact, the Shias wanted to drive out the Palestinians to make sure that the PLO 
would never again be able to set up a state within a state in Lebanon. After 
several dire threats, the hijackers freed the passengers and blew up the aircraft.
The hijackers subsequently made their escape over rough ground beside the 
airport runway, untouched by the local Amal militiamen who were in control of 
the area.'*^
Several released passengers then boarded the first plane they could catch out 
of Beirut, a Middle East Airlines flight to nearby Cyprus. But a young
IV-2-2. Analytical Discussion of Event, Actors and Outcome
IV-2-2-1. The Hijackers
42 Newsweek, June 24, 1985, P. 30
43 The Guardian, June 18, 1985; Time, June 24, 1985, P. 25
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Palestinian teiTorist armed with a hand grenade hijacked the aircraft moments 
before it landed at the Larnaca airport. The hijacker stated that he had seized the 
aircraft in retaliation for the eailier A LIA  aircraft hijacking. He soon agreed to 
end the hijacking after being granted his request to fly  to Amman aboard a :|
Jordanian aiiliner.^^
These were the conditions that had produced the nightmaie of the TW A 847 
hostage crisis. In fact, Beirut’s wai' of the camps between Amal Shia Muslims 
and Palestinian was transfeixed to the air.
In analysing the implication of the TW A 847 hijacking which illustrated the 
tenorists’ strategy, it is essential to note what an exceptional challenge this type 
of terrorists can present to the parties involved and to the liberal states. The 
terrorists’ firm  intentions, persistent ability to control the situation, mass media 
utilization, and exceptional confidence were demonstrated throughout the event.
This indicated that aircraft hijacking by politically motivated terrorists could 
produce great difficulties for international society.
The hijackers were identified as members of Hezbollah, which is comparable i
"3with the main Shia Fundamentalist movement in Lebanon.^ ^ Hezbollah appeared #
as a result of the merger of Husayn Musawi’s Islamic Amal and the Lebanese
branch of the DaVa Party in 1982/4 The organization is a social, political, and 
m ilitaiy movement that gives focus and general identity in Lebanon to Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s Islamic militancy. Thiough this connection, Hezbollah’s ties to Iran 
aie important in so far as Iran provides political indoctrination, financing and 
ideological support, though it is an over simplification to claim that Tehian 
controls all the activities of the Islamic groups in Lebanon.^®
Tlnoughout the hijacking crisis, one of the main objectives of this TW A 
hijacking was the release of more than 700 Lebanese Shias held at the A tlit 
detention camp in north-east Israel. Obtaining freedom for those people was 
certainly only one part of the hijackers’ intention, since the Israelis claimed that 
they were about to release the Lebanese prisoners, and the hostages were 
eventually released before the release of Lebanese prisoners. The TW A 847 
hijacking occuixed at least in part because the Hezbollah sought to win credit for 
the Lebanese prisoners' release in order to gain an advantage over the other 
nationalist organizations such as the Amal m i l i t i a . At the same time, those who 
organized the hijacking of the TW A 847 would have recognized from past 
experience that theii' operation, if successful, would again expose the inability of 
the United States to prevail against them. Accordingly, the teixorists would strike 
another great blow against then enemy and for the spread of Shia 
fundamentalism. The hijackers also demanded that A li Atwa, who had been 
aixested at Athens aiiport after his two accomplices commandeered the TW A
44 U.S. Department of Defence, Teixorist Group Profiles. P. 15
45 Ibid; Fuiiher reading on Hezbollah, see Marius Deeb, "Shia movements in 
Lebanon: their formation, ideology, social basis, and links with Iran and Syria", 
Third W orld Quarterly. Vol. 10, No. 2, 1988, 692-698
4b A lvin H. Bernstein, "Iran’s Low-Intensity War against the United States", 
QRBIS. Spring 1986, P. 159
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49 Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991, P. 605; For bomb attacks in December 1983, see Edwai*d Mickolus, 
Todd Sandler, and Jean M. Murdock, op.cit, PP. 465-467
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847, be released by the Greek authorities and brought to Algiers. Otherwise, 
they threatened that they would k ill all seven Greeks on the plane.4  ^ In this 
situation, the Greek authorities submitted, w ith ease, to the hijackers* blackmail 
for the release of their own nationals. They obviously did not make any efforts 
to secure the release of all hostages by close cooperation with other national 
authorities. The Public Order Minister of Gieece said, without any qualms, that 
he was delighted the decision to yield to the hijackers' threat to k ill seven Greek 
passengers unless then* comrade was freed led to the release of 50 hostages.^ »
A li Atwa was flown to Algiers on June 15 on a special Olympic A ii ways flight.
Greek action provided encouragement to the terrorists and signified to the |
ten'orists that hostages constitute a most valuable weapon with which to bargain 
and secure their aims. In addition, it was reported that the hijackers wanted the 
release 17 Hezbollah terrorists who had been arrested and taken into custody in 
Kuwait prison fo r bomb attacks in Kuwait on December 12, 1983. One of the 17 
prisoners was the brother-in-law of Imad Mougnieh who had planned the hijack 
operation.4® However, the hijackers abandoned this attempt, because they 
recognized that the Kuwait government would not easily sunender to their 
blackmail. In fact, the Kuwait government maintained a hardline policy when 
dealing with aviation teixorists. This was demonstrated in 1988, when a Kuwaiti 
aii'liner was hijacked by Hezbollah, Despite the murder of two of its citizens 
during the 16-day ordeal and the presence of three Royal Family members n
The Sunday Times, April 10, 1988
The Independent, April 6, 1988; For further information concerning Kuwaiti 
airliner hijacking, see Robin E. H ill, Problems of International Cooperation to 
Impmve Standards of A vk tion Security, with. Refereoc.e to the Passengers, Ph.D. 
Thesis, University of St. Andrews, 1990, at Chapter 3
^2 The Times, June 16, 1985
^3 For further information concerning conflict among Lebanon's main religious 
groups, see Bruce Hoffman, Shi'a Tenorism. the Conflict in Lebanon and the 
Hijacking of TW A Flight 847. Santa Monica: RAND, July 1985
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among the hostages, the Kuwaiti government steadfastly refused to meet the 
hijackers demand for the release of the convicted terrorists. The 17 Kuwaiti |
prisoners became important pawns in the game of international terrorism. Theii' 
release had been demanded on numerous occasions by the Hezbollah including 
the Kuwaiti airliner hijacking in December 1984.^ ® The attempt to release the 17 
prisoners held in Kuwait was made once again hi April 1988, when a Kuwait 
airliner was hijacked by Hezbollah. The principal aim of the Kuwaiti airliner I
hijacking was also the release of the 17 prisoners.®* This demand, finally, î
became overtaken by events through the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 
disappearance of the prisoners from the Kuwait gaol.
One of the most important objectives in hijacking the TW A 847 was to gain 
publicity for and so draw public attention to the cause espoused by the 
hijackers. On a political level, the hijackers demanded the immediate withdrawal 
of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon and international condemnation of the 
U.S. and Isra e l.® ^  I n  a broader sense, the Shias of Lebanon, radicalized by the 
violence following the Israeli invasion of June 1982, were seeking fairer i
treatment after generations of neglect and discrimination by Lebanon’s wealthier 
and more powerful Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims.®  ^In addition to that.
I
Shias, inspired by the example of the Iranian revolution, intended to destroy the 
last vestiges of Western decadence in the Islamic world, particularly the 
presence of the United States.®^  In fact, the 753 Shia prisoners were expected to 
be released by Israel, according to the international law. However, by 
demanding the release of the Shia prisoners, the hijackers attempted to appeal 
the world public opinion and turn it against the Israeli Government who were 
holding the Shia prisoners contrary to international law. And inevitably the 
hijackers claimed the entire credit for the Shia prisoners' release. To achieve the 
prisoners release, the hijackers effectively utilised the mass media. As the 
hijacking crisis progressed, removing the passengers with Jewish-sounding 
names to a secret place controlled by the Hezbollah made it possible to gain a 
great deal of U.S. media coverage. In addition, the series of chaotic press 
conferences may have been intended to regain media interest at a time of 
inactivity during the hostage crisis. The hijackers also set a deadline each time to 
intensify the effect of theii' tlireats, and this focused the attention of the mass 
media more sharply on their cause.
As the hostage crisis progressed, the hijackers felt uneasy about theii* own 
safety. By theii* actions, the hijackers had shown themselves to be worried about 
a m ilitaiy rescue attempt from the start. This was intensified by the very real 
possibility of a military rescue operation by U.S forces. In fact, as public anger 
and w ony about hostage safety mounted, there were loud calls for a swift 
military response to free the hostages. The U.S. anti-teirorist unit. Delta Force, 
was ready to cairy out a rescue operation.®® Britain also dispatched a team of 
about 5 SAS troops to Cyprus to keep watch on events, even though there was
54 Newsweek, June 24, 1985, P. 25 
The Times, June 17, 1985
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no question of them taking paii in the events.®® However, from the outset, the 
hijackers appeared to be one jump ahead of any action planned against them.
The well-trained terrorists assumed that the chance of a military response would 
decrease as the number of American lives at risk increased. For their safety, the 
hijackers transferred the passengers with Jewish-sounding names to safe houses 
controlled by Hezbollah to prevent such operation.®' In addition, to put pressure 
on the U.S. government to desist from any rescue operation, they sent a letter 
signed by the American hostages, to President Reagan. In this letter, twenty-nine 
American hostages held aboai'd appealed to Reagan to meet the hijackers’ 
demands and refrain from any military operation.®* At the same time, during the 
negotiations in both Algiers and Beirut, the hijackers would move on to another 
airfield, just as the negotiators were beginning to feel confident that a solution 
was near, or when rescue operation forces were in a position to storm the s
aircraft.
At every stage in the hostage crisis, the well-trained hijackers held the 
initiative, and the most disturbing aspect of the hijack was the sophisticated 
understanding of counter-terrorism methods demonstrated by the hijackers. The 
terrorists had adapted to the Western counter-terrorist capability from their own 1
sources. In addition, terrorists had profited from the bitter lessons of Entebbe |
and Mogadishu that the longer they stayed in one place the more vulnerable they 
were to a military rescue operation. They also knew that the chances of a rescue 
attempt increased dramatically once they murdered a hostage. By moving 
frequently and spHtting up the hostages, the terrorists multiplied the obstacles
55 The Guai'dian June 18, 1985 
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facing a rescue force. In addition, tenorists had learned that hostage-taking in a 
hijack situation was the weapon of choice when diiected against Western 
governments. The teixorists recognized that by holding Western hostages they 
had a better position fo r negotiation, since the political and social tradition from #
which they came placed quite a different value on human life in such a crisis.
There is little doubt that the attitude of the Western governments to hostages has 
affected the calculations of teixorists vis-a-vis the effectiveness of hostage-taking 
as a tactic/® In fact, the large number of hostages gave the politically motivated 
hijackers immense bargaining power during the TW A 847 crisis. The hostage 
taking tactic appeared once again in 1988, when a Kuwaiti airliner was hijacked 
by Hezbollah.
IV-2-2-2. U.S and Israeli Governments
Despite all the promises that the teixorists would be brought to justice, both 
before and during the TW A hostage crisis, the most powerful government in the 
world was once again made to seem powerless. Governments inevitably find it 
easier to react to the last threat than to protect against the next attack. Ten orism 
has a tantalising capacity to make every incident seem like an exception to the 
rules that ought to apply. In this respect, the TW A 847 hijack incident was 
unpredictable. The United States had set up a special task force at the State 
Department to coordinate efforts to secure the release of hostages w ith President 
Ronald Reagan taking charge of the TW A 847 crisis, on June 16. Reagan had 
been in touch with the governments of Israel and Lebanon. He also sent a
59 Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory. Tactics, and Counter- 
Measures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, PP. 152-157
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message to Resident Chadli Benjedid of Algeria and President Hafez al-Assad 
of Syria requesting cooperation/® When the TW A 847 landed at Algiers airport, 
U.S. officials, who well remembered the important role played by Algerian 
diplomats in settling the Iranian hostages crisis in 1980, were hopeful that the 
hijacking could be resolved one way or another in Algiers.®* However, the 
aiicraft took off fo r Beiiut for a second time without outcome, beyond the 
release of 21 passengers.
The TW A aiicraft hijacking could hai‘dly have come at a worse time for the 
Israeli government. In fact, the crisis came as the Israeli government was still 
reeling from the baixage of criticism provoked by its prisoner exchange deal 
with a Palestinian terrorist organization. On May 20, 1985, about 1,150 
prisoners, including some convicted of serious terrorist offences, were freed in 
return for only three Israeli soldiers captured in Lebanon in 1982 and held by 
the Populai* Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP- 
GC).®2 One of the released teixorists was Kozo Okamoto, the sole survivor of 
the Japanese Red Ai*my teixorists who killed 25 people in an attack at Lod 
airport, Israel, in 1972.®® Israel's willingness fo r compromise in this case stood 
in glaring contrast to previous policy, which insisted on "no deal with teixorists". 
Both at home and abroad, the prisoner exchange deal with PFLP-GC 
undermined the credibility of Israel’s hard line policy on international terrorism. 
At the same time, the government of Shimon Peres, alicady pushed to the brink
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deal with terrorists, recognized that it could suffer a major setback if more 
concessions to ten orism were m a d e / *  As a consequence of their recent loss of 
face, the TW A hostage crisis found Israeli leaders less w illing than ever to 
capitulate, or to appear to do so.
The Israeli authorities started to discuss the TW A 847 hostage crisis on June 
16. Israel, in fact, had long planned its own initiative to release about 800 shia 
Muslim detainees held in a strictly disciplined Israeli detention camp at A tlit in 
north-east Israel.®® However, the Israeli authorities were intensely and 
uncomfortably aware of the relationship between the TW A 847 hostage crisis 
and the controversial and disproportionate exchange. In political circles, Israel's 
stand on the TW A hostage crisis had been greatly complicated by its decision in 
May to free 1,150 prisoners. In tliis situation, Israeli officials were trying to find Ï
means of face-saving. On June 17, Israel broke its silence over the TW A hijack i
with an announcement that any initiative would have to come from the U.S. if 
the key demands of the hijackers were to be considered. The police Minister,
Chaim Bar-Lev, said that the Israeli government did not consider it had to take 
any initiative on releasing the prisoners. But if a request to do so came from the 
proper level of the Reagan administration, it would have to be considered 
seriously.®® In response to Israel's position, the White House spokesman, Larry 
Speakes, said the U.S. had not been in touch with Israel over the hijackers' 
demand. He also said as follows:
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"we do not make concessions, we do not encourage others to make 
concessions, and we do not ask others to do what we would not do."®'
At this point, the United States had very few options. As public anger and 
frustration mounted, there were loud calls for a swift military response to free 
the hostages. The U.S. anti-tenorist unit. Delta Force, was ready to caixy out a 
rescue operation, if necessary in either Algiers or Beirut, from U.S. Navy ships 
in the Mediterranean.®» However, in an attempt to pre-empt such an operation. 
Western Embassy officials privately expressed their deep concern that a rescue 
bid could jeopmdise the lives of passengers with Jewish-sounding names who, 
it was reported, had been taken to safe houses controlled by Hezbollah, on June 
16.®® Indeed, the hijackers had no lack of supporters at Beirut airport. As Beirut 
ahport lies next to the Lebanese coast, it might have been geographically 
suitable for a rescue operation. However, it was an aimed camp occupied by 
Nabih Bern's Amal movement. There was no doubt,, that the Amal militia would 
have been on the teixorists’ side had Delta Force canxed out a rescue 
operation.'® In short, the prospect of a successful military rescue operation was 
virtually nonexistent. The U.S. administration recognized that m ilitaiy action 
would only get the hostages killed, and turned to the prospects for a peaceful 
settlement. Moreover, as increased media attention focused on the personal 
anguish of returning ex-hostages and upon the families of those who remained 
captive, all of whom called for arranging a release of the hostages, it became
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evident that the Reagan administration would be unable to let the remaining 
hostages languish indefinitely in captivity or be killed.
In the end, the U.S. authorities had no choice but to make a deal with Nabih 
Berri and President Assad of Syria, who had some influence and power over the 
Middle Eastern states. President Reagan's recourse to diplomacy, his unlikely 
acceptance of Syria as a negotiating intermediary, although his administration had 
in the past frequently denounced Syria as a sponsor of international tenorism, 
much of it directed against American interests  ^and his failure to attempt to secure 
a forcible release of the hostages, were contrasted with his criticisms of former 
President Jimmy Carter for having employed a similar approach during the 
Tehran hostage affair in 1980.'* Mr. Reagan and his officials had said so often 
that they would not allow their state to be humiliated by terrorists. However, 
they found themselves facing similai* problems and the same realities limiting the 
action they could take.
As public anger rose amid mounting calls for swift retaliatory action, Reagan 
diiected the American ambassador in Beirut to explore every avenue with Beni 
in an effort to free the hostages. The U.S. administration was appaiently seeking 
a formula which could result in the release of Shia prisoners held by Israel and 
of the American hostages with the help of the Red Cross. The U.S. officials 
attempted to persuade the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to 
contact the Israelis in order to ascertain the status of the release of the Shia 
prisoners in Atlit, but the U.S. officials insisted that they were not asking the 
Israelis to do so nor were they giving in to the terrorist demands.'^  On June 19,
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the ICRC, however, announced that it could not act as an intermediaiy between 
the United States and Israel, which had permanent and direct contacts with each 
other, to secure the release of prisoners held by Israel to end the TWA hostage 
crisis, but left open a possible neutral supervisory role if approached by the 
hijackers and Israel.'®
The dilemma faced by the U.S authorities stemmed from the fact that the 
Israeli administration was still adopting a fii*m and unchanging attitude. Israeli 
officials said again that no direct request had yet been made by the United States 
to Israel to release the prisoners.'* On June 21, five of the hostages were 
produced at a press conference at the airport, in an attempt by Amal to bring 
pressure to beai* on American public opinion. The hostages appealed to 
President Reagan for a second time not to undertake any mihtary action to 
secure their release, and urged Israel to free the Shia prisoners.'® The U.S. 
subsequently played down the possibility of direct action, and shifted emphasis 
towaids thieats of sanctions against Lebanon.
The hijackers’ main demand was easy enough to satisfy. They wanted the 
release of the their brethren, Shia prisoners who had been destined to be set free 
before the incident stalled, from an Israeli prison camp. The US administration, 
which had promised to make no concessions could hardly demand one from an 
embattled ally, Israel. With tempers growing, the United States and Israel found 
themselves trapped in a squirrel's spinning wheel, each waiting for the other to 
suggest that the Shias be freed. Each side was afraid of losing face. To the last, 
they refused to compromise. Faced with the painful choice of either losing face
3^ The International Herald Tribune, June 20, 1985; The Times, June 20, 1985
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or losing U.S. support, the Israeli authorities began to edge towards 
compromise. Finally, the Israeli government announced the freeing of the 
detainees. The official statement insisted that theii* release had nothing to with the 
TWA hostage crisis and they were being set free as part of "ongoing policy". 
The Israeli authorities, however, seemed to have lost, and although they would 
perhaps have eventually released most of their prisoners in due course, they 
were forced to do so prematurely under embaiiassing ciicumstances. When the 
U.S. administration was forced to negotiate for the freedom of American 
hostages, it was clear that all the rhetoric in the world could not replace relevant 
action. During the hostage crisis, the U.S. government lost ground in the battle 
against teixorism. The United States had done nothing to discourage tenorists 
from seizing other Americans in the future. It appeared that a major superpower, 
the United States, was impotent at the hands of a few, highly politically 
motivated teixorists.
Meanwhile, the U.S. actions after the resolution of the event appealed 
incapable of enforcing any punishment on those involved. Despite a last-minute 
pledge the night before the hostages’ release not to retaliate against Lebanon, the 
U.S. administration's first action was to lash out against Beirut airport. On July 
1, the day after the hostages were released, President Reagan ordered legal and 
diplomatic steps to try to shut Beirut aiiport, and the State Department 
announced that henceforth no Lebanese aiilines would be allowed to fly to the 
United States and, in addition to Lebanese airlines, any airlines which continued 
to fly into Beiiut would be denied American landing rights.'® In fact, before the 
TWA hostage crisis was over, U.S. attention had turned to the problem of Beirut 
aiiport which was in fact a free-fiie zone subject to no lawful, responsible
1
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authority.” This situation augmented the tenorist tlireat to all civil aviation in 
Europe and the Middle East. One senior U.S. State Department official said that 
some 15 per cent of all aircraft hijackings in the past had begun, passed through 
or ended at Beirut airport.'» Apart from the lack of substantive response which 
resulted from Lebanon’s basic incapacity to take proper measures, it is notable 
that Lebanon was serving as a sanctuaiy for tenorists. American sanctions 
against Beiiut aiiport, however, confronted difficulties. The fact that the Beiiut 
airport was routinely closed for long periods because of fighting around it, that 
few aiilines used it any longer and that the TWA hijacking did not originate 
there seemed to have little influence on the U.S. intention. In addition, the United 
States moves to close Beirut aiiport were, in fact, jeopardising efforts to secure 
the release of Western hostages in Lebanon. In response to the U.S. thieat to 
isolate Beiiut airport, Hezbollah, which claimed responsibility for the 
kidnapping of several Westerners including 7 Americans, wained that they 
would execute all western hostages held in Lebanon if the U.S. attempted to 
retaliate for the TWA hijacking to Beirut.'® At the same time, the U.S. 
government received strong protests from 17 Arab League states and even many 
European states, including France, Switzerland and Greece, which announced 
that they would allow Lebanese aiilines to go on flying to their states.»® In this 
respect, the policies of western governments taken as a whole in the aftermath of
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the TWA 847 hijacking revealed some fundamental weaknesses in international 
coimter-teiTorism cooperation. The U.S Administration’s move to isolate Beirut 
airport by calling for an international ban on the flights of Lebanese airlines had 
one small practical effect. Amid growing scepticism among its allies about the 
proposed boycott of Beirut airport as a haven for terrorists, the US government 
began to play down the sanctions aspect of its response to the TWA 847 
hijacking, shifting to a lower-key approach that stressed security improvements 
at international airports.
IV-2-2-3. Amal Militia
Thi'oughout the TWA crisis, Mr Nabih Berri conducted negotiations on be 
half of the hijackers. At the early stage, Mr Nabih Berri and his Amal militia did 
not want to get involved in the TWA hijacking crisis, as relations with the |
Hezbollah had been growing worse since Husayn Musawi deserted from Amal Ï
and joined up with Shaykh Muhammed Husayn Fadlallah’s Hezbollah when Mr i
Berri joined the Lebanese Coalition Government of Reconstruction in April 
1984.»* Meanwhile, the Hezbollah had to persuade the Amal militia to cooperate 
because Beirut airport was completely surrounded by hostile militia, and the 
Hezbollah did not have any influence with any of them, and so the Hezbollah 
had no direct access to the airport.»^  At the same time, Mr Berri was shrewd
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enough lo lake advantage of the TWA hostage crisis for his own personal 
political ambitions. There could be no better chance to increase his international 
stature than to play the role of intermediary over the lives of U.S, hostages, even 
though he had his position as a leader of the principal Shia movement to think 
of, as well as his relations with the fundamentalist groups from whom the 
hijackers had emerged. Throughout the hostage crisis, Mr Berri had been 
required to face in many directions. Mr Berri intended that he would achieve 
Washington’s goodwill by saving the lives of U.S. hostages, the support of the 
Shias of southern Lebanon by freeing their brethren from Israeli detention, the 
humiliation of Israel by forcing it to free its detainees, and, finally, the favour of 
Syria by sending the freed hostages off to Damascus.
rV-2-2-4. Mass Media
During the ordeal of the TWA 847 hostage crisis, the developments 
surrounding the event and the fate of the passengers dominated the world’s 
headlines and burnt images of terrorism into the minds of millions around the 
world for more than two weeks. One of the most noticeable developments in 
recent years has been the increasingly skilful use of publicity by terrorist 
organizations. During the TWA hostage crisis, the hijackers were seen to be 
adept at organising press conference and handling requests for interviews. This 
particular incident showed a very sophisticated use of the media by the 
hijackers. According to Tony Atwater, the total number and duration of TWA 
847 hostage reports by the American networks, ABC, CBS and NBC, amounted 
to 491 reports and 729 minutes over the seventeen-day period, from June 14 to
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June 30.»® These figures show that coverage was extensive and continuous 
during this crisis. In this respect, the hijackers gained the one thing which they 
aimed at, publicity. One of the most important aims of a terrorist operation is to 
gain publicity, and, in some cases, publicity is the sole aim, Walter Laqueur 
precisely made his point by saying that:
"the media are the teixorist* s best friend. The terrorist*s act by itself is nothing, publicity is all."»*
The freedom to publish rests on a general public interest expressed in terms of 
"right to know *,»® However, it is a palpable objective of some media segments 
to entertain, shock, amuse or otherwise affect the emotions of the audience.»» 
Grant Wardlaw levelled the following criticism:
"The competitive nature of news gathering places an undue emphasis on the sensational aspects of terrorists events and makes entertainment of public 
violence rather than performing a public duty to inform."»'
During the TWA crisis, certain sections of the Western media were criticized for 
having entered into a symbiotic relationship with Amal militiamen, exchanging 
access to the prisoners for publicity which was seen as the lifeblood of terrorist
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activity, broadcasting unedited interviews with hostages who were being held at 
gunpoint, in which the hostages appealed to express gratitude to their guards for 
good treatment and to extend sympathy for their cause, and for bribery to obtain 
access to individuals/» The inappropriate role of mass media during the crisis 
only made the involvement of governments more complicated and politically 
more perilous. Some of the U.S. hostage families complained by saying that 
"From the beginning, the administration's policy has been rhetoric and no 
action" and "Why did our government have to be so prideful and haughty, so 
afraid of losing face".»® Reflecting on his network's coverage during the TWA 
hostage crisis, Lawrence Grossman, president of NBC News, sought 
justification and denied criticism in the following terms:
"Whether the television networks made the Reagan administration’s job easier 
or haider it was simply not the right to judge their coverage. The networks do 
not work for the government: they are supposed to work for the public."®»
The public wanted to know where the hostages were and how theii' families 
were bearing up, and the networks told them. It is understandable that what is 
happening must be reported, and the better the reportage the more likely 
international societies are to understand the phenomenon with which they are 
confronted. The problem, however, is the fact that television coverage served to 
focus public concern on the hostages' human anguish. Without similar coverage 
that would have balanced the immediate problems of the hostages' safety with
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the long-term problems that other innocent people will face if terrorists perceive 
that their tactic is effective enough, this is dangerous.
On some occasions, media coverage of a terrorist event creates the most 
serious problems by broadcasting information which may hinder the effective 
management of terrorist incidents, such as the movements of special security 
forces or possible tactical approaches. This may place the lives of hostages and 
security forces in jeopardy. When a Lufthansa aircraft was hijacked in October 
1977, the terrorists heard radio broadcasts revealing that the pilot had managed 
to alert the outside about the number of hijackers by special signals. 
Subsequently, the hijackers killed the pilot in front of the passengers.®* In this 
case, the media contributed directly to the death of a hostage. On the fii st day of 
the TWA hijacking, the U.S. major Television news had reported that special 
security forces had been dispatched.®® The reports were picked up by a number 
of other news organizations and before long the whole world knew special 
forces was moving. This might have caused the tenorists to break off 
negotiations when the aircraft landed in Algiers for a second time. In Algiers, in 
fact, with the help of Algerian authorities and the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, it seemed that the TWA hijacking crisis was going to be settled. 
According to the U.S. Ambassador in Algeria Michael Newlin, Algerian officials 
told him they heard radio reports that the Delta force was on its way and 
speculated that the hijackers had heaid the reports, too.®® Tliere is no doubt that 
the media coverage, in this case, made the hostage rescue operation impossible 
and the hijacking crisis far more difficult. The lesson to be drawn from the two
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incidents is that it is extremely important to withhold news of plans to deal with 
the terrorists until the incident has been resolved. If this can not be arranged, 
Professor Paul Wilkinson sounds the following waining:
"then the authorities will have to consider a total media ban from the airports
and aiiport perimeter areas where a hijacked aiiiiner is being held."®*
Tenorism offered a means for the underdogs of the world to break into prime 
time by creating a human drama no network could resist. Terrorists could shoot 
their way onto the an and the networks would take it from there as they spaied 
no expense in the competitive battle to be the first to break the news. There is no 
way of playing down the hijack story of a jumbo aircraft. Terrorists aie well 
awaie of this phenomenon. For the future, greater attention should be paid by 
the media and others to the possible relationship between media coverage and 
tenorist activities with a view to fonnulating guide-lines governing the nature 
and extent of media coverage of terrorist activities.
IV-2-3. Analytical Discussion and World Reactions
Until late 1960s, there was little worldwide concern over aiicraft hijackings 
and theii* impact on international civil aviation. However, with an increasing 
number of such incidents, the international community started to recognize the 
vulnerability of civil aviation to ahcraft hijacking in the late 1960s. At this eaiiy 
stage, many governments including the United States and Communist states 
enacted stringent anti-hijacking laws. However, the real battle for international 
regulations and legislation to combat aircraft hijacking has been led by the
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United Nations and ICAO, with the former organization attempting to persuade 
member states to discourage aircraft hijacking by political, legal and other means 
and ensure the extradition or punishment of hijackers. ICAO performs the 
detailed work required to develop international conventions which may be 
considered a universal source of general international law. The fhst result of its 
efforts was the adoption of the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts 
Committed on Board Aiicraft, generally known as the Tokyo Convention, in 
1963. Although this Convention obligates the state in which a hijacked aiicraft 
lands to restore the aiicraft to those entitled to its possession, it does not deal 
with measures to deter aircraft hijacking. The Tokyo Convention was of value 
because it resolved key juridical questions and established a precedent for 
multilateral action against hijackers. But it did not come into force until it was 
ratified by the twelfth sate, the United States, in 1969.®® This leisurely rate of 
ratification reflected the general tolerance with which governments regarded the 
infrequent aiicraft hijackings of the mid-1960s. However, the equanimity of the 
international community was dispelled in 1968. In that yeai* alone 35 aircraft 
were hijacked. In September 1968, in the wake of increased incidents of aiicraft 
hijacking and other attacks, the ICAO Assembly passed a resolution asking its 
council to study measures to cope with the problem of unlawful seizure of civil 
aiicraft. In 1969, the ICAO Legal Committee prepared a draft convention that 
requiied contracting states to punish or extradition hijackers, but left to the states
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themselves the discretion as to whether to initiate prosecution or extradite. This 
draft convention, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft, known as Hague Convention, was adopted at the Hague in December 
1970. The Hague Convention was ratified by the requiied number of states and 
entered into force on October 1971.^  ^ In the early 1970s, the international 
community faced another problem with escalating tenorist violence against civil 
aviation. El A1 offices and other ahiines had been targets of sabotage attacks by 
politically motivated terrorists. The gravity of the problem was underlined by 
sabotage bomb attacks in flight. In order to encounter this situation, ICAO held a 
meeting in Montreal in June 1970, and urged member states to develop and 
implement tight security procedures to prevent such attacks. Consequently, 
ICAO adopted the Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation, known as Montreal Convention, in Montreal in 
September 1970. It contains similar provisions for punishment or extradition as 
the Hague Convention but also deals with teiTorist actions other than aiicraft 
hijacking such as sabotage attacks.®^
The tliree international Conventions have gained wide acceptance. In 1970, 
only 32 states had ratified or conceded to the Tokyo Convention. By May 1978, 
the Hague Convention had 93 adherents and the Montreal Convention 8 6 .®* By 
1990, the numbers of states party to the Conventions had risen to 138 for the 
Tokyo Convention, 142 for the Hague Convention and 143 for the Montreal
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Convention.®® Although the increasing concern of most governments with Ç
aiicraft hijacking and other thi*eats to civil aviation is indicated by the pace of 
ratification, these Conventions contain too many ambiguities, and many states 
have not ratified the conventions.Consequently these Conventions with then 
many limitations have failed to provide much of an effective baiiier against 
aiicraft hijacks and other attacks. In fact, even two decades after the adoption of 
the first international Convention, the international community was still subjected |
to aircraft hijacking incidents such as the TWA 847 aircraft hijacking in 1985 
and a Kuwaiti aircraft hijacking in 1988.
With the lack of success in preventing aiicraft hijacking by international 
Conventions, the international community has turned its efforts to specific 1
aviation security activities since the early 1970s, when aircraft hijacking was fiist 
perceived as requiring a systematic approach to be taken in employment W
preventive measures for its suppression. In the United States, during the late 
1960s and the eai'ly 1970s the number of U.S. aiicraft hijacked to Cuba 
dramatically increased. Meanwhile, the development of Palestinian aviation 
terrorism in the Middle East and Europe was causing great concern among the 
major aviation states. In the United States, passenger searches and elementaiy 
electronic screening of luggage was introduced on all flights in the early 1970s.
By the late 1960s, the Israeli canier, El Al, adopted even more rigorous 
passenger seaich procedures to cope with mainly Palestinian aviation terrorism.
Analysts developed profiles of the type of passengers who were most likely to
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hijack aiicraft. Some states also deployed armed security guards, known as Sky 
Marshals. Although the impact of Sky Marshals has not been regarded as having 
been decisive, a number of states including Israel, Pakistan, Egypt and South 
Korea, still carry such staff.
The security measures against aircraft hijacking have now been in place for 
over two decades and indeed they have been considered to have been 
successful in reducing the number of international incidents. In fact, aircraft 
hijackings did decline from 184 aircraft hijackings between 1968 and 1970, to 
134 incidents between 1971 and 1973, to 53 incidents between 1974 and 1976. 
However, these security measures have failed to provide a complete answer. 
Many loopholes still exist in the cunent system.
Since the adoption of screening procedures for passengers and theii* luggage, 
teiTorist organizations have rapidly developed thek tactics and abilities to 
overcome tight security systems. The international community, however, has 
failed to improve its anti-hijacking capacities. It is depressing to note that 
aviation authorities have been permitted to employ outdated and obsolescent 
security measures. This tendency may aiise from the miscalculation that their 
airports are a low risk target for attack. After the TWA hijacking, for example, a 
Greek aviation spokesman said that the hijackers could not have smuggled thek 
weapons past the two security checks at Athens akport.^ *^  However, according 
to a report, as the hijacked TWA akliner was flying ai'ound the Meditenanean, 
one reporter walked unchallenged and uninspected through Athens's security 
checks.i*^  Even if those checks were rigourously operated, the poor perimeter 
fencing at Athens would have allowed teiTorists to by-pass the system and
101 TEe Times, June 20, 1985
102 xhe Economist, June 22, 1985, P. 42
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smuggle arms on board at the aircraft’s ramp. Richard Clutterbuck precisely 4
described the situation as follows:
i
"On one notorious Mediterranean airfield, airport staff regularly took a short 
cut to their work through a gap in the fence and their families used the same 
gap to collect wild flowers from the grass verges".^ ®®
It was reported that Athens airport was a one of six around the world still 
causing extreme concern to the member airlines of the International Air 
Transport Association (lATA). Of the 40 airports which used to woiry lATA,
Athens was the only one which had failed to make any improvement despite the 
lATA's waining on airport security.During the hostage crisis, the U.S. 
administration criticized the alleged laxity of security at Athens airport and the 
Greek decision on June 15 to release an accomplice of the hijackers detained at ’
the airport, in return for the release of eight Greek passengers on the TWA #
akliner. The EC Foreign Ministers also criticized Greece on the same grounds, 
on June 18, during thek meeting at Luxembourg. In addition, the U.S. State 
Department advised U.S. citizens to avoid Athens akport and asked U.S. aklines 
to suspend flights to Athens. The Gieek administration lodged an official protest 
against the advisory notice which had led to the mass cancellation of holidays in f
Greece by American tourists, costing up to an estimated $300,000,000 in lost 
revenue. The advisory notice was withdrawn on July 22, 1985, and U.S. 
officials later expressed appreciation of the improvement in security at Athens 
akport. 1®^
Richai'd Clutterbuck, Kidnap. Hijack and Extortion. London: Macmillan Press, 1987, P. 76
104 The Economist. June 22, 1985, P. 42
105 Keesing’s Contemporaiy Archives, September 1986, P. 34637
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Meanwhile, after the TWA 847 hijacking and under mounting international 
pressure, the Coordination Committee of Lebanon's government reviewed the 
security situation in general and security on the Beirut Airport Road in paificular, 
and decided to take whatever measures were necessary to improve the security i
situation. 1®* Following the Coordination Committee's decision, they 
strengthened security measures at Beirut akport and it was reported that 
measures at Bekut akport had greatly improved with the help of Syrian 
specialists following the TWA 847 hijacking crisis.^ ®^
The hijacking of the TWA 847 promoted interest in akport security once 
again. The U.S Depailment of Transportation, through the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), is mainly responsible for dealing with aviation tenorism 
and the supervision of aviation security programmes. The Office of Civil 
Aviation Security in the FAA is responsible for the supervising of the security 
and safety regulations concerning all aspects of civil aviation mandated by Title 
V of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act (ISDA) of 
1985 which amended section 1115 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.^ ®®
0^6 Coordination Committee Statement on Security, NC201658 Bekut 
Domestic Service in Arabic, 1400GMT, July 20, 1985, SWB/Monitoring Report, July 22, 1985
107 jsjew Akport Security Measures Take Effect, NCI9416 Beirut Domestic 
Service in Arabic, 1300 GMT, July 19, 1985, SWB/Monitoring Report, July 22, 1985; Syrian to Oversee Security, NC201754 Bekut Domestic Service in 
Aiabic, 1500 GMT, July 20, 1985, SWB/Monitoring Report, July 22, 1985
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Arms Control, International Security 
and Science and on International Operations of he Committee on Foreign Affaks 
and the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Joint Hearings: Impact of International Terrorism on Travel, 
February 19, 1986, P. 34; U.S Department of Transportation, FAA, Semiannual 
Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Program: January 
L 1987-June 30. 1987. November 1987, P. 2
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Before the passage of the ISDA of 1985, the FAA developed extensive security 
measures as mandated by the Air Transportation Security Acts of 1974.i®® The 
FAA's security programme has been generally successful in preventing aiicraft 
hijackings and other significant attacks against civil aviation in flights originating 
in the U.S.. It was reported that, in the U.S., a total of 38,000 weapons were 
detected and more than 1 0 0  hijackings or related crimes were prevented from 
1973 to 1986.^ 1® In the aftermath of the TWA 847 incident, U.S. attempts at 
increasing aviation security were basically concerned with the security 
programmes in other states. In response to the TWA 847 hijacking, the U.S. 
Department of Transportation asked the ICAO to review security measures as 
they aie cuiTently implemented by its members with a view to improving 
security at international airports, to review and strengthen existing international 
airport security standards, to provide a means of evaluating the level of 
adherence to ICAO security standards at international aiiports, and to expand its 
security training program.Upon receiving this request from U.S. Department 
of Transportation, in December 1985, the ICAO revised and strengthened the 
security standards outlined in Annexe 17 of the Cliicago Convention. According 
to the new Amiexe 17, member nations of the ICAO were now requked to
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affaks, An Act to 
Combat International Terorism: Hearings On S. 2236, January 25, 1978, P. 54
U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Semiannual Report to Congress an the. Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Program: July 1-December 31. 1986. May 1987, P. 6  and Exhibit 6
i 1 ^  U.S. Congress, House Committee on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on International Operations of he Committee on Foreign Affaks and the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Public Works and 
Transportation, Joint Healings: Impact of International Terrorism on Travel, Februaiy 19, 1986, P. 37
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expand preflight security checks for certain luggage in certain ckcumstances to 
discover illegal weapons and other dangerous devices, to ensure that baggage 
that does not belong to passengers is either not loaded or is thoroughly 
inspected, and to intensify other security measures at international airports and 
aiiiine f a c i l i t i e s . However, lacking the means to enforce its decisions, ICAO 
can only exercise moral influence, and risks losing much of its effectiveness. 
Like any other international regulatory agency, ICAO has to resort to a vai'iety 
of techniques to secure the cooperation of its member states. These states aie 
pledged to cooperate in a general way with ICAO and may find it to their 
advantage to do so, but they cannot normally be compelled to comply with the 
rules. To achieve its objectives, the ICAO has made continual efforts to improve 
its organizational approach to the security of civil aviation, its technical 
assistance to member states and the formulation of standaid procedures for 
states to use to evaluate their own security programmes.In this situation, it is 
impossible to anticipate the implementation of measures which would ensure 
total security. To achieve global solutions, a strict application of security 
measures and a plurality of controls, national and international, including 
diplomatic pressure and economic boycotts are requiied.
112 Ibid, PP. 37-38
113 Ibid, P. 39
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IV-3. KAL 858 Sabotage Bombing
i
; i
-I
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the hijacking threat to civil aviation 
worldwide increased to such proportions that Western states, led by the United #
States, developed and implemented a security system to prevent or deter aircraft 
hijacking. However, one of the problems that exists today is that terrorists have 
become sophisticated. This has come about, in part, as a result of the increased 
training and support provided by several states such as Libya, Iran, Syria and |
North Korea, Better technology is also now available to aid the terrorists that |
had not been available to them in past decades. New explosives and detonating |
devices seem to be developed faster than the Western capability to counter 
them. Consequently, the nature of the threat to civil aviation changed from one 
of hijacking to a sophisticated sabotage bombing threat. Since the early 1980s, M
the sabotage bombing of aircraft has become one of the most common tactics 
and form of attack against civil aviation. The popularity of this method is 
probably explained by the fact it is the simplest and least risky method of attack |
that can be used by a terrorist. Over the past decade more than 1 , 0 0 0  people aie 
known to have died in sabotage bombings, which in the early 1980s superseded 
aircraft hijackings as the favoured form of aviation terrorism. Unfortunately, ^
unlike the early 1970s action to protect against hijackings, the world has not 
established the development and implementation of a comprehensive civil 
aviation security system to protect against sabotage bombings. In these 
circumstances, one of the most devastating acts against civil aviation occurred 
on November 29, 1987, when a Korean Airlines 858 was destroyed in mid-air. ^
This incident bore similarities to other sabotage bomb attacks on civil aviation.
At the same time, the destruction of KAL 858 raised the issue of aviation security 
against sabotage bombing. The Pan Am 103 disaster brought a great amount of
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world attention as the majority of victims were American, the journey began at 
Frankfurt, passengers and luggage changed planes at London, the explosive 
material used had been manufactured in Czechoslovakia, and warnings had been 
given to American Embassies in Europe. Unlike the Pan Am 103 incident, the 
destruction of KAL 858 failed to receive much international attention as the 
victims of the disaster were mainly Koican, and the crash point was far away 
from Western states. However, the destruction of KAL 858 might signal the 
prospect of further sabotage attacks by a means slightly different from those 
used against Pan Am 103. After the survey of the facts of the incident, revealing 
North Korean sponsorship, and the history of terrorist attacks against South 
Korea, it is possible to understand the background of this incident which, in part, 
derived from the special political situation in the Korean Peninsula. In addition, 
analytical discussion of the incident is necessary to examine the critical problems 
which relate to the security of civil aviation. Finally, a review will be made of 
the methods employed to deter and prevent such forms of aviation terrorism in 
the future.
IV-3-L Facts of the Incident
On November 29, 1987, Korean Air Lines (KAL) flight 858, flying from Abu 
Dhabi to Bangkok, disappeared with 95 passengers and 20 crew members soon 4
after it had ceased communication with the ground control station in Rangoon,
B u r m a .  When the government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and KAL 
learned of the missing akcraft, they analyzed the overall situation and concluded 
that there was a great possibility that the plane had been destroyed by terrorists’
1^4 Facts on File, December 4, 1987, P. 903
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sabotage bombing, because there had been no indication at that time that 
anything was wrong with the flight, and no distress calls had been received from 
the aircraft before it disappeared."^  The Korean government and KAL 
immediately began to search for the akliner near the likely crash point with the 
full cooperation of the states concerned, such as Burma, Thailand, and India. 
They made great efforts to find the wreckage of the akliner including the "black 
box" flight recorders. It was not until December 13, more than two weeks after 
the incident, that the fkst piece of its wreckage was found in the Andaman sea 
off the coast of Burma. Subsequently, several pieces of wreckage were found in 
the Andaman sea by the Burmese Navy in January 1988. The finding of the 
wreckage confkmed that KAL 858 had in fact exploded in mid-ak over the 
Andaman sea."®
The Korean investigation authorities began to examine the identities of the 
passengers on board the akliner, particularly 15 of those who had disembaiked 
from the plane in Abu Dhabi, the Flight's fkst stop-over pomt.‘" In the process, 
suspicion was focused on two Japanese passengers named Shinichi Hachiya 
and Mayumi Hachiya. They were suspected for the following reasons.^ " Fkst,
i
"KAL Bomber Kim Hyun-Hui: From Aixest to confession(Korean)", Wall 
Kan Cho Sun. Feburaiy 1988, P. 250
ROK Ministry of Foreign Affaks, Findings of the Investigation by the 
Government of the Republic of Korea on the Destruction of Korean Ak Flight 858» March 4, 1988 (hereafter Findings of Investigation); "On Explosion of Korean Ak Flight 858", Statement by Mr. Kwang-Soo Choi, Minister of Foreign 
Affaks, at the UN Security Council, Febuary 16, 1988 (hereafter Statement), The Korean Journal of International Law. Vol. 33, No. 1, 1988, PP. 151-158; Facts on File, December 18, 1987, PP. 926-927
Arab News, December 14,1987
Findings of Investigations op.cit* P. 2; Statement, op.cit, 153; KAL Bomber Kim Hyun-Hui. op.cit, P. 250
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on the entry report forms, they had written thek given names, Shiniclii and 
Mayumi contrary to the usual custom of Japanese tourists of only writing family 
names. Second, they had travelled to such places as Vienna and Belgrade which 
are frequently used by North Koreans as bases for overseas terrorist operations.
Thkd, they used KAL 858 from Baghdad to Abu Dhabi, even putting up with 
thiee- to six-hours wait at akports as transit passengers despite the fact that 
Baln ain, thek destination, could be more conveniently reached by a dkect route 
from Belgrade via Amman.
Based on these suspicious facts, the ROK Embassy in Balirain promptly 
checked on thek passports with the Japanese Embassy, and discovered that at 
least one of the passports had been falsified. Tokyo police tracked down the real 
Shinichi Hachiya, who said he had loaned his passport and personal seal four 
years previously to Akka Miyamoto, an entrepreneur. Then in South Korea a §
friend of Miyamoto came forwai'd. It tinned out that Miyamoto was really Lee 
Kyong-Woo, a South Korean who reportedly had helped orchestrate a 1948 |
Îcommunist uprising in Cheju Island in South Korea and then fled to Japan to 4
avoid arrest. Miyamoto became a resident spymaster specialising in false 
identities for North Korean operatives.^ " The Bahraini authorities were notified 
of this, and apprehended the two suspects at the akport when they were going 
though exit procedures. While being held at the akport for questioning, they 
attempted to commit suicide by taking cyanide capsules which they had hidden 
in a packet of cigarettes, thus increasing suspicions about thek involvement with 
the sabotage bombing of the akcraft. Shiniclii Hachiya died within hours, but 
the young woman, Mayumi Hachiya, survived and was hospitalized in a serious
120 Keesing’s Record of World Events, May 1988, P. 35905
121 Ibid; Facts on File, December 4, 1987, P. 903;
122 Both the State of Bahi'ain and the ROK aie contracting paities to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation(Montreal Convention of 1971)
123 Findings of Investigation, op.cit, P. 3; KAL Bomber Kim Hyun-Hui, op.cit, 
PP. 251-252; Facts on File. December 18,1987, P. 926
124 KAL Bomber Kim Hyun-Hui. Ibid, PP. 255-256
125 She became increasingly agitated because, as she said later in a news 
conference, what she saw of life in South Korea on Television and on the streets of Seoul was entirely different from what she had been led to believe. She began 
to realise that she had been exploited as a tool for North Korean tenorist 
activities. She said also that "I deserve to die a hundred times over, but before 
die I decided to reveal the whole truth of the incident to help make up for the honible crime I committed." See, The Korea Herald, January 19, 1988; Facts on File, January 22, 1988, P. 30
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condition."® Immediately following the suicide attempt, the ROK government 
began to suspect that the incident had been an act of ten orism committed by 
North Korea, because their metliod of suicide by taking poison was identical to 
that usually used by North Korean agents. The type of poison they had taken 
was the same as that canied by North Korean agents who had been captured in 
the past."i The South Koreans requested the Bahrain government to hand over 
the suspects to the ROK.1" The government of Bahraini examined the ROK's 
request and decided to extradite Hachiya Mayumi, and return the body of her I
deceased partner and all the evidence to the ROK."® Hachiya Mayumi arrived in 
Korea on December 15, but she did not respond to any questions posed in 
Korean. She pretended to be Chinese, for example, by writing Chinese 
poems."^  On December 23, eight days after her arrival, she voluntarily began to 
make a detailed confession in Korean.^ ^^
IV-3-2. Identity of the Terrorists
Kim Sung-Il, who disguised himself as a Japanese named Shinichi Hachiya, 
was a special agent of the Intelligence Department of the Central Committee of 
the North Korean Workers Pai*ty, He was an elite agent, who had long 
experience overseas, was fluent in four langauges, Japanese, Chinese, English 
and Russian. He once sneaked into Kimpo International Airport on September 
21, 1984 and stayed at Seoul for six days."^
Kim Hyun-Hui, who masqueraded as a Japanese woman by the name of 
Hachiya Mayumi is the eldest daughter of Kim Won-Suk, who used to work for 
the North Korean Foreign Ministry. She was recruited in February, 1980 as an
The sabotage bombing of the KAL 858 was conducted under direct orders 
from Kim Jong-Il, the son of and hek presumptive to the North Korean leader,
Kim ITSung, in order to disrupt the ROK presidential elections scheduled for 
December 1987, the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, and to foster social discord 
within South Korea. It was executed by two special agents of the Intelligence 
Department of the Central Committee of the North Korean Worker's Party, Kim itSung-Il and Kim Hyun-Hui, disguised as Japanese nationals and using the 1
names of Shinichi Hachiya and Mayumi Hachiya."® i
126 Findings of the Investigation, op.cit, p. 2-5; Statement op.cit, PP. 151-158;
Cho Sun II Bo(Korean), January 17, 1988; The Korea Herald, January 19, 1988;KBS Clnonology(Korean), 1988, P. 62; Facts on File, January 22, 1988, PP.29-30; Keesings Record of World Events, Vol. XXXIV, No. 5, 1988, P. 35905; 1
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operative on account of her family background, good looks and ability to speak 
Japanese. She was in the second yeai' at the Pyongyang Foreign Language 
College at the time,"* In 1980, she underwent a year's incommunicado training 
in political ideologies, mai*tial arts, shooting and other military courses at 
Kumsung Political-Military College. In July 1984, Kim Hyun-Hui was paked 
with Kim Sung-Il as a father-daughter sabotage team and underwent thorough 
training for tliree years and four months in covert operations, including 
bombing, foreign languages and adaptation to western cultures."® She was 
educated that to die for Kim Il-Sung while carrying out a mission would be the 
right thing to do and would bring her the greatest happiness and glory."® She 
said that:
"I left Pyongyang to blow up KAL 858. I placed the bomb on the plane in 
Abu Dhabi and I got off. I had only one thought in my mind, had I 
successfully caiHed out the order to blow up the plane.... In North Korea we 
worship Kim Il-Sung as a god. We are even willing to sacrifice our lives to 
obey him. To die for him would be the right thing to do and would bring us our greatest happiness and glory. We aie taught this and we believe it. Since 
all North Koreans are taught and educated this way, any other young person in North Korea would do the same as I have done.
2^8 Kim Hyun-Hui was a actress when she was a elementary school gkl owing 
to her beautiful face and good family background. On November 2, 1972, while 
she was in the fkst yeai* of middle school, she presented a flower bouquet to 
Chang Key-Young, senior ROK delegate to the South-North Coordinating Committee, when he visited Pyongyang to attend the second meeting of that Committee. See, Explosion of Korean Ak Flight 858. Korean Overseas 
Information Service, Januaiy 1988
129 Ibid
130 Korea: Assigment, BBC 2, December 4, 1990
131 Ibid
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Kim Hyun-Hui was sentenced to death on March 27, 1990 for planting a bomb 
on the KAL 858,"® but she was pardoned by the amnesty, approved by ROK 
President Roh Tai-Woo, following a decision by the cabinet to pai'don her."® 
The ROK officials explained the reasons of her pardon as follows: "Kim Hyun- 
Hui was merely a tool to commit the crime of bombing an airliner and Kim Il- 
Sung, and his son, Kim Jeong-Il were the real criminals". "She has repented and 
is the only witness of the incident, and can crush North Korean's black 
propaganda that our probe of the incident and trial have been fabricated"."^
IV-3-3. North Korean Terrorism Campaign against ROK
After Japan's sunender in August 1945, ending the Second World War, 
Korea was divided at the 38th paiallel into militaiy occupation zones: Soviet 
forces dominated the northern zone and U.S. the southern. Since the division of 
the peninsula in 1948, the rival governments in Seoul and Pyongyang have been 
involved in a high stakes competition to eclipse one another and emerge as the 
legitimate government of the entile peninsula. Tliroughout these yeais of 
skuggle. North Korea has consistently shown its willingness to use violence and 
military force. On June 25, 1950, North Korea troops invaded the South, 
precipitating the Korean War. An aimistice was signed in July 1953, and the
132 The Hankook Ilbo(Korean), March 28, 1990
133 The Hankook Ilbo, April 4, 1990
134 Ibid; The Guardian, April 13, 1990
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13b Daiyl M. Plunk, North Korea: Exporting Terrorism. Backgrounder, No.74, The Heritage Foundation: Asian Studies Centre, Februaiy 25, 1988, P. 2; See 
also, U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global TeiTorism: 1985. October, 
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cease-fke line, again roughly following the 38th paiallel, remains the frontier 
between North and South."®
More recently, North Korea has sought to strengthen its diplomatic hand #
through aggressive support for international terrorist organizations. Using |
special training camps in North Korea as well as its own militaiy personnel 
stationed abroad. It has trained more than 5,000 terrorist recruits from 25 states.
North Korean military advisers have also operated in some 30 nations. North 
Korea's teiTorist allies have included the Red Brigade, the Baader-Meinhof 
Gang, the Japanese Red Army and the Palestinian terrorist movements."®
Sponsorship of tenorist attacks against the ROK has been pai1  of North 
Korea's campaign to destabilize the South, The sabotage bombing of KAL 858 
was not the fkst time that the North Koreans had used terrorist attacks against the 
ROK. For instance, on August 15, 1974, a North Korean agent attempted to 
assassinate ROK President, Chung-Hui Park, while he was delivering an 
Independence Day address at the National Theatre. The president escaped 
unharmed, although, his wife and a chok gkl were killed. The assassin, Mun 
Sae-Kwang, was anested after being wounded by security guards. The ROK 
government charged that the attempted assassination of President Park had been 
plotted by the North Korean government.
Clearly the most aggressive act committed by North Korea was the Rangoon 
bombing. The bomb attack at the Martyrs’ Mausoleum in Rangoon, Burma, on Î
October 9, 1983, took place while Korean officials accompanying President 
Chun Doo-Hwan of the ROK on his goodwill state visit to Burma and Burmese "1
officials were waiting at the Martyr’s Mausoleum for the arrival of President #
Chun for a wreath-laying ceremony. In that attack, 17 ROK officials, including 
four cabinet ministers, and four Burmese officials lost their lives. This incident J
'iled to the Burmese withdrawal of the recognition of North Korea and the Q
shutting down of the North Korean Embassy in Burma. Of the three North 
Korean army officers who carried out the bombing, two were captured alive.
After trials by the Burmese courts, one was executed and the other, who 
confessed, is still serving his life sentence in Burma."®
The fact that the ROK had won the honour of hosting the 1988 Seoul |
Olympic was a tremendous blow to the prestige of the North Korea. The |
majority of all the North Korea’s operations immediately prior to the Olympic |
were conducted with one goal in mind, disrupting the 1988 Seoul Olympics by 
making the world believe that the ROK was unsafe to visit. On September 14,
1986, a powerful explosion in front of the international terminal building at 
Seoul International Airport killed five people and injured 29 others."® The ROK H
government charged that the explosion was a North Korean engineered attempt 
both to disrupt the 10th Asian Games, opening in Seoul on September 20, 1986,
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I
3^8 A^Lingering Nightmare: The Rangoon Bombing. Korean Overseas Information Service, October, 1984; The Dong-A Ilbo(Seoul, Korea),September 4, 1984; The Korea Herald(Seoul, Korea), November 27, 1983
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and to cast a shadow over the Seoul Olympics.The sabotage bombing of the 
KAL 858, as mentioned above, was also canied out by North Korea as pail of 
an attempt to disrupt the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games.
North Korea has not shown any sign of change in its persistent use of 
international teiTorism as an instrument of national policy. Not only do they 
deny their involvement in the bombing in Burma and in the sabotage bombing 
against KAL 858, but also argue that it was the ROK that committed these 
crimes. Such preposterous lies by North Korea do not in themselves disturb the 
ROK, because the facts speak for themselves and no one believes their 1
allegations. Such perversion of the truth is dangerous because it shows complete 
absence of regret or moral scruples. Those charges have the dangerous 
implication that North Korean regime may repeat its teirorist acts in the future.
IV-3-4. World Reaction
After Kim Hyun-Hui confessed on national television, on Januaiy 15, 1988, 
the government of South Korea announced its intention to retaliate against North 
Korea for its alleged complicity in the destruction of the KAL 858. The minister 
of culture and information, Lee Woong Hee, wained that "North Korea will not 
be able to get away with its barbai'ous terrorism without receiving appropriate 
punishment for it, including retaliation commensurate with its gravity." The 
South Korean Government placed its armed forces on a full alert. In fact. South 
Korea was not planning to retaliate militarily, but certainly preferred political or 
economic sanctions against North Korea.The South Korean Government also
4^0 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., op.cit, P. 48
141 Facts on File January 22, 1988, P. 30: Arab News, January 16, 1988
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fcancelled its initiative allowing its officials to talk with North Korean officials |
and called upon other governments to condemn the sabotage bombing of the %
KAL 858. " 2  In addition, for the safety of civil aviation in the future, the ROK 
government cohosted with the United States an Asia-Pacific Regional Aviation 
Security Conference in June 1988 that included representatives from eight 
nations, IFALPA and ICAO. The conference promoted cooperation between the t
airlines and airport authorities and planned for aviation security during the Seoul 4
Olympics."®
After the KAL 858 incident, the U.S. Secretary of State designated North 
Korea a state sponsor of terrorism and added North Korea to a list of states that 
supported international tenorism. The U.S. Government also tightened its strict 
visa regime on North Korean passport holders and withdrew its authorization 
issued in March 1987 allowing U.S. diplomats to hold substantive |
communication with North Korean diplomats in neutral settings."'* In addition to 
the U.S. reaction, a number of states, including the United Kingdom, Japan,
Denmark, Singapore and the Netherlands, issued strong statements condemning 
both the sabotage bombing and North Korea’s responsibility for it. The i
government of Japan, on January 26, 1988, imposed diplomatic sanctions on ^
North Korea for its alleged role in the destruction of the KAL 858. Under 
Japan’s sanctions, contact between Japan and North Korea was severely
4^2 The Bombing of Korean Airlines Flight: KAL 858. Hearing and Makeup before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 100th Congress Second Session on 
H. Con. Res. 246 (hereafter Hearings), February 4, 1988, Washington: U.S. GPO, 1989, P. 10
4^3 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988. P. 40 
144 Hearings, op.cit, P. 13: Facts on File, Januaiy 22, 1988, P. 30
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restricted, and Japanese officials, in principle, were not allowed to visit North 
Korea and North Korean officials were denied entry to Japan. Also, flights 
between Japan and North Korea were banned.i^ ® In December 1988, Soviet 
President Gorbachev’s speech to the United Nations, despite the Soviet Union’s 
eai'lier policy of close relations with North Korea, condemned the use of 
violence and terrorism as a means of attaining political or ideological goals with 
a clear reference to North Korea.
The destruction of KAL 858 is not simply a tragic loss of imiocent life. It 
reminds us that liberal democratic states aie engaged in a bitter global struggle 
against teiTorism. It is also reminds us that those who currently control North 
Korea repeatedly ignore civilized rules of behaviour. The entke world 
community must let the North Korean Government know that no one will 
tolerate acts of state teiTorism and the North Korean leaders must understand that 
they have no alternative but to abandon thek confrontational and murderous 
approach to international affaks. If the world should prove indifferent, North 
Korea may conclude that ten orism carries no penalty and continue to conduct its 
atrocities against South Koreans. Such actions could make the Korean peninsula 
and world peace dangerously unstable.
4^5 Japan did not impose any restrictions on its US$ 350 million annual trade 
with North Korea. Diplomatic sanctions was lifted on September 13, 1988, Facts On File, February 5, and September 23, 1988, P. 74 and 691; Hearings, op.cit, P. 18
146 Backgrounder Brief, Foreign and Commonwealth office, June 1989, P. 4
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IV 3-5. Analytical Discussion of Event
Behind the sabotage bombing of the KAL 858, killing all the passengers and Sf
crew members aboard, there is a state, North Korea. This is notable in terms of 
resources, the selection of operatives and then training and preparation, and the 
almost unlimited ways and means available for conduct of the terroristic il
operations. The destruction of the KAL 858 was not launched overnight. The 
Planning and the intensive training for this type of operation was conducted 
over a period of eight years in North Korea. The mission was cai'efully 
conceived, planned and executed. The two teiTorists received the explosives 
from a North Korean official in Belgrade. In this respect, the KAL 858 incident 
is very similar to the attempted bombing of the El Al aircraft at Heatlirow 
Akport on March 17, 1986. A Palestinian teiTorist working with the Syrians,
Nazk Hindawi, tried to destroy an El Al akcraft with 373 people on boai'd by 
means of an explosive device hidden in the luggage of his pregnant gkl friend, I
Anne Marie Murphy, without her knowledge."^  The British authorities had |
much evidence, proclaimed in court, that the Syrians had not only known about 4
this projected exploit in advance but also had actively assisted in the 
operation."* This state-supported operation makes the work of the aviation 
security system much more difficult.
4^7 U.S. Department of Transportation, Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation 1986, FAA, P. 32
148 Edgar 0 ’Ballance, Terrorism in the 1980s. London: Arms and Aimour 
Press, 1989, P. 36; Geoffrey M. Levitt, Democracies against Terror: The 
Western Response to State-Supported Terrorism. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988, PP. 85-92; The Guardian, October 8 , 11, 23, 25, 1986; Los Angeles Times, November 11, 1986; Atlanta Constitution, November 11, 1986; 
Chicago Tribune, October 26, 1986; Atlanta Journal-Constitution, October 26, 1986
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The two terrorists, Kim Sung-Il and Kim Hyun-Hui, were unusual 
passengers. They used Flight 858 from Baghdad to Abu Dhabi, even putting up 
with six-hour waits at the airport as transit passengers despite the fact that 
Balirain, thek destination, could be more conveniently reached by a dkect route 
from Belgrade via Amman. They also disembai'ked at a stop-over. For these 
suspicious reasons, they should have been classified as highly suspect 
passengers. The checking of highly suspect passengers must be thorough and 
methodical. When the two teiTorists used an Iraqi akcraft from Belgrade to 
Baghdad, the crew seized the batteries of battery-powered goods at the time of 
boarding and returned them to the passengers only after the akcraft landed in 
Baghdad. During the secuiity screening process in Baghdad, the akport security 
officer raised the issue of the batteries in the radio. At this point, Kim Sung-Il 
complained by saying that this was the only place where the personal items of 
passengers were checked, and turned the radio on to demonstrate to the Iraqi 
security officials that it was a bom  fJde radio. Hereupon, security officers acted 
as if they were sony and permitted them to cany the radio.This was a crucial 
mistake. The procedure of checking highly suspect passengers demands that any 
object which can not be properly searched will not be permitted onto the akcraft 
in any ckcumstances. In the case of KAL 858, a radio, like other electronic 
appliances, should not have been allowed on boai'd the akcraft. Many sabotage 
attacks in recent years indicate that electronic items have been frequently used to 
a conceal sophisticated plastic bomb. In addition to the KAL 858 incidence, the 
bomb that blew up Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie was concealed in a radio 
cassette player in the forward luggage hold. Since the Lockerbie disaster, 
aklines in the United States have started using tougher security inspections on
^49 Investigation Findings, op.cit, P. 49
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electronic items under orders from the FAA. During the ICAO conference in 
Montreal in Februaiy 1989, the British and U.S. transport secretaries jointly 
produced a proposal for security, which they urged all international airports to 
adopt. It advocated a ban on the caiTying of electronic items including radios 
and cassette tape players."® Many security experts also called for ammending 
an agreement to restrict the carrymg of electronic items.The total ban of 
electronic items is not easy to implement because travellers today want to take 
modern electronic items for their convenience and businessmen have become 
accustomed to cany personal lap-top computers wherever they go. In this 
respect, electronic devices including personal lap-top computers, tape recorders, 
radios, video equipment and cameras should be very caiefully seaiched by 
security staff.
It is also extremely important for security staff performing a body seaich to 
note that a corset can be specially constructed to conceal the parts of an 
explosive device. The components of an explosive device may be caixied by 
one or more persons. The parts are assembled and the explosive device set 
nearer the time of the planned sabotage bombing. This is done to avoid detection 
by security systems and to reduce the danger to the teixorist lives at an early 
stage of their mission.
The appearance of the sophisticated bomb in the annoury of the civil aviation 
tenorist is an alarming new development. This level of sophistication and 
concealment had never been used against civil aviation before. Compared to 
known devices, the improved explosive devices are devastating. They could be
150 Edgar O’Ballance, "Aviation and Airport Security", Military Digest. April- 
May, 1989, P. 12
131 The International Herald Tribune, February, 21, 1989
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easily earned by a teixorist in any number of ways to evade detection. The small 
size batteries to power the bomb could be disguised in any number of legitimate 
electronic devices canied by passengers. An example of this ease of 
concealability occuixed on April 2, 1986, when a Lebanese female is suspected 
to have planted the bomb on TWA 840. The Lebanese female suspected of 
planting the bomb under the seat cushion was observed to be listening to a 
cassette tape player during her flight. She is thought to have connected the 
batteries to the explosive device when she went to the lavatory just prior to 
landing in Athens, a stop-over on the flight. After returning from the lavatory, 
she could easily have left the now-aimed and powered device under the seat 
cushion of her seat without being noticed."®
It is not enough to count the sabotage incidents and expect the uninitiated to 
understand the level of the tln*eat against civil aviation. It is necessary that the 
types of sabotage devices, thek ease of concealment, difficulty of detection, and 
thek destructive potential be examined. The time bomb made of Composition C- 
4 that destroyed the KAL 858 represents a variation in concealment. 
Approximately one pound of liquid explosive was concealed in a liquor bottle. 
A Japanese-made Panasonic radio. Model RF-082, was used to conceal 
approximately 350 grams of plastic explosives, a timer, electric blasting cap, and 
power source. The inside of the radio had been reananged to minimize the 
function of the radio to make enough room for the explosives and the detonating 
mechanism. One battery of the radio had been wked to serve as the power 
source to detonate the electric blasting cap and, in turn, the explosives in the
132 Statement by Mr. Billie H. Vincent before a Subcommittee of the 
Government Operations House of Representatives, September 25/26, 1989, P. 12; US Depai'tment of Transportation, Criminal Acts against Civil Aviation: 
>, P. 14
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radio and liquor bottle. Composition C-4 in the radio time bomb is 1.34 times 
more powerful than TNT. It can be easily moulded into any shape. At the same 
time, it has no smell and can not be detected by conventional methods such as 
X-ray and sniffer dogs."® As noted above, the eaily stage of aviation security 
was concerned with and was designed to prevent akcraft hijackings. The 
traditional technology such as original X-ray screening units and metal detectors 
worked well in detecting handguns and knives. Aviation teiTorists, then, became 
more sophisticated and started using plastic explosives such as Semtex. This 
problem has become quite critical since eaiiy 1980s. Plastic explosives pose 
serious problems for detection. They have no metal content, which traditional 
detection devices can reliably discern. Semtex can be shaped to fit into items like 
radios, or formed into thin sheets in luggage, making detection even more 
difficult. These explosives defy reliable detection by X-ray and other devices 
now operational at the akports.i" In order to develop automated screening 
devices to detect the presence of explosives, reseaich and development in the 
security field has been accelerated in recent yeais. These devices included 
Colour Coding Detectors(CCD), Vapour Detection Systems(VDS) and Thermal 
Neutron Analysis(TNA). CCD are sniffer machines which detect arms and 
explosives by the odour they emit, showing the results on the monitoiing screen 
in colour. Organic material, for example, shows up as bright orange, metal as 
dark blue, and plastic explosive as orange-brown. The systems are pailiculaily 
good at identifying plastic explosives. However, it is known that so fai* these
Investigation Findings: Explosion of Korean Ak Flight 858. Korean Overseas Information Service, January 1988, P. 21; Cho Sun II Bo(Korean), January 9, 1988; Newsweek, December 14, 1987
154 The Sunday Post, May 27, 1990: The Daily Telegraph, March 23, 1990
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systems can not detect Semtex.^ ^^  Although Semtex does not give off any odour, 
it does emit vapour, and VDS have been developed capable of sniffing 
vapour, By fai' the most mature technology for explosives detection in
luggage is TNA. The U.S. began research and development (R&D) on 
explosives detectors soon after the bombing at LaGuardia Airport on December 
29, 1975, when a fairly large bomb exploded in an aiiport locker killing 11 
people. The U.S. government reacted to an event as opposed to being pro­
active, and initiated an explosives detection R & D program. In the late 1970s, R 
& D was undertaken by the FAA on TNA explosives detection technology. In 
1985, the FAA greatly accelerated its efforts when the destruction of an Air India 
flight off the coast of Ireland made it appaient that the tlneat was escalating 
rapidly. Under the TNA process, the object being analysed is bombaided with 
neutrons which stimulate gamma ray-emitting elements and interact with any 
traces of gamma rays given off. The atomic content of all materials constituting 
the bag and contents emitting the rays are then compared with the known atomic 
content of explosive m a t e r i a l s . ^ ^ s  Despite widespread acknowledgement that 
TNA is the best system for the detection of explosives, many experts doubt the 
effectiveness of TNA. They are concerned that over reliance should not be 
placed on TNA detectors since their detect capability diminishes if only small 
amounts of explosive are present. It was reported that TNA can not detect
155 Edgar O,Ballance, op.cit, P. 18
156 Ibid, P. 19
157 Mitchell Waldrop, "FAA Fights Backs on Plastic Explosives", Science. Vol. 243, January 13,1989 (reprinted)
158 David Learmont, "Neutrons Detect Plastic Explosives", Flight International. May 6 , 1989
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bombs as small as the device which brought down the Pan Am 103.^ ^^  At the 
same time, the high cost of TNA is one of the obstacles standing in the way of 
the adoption of new security technologies. It is unlikely that this high-technology 
response will bring about the ultimate cessation of teiTorist sabotage bomb 
attacks. TNA is not a cure and can never be any more than a supplement to the 
civil aviation security system.
According to the report of the U.S. Congress Office of Technology ^
Assessment(OTA), there is no evidence that any device is capable by itself of 
reliably detecting small quantities of plastic explosives in checked luggage.*®®
Since each explosive detection system has its own pailicular weakness, one of 
the solutions for a security system would be a combination of different 
technologies. This would exploit the advantages of each technique while 
compensating for its weaknesses. At the same time, to keep pace with the Î
changing teixorist thieat to civil aviation, research and development programmes 
should be intensified. In addition, the significance of the human element in civil 
aviation security should not be underestimated. Civil aviation security systems 
have historically placed an over-reliance on technology. It is no use having high- 
tech equipment if we use low-tech people. Without a fully trained and 
functioning human element, no security system will be effective.
Recently, a number of sabotage bombings against civil aviation were 
characterised by "non-reconciliation of luggage". Someone checks in for a flight 
and checks in their luggage. The luggage is loaded but the passenger does not 
board the flight, which leaves without him but with his luggage. The Air India
i
159 The Independent, January 27, 1990; Airport International. Januaiy 1990, P. J 
18
160 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Teclinology Against 
Terrorism: The Federal Effort. OTA-ISC-481, Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, July 1991, P. 61
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Idisaster in June 1985 gave us an important lesson in this respect. Evidence 
showed in the case of the Air India incident that a passenger checked his luggage 
in at Vancouver for an interline journey across Canada and on to New Delhi.
The passenger was in possession of a confirmed booking Vancouver-Toronto 
but waitlisted Toronto-New Delhi. Normal procedure would have seen the bag 
checked only to Toronto. However, it was through-checked to its final 
destination. The teixorist failed to board the aircraft. The luggage which is 
thought to have contained a powerful bomb travelled alone without its owner.*®*
This situation was repeated in the respect of the destruction of a UTA DC- 8  at 
N’Djamena in 1984 and the explosion at Naiita Airport in Tokyo in 1985.*®^
Following the Air India disaster, the civil aviation community started to 
recognize the importance of luggage reconciliation to prevent similar attacks, and 
ICAO adopted a new standard for luggage security. Standard 5.1.4, of Annexe 
17, which requires an effective reconciliation of passengers and their checked 
luggage.*®^  In fact, prior to 1985, the significant tlireat to civil aviation was seen 
as aircraft hijacking. As a result, the Standards and Recommended Practices H
tended to focus on aircraft hijacking rather than sabotage attack. Further changes I
to Annexe 17 were developed in 1988 which included specifications to further 
assist in fighting sabotage. Some of the changes included in Amendment 7 to 
Annexe 17, which was adopted in June 1989, provide for a clarification of the
161 Salim Jiwa, The Death of Air India Flight 182. London: W. H. Allen, 1986, PP. 78-86
162 U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Worldwide Significant Criminal Acts Involving Civil Aviation: 1984. P. 4 and 1985, P. 1 1
163 Rodney Wallis, op.cit, P. 3
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standard dealing with the reconciliation of luggage with passengers and control 
over items left behind on the ahcraft by disembarking passengers.*®^
It is generally accepted that passengers and then luggage should not be kept 
apart from their allocated aircraft at any stage of a journey, because such a 
situation could give a opportunity to tenorists who could plant explosive 
devices in then luggage and then leave the flight at stopover before the 
explosion. Most airlines positively check for "No Show" passenger. However, 
luggage is not being checked on all flights to make sure it belongs to a passenger 
and has not been slipped into the luggage sorting system. According to the UK 
Department of Transportation, passengers are still flying on aircraft containing 
unaccompanied luggage.*®* Total luggage reconciliation is not a easy task. In a 
sense, it is impossible to stop the problem of non-reconciliation luggage at major 
international airports where there is so much luggage going thi'ough. However, 
the most serious concern is the misoriented approach of the airlines. This was 
confiimed by Issac Yeffet, the former dhector of security for El Al, who stated:
"If Lockerbie tells us anything, it is that ahlines must match luggage to 
passengers. If, for any reason, a piece gets on an airplane without its owner, 
it should be taken off immediately, no matter what the delay or 
inconvenience to passengers. But airport managers, more woixied about on- time statistics, routinely let planes fly with unaccompanied bags".*®®
Civil aviation authorities have to note that this approach might give a chance 
to tenorists who set their eyes on finding any kind of security loophole for 
putting deadly devices on to an aircraft. In order to minimise risks of such
6^4 ICAO, International Standards and Recommended Practices, Annex 17 to 
the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Fourth Edition, October 1989.
165 The Sunday Telegraph, November 10, 1991
166 "No Airport in the U.S. is Safe", Lié, March 1989, P. 132
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attacks, it is important to remove the possibility of luggage travelling without its 
owner by adopting and enforcing ticketing and check-in procedures.
Despite the luggage matching system, luggage that could have contained 
explosives has managed to slip tlirough. Sometimes the bomb carrier will check 
in for a multi-stage flight and will ask for his luggage to be checked though to 
his final destination but will leave the aircraft at one stage. The caixier simply 
does not re-board the ongoing flight at that stage. The most important lesson 
from the KAL 858 incident is that the remaining passengers with all their 
belongings must be checked during the stop-over. In the KAL 858 case, two 
teiTorists got off the plane at Abu Dalibi Airport, a stop-over on the flight, after 
leaving the shopping bag containing the time bomb and liquid explosives in the 
luggage compartment over the seats number 7B and 7C in the plane. KAL 858, 
with the unchecked belongings which caused the fatal disaster, continued its 
flight to Bangkok, and nine hours after the time bomb had been set, the plane 
exploded in the mid-aii* over the Andaman Sea, off the coast of Burma, killing all 
people aboard. There is no doubt that the KAL 858 sabotage bombing incident 
might have been prevented by simple checking of the remaining passengers with 
their belongings. In order to minimise risks of such attacks in the future, airlines 
have to undertake hand luggage reconciliation. Even though it is not a scientific 
method, cabin staff have to make a brief inspection of the overhead luggage 
compartments and floor space around passengers seats at each stopover point. It 
is worthwhile to remember that such an inspection might have prevented the 
explosion on the KAL 858. It may be true that such a proposal would be very 
difficult to put into operation, because the huge jumbo airliners aie complex 
vehicles with an almost infinite range of potential hiding place for small, but fatal 
devices. In this respect, designers and manufactures should consider the "No 
Hiding Place" maxim, and eliminate all dark comers, nooks and other places of
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concealment from future aircraft to allow easy visual seaiches. This is a long 
term project, but civil aviation security in the future will depend on such far­
sighted security considerations.
Finally, it was reported that more than 90 percent of aviation terrorists used 
false passports for their operations.*®^  In the case of the KAL 858 incident, two 
terrorists also concealed their identities with false passports. In this respect, a 
high-technology identity document and detection system for the use of false or 
stolen passports should be introduced to prevent aviation terrorism and the entry 
of terrorists.*®*
IV-4. Conclusion
This Chapter has demonstrated that ensuring aviation security becomes 
more complex and more urgent. No longer is it simply a matter of passenger 
safety. The resolution of the TWA hijacking crisis did not enhance the stature of 
the international community involved and furthermore it also failed to diminish 
their vulnerability to international aviation terrorism. Thanks to better 
precautions and firmer responses, aircraft hijackings have decreased since the 
three-yeai* surge of terror that followed the Arab humiliation in the June war of 
1967. However, terrorists have realized that by the right use of foil or fibreglass 
they can take their weapons through a carelessly operated metal detector or X- 
ray machine. Even thick clothing can muffle the image of a weapon, and plastic
167 Paul Wilkinson, "The Lessons of Lockerbie", International Security 
Review. January/February 1990, PP. 25-26
168 For further reading on detection system of this subject, see Richaid Clutterbuck, Teirorism and Gueirilla Waif are: Forecasts and Remedies, 
London: Routlege, 1990, PP. 76-80
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explosives are easily disguised. Some airports aie installing the newest 
equipment such as Thermal Neutron Analysis(TNA), but most states are not. 
Unfortunately, despite the increased security measures that have been 
implemented around the world in the past two decades, teixorists seem to be 
able to cany out theh operations ahnost at will. Although aircraft hijacking by 
politically motivated terrorists has decHned, it could once again produce a great 
danger to the safety of passengers and crew members. Airport security will 
never be 1 0 0  per cent perfect but the efforts to improve it have had some 
success. The most critical element affecting the vulnerability of civil aviation is 
the fact that most current security programmes were created to prevent aircraft 
hijackings by tenorists who were initially not well-trained. It has been 
demonsti ated that these types of security systems can be circumvented. It is easy 
to mould plastic explosives to resemble many common objects such as an 
athletic shoe. Similarly, powerful explosives can be easily concealed in whiskey 
bottles and cassette radios. The timing and detonation devices aie sophisticated, 
small in size, and can be easily hidden. All these factors make detection by 
security personnel extremely difficult.
It is clear that aviation terrorism has now evolved to a point where the 
international community may need to reassess the whole situation. With the 
advent of state sponsorship of terrorists operating internationally, the threat 
against civil aviation has become more complex and the tenorists better trained 
and equipped. From the statistics relating to successful terrorist operations it 
seems new ideas and systematic approaches to aviation security against 
sabotage bombing should be considered. Teixorist tactics simply can not be 
allowed to succeed or the world will have little chance of achieving peace and 
stability. To achieve this aim, far-sighted aviation security measures are required
2 6 8
together with a precise discernment for the future threat. The following Chapter 
will examine the potential futiue thi eat.
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CHAPTER V
NEW AND POTENTIAL THREATS TO CIVIL AVIATION FOR THE FUTURE: MISSILE ATTACKS
* * *
"What Soviet militaiy forces did to a civilian Korean airplane was cleai'ly a criminal act in violation of all the legal nouns and standai'ds of international civil aviation. ... The deliberate in-flight destruction of this civilian, unaimed, 
easily identifiable passenger aircraft by sophisticated fighter aircraft of the 
Soviet Union, no matter where it occuixed, is nothing short of murder. It is 
flagrant attack on the safety of international civil aviation which should never have occuixed and must not be allowed to occur again".*
"The growing supply of sophisticated weapons and explosives available 
today to terrorists make them even more dangerous. For example, we know there are small surface-to-air missiles available right now to vaiious tenorist 
groups. We also know of at least two incidents in which terrorists with these 
missiles have been arrested near airports. It is only a question of time until 
someone uses such a missile to shoot down an aiiiiner and murder the innocent persons on board".^
* * *
V-1. Introduction
While technological advances have produced a remaikable degree of safety 
in the air transportation system, unpaialleled by any other means of transport, 
violent attacks against civil aviation have posed a man-made tlmeat for which 
there aie no simple technical solutions. Since terrorists came to the conclusion
 ^ UN Security Council, "Provisional Verbatim Record, September 2, Document 
S/PV. 2470, 1983", Reprinted in International Legal Material. 1983, PP. 1114- 1117
2 Thomas M. Ashwood, "The Airline Response To Terrorism", in Y. Alexander and Robert A. Kilmai-x, Political Terrorism and Business: The Threat and 
Response. New York: Praeger, 1979, P. 131
3 Paul Wilkinson, "Putting Lives First?: the problems of creating an effective 
international regime for aviation security". Inaugural Lecture, October 22, 1991, University of St. Andrews, P. 14
^ Richard Clutterbuck, Tenorism and Gueixilla Warfare: Forecasts and Remedies. London: Routledge, 1990, PP. 50-51
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that aircraft hijacking was complicated and without any guaiantee of a successful 
outcome, the last decade has been mai'ked by a most serious eruption of 
sabotage bombing against civil aviation. The modern technology of terrorism f
has bypassed the ability and resources of the aiilines to defeat the sophisticated S
terrorist. Small amounts of plastic explosives are extremely difficult to detect and |
simple to slip into the airline luggage of an unsuspecting passenger. While this 
presents vast danger, the future might be overshadowed by a new threat, missile I
attack. Such a threat can be identified as falling into two categories: missile i
attacks by a state against a civilian ahcraft that has strayed off its course and 
missile attacks by terrorist groups against innocent civilian aircraft to achieve 
then political end. Some experts feai* the use of Surface-to-Ah missiles(SAM), 
already known to be in the hands of many terrorist organizations, to attack 
civilian aircraft. What is worse, as Paul Wilkinson warned, is the possibility of 
terrorists using chemical and biological weapons to attack civil aviation.^
Although neither chemical nor biological weapons have been used by ten orists, 
who are all aware of the political price they would pay/ the possibility of then 
use cannot be ruled out. However, previous experience of missile attacks 
demonstrate that such attacks should be considered more seriously as a future 
tlneat. The international community should now pay great attention to the 
potential threat of missile attack. This Chapter is designed to provide a 
perspective outline of such attacks and the future prospects for an international 
response.
.... V.-.- ,  . .'. : - . ‘•V - .  .  i -  ^ . r  - . -  . • - A; ' - .  *- >^ 1
V-2. Missile Attacks Against Straying Civilian Aircraft 
V-2-1. The Soviet Downing of KAL 007
An attack on Korean Airlines (KAL) KE 007 by Soviet fighter aircraft in the 
pre-dawn hours of September 1, 1983, shocked the world when it culminated in 
the greatest single massacre in the annals of international civil aviation to that 
date. The Soviet fighter aircraft fired two missiles which plunged the airliner, 
and all 269 passengers and crew aboaid the plane, into the Sea of Japan. This 
act was perpetrated when KAL KE 007 mistakenly deviated into Soviet 
territorial airspace over a sensitive military base located on Sakhalin Island, on 
the northern Pacific coast of the Soviet Union. The downing resulted not only in i
great loss of civilian life and strong international condemnation of a military I
attack against a civilian aircraft, but also raised serious questions regarding the 
rule of international law and world order, in ensuring the safety of international 
civil aviation.
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that terrorist attacks are not the 
only threats to the safety of air transportation. The first part examines incidents 
involving the militaiy interception of civil aircraft by missile attack. Secondly, an 
analysis of various proposed theories of why KAL007 deviated is provided.
Thirdly, Soviet action along with the legal framework of international air law 
relating to this incident is presented. In addition, it also takes into account the 
international responses to the downing of the airliner.
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V-2-1-1. The Previous Incidents
KAL 007 was not the fii'st aircraft to be shot down by another state or 
adversaxy force in peacetime. There had been several previous peacetime 
incidents in which civilian airliners were filed on by the militaiy forces of a 
subjacent state and where major casualties subsequently resulted. The 
international community, however, reacted to these incidents inconsistently, 
indicating no clearly shared normative expectation in dealing with these crises.* 
Furthermore, there were factual considerations in the KAL tragedy that were not 
present in the earlier incidents. As a result, any collective judgement of those 
earlier incidents may not provide a complete basis for assessing the couise of 
action of the participants in the KAL 007 incident.
The first recorded aimed attack on civilian aircraft occuixed on April 29, 
1952, when an Air France passenger airliner with 12 passengers and 5 crew 
members, on a routine flight from Frankfurt to Berlin, was attacked by two 
Soviet fighters while flying in the air corridor estabhshed by four-Fower 
agreement for flights across the Soviet Zone. As a result of the attack, two 
German civilians and a French steward were wounded, but the aircraft managed 
to land in Berlin.® The same day, the Allied Air Safety Board (AASB) in Berlm
5 William J. Hughes, "Aerial Intrusions by Civil Airliners and the Use of 
Force", Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Vol. 45, 1980, F. 595; Oliver J. 
Lissitzyn, "The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and International 
Law", American Journal of International Law. Vol. 47, 1953, P. 559; Kay Hailbronner, "Freedom of the Air and the Convention on the Law of the Sea", 
American Journal of International Law. Vo. 77, 1983, P. 490; Farooq Hassan, "A Legal Analysis of the Shooting of Korean Airlines Flight 007 by the Soviet 
Union", Journal of Ah Law and Commerce. Vol. 49, 1983-83, P. 555; Craig A. Morgan, "The Shooting of Korean Ah Lines 007: Responses to Unauthorized 
Aerial Incursions", in Michael W, Reisman and Andrew R. Willard (ed), 
International Incidents. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Piess, 1988, p. 202
6  Keesing's Contemporaiy Archives, May 3-10, 1952, P. 12190
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sent a sti'ong protest to the Soviet authorities. The Soviet government, however, 
delivered a counter-protest claiming that the aircraft had been flying outside the 
air conidor, and that it had ignored orders to land.^  The AASB denied the 
Soviet version, and demanded an immediate investigation, the punisliment of 
those responsible, and the payment of reparation. At the same time, the AASB 
emphasized that it was in any case "entirely inadmissible and contraiy to all 
standards of civilian behaviour" for such "brutal and unjustifiable" attacks to be 
made on an unarmed ahcraft in time of peace.*
After this initial incident, another tragedy occurred on June 23, 1954, when a 
British-owned Skymaster of Cathay Pacific Ahways with 18 people, en route 
from Bangkok to Hong Kong, was shot down by two Chinese fighters in the sea 
off Hainan Island. As a result of the attack, 10 people were killed.® After the 
Chinese government had received strong protests from the British and U.S. 
governments, it apologized, on July 26, for the downing of the ahcraft as a 
simple mistake, and promised to pay compensation.*® Subsequently, Chinese 
government paid £367,000 in compensation on December 13, 1954.**
On July 27, 1955, an Israeli Ahliner (El Al) was shot down by Bulgarian 
fighters near the Greco-Bulgarian frontier, killing all 51 passengers and 7 crew 
members on boaid*^  On the same day, Israel denounced the Bulgarian attack on
7 Ibid
8  Ibid
9 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, August 14-21, 1954, P. 13733 
9^ Ibid
Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, December 11-18, 1954, P. 13933 
2^ Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, August 6-13, 1955, P. 14359
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the airliner and demanded the punishment of those responsible, as well as full 
compensation for the loss of the aircraft and for the families of the 58 passengers 
and crew who had lost theh Hves.*^  In addition to the Israeli reaction, strong 
protests and demands for compensation were made to Bulgaria by the British 
government and by the U.S., French, and Swedish government on behalf of 
then nationals killed in the incident.The Bulgarian Government issued a 
statement, on August 3, claiming that the aiiiiner had violated its airspace and 
ignored signals to land, but nonetheless admitted that its ah' defences had shown 
hastiness in firing on the airliner before exhausting other means of forcing it to 1
land. At the same time, the Bulgarian government promised to investigate and 
punish those responsible for the catastrophe, and to take all measures to prevent j
the repetition of an such incident, while agreeing to pay compensation to all 
famihes of the 58 victims.** However, Bulgaria changed its position, disclaiming 
all responsibility and proposing instead to make payments in Bulgarian 
cunency. The case ultimately went before the International Court of Justice with 
the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom submitting memoranda.
Bulgaria refused to yield to the jurisdiction of the Court, however, and the case 
had to be dismissed.
The incident claiming the laigest number of human lives prior to the 1983 
tragedy, and perhaps most comparable to the KAL 007 disaster, occuned on 
February 21, 1973, when a Libyan Airline B-727 was shot down by an Israeli 
Phantom F-4E fighter over the Sinai Desert, which Israel considered a war zone.
13 Ibid
14 Ibid
15 Ibid
275
As a result of the attack 108 of the 118 people on board were killed.*® In 
justification of this action, Israel issued an official statement claiming that the 
Libyan aircraft had violated Israeli ah space over a very sensitive Israeli- 
controlled aiea and had behaved in a manner that had aroused suspicion and 
concern regaining its intentions. Israel maintained that the pilot of the ahcraft 
had noted the warnings and interception signals, but refused signals from the 
intercepting fighters to land. As a further justification, Israeli officials cited 
intelligence reports that Arab terrorists would attempt to crash an ahcraft loaded 
with explosives, or hijack an ahliner, into Israel.*^  However, as a result of 
international condemnation, the Israeli Government acknowledged its regret, and 
offered a payment for compensation on an ex g ra tia  basis.** Yet, demonstrations 
in the Libyan town of Benghazi, at the funeral service for the 55 Libyan victims, 
called for vengeance against Israel regardless of any compensation.*® In essence, 
several factors contributed to the conciliatory measures taken by the Israel 
government. Immediately after the incident on February 21, the United Nations 
General-Secretaiy, Kurt Waldheim, called for a thorough mvestigation. 
Additionally, the International Federation of Ahline Pilots' Association 
(IFALPA), meeting on Februaiy 26, called for constructive measures to prevent 
any further disaster, and endorsed a proposal for an impaiiial investigation by 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in order to recommend 
ways of avoiding futme disasters. Nevertheless, the IFALPA decided against
^ 6  Keesing's Contemporaiy Archives, March 5-11, 1973, P. 25757
17 Ibid
18 Ibid
19 Ibid. P. 25758
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21 International Civil Aviation Organization, "Council Resolution Concerning 
Israeli Attack on Libyan Aircraft", June 4, 1973, International Legal Materials. Vol. 12, 1973, P. 1180
22 The Hapdong News Agency (ed), Korea Annual 1978. Seoul, Korea: The Hapdong News Agency, 1978, P. 45
23 Ibid, PP. 45-46
24 Ibid, P. 46
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any strike action or boycott of flights to Israel.^ ® After consideration of the 
investigation report of the incident, ICAO adopted a resolution on June 4, 1973, 
strongly condemning the Israeli action which resulted in the destruction of the 
Libyan civil aircraft and the loss of innocent lives.^ * ■
iA further incident occurred in 1978 when a Korean Air Lines (KAL) B-707, 1
!carrying 97 passengers and 13 crew, was fired on by a Soviet fighter during its 
flights from Paris to Anchorage on April 21, as it strayed over Soviet airspace. !
Although the airliner managed to an emergency landing on a frozen lake, about |
345 kilometres south of Murmansk, two people were killed and 13 injured.22 %
The Soviet Union's reaction was the release of all passengers except the pilot %
and navigator, detained for further questioning. On April 30th, the two crew ^
members were finally released.^ ® The downing of the aircraft received no f
international reaction or condemnation since the Soviet Union neither publicly 
questioned the reasons for the incursion, nor did South Korea condemn the 
shooting as unjustified. In fact, South Korean President Park Chung-Hui, on #
April 25, expressed profound gratitude for the quick return of both passengers 
and crew members.^ -*
Although the moderate reaction to the KAL incident in 1978 appears difficult 'I
to reconcile, international condemnation of the use of force against unarmed civil
I
 J..;.,,. -1 ' ' __i-.i.-'..- .. i\r> ' i '  'r-a!.- .£,r, >• ■ X'.. .*'.x « .r »
aviation is the general norm. The previous incidents show that exclusive 
sovereignty over airspace could not justify shooting down an intruding civilian 
aircraft.
%
V-2-1-2. Facts of the Incident
On August 31, 1983, a Korean Air Lines (KAL) Boeing 747 KE 007, one of 
five régulai' weekly flights between Seoul, Republic of Korea (ROK) and New 
York, the United States, departed from John F. Keimedy International Aiiport, 
on a one-stop scheduled flight for Kimpo International Airport. This en-route 
stop occuixed at Anchorage International Airport, Alaska, in the United States. 
At Anchorage, the ahcraft was refuelled, serviced for the remainder of the flight 
to Seoul, and, m accordance with standing company operating procedure, the 
flight and cabin crews were changed. The flight departed at the planned 
estimated time of departure (ETD) which, according to standaid Korean Air 
Lines' procedure, was sepaiately calculated for each flight of KE007. According 
to original estimations, flight KE007 was scheduled for departure at 1220 hours. 
The airborne time between Anchorage and Seoul was 8 hours and 40 minutes 
with an estimated aixival at 2100 hours (0600 hours Korean local time). 
Flowever, owing to the prevailing head winds blowing at less than average 
strength, the flight time was reduced to 7hours and 53 minutes by the computer 
flight plan. Under these ciixumstances, the routine practice of KAL was to 
reschedule the Anchorage departure time in order for the flight to arrive in Seoul 
at 2100 hours. The reasons for rescheduling were twofold. Apai*t from being the 
scheduled ari'ival time, passenger handling and custom service were unavailable 
prior to that time. Accordingly, the departure from Anchorage was rescheduled
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to 1250 hours and KAL KE007 left Anchorage at exactly 1300, with 240 
passengers and 29 crew members/* Apart from Korean passengers, there were 
many different nationalities on board: forty-seven Americans; forty-four 
Chinese; twenty-eight Japanese, fifteen Filipinos, six Thais and others. It was 
due to aiiive in Seoul seven hours and fifty-three minutes later, in the eaiJy 
morning houis of September 1, yet it never reached its final destination.
What happened? Soon after its departure from Anchorage, KE007 began 
deviating to the right (North) of its assigned dhect route to Bethel. The 
deviation resulted in a progressively greater lateral displacement to the right of 
its planned route. This ultimately resulted in its penetration of adjacent high seas 
aii'space in flight information regions (FIRs) operated by the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), as well as of theh sovereign airspace overlying 
portions of the Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin Island and their surrounding 
teiTitorial waters. The flight plan called for the KAL KE007 to proceed west 
from Anchorage to Bethel, Alaska, on standaid Ah Traffic Service (ATS) route 
J501, and from there continue on a virtually straight line via ATS route R20.2® 
This route was divided into eight segments, sepaiated by the Very High 
Frequency Omni-bearing Range Radio Station (VOR)-established over water 
checkpoints.27
25 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), "Action with Regard to the 
Downing of the Korean Air Lines Aircraft, December 30, 1983 and Attachment B, Destruction of Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 over Sea of Japan, 31 August 
1983, Report of ICAO Fact-Finding Investigation", December 1983, International Legal Materials. Vol. XXIII, 1984, PP. 864-871
26 Ibid, P. 870
27 Some of the checkpoints, identified by arbitrary names such as NABIE, 
NEEVA, NINNO, and NOKKA, aie obligatory for planes to provided position reports.
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The plane reported to Anchorage Ah Route Traffic Control Centre (ARTCC) 
that it passed Bethel at 1349 hours and estimated passing over NABIE at 1430 
hours. KAL KE007 continued reporting as if on course. It checked in with f
NABIE at 1432 hours and NEEVA at 1558. The plane established high- 
frequency radio contact with Tokyo Aeronautical Station. It reported passing 
over NIPPI at 1707 hours, estimating that it would reach NOKKA at 1826 hours. ^
At 1815 hours, the plane requested clearance to climb to 35,000 feet, which 
Tokyo provided at 1820 hours. At about 1820 hours when it was in the vicinity 
of Sakhalin Island, USSR, the flight was intercepted by Soviet military aircraft.
At 1827 hours the ahcraft was hit by at least one of two air-to-air AA-3 Anab 
missiles fhed from one of the USSR fighter aircraft, an SU-15 whose pilot had 
been diiected by his ground command and control unit to terminate the flight of 
KE007. As a direct result of the missile attack, KE007 crashed and sank into the 
Sea of Japan southwest of Sakhalin Island. The extensive and bitterly contested 
multinational search for bodies, debris, and the Black Box (containing records of |
routing and in-flight recordings) from the plane yielded little assistance or value. *|
Only fragmentary pieces of the KE007 aircraft and a small number of items of f
personal property were salvaged.^ *
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V-2-1-3. The Controversy Over Deviation
There is evidence indicating that KAL KE007 flew over the Kamchataka 
Peninsula and Sakhalin Island before being shot down and its greatest deviation 
from the flight plane was 350 miles off course. The flight from Anchorage to 
Seoul was planned to fly along Ah Traffic Service (ATS) routes J50L R20 and 
oceanic transit route (OTR) 1, then to cross Japan’s main island, Honshu, and 
the Sea of Japan, The route was situated within flight information regions (FIRs) 
Anchorage, Anchorage Oceanic, Tokyo and Taegu. Korea.2® How and why did
29 ICAO Report, op.cit, P. 883
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.KAL KE007 stray so far off course, so close to one of the most militaiily 
sensitive and dangerous regions in the world? It is extremely difficult to 
determine exactly what made KAL KE007 stray from its scheduled course since 
no testimony from any crew members is available. Also the communications 
which might have shed light on the reasons for KE007’s major course deviation; 
indications of flight crew awareness of their being off track, and vital flight 
instrumentation, communications and avionics equipment from the wreckage of 
KE007, could not be utilised after the flight’s destruction since it was never 
recovered. However, there are several potential reasons for KAL KE007’s 
deviation of flight course. They aie as follows/®
a. Deliberate crew members' action associated with fuel savingb. Intentional action by some of the crew to carry out a special mission
c. Mechanical failure of navigation systemd. Innocent human eiTor of the crew members
V-2-1-3-1. Fuel Saving
Soon after news of the KE007's tragedy became known, rumours surfaced 
that Korean Air Lines pilots had a reputation for 'cutting corners' and taking 
risks.®* Richai'd Rohmer, who is the strong advocate of this point of view.
39 Alexander Dallin. Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985; Richard Rohmer, Massacre 007: The Story of the Korean Airlines Disaster. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1984; Oliver 
Clubb, KAL Flight 007: The Hidden Story. New York: Permanent Press, 1985; 
R. W. Johnson, Shootdown: The Verdict on KAL 007. London: Unwin Hyman, 1986
31 Ibid
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32 Richard Rohmer, op.cit, PP. 64-67 and PP. 207-213
33 Ibid, PP. 66-67
34 The Hapdong News Agency (ed), Korea Annual 1978. op.cit PP. 45-46; 
Time, September 12, 1983, P. 11
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I
stressed the KAL’s rapid growth, aggressive management, and heavy debts to 
explain the reason of deviation.®® He said as follows:
"During 1980-81, the cumulative lossess of KAL were $47.8 million. In 
1982 the airline showed a profit of $6 million after chairman Harry Cho 
initiated a series of cost-control and expense cutting policies, ... There is no 
doubt that the cost-cutting was the order of the day, starting with the most i
obvious of places, operating-fuel burning time in Korean A ir Lines’ big, |
modern and very expensive fleet of forty-one aircraft. ... For example, if 
Flight 007 had been able to shave twenty minutes off its scheduled flying I
time on August 31, and, on the same day, five others of Harry Cho’s fleet 
had managed to do the same thing(with appropriate bonuses or other |
incentives for their captains), the saving for the company would be in the 
order of $13,000. Given that the airline operates some 130 international 
flights every week, the opportunity fo r that scale of flying time and corner 
cutting is by no means unrealistic. The cumulative results would be in the ^
neighbourhood of half a million dollars a month, or $6 m illion a year - 
almost the amount of Korean A ir Lines’ profit in 1982 after the massive 
losses in 1980-81. Even a one-million dollar saving, to say nothing of six 
million, would be a good business target. ... W ith this kind of policy in 
effect, in order to save the airline and their jobs, the pilots would be very 
much aware of and committed to the whole concept of cost-cutting."®®
This line of aigument lacks validity for a number of reasons. W ith a small 
amount of money as an incentive, it is almost unthinkable that the KAL 
management, and the crew, consisting of rational and well informed pilots, I
would embai'k on a flight which was viitually certain to be detected and thus 
was tantamount to suicide. There is no doubt that the pilot of KAL KE007 
would have known the reputation of Soviet interceptors, as they had fired two 
heat-seeking missiles at KAL Flight 902, in 1978.®^  There is no evidence that the 
KE007 crew might have flown deliberately over Soviet territory to save fuel and
time. I ll fact, the ICAO found that there were no records of such deviations 
previously made by KAL pilots.®* Any short cuts were impossible without 
flying thi'ough FIRs of the USSR where such flights would be observed and any 
iixegularity on the pail of KAL would have been reported to Japanese ground 
control®® Any theory of short-cuts is neither consistent with previous records of 
KAL KEOOT’s pilots nor the distance (350 miles) into Soviet sovereign teiiitory. 
An alternative route, known as the "Great Circle" route, which would have 
saved a maximum amount of money was not used by KAL 007 and it was never 
ill close proximity to this route. Furthermore, on the prescheduled course them 
was no reason to veer over Sakhalin Island, a change that added time, distance 
and danger.®  ^Alexander Dallin cited from French sources that KAL management 
routinely remitted to the crew approximately 60 per cent of the cash equivalent 
of the saving effected.®* He also said as follows:
".. If, hypothetically, KAL 007 had saved thiee-fifths of the amount saved by 
flying the Great Ciicle route, the $1,500 would have been divided so that 60 
per cent, or $900, went to the crew(how many members of it) and $600 to 
the company. It defies all good sense to take seriously the notion that, 
presumably with connivance of company officials, the flight courted death 
and destruction for $600."®*
35 ICAO Report, P. 894
36 Ibid: See also, Mark N. Kr amer, "Continuing Contr oversy over KE007", A  
Review Essay, Survival. Vol. 28, No. 1, 1986, P. 145
37 David Peai'son, "K.A.L.007: What the U.S. knew and when we knew it", 
The Nation. August 18-25, 1984, PP. 120-121
33 Alexander Dallin, Ibid, P. 38
39 Ibid
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Another opponent to the cost-cutting theory, Muiray Sayle, using a different 
calculation of savings, claims that: "The Great Circle route between NEEVA and 
Seoul is shorter than the Romeo 20 route and in normal circumstances would 
have provided a valuable saving in fuel, but no pilot would fly  over most of the 
Soviet Union’s conventional and nucleai* m ilitaiy installations in East Asia in 
order to save a sum of about US $2,500"/® In fact, R. W . Johnson of Magdalen 
College, Oxford, argues:
"In fact, the fuel saving hypothesis won't stand up. ICAO looked at it and 
found no evidence for it or for previous such short-cutting by KAL. Sayle, 
having origmally propagated this theory (and received a journalism prize for 
it), later abandoned it altogether. The reasons are not difficult to see. First, if 
KAL were to try such illegitimate fuel-saving techniques, this would be the 
last (because most dangerous) route on wliich it would be tried. Two 
thousand five hundred dollars is really a very small amount to save if it 
entails putting not only all one’s passengers but oneself at risk. To get pilots 
to take such risks (even supposing one wished to) one would have to offer 
them incentives far in excess of $2500. No pilot would risk his neck to save 
the company - not himself - just $2500. Finally, any pilot who was 
knowingly short-cutting would, in this region, be like a cat on hot bricks - 
desperately aware of the risks he was mnning, knowing that any moment he 
was likely to be intercepted by Soviet fighters.
While there has been inevitable speculation concerning financial incentives 
for the flight crew, there is scant indication that they would have earned anything 
but a word of admonition. There is nothing to support this hypothesis, which 
requhes more South Korean trust in Soviet benevolence and perhaps also a 
gi'eater belief in Soviet incompetence than the facts appear to warrant.
49 Murray Sayle, "Charge and Countercharge ”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 
September 22, 1983, P. 28
41 R.W. Johnson, op.cit, PP. 251-252
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V -2-1-3-2. Special M ission
The Soviet Union, in its justification for shooting down of KAL 007, claimed 
that the intiusion of KAL KE007 aircraft into Soviet airspace was a deliberate 
and caiefully planned intelligence operation undertaken by some of the members 
of the flight crew, presumably on behalf of an American intelligence agency/®
There is no doubt that KAL 007 violated the State boundary of the Soviet 
Union. However, there is no evidence in support of the Soviet contention that it 
was on a spy mission. The ICAO investigation did not consider further the 
hypothesis presumed by the Soviet Union Accident Investigation Commission 
that there was a premeditated deviation from the fhght plan route fo r intelligence 
gathering purposes.-*® In addition, it is very difficult to see why KAL KE 007 
would have deviated deliberately to caixy out a special intelligence mission 
when a vast U.S. intelligence network already exists in the northern Pacific, 
including RC-135 and other reconnaissance aircraft; electronic surveillance ships 
off the Soviet coast; electi'onic monitoring stations in Japan and Korea; the 
Cobra Dane phased aixay radai* network at Shemya in Alaska, and photo­
reconnaissance and electronic data from satellites. The U.S. could have obtained |
information, when required, by these means fai' more easily and at far lower 
risk.-*** Common sense suggests that even the most expert observer, flying some
42 Tass statement of September 3, 1983 in Pravda, Reprinted in Current Digest 
of the Soviet Press. September 28, 1983, P. 1; Press Conference in Moscow, 
Pravda and Izvestia, September 10, 1983, Reprinted in Current Digest of the 
Soviet Press. October 5, 1983, P. 1; ICAO Report, op.cit, P. 912; Documents 
Concering the Korean Airlines Incident, op.cit, P. 1116
43 ICAO Report, P. 868 and 908
44 David Peaison, op.cit P. 116; See also, James Bamford, "The Last Flight of 
KAL 007: How the U.S. knew so much about what happened", Washington 
Post Magazine. January 8, 1984, PP. 4-6; Mark N. Kramer, op.cit, P. 143;
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six miles high in dim pre-dawn light, is not likely to see an)4hing that U.S. 
surveillance satellites would not have repeatedly scrutinized and photographed 
in fai* greater detail.*^  Moreover, to cany out a special intelligence gathering 
mission, a civilian aircraft would require dozens of items of special equipment. 
The KAL KE007 had certainly not been reconfigured with elaborate and 
sophisticated electi‘onic intelligence equipment, which is usually large. It was 
reported that the handling staff in New York and Anchorage had free access to 
all parts of the aircraft and none of them reported any unusual equipment or 
structural changes/* The fact that KAL aircraft were open to regular maintenance 
by airport personnel of various nationalities is in itself an indication that no 
special equipment was on boaid.^  ^Moreover, any plamiing for a special mission 
would have to accept the great possibility that the plane would be forced down 
to land in Soviet territory, where it would be completely disassembled as 
previously demonstrated by the KAL aircraft forced down over Murmansk in 
1978. In that case, such special equipment could have been used by the Soviet 
Union as a political weapon before the world with at least equal effect as in the 
exhibition of the American U-2 spy aircraft in 1960. In that particulai' incident, 
on May 1, 1960, (a fortnight before the opening of the Summit conference in 
Paris), an unarmed U.S. reconnaissance aircraft was shot down by a Soviet 
rocket after penetrating about 1,250 miles into Soviet temtory. The pilot was
U.S. News and World Reports, September 12, 1983, P. 24; Richard Rohmer, op.cit, P. 204
Time, September 12, 1983, P. 14; Toronto Gazette, September 3, 1983
ICAO, "Ah' Navigation Commission, 1818th Report to Council by the President of the Ah' Navigation Commission", Document C-WP/7809, Febuary 
1984, P. 13; David Pearson, op.cit, P. 123; R. W. Johnson, op.cit, PP.255-256
Mark N. Kramer, op.cit, P. 143
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captured after making a parachute landing and the wreckage of the aircraft was 
subsequently taken to Moscow and examined by experts. This incident brought 
about the break-down of the Summit conference even before its opening session 
in Paris on May 16 which placed the U.S. in an embarrassing position since 
President Eisenhower was forced to admit that his Administration had been 
lying when it had earlier asserted that the U-2 was merely a weather 
reconnaissance aircraft which had lost its way.^ *
Any claims that KAL KE 007 was involved in testing the air defence system 
of the USSR lack credibihty. Mark N. Kramer conectly observes that:
"American military and reconnaissance aii'craft could have been-and, indeed, 
frequently aie-used for that very purpose, without the same degree of risk.
Carrier-based fighters and RC-135 aircraft, in particular, regularly fly neai'
Soviet teiTitory, and a few have penetrated Soviet airspace to trigger a 
response from radar warning systems and ah defence units. It would have been pointless to use a civilian airliner in this way at such great risk, even if I
the alleged sponsors of the mission had expected Soviet ah defence radai's and fighters to be incapable of distinguishing between a 747 and military ahcraft."*®
For all the above mentioned reasons, it is impossible to assert that KAL 007 "i
was on a special mission. It is also unthinkable that an agency of the American 
Government would jeopardize the lives of 269 innocent civilians in order to 
obtain information and intelligence readily available by other means.
Recently, Lieutenant Colonel Gennady Osipovich, one of the pilots who shot I
down KAL 007, revealed his account in a series of articles of what happened on 
September 1, 1983, in the Soviet newspaper, Izvestia. His account in the 1991
48 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, May 21-28 and May 28-June 4, 1960, PP. 17425-17430 and 17437-17411
4^ Mai'k N. Kiamer, op.cit, P. 143
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published interview contradicted the official Soviet version that KAL 007 was 
on an intelligence mission. He revealed that he saw clearly that his target was not 
the American RC-135 reconnaissance ahcraft that the Soviets at the time 
maintained they had believed the ahcraft to be.^ “ At he same time, he admitted 
that he was ordered by a high Soviet official to lie.^ i The senior editor of 
Izvestia, Andrei Illesh, concluded that KAL 007's reason for entering Soviet 
airspace was simply because it was lost. He cites an unnamed member of the 
Soviet team which investigated the KAL 007 incident as saying: "I do not think 
the Boeing was on an intelligence flight."^  ^ In addition, Izvestia said that the 
Soviets did find the black box, which had vital information, but lied about it to 
conceal the true story.^ ^
According to the American publication, Newsweek, between 1981 and 1982, 
Aeroflot planes of the Soviet Union went off course 16 times to fly over U.S. 
militaiy installations, including one occasion at Groton, Connecticut, at the 
precise moment when General Dynamic Corporation's Electronic Boat Division 
was launching the first Trident nuclear submarine.^  ^The civilian airlines of the 
Soviet allies, which includes Lot (the Polish carrier), and the Czechoslovak line 
CSA, have flown similai* spy missions. Given the Soviet bloc's appaient use of 
civilian aiicraft for intelligence gathering, it was perhaps not surprising that 
USSR could suspect the Republic of Korea and the United States of using the
The Sunday Times, May 19, 1991
51 Ibid
52 The Independent, Februaiy 10, 1991 
55 The Sunday Times, May 19, 1991
54 Newsweek, September 12, 1983, P. 22; Time, September 12, 1983, P. ID
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same methods/® Yet, there is no conclusive evidence of the theory of special 
missions and most experts, outside the Soviet Union, do not consider this as a 
possibility.
V-2-1-3-3. Mechanical Failure
The aiicraft type of KAL KEÛ07 was Boeing 747-23ÛB, serial number 
20559, manufactured in 1972 for Lufthansa. In February 1979 it was purchased 
by Korean Ah Lines and registered in the ROK as HL7442. The Certificate of 
Registration issued by ROK on Februaiy 5, 1979, was permanent. The 
certificate of Aii worthiness was issued by the ROK and renewable on a yearly 
inteiwal and was last renewed on January 15, 1983. The total amount of ahbome 
travel amounted to 36,718 hours, in which 9,237 landings had been made - well 
within its designed service life* In addition, it had passed a major overhaul on 
August 10, 1983, only three weeks before it was shot down. The aircraft had 
been maintained in accordance with Korean Civil Aviation Bureau (CAB) 
requirements. KAL KE007 was equipped with three Inertial Navigation Systems 
(INS), three Very High Frequency (VHF) and two High Frequency (HF) radio 
transceivers, two transponders, two weather radais, two autopilots, and a 
vaiiety of other altimeters, indicators compass systems and auto-throttles.®*
From the earliest days of flying, aircraft have canied magnetic compasses of 
the kind that guided Christopher Columbus across the Atlantic Ocean in the 15th
55 Newsweek, Ibid, P. 12
56 ICAO Report, op.cit, PP. 874-875
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century, and KAL KE007, in fact, had two aboard. Even the smallest aircraft 
have magnetic compasses, which are noimally reliable, instantly available and 
need no power. By tradition, the lines of approach and departure to and from 
aii’ports are also laid out with magnetic headings on air maps, and directions 
from ah traffic controllers in ah'port towers are given on the same system. One 
reason is that of safety: if all else fails, the simple, husty magnetic compass will 
give the pilot a good idea of where he is going, at night or when there is no 
landmark below to steer by. Magnetic compasses alone aie not, however, 
reliable enough for any but the shortest ah journeys, and aie useless near the 
poles. Ahcraft are carried by wind, which will set a plane to one side or other of 
a chosen magnetic track in ways unpredictable to the pilot. He must therefore, on 
a long flight, keep constantly checking his position, and as recently as the early 
1970s pilots still did this.®^
In the past two decades, however, a new instrument has revolutionised 
navigation, making flying fai* safer and rendering the specialised profession of 
ah navigator all but extinct. This most extraordinary invention is called the 
Inertial Navigation System (INS), a benign by-product of the space race 
between the superpowers. All navigation works by establishing a relationship 
between the moving vehicle and some fixed point of reference: For Columbus, 
the reference points were the magnetic pole, the sun and the stai's. With the INS 
system the reference point is carried within the ahcraft itself, in the form of a tiny 
platfoim stabilised by gyroscopes which is unaffected even by the movements 
of the earth and holds itself steady in relation to the universe itself. The INS can 
thus detect the rotation of the earth, determine its own latitude and longitude, 
measure the height at which the ahcraft canying it is flying, and whether its
57 The Sunday Times, May 20, 1984
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wings are level, all without reference to any outside signal It does all this and 
fixes the position of the ahcraft with astonishing accuracy to within one nautical 
mile. Usually the pilot has to do little more than punch into the INS the latitude 
and longitude coordinates of successive intermediate points along his route, turn 
the rotary switch that couples the INS to the automatic pilot, and the automatic 
phot will then steer the ahcraft to its destination. The INS is still only a machine, 
and any machine, or its power supply, can fail. It is therefore current practice to 
equip big aircraft like 747s with three independent INS instruments, so that an 
error in one will be instantly detected by the other two. Electronically linked, 
they can, in fact, vote' among themselves to reject a faulty reading.®* INS has 
reduced navigational eiror to about one in every 10,000 flights. Undetected 
failure in the INS itself is even raier, and no simultaneous failure of a triple INS 
system has ever been recorded.®’
According to the Report of ICAO Fact-Finding Investigation in December 
1983, the flight crew of KE007 did not report any problem, call for assistance, 
or indicate in any way that they were unable to comply with the navigational 
requhements of theh assigned route. The possibility of a failure of all tliree INS 
must be regarded as extremely remote. The fact that no difficulties were 
reported, that the flight crew repoi-ted upper winds and provided estimated times 
of arrival (ETAs) and position reports were consistent with the flight plan, 
suggested that at least two of the INS systems were functioning normally. The 
progress of the flight appealed normal from the position reports and estimates. 
The aircraft departed from Anchorage with a defect in the No. 2 compass
58 Ibid; Murray Sayle, "KE007: A Conspiracy of Chcumstances", The New York Review. April 25, 1985, P. 45; Newsweek, September 12, 1983, P. 10
59 Ibid
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system, rectification of which was defened until arrival in Seoul. Four heading I
reference systems were still available, as well as the standby compass.*®
V-2-1-3-4. Human Error
The final explanation for the deviation of KAL KE007 may be found in 
human error. How was it possible that the ahcraft was nearly 350 miles off 
track when it was shot down? As mentioned before, there were tliree INS 
systems aboard the KAL KE007 which were easily capable of holding the 
ahcraft within five miles of assigned track. The INS system is programmed on 
the ground, before take off, with the geographical co-ordinates (latitude and 
longitude) of the intermediate stages, or 'way-points*, of the flight. Even though 
pilots have been brought up in the INS era with an all-built-infallible system 
aboard, they can still make mistakes, as the machines requhe human interaction. 
There has been much speculation about the possibility that KE007 was 
misprogrammed - that is, the wrong coordinates were punched into one or more 
of the INS systems, an eiTor known to have been made occasionally in the last 
decades of the civil use of inertial systems. In the aviation business, this is called 
finger ti'ouble.*^  The INS, like any other computer or programmable system, will 
do exactly what it is told within the limits of its design. Thus, putting in 
inconect waypoint coordinates will naturally result in an ahcraft going off its 
designated track. Michael Westlake has expertly phiased this argument as 
follows:
60 ICAO Report, op.cit, P. 895
61 The Sunday Times, May 20, 1984; Muixay Sayle, op.cit, P. 45
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\ "Previous attempts at explaining how the 747 came to be off course, such as 
suggesting that the captain was flying the so-called "great circle" course from 
some point along his original path to Seoul, have all relied on the pilots in 
some way misprbgramming their inertial navigation system(INS) so that it 1took them about 300 miles north of their proper track without them knowing 
it. Supéïficially this is an attractive argument because mistakes have been made by pilots using an INS, including at least twice by other Asian airlines, fortunately with only embarrassment as the result. The Atlantic has been a particularly bad area for gross navigational errors."*^
Furthermore, Murray Sayle points out that:
"On the North Atlantic, gross errors of navigation have averaged one in ten 
thousand crossings, or some twelve a year at the present traffic density.
Misuse or mispyogramming of inertial navigation system is by far the commonest causé oi gross error reported, followed by failure to recouple the autopilot to the INS.... The records of the CAA show five cases of gross 
navigational error since 1975..."*®
According to communications received from KE007 during the flight, no 
evidence was found to indicate that the flight crew of KE007 was aware of the 
flight's deviation from its planned route in spite of the fact it continued along the 
same general off-track flight path for some five hours and twenty-six minutes. I
Soon after the KAL 007 incident, the FAA ordered the closure of the R-20 
route and the route was reopened on September 1983, with two civil air traffic 
controllers monitoring the military radar screens and checking them against 
airline flight plans radioed from Anchorage. Airliners that are detected off course 
are warned by radio from the civil controllers at Shemya. Since October 19,
1983, when the first radar surveillance of the NOPAC routes was begun.
however, more than seventeen aiiliners have been logged off course, including a 
proportion of those on the R-20 route.**
Therefore, it is a strong possibility that factors including human error played 
a major role in accounting for the deviation of KAL 007.
V-2-1-4. Soviet Action and International Order
V-2-1-4-1. Sovereignty over Airspace
As ahspace has been subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial state since the 
turn of the century, there has emerged a doctrine of international law that a state 
exercises a complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its lands 
and the adjoining territorial sea. Broadly speaking, the basis for granting a f
subjacent state the right to control the airspace above its tenitory is similar to 
that where the holder of patrimony in land should also be given the right to 
control the airspace directly above it under the domestic law.*® In other words, 
control over airspace is granted because of the existence of the sovereign rights 
of a state in the land below it. Sovereignty in the airspace is therefore a facet of 
the totality of interests a state has in its land, known as territorial sovereignty.**
64 Ibid
65 Farooq Hassan, op.cit, P. 561
66 Bin Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport. London: Stevens and 
Sons Ltd, 1962, P. 3; See also generally, Ian Brownlie, Principle of Public 
International Law (3rd Edition), Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1979; J.G. Strake,Introduction to International Law (10th Edition), London: Butterworth & Co.,
1989; Kay Hailbronner, "Freedom of the Air and the Convention on the Law of the Sea", American Journal of International Law. Vol. 77, 1983, PP. 490-520; R.Y. Jennings, "International Civil Aviation and the Law", British Yearbook of 
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A sovereign's right to control its airspace is equally well recognized under 
the international conventions dealing with civil aviation. The Paris Convention 
for the Regulation of Air Navigation*^  was the first major international treaty 
dealing with civil aviation. The Convention defined that every state, not just the 
contracting pailies, has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace 
above its territory.** The next important milestone in civil aviation was the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on December 4, 
1944.69 jbe principle of sovereignty over airspace was reaffirmed in Article 1 of 
the Chicago Convention, which provides that:
"The contracting states recognise that every state has complete and exclusivesovereignty over the air space above its tenitory."^ *
One significant aspect of the Chicago Convention, in contrast to the Paris 
Convention, is that there is an omission of the freedom of innocent passage in 
time of peace under the Chicago Convention, the freedom which was recognized 
under Articles 2 and 15 of the Paris Convention.^  ^ This omission could be 
interpreted as significant, in that the concept of complete and exclusive 
sovereignty now emerges in a strengthened manner under the Chicago
67 The Convention was signed on October 13, 1919 and entered into force on July 11,1972 (Hereafter cited as Palis Convention)
68 Paris Convention, Article 1
69 The Convention was signed on December 7, 1944 and entered into force on April 4, 1947 (Hereafter cited as Chicago Convention)
70 Chicago Convention, Article 1
71 R. Y. Jennings, op.cit, PP. 197-198
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V-2-1-4-2. Aerial Intrusion and Chicago Convention
Does the principle of sovereignty over the airspace above its temtory mean 
that any aircraft entering without permission is completely at the mercy of the 
territorial sovereign? The possible action of the territorial sovereign with respect 
to the intruding aiicraft and its occupants may be as follows: it may seek to 
destroy the intiuder; it may attempt to control the movements of the intruder in 
the airspace in order to compel it to leave or change its course; and it may 
attempt to exercise jurisdiction through administrative and judicial organs over
72 Chee Choung II, "Aerial Intrusion and Soviet Attack on the Korean Airliner 
in International Law", Korean Journal of International Law. Vol. 28 No. 2, 1983, P. 122
73 D.W. Greig, International Law(2nd ed), London: Butterworth, 1976, P. 349
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C o n v e n t i o n . ^ 2  While Article 5 of the Chicago Convention appears to qualify the 
notion of complete and exclusive sovereignty of state by recognizing the right of 
non-scheduled flights to fly over the territorial aii'space of the contracting states 4
without their permission or authorization, the practice of states demonstrates that 
such provision has become a dead letter as almost all states requhe prior 
pemission or authorization to fly over the territorial airspace of other states, 
thus ignoring the principle under Article 5.^ ® International aviation convention is 
similai' to the broad international law principles applicable to aii space rights. The 
absolute sovereignty of a subjacent state over its airspace is well recognized 
among states, and is accepted by the leading treaties on the subject.
Consequently, no aircraft is normally entitled to enter the airspace above the 
temtory of a foreign state without the latter’s permission.
the intruding aircraft and its occupants after it has landed on soil/* What action 
is permissible? Is the territorial sovereign, for example, entitled to attack any 
intruding ahcraft without prior waniing?
While the Chicago Convention does not permit unauthorized entry into 
national ahspace of the contracting states, it clearly anticipated the great 
possibility of an aerial intrusion into the territorial ahspace by foreign ahcraft. 
This was shown by Ailicles 25 and 26 which provide for dealing with the 
contingency of ahcraft in distress and the investigation of accidents. Aiiicle 25 of 
the Convention states as follows:
"Each contracting state undertakes to provide such measures of assistance to 
ahcraft in distress in its territory as it may find practicable, and to permit, 
subject to control by its own authorities, the owners of the ahcraft or authorities of the state in which the ahcraft is registered to provide such measures of assistance as may be necessitated by the chcumstances. Each 
contracting state, when undertaking search for missing ahcraft, will collaborate in co-ordinated measures which may be recommended from time to time pursuant to this Convention. '^®
It is worthwhile to note that Article 25 refers to provision of assistance to 
intruding ahcraft in distress instead of permitting attacks on such ahcraft. The 
general overtone of the Chicago Convention is that it aims to protect intruding 
ahcraft in distress and ahcraft straying into the ahspace by providing due regard 
for the safety of such ahcraft. For this purpose, the Council of ICAO formulated 
special recommendations in accordance with Article 3 of the Chicago 
Convention, "which contracting states aie urged to implement tlu'ough 
appropriate regulatory and administrative action".^ * In one of these
74 Oliver J. Lissitzyn, op.cit, P. 559
75 Chicago Convention, Article 25
76 Ibid, 3(8) Interception, Rules of the Ah, Annex II,
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recommendations, it has been provided that " Intercepting aircraft should refrain 
from the use of weapons in all cases of interception of civil a i r c r a f t " . î  
Considering the provisions of the Chicago Convention concerning the aerial 
intrusion of civil aircraft, the shooting down of the KAL KE007 by the Soviet 
fighter ahcraft with missiles is cleaily contraiy to recommended procedures 
under the Chicago Convention. For instance, the Soviet attack on the KAL 
KE007 is contraiy to Ailicle 25 of the Convention, which provides for giving 
assistance to intruding ahcraft in distress. Instead of assisting the ahcraft, the 
Soviet fighter ahcraft hastily attacked and destroyed the KAL KE007.
Moreover, Soviet authorities did not make any efforts to identify the ahcraft.^ *
The Soviet Union asserted that the KAL 007 had ignored the efforts of the 
Soviet fighter ahcraft to establish contacts with it and escort it to the nearest 
ahfield on Soviet tenitory.^ ’ The Soviet Union also contended that, over the 
island of Sakhalin, warning shots of tracer shells had been fhed by a Soviet 
fighter ahcraft along its flight path.*® Contrary to the Soviet aigument, according 
to the transcript of the tapes between the Soviet fighter ahcraft and ground 
control tower, the pilot of the Soviet fighter ahcraft made no mention of any 
warning shots, except for the fhing of the missiles.®^  Recently, Gennady
V-2-1-5. World Reactions
The KAL KE 007 incident caused a wave of populai* revulsion, particulaiiy 
among the non-communist states of the world, but also from the People’s 
Republic of China and from Yugoslavia, at what was felt to be an inadmissible 
use of Soviet militaiy force in peacetime. Many of these states decided in the 
following weeks to impose retaliatory sanctions against the Soviet Union, such
82 The Independent, February 10, 1991; The Sunday Times, May 19, 1991
83 Ibid
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Osipovich, stated that the official Soviet statements that claimed of having fired 
tracer bullets to alert the Korean pilots to the danger were untrue.*^ He also said 
that the problem of all Soviet pilots is that they do not study the civilian aircraft I
of foreign airlines. He knew all the militaiy planes and all the intelligence planes, 
but KAL 007 was not like any of them. He was convinced the crew had spotted 
him because the plane reduced speed as he approached. He interpreted this as a 
manoeuvre to make his faster fighter overshoot the target. At this time, the order 
came from ground control: "Destroy the tai'get!"®® Although it was not disputed 
that KAL KE0Û7 strayed into the Soviet ahspace by mistake and not in disti'ess, 
the aircraft should not have been subject to an armed attack resulting in the 
destruction of the aircraft. It is clear tliat exclusive and complete sovereignty T
over its territorial airspace does not justify a reckless and indiscriminate act of 
violence or the use of fire aims against international civil aviation. One should be 
reminded in this connection that killing innocent and defenceless civilians is 
prohibited even in time of war under the customs and the laws of warfare.
as the boycott of Soviet goods, the suspension of landing rights for the Soviet 
airline Aeroflot, or the suspension of their own airlines’ flights to and from the 
Soviet Union.
The ROK Foreign Minister, Mr. Bum-Suk Lee, said on September 2, 1983 
that the destruction of the civil ahcraft had been a ’’shameless" and "savage" act, 
and he called on the Soviet Union to apologize,** to pay compensation for the 
loss of life and property and to punish the perpetrators of the attack.*® It was 
also reported that the United Kingdom, French, West German, Dutch and 
Japanese Governments had conveyed to the Soviet ambassadors in theh states 
the seriousness of theh concern over the issue,** While some of these were 
sponsored and exploited by extreme anti-Soviet groups, many were 
spontaneous and elicited intense feelings, by no means only from friends and 
relatives of the victims. A number of memorial seiwices and protest rallies were 
held in Japan, Korea and the United States, and a variety of planned Soviet visits 
and joint activities were either cancelled or postponed. *^
84 Soviet Union officially apologised to South Korea for the shooting down a KAL KE 007, on December 18, 1990; See, The Independent, December 19, 1990
85 Keesing’s Contemporary Aixhieves: Record of World Events, November 1983, P. 32514
86 The British Foreign Secretary, Geoffery Howe, summoned the Soviet 
ambassador, on September 2, to demand an apology, compensation and the 
punishment of the offending officers. The West German Government called the shooting "an inconceivable act of unsurprised brutality", while the French 
Government said that it "placed in question the principles which govern 
international relations and respect for human life". The Italian Government referred to it as "a mad gesture of war ”. The Chinese Government expressed its "shock and regret ” at the Soviet action. See, Ibid
87 The French Government postponed a proposed visit to Paris by Andrei 
Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, which had been scheduled for September 5, 1983, and the Netherlands cancelled a Soviet ministerial visit
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On September 8, 1983, the Soviet Union vetoed a draft Security Council 
resolution whose preamble reaffirmed the rules of international law prohibiting 
acts of violence contraiy to the safety of international civil aviation and which 
recognized the necessity of using only internationally agreed procedures in 
responding to intrusions into a state’s ahspace. The preamble also recognized 
the right under international law to appropriate compensation. The operative 
portion of the draft resolution deplored the destruction of the Korean airliner and 
the loss of life, declared that such use of armed force against international civil 
aviation is incompatible with the norms governing international behaviour and 
elementary considerations of humanity, and welcomed the agreement of the 
ICAO Council to consider the incident.*® Therefore, it is indefensible that the 
Soviet Union rejected this draft Security Council resolution while recognizing 
these measures in principle as a signatory to Chicago Convention. The political 
expediency of this must be viewed as limited in light of the international 
community’s strong reaction and condemnation to this behaviour.
The International Federation of Ah Line Pilots Association (IFALPA), as a
non-political, professional organization, deplored and condemned the brutal
action of the USSR on September 6, 1983, and approved a recommendation to
its members not to fly to the Soviet Union for sixty days and requested other
international professional organizations to take similai' actions aimed at
demonstrating the outrage of the civil air transport industry and of the world
generally at this incident.®’ Pilots of the Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS)
which had been planned for September 13, 1983. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand 
and the United Kingdom also cancelled meetings with Soviet ministers and officials. See, Ibid, P. 32514 and 32516
88 UN Document S/15966/ Rev. 1, September 12, 1983
89 Action Taken by the International Federation of Air Line Pilots (Press Statement), September 6, 1983 and Open Letters to the World’s Press by R.F.
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declared a 60 day ban on flights to the Soviet Union, starting from September 7, 
1983, while Finnish and Italian pilots also refused to fly to the Soviet Union for 
a period of 60 days, following a recommendation to this effect which was 
approved by the IFALPA. The recommendation, which was not binding on 
members, was endorsed by the British Air Line Pilots’ Association (BALPA), 
wliich banned all flights to the Soviet Union, and also by Dutch, West German, 
and Ii'ish associations. The IFALPA ban on flights to and from the Soviet Union, 
on September 7, was suspended effective from October 3 in the light of the 
evident determination among ICAO member states to achieve an international 
instrument to prevent any recurrence of a tragedy similar to the KAL KE 007 
incident.’® In addition to the above actions by pilots’ associations, a large 
number of Western governments, including those of the United States, Canada 
and Japan also suspended Aeroflot landing rights in their states for a fortnight 
from September 15 to 28, although in some cases for a longer period up to 60 
days.’i
Meanwhile, the ICAO Council met at an extraordinaiy session to consider the 
KAL 007 incident at the request of the ROK and of Canada, between 15-16 
September 1983, and adopted a resolution, deploring ’’the destruction of an 
aiicraft in commercial international service resulting in the loss of 269 innocent
Tweedy, President of IFALPA, September 9, 1983, in Documents Concerning the Korean Air Lines Incident, International Legal Materials. 1983, PP. 1218- 1219
90 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives: Record of World Events, November 1983, PP. 32516-32517
91 Japanese Suspension of Flights between Japan and the Soviet Union and Resolution of the House of Representatives, statement by Mr. Masaharu Gotoda, 
Chief Cabinet Secretary, September 9, 1983 (Press release from the Embassy of Japan in Washington, D.C., dated September 14, 1983), in Ibid, International Legal Materials. 1983, PP. 1201-1204
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lives." It recognized that "such use of armed forced against international civil 
aviation is incompatible with the norms governing international behaviour and 
elementary considerations of humanity and with the rules, standards and I
recommended practices enshrined in the Chicago Convention and its Annexes i
and invokes generally recognized legal consequences." and reaffiimed "the 
principle that states, when intercepting civil aircraft, should not use weapons 
against them."’  ^The resolution, which was adopted by 26 votes in favour, with 
2 opposed (the USSR, and Czechoslovakia), and 3 abstentions (India, Algeria, 
and China), directed the ICAO Secretary-General to institute an investigation to 
determine the facts and technical aspects relating to KAL KE007 and its 
destruction and to provide an interim and complete report. In this resolution,
ICAO council also insti'ucted the Air Navigation Commission urgently to review 
the provisions of the Chicago Convention, its attachment A to Annex 2 and other 
related documents; to consider possible amendments to prevent a recurrence of 
such a tragic incident, while examining ways to improve the coordination of 
communication systems between military and civil ahcraft and air traffic control 
services, and to improve procediures in cases involving identification and 
interception of civil aircraft.’® The Council also agreed by consensus to include 
in its work programme and examine with the highest priority the question of an 
amendment to the Cliicago Convention involving an undertaking to abstain from 
recoui'se to the use of force against civil aircraft.’* This resolution was later 
endorsed by the ICAO Assembly on October 1, 1983 by votes of 65 in favour.
92 ICAO Document, 9416-C/1077, C-Min. Extraordinary, 1983
93 Ibid
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10 against, and 26 abstentions.’® On March 6, 1984, after consideration of the 
Secretary-Generals and the A ir Navigation’s reports, a resolution was adopted 
by ICAO Council, The resolution reaffirmed that, whatever the chcumstances 
which may have caused the KAL 007 to stray off its flight, the Soviet action 
violated international law. More important than apportioning blame, however, 
was the question of avoiding future incidents. This was to be accomplished 
through an amendment to the Chicago Convention. On May 10, 1984, the ICAO 
Assembly then adopted unanimously an amendment to the Convention on 
International C ivil Aviation with regard to the interception of c iv il aircraft. This 
amendment is intended to address the problem of the interception of civilian 
ahcraft and settle the problem of the use of force against c ivil ahcraft. In 
addition, the ICAO Council also decided to improve the coordination between 
military and civilian communications systems and ah' traffic control agencies. 
The main proposals for amendment of the Chicago Convention were presented 
by France and Austria, the United States, the USSR, Ecuador, the Latin 
American C ivil Aviation Commission (LACAC), and the Republic of Korea.’ * 
As a result, the Protocol relating to an amendment to the Convention on 
International C ivil Aviation (Article 3 bis), providing the general desire of 
contracting states to reaffirm the principle of non-use of weapons against civil 
aviation in flight, was produced. The new AiJicle 3 bis reads as follows:
(a) The contracting states recognize that every state must refrain from
resorting to the use of weapons against c iv il aircraft in flight and that, in case
95 ICAO, Document 9409, A24-EX, Report and Minutes, 1983
96 News from International Organizations, "ICAO, 25th Session 
(Extraordinary) of the ICAO Assembly", A ir Law. Vol. IX , No. 3, 1984, PP. 
188-189
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of interception, the lives of persons on hom'd and the safety of ahcraft must 
not be endangered.../^
The provision of Article 3 bis did not break new ground since it only 
formally reorganized a generally accepted principle in international law.’ * 
However, the amendment of the Convention on International C ivil Aviation, 
though merely reaffirming the existing principle of the prohibition of the use of 
weapons against civil aircraft in flight, constitutes an important step forward in 
preventing such a tragedy in the future.
V-2-1-6. Closing Remarks
The overall purpose of this section has been to demonstrate that the use of 
force against civilian aiicraft cannot be justified under any circumstances, even 
in the event of breaching another state’s sovereign ahspace. In particular, the 
Soviet downing of KAL 007, resulting in the needless killmg of 269 innocent 
civilians, exemplifies totally uncivilized behaviour in breach of international law 
and norms which the Soviet government previously, in the Chicago Convention 
and other agreements, had declared and promised to adhere to. In my analysis of 
possible reasons for this deviation, it has been shown that the Soviet justification 
for attacking KAL 007, on the grounds that it was on an intelligence gathering 
mission over stiategically sensitive ahspace, is totally groundless. In addition.
97 'Protocol relating to an amendment to the Convention on International C ivil 
Aviation, [Article 3 bis]’’, 1984, reprinted in International Legal Materials. Vol. 
23, 1984
98 Jean-Louis Magdelenant, ’The Use of Force against C ivil Ahcraft: The 
Aftermath of the KAL Flight 007 Incident, Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law, 1984, P. 305
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other possible explanations have been explored to provide an adequate picture 
of the events that lead to the destruction of the Korean airliner in 1983.
The main purposes for this are twofold. First, it is important to recognize that 
missile attack against civilian aircraft is not a recent experience for the 
international community. As such, valuable lessons should have been learned, 
and can still be drawn, from the KAL 007 and other incidents by decision­
makers in order to develop safety regulations and effective international legal 
instruments aimed at preventing any such future incidents. From an international 
legal standpoint, it is unfortunate that the Chicago Convention has failed to 
provide enforcement mechanisms in dealing with intrusions by civilian aircraft 
into sovereign airspace which result in a military attack. In the aftermath of the 
KAL 007-incident, ICAO recognized some of these problems and proposed a 
protocol of amendment to the Chicago Convention on May 10, 1984. Yet, by 
late April 1987, only 22 states had ratified the Convention which is short of the 
mandatory 36 states needed to make it binding for all 102 member states. 
Furthermore, the existing disputes over legal terminology within this Protocol 
along with other problems are unlikely to be resolved in the short term.”
In the lack of international determination vis-a-vis missile attack against 
civilian ahcraft, an American aircraft carrier USS Vincennes shot down an 
Iranian commercial airliner over the southern Persian Gulf on July 3, 1988 after 
mistaking it for an attacking F-14 fighter jet, which resulted in the deaths of 290 
passengers and crew members. Iran A ir Flight 655 was on a scheduled run 
between the Iranian coastal city of Bandar Abbas soutliwest across the Strait of
99 Craig A. Morgan, op.cit, P. 230; For further reading on the problems of the 
amendment of the Chicago Convention, Bin Cheng, "The Destruction of KAL 
Flight 007, and Article 3 Bis of the Chicago Convention", Reprinted from Air 
Worthy, Liber ■■Amicorum. Houring Professor Dr. I. H. Ph. Diederiks- 
Verschoor. Duventer: Kluwer, 1985
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Hormuz to Dubai in the United Arab Emhates when it was shot down/®® This 
disastrous incident invited immediate compaiison with the KAL 007 incident 
because Iran accused the United States of a deliberate attack. However, Admiral I
W illiam  Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was quick to dismiss 
parallels between the two incidents. The Iranian airliner, he pointed out, had 
flown into a war zone at its own risk unlike KAL 007 which had merely strayed 
into Soviet ahspace.i®i In defence of the U.S. action, he also emphasised that the 
incident had to be viewed against the growing hostilities in the Gulf and the E aqi 
missile attack against the USS Stark. In that incident, an Eaqi warplane fhed 
missiles at the Stark, killing 37 U.S. sailors. The Navy had blamed the ship's 
senior officers for taking inadequate defensive measures, and the captain and 
chief weapons officer were forced to resign. As a result of the attack, the U.S. I
Navy had changed its rules of engagement for the Persian Gulf. Wliereas 
officers previously had been told to hold theh fii^ e until an approaching ship or 
ahcraft performed an overtly hostile act. Navy warships and planes were now 
allowed to shoot at any craft that refused to heed warnings and approached in a 
tlireatening manner. The U.S. issued an official notice to aviators about the new 
procedures and the need for ahmen to identify themselves and state theh 
intentions when queried.i®  ^ Because of the new rule, and the effect the forced 
resignation of the captain and chief weapons officer of the Staik must inevitably 
have had on other U.S. Navy officers, the downing of a civilian jetliner over the 
congested ah and sea lanes in the southern gulf had been, in effect, an accident 
waiting to happen.
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Unlike the Soviet Union, the U.S. government quickly expressed its deep 
regret and offered to pay compensation to the families of victims.^ *® By then it f
had become cleai' that the Reagan administration did not have much of choice.
While the U.S. authorities originally claimed that the Iranian ahcraft was outside 
the commercial ah corridor over the Strait of Hormuz, it had to admit that the 
ahliner was flying well within its assigned corridor. In addition, w liile the U.S.
Navy claimed that the ahcraft was descending towards the USS Vincennes, 
other data confhmed that the ahcraft was cruising at a normal altitude.
Subsequently, the U.S. Defence Department, in its final report on the shooting 
down of the Iranian ahliner released on August 19, 1988, admitted that the 
Vincennes had made several mistakes.^ ®® This was confhmed by the ICAO's 
investigation. According to the ICAO report, the shooting down of the Iranian 
Ahbus was in laige part a result of poor planning by the U.S. Navy. In 
particulai', it cited the fact that American Waiships were incapable of monitoring 
the civilian ah-traffic-control radio frequencies that would have enabled the 
Vincennes to identify the approaching radar blip as a commercial ahliner.i®*
The shooting down of the banian ahliner once again provides a useful lesson 
in that international community must take all necessary measures to arrange for 
the effective coordination of civilian flight operations and m ilitaiy activities as 
well as better routing arrangements to prevent another disaster. At the same time, 
this effectively illustrates the urgency with which the international community
must devise multilateral political and economical sanctions against offending 
states along with effective legal instmments in order to prevent incidents of this 
sort from occurring in the future; and to provide the necessaiy enforcement 
mechanism in international law for just and swift compensation to governments 
and families of victims.
A second point worth mentioning stems from a different ai’ea of potential 
threat to civil aviation, although it is not properly connected to the KAL 007 
incident. Some of the shooting down incidents provoked terrorist attacks and 
they could be cited as justification for retaliation in kind. For example, after the 
shooting down of a Libyan ahliner by Israeli fighters in 1973, Libya reportedly 
provided Arab tenorists with Surface-to-Ah Missile(SAM) to shoot down an El 
A1 plane as an act of revenge. According to most aviation security specialists and 
counter-teiTorist experts, international terrorist groups and state-sponsors of 
terrorism are likely to use suiface-to-ah missiles in the near future against 
civilian ahlines. As the international community has learnt valuable lessons from 
teiTorist attacks on ahcraft over the past two decades, evolving from hijackings 
to sabotage bombings in-flights, coupled with subsequent security measures, the 
method of missile attack w ill become an attractive solution for tenorists. 
Furthermore, the vast aiins-lrade in areas of conflict aiound the world places 
new, sopliisticated weapomy within the attainable reach of tenorist groups, and 
to counter this adequate contingency plans must be drawn up on a multilateral 
basis. This subject w ill be discussed in the following section in detail.
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V-3-1. Technical Development in Weapon System
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In the last three decades, one of the most significant developments has taken 
place in major weapons systems and this technological development has created 
more opportunities for terrorists in terms of weapons and targets. The rapid 
absorption of new modern technologies by the international community and our 
growing dependence on them have created many high-value targets such as 
nuclear power stations and civil aircraft in flight. Similarly, developments in 
electronics, microelectronics, and the trend toward miniaturization and i{
simplification have resulted in a greater availability of smaller weapons with 
longer ranges and more accuracy that are also simpler to operate. One of the 
most dramatic developments in individual weaponry is man-portable precision- 
guided munitions(PGMs). Man portable PGMs are lightweight and easy to 
operate. They usually can be carried and operated by a single man. The U.S.- 
made Stinger, the British-made Blowpipe, and the Soviet-made SA-7 missiles 
are the representative examples of man-portable PGMs.. These are shoulder- 
fired, anti-aircraft missiles that have infra-red, heat-seeking sensors in the 
projectile that guide it to the heat of an aircraft engine. It is known that more than 
50 states possess the SA-7 missiles, and there is no doubt that all these states 
maintain strict security measures to prevent outflow of the weapons. However, 
some states, including Libya, have supplied PGMs to terrorist organizations. It 
is absolutely clear that in the hands of terrorists, man-portable missiles aie not 
likely to be used against tanks and fighter aircraft. Of Particular concern is the 
prospect of civilian airliners being shot at by portable hand-held surface-to-air 
missile (SAM) and anti-tank rockets as they land at or take off from airports.
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Dr Richard Clutterbuck, an international authority on terrorism, pointed out 
concisely the great threat of missile attacks in the following terms:
'Recent years have seen increasing use of expensive and sophisticated 
surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles (SSM and SAM) by terrorists, 
generally of Soviet or East European origin and redirected by Ai'ab 
governments, notably Colonel Gadafi's. Continuing development of these 
weapons for use by regular armies w ill ensure that new and more efficient 
versions w ill become available fo r terrorists."^®*
W ith increased airport security, the possibility of placing explosive devices on 
civil aircraft is becoming more difficult, but now the same destructive result can 
be achieved far more easily by using modern missiles or rockets.
V-3-2. Current Picture of Terrorist M issile Attack
The use of surface-to-aii* missiles and anti-tank rockets by terrorists is not 
new. On September 5, 1973, Italian police arrested five Arab terrorists armed 
with SAM-7 surface-to-aii' missiles. The ten'orists had rented an apartment on the 
flight path to Rome airport and were planning to shoot down an El A1 airliner 
aircraft coming in to land at Rome a irp o rt.T h is  affair was a considerable 
embarrassment to Egyption authorities, because the SAM-7s were traced back to
Donald J. Hanle, Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare. New York: 
Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1989, P. 185; Arie 1
Ofri, "Intelligence and Counterterrorism", ORRIS. Spring 1984, P. 49; Andrew 
J. Pierre, "The Politics of International Ten orism", ORRIS. Vol. 19, 1975-76, P.
1256; Frederick C. Dorey, Aviation Security. London: Granada, 1983, P. 142
108 Richard Clutterbuck, op.cit, P. 175
Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, Appendix R: The Chronology of 
Tenor: 1968-1987 in Wai' Without End: Tlie Terrorists: An Intelligence Dossier.
London: Sphere Rooks, 1987, P. 366
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a batch supplied to him by the Soviet Union. It is believed that what had 
happened could be attribute to pressure from the Libyan leader, Gadafi, who 
was then urging the unification of Egypt and Libya. The Egyption government 
decided to supply some of these new modem missiles so that the Libyan army 
could learn how to use them. However, the Soviet-made SAM-7s were directly 
re-routed to the terrorists.!^ ® The plot of the missile attack on El A1 derived from 
the appalling incident of Febmary 21, 1973, when a Libyan B-727 was shot 
down over the Sinai desert by an Israeli fighter, killing 108 innocent people 
aboard.!!! The Libyan people called for vengeance against Israel. Gadafi urged 
the other Arab states to send their warplanes against Israel’s major cities and to 
destroy Israeli airliners wherever they could be found.ü^
In addition, on January 5, 1974, two hundred and twenty soldiers and two 
hundred police sealed off five squai'e miles aiound Heathrow International 
airport in London after receiving reports that temorists had smuggled in SA-7 
anti-ahcraft missiles by using the diplomatic pouches of Ai'ab embassies, and 
planned to shoot down an El A1 a ir lin e r.A n d , on January 13, 1975, the 
attempt to shoot down an El A1 plane with a missile by Ai'ab ten'orists was 
believed to have brought civil aviation to the brink of disaster. Two terrorists 
drove their car onto the apron at Orly airport. They set a rocket launcher up and 
fired at an El A1 airliner which was about to take off for New York with 136
Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Cailos Complex: A Pattern of 
Violence, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977, P. 134
m  Keesing’s Contemporaiy Archives, March 5-11, 1973, P. 25757
Edwai'd F. Mickolus, Transnational Tenorism: A Chionology of Events. 
1968-1979, London: Aldwych Press, 1980, P. 428
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Clirislopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Carlos Complex, op.cit, P. 53 
115 Ibid
115 Data aie compiled from U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Aircraft 
Hijackings and Other Criminal Acts Against C ivil Aviation Statistical and 
Narrative Report: Updated to January 1, 1986; Edward F. Mickolus, 
Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events. 1969-1979, London: 
Aldwych Press, 1980; Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Carlos 
Complex: A Pattern of Violence. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977; Dennis 
Elsenberg and Eli Landau, Carlos: Terror International. London: Corgi Book, 
1976; Facts on File; Keesing's Contemporaiy Aixhives;David Leai'inount, "Is 
Nothing Safe?", Flight International. January 29-Februaiy 4, 1992, PP. 20-26
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"Jpassengers on board. The Israeli pilot took evasive action as the rocket crashed 4
into and through the fuselage of a Yugoslav DC9 waiting nearby to embark f
passengers for Zagreb. It failed to explode and a policeman and a steward were 
slightly injured.!!^ It is known that, once again, an El A1 airliner was chosen as a i
tai'get by Gadafi as one of his attempts to avenge the loss of the Libyan civil 
aii'liner shot down by the Israelis over the Sinai Desert on Februaiy 21, 1973.ü^
This form of aviation teiTorism is on the increase. The following Table V-1 
on the next page illustrates the development of this type of attack against 
aii'craft.!!*
I
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Table V-1
Missile Attacks against Aircraft
(1973-1991)
Year No. of Events Casualties
1973 1 0
1974 0 0
1975 2 3(1)
1976 1 0
1977 0 0
1978 1 48(K)
1979 1 59(K)
1980-1983 0 0
1984 1 0
1985 2 0
1986 1 60(K)
1987 7 141(K)
1988 2 6(K)
1989 2 5(K) /1(I)
1990 0 0
1991 3 71(K)
Total 24 390(K) /4(I)
* K=Killed / I=Injured
Since 1984, the SAM missile attacks have gradually increased. On September 
21, 1984, Afghan counter-revolutionaries fiixd  a suiface-to-ak missile and hit a 
DC-10 Ai'iana Airliner with 308 passengers. The explosion tore tlnough the 
aii'craft’s left engme and damaged its hydraulic system and wing containing the 
fuel tank. The Captain of tlie aiicraft, however, managed to land the aircraft 
safely at Kabul International A irp o rt.A n o th e r significant incident took place 
on April 4, 1985. A ten'orist of the Abu Nidal Organization fired two R.P.G.
U.S. Department of Transportation (F.A.A.), Worldwide Significant Acts 
Involving C ivil Aviation. 1984, P. 14
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rocket at an Alia airliner as it took off from Athens airport. Although the rocket 
did not explode, it left a hole in the fuselage.
It is not uncommon to find surface-to-aii* missiles in terrorist and insurgent 
arsenals. In addition, while fewer groups possess the sophisticated Soviet-made 
RPG-7 and RPG-7V anti-tank grenade launchers, the list of those who do 
includes most of the Palestinians who reportedly even have their own 
manufacturing facility, Iranian militias in Lebanon, German Red Army Faction, 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army(PIRA), and vaiious African and Central 
American insurgents. At least a dozen terrorist and insurgent groups are known 
to possess man-portable Surface-to-Air missile weaponry (discussed below), 
including various Cuban surrogates, Colombian drug dealers, the U.S.-backed 
contras' in Nicaragua, and a number of African, European, and Palestinian 
terrorist organizations."^
It is quite clear that the possibility of frequent use of missiles may be 
encouraged by the rapid proliferation of missile weapomy and the publicity 
gained by using such modern weapon systems."® The danger of airborne 
aircraft being attacked must be seriously considered a possibility for the future, 
though it may not remain the most probable one.
U.S. Depaiiment of Defence, Terrorist Group Profiles. Washington D.C.: 
U.S. GPO, 1989, P. 7
James Adams, Trading in Death: Weapons. Warfare and the Modern Arms 
Race. London: Hutchinson, 1990, PP. 60-61; Neil C, Livingstone, op.cit, P. 139; 
Paul Wilkinson, "Terrorism: International Dimensions", in W illiam Gutteridge 
(ed), The New Terrorism. Institue for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1986, 
PP.39-40
120 Arie Ofri, op.cit, P. 50
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V-3-3. Type of Missile Weaponry Available to International Terrorists
V-3-3-1. Blowpipe Surf ace-to-Air Missile
The British Blowpipe Surface-to-Air missile is a weapon designed for the 
defence of forward-deployed troops against close-range low-level air attack. To 
carry out this role effectively the weapon is compact, light, and simple so that it 
can be both canied and operated by a single man.!2i The Blowpipe missile is 
entirely self-contained with no external power requirements, and consists of two 
main components: the missile, sealed within its launching canister, and the 
aiming unit."^  The Blowpipe does not rely on passive infra-red guidance to find 
its target but rather is guided by an aimer who steers the missile to its taiget by 
means of a radio link. It can be brought into action very quickly, and reloading 
time is a few seconds. The Blowpipe SAM is 1390 millimetres long and weighs 
11.1 kilograms. Apart from the advantage of mobility, it can destroy an aircraft 
flying at an altitude of around 2010 meters over a range of 4025 meters.i^  ^The 
operator lifts the Blowpipe to his shoulder, acquiies the target visually with his 
monocular sight and then initiates the system. It is known that Afghan rebel
R. T. Retty, Jane's Weapon System. London: Macdonald and Jane's 
Publishers, 1977, P. 96
122 Ibid
123 Chi'istopher Chant, Ah' Defence Systems and Weapons: World AAA and SAM Systenis in the 1990. New York: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989, PP. 
30-31
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forces, Angolan rebel forces, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Nigeria, Oman,
124 Ibid, P. 31; Facts on File, September 25, 1987, P. 695; Facts on File, 
January 16, 1987, P. 20
125 Ian V. Hogg(ed), Jane’s Infantry Weapons: 1984-85. London: Jane's Publishing Co., 1984, P. 680
125 Cliristopher Chant, op.cit, PP. 31-34
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Qatar and the United Kingdom are employing the Blowpipe SAM.^ ^^
V-3-3-2, Javelin Surface-to-Air Missile
The British Javelin Surface-to-Air missile is an advanced version of Blowpipe 
designed to deal more effectively with battlefield targets such as combat 
helicopters, which can launch then anti-tank missiles at range up to 4,115 
meters."^  Targeting at greater range is aided by the employment of semi­
automatic command to line of sight guidance, requiring the operator merely to 
keep the target centred in his sight, rather than to guide the missile. The 
performance of Javelin is such that the manufacturer has opted to develop a 
series of lightweight multiple launchers(LMLs), of which there are two man- 
portable configurations viz man-portable with a seated operator; man-portable 
with a standing operator, to increase its operational flexibility. The man-portable 
model for a seated operator can be traversed 360° and, without missiles, weighs 
38 kilograms. The man-portable model for a standing operator can also be 
traversed 360° and without missiles weighs 30 kilograms. Both man-portable 
models are easily transportable in an average size car. The Javelin SAM can 
attack an aircraft flying at an altitude of around 1,980 meters over a range of 
5,485 meters.!26
V-3-3-3. SA-7 Grail Surface-to-Air Missile
Developed in the early 1960s, tlie Soviet SA-7 Grail SAM is known in Soviet 
service terminology as the Strela-2. It is known that it is a simple weapons, and 
was fii'st used in combat during the 1967 Six-Day Wai' and later duiing the 1973 
Arab-Israeli Wai%"7 The weapon is operated by a two-man team, one of whom 
carries the firing unit and a missile, and the other caivying a reload missile. It is 
tube-mounted and fhed from the shoulder. The heat-seeking missile was often 
effective against helicopters and low-flying aircraft despite counter-measures 
which included the use of decoy flares and deflected helicopter exhaust. 
During the Yom Kippur War, McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawk light attack 
aiicraft of the Israeli aii* force on several occasions returned to base with 
damaged jet pipes as the result of a hit by an SA-7.!z@ If the missile fails to find a 
tai'get within 15 seconds or range of about 6,500 meters, it self-destructs. It is 
reported that though an upper altitude limit of 1,500 meters is often given for the 
SA-7, there is a well documented instance of an Omani air force Hawker Hunter 
being hit by such a missile while flying at 3,505 meters. Overall length of the 
weapon is 1,500 inillimeties and the weight is in the region of 15 kilograms.!^ ® A 
useful, easily handled weapon against low-flying aircraft, it has been adopted by 
a number of Soviet backed guemlla groups and ten'orists organizations
2^7 Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Terrorists: Their Weapons.
Leaders and Tactics. New York: Facts on File, 1982, P. 116
128 Chi'istopher Chant, op.cit, P. 69
129 Ray Bonds(ed), The Soviet War Machine: An Encyclopedia of Russian 
MiUitar-y-Equipmeait and.Strategy. London: Salamander Books, 1976, P. 228 I
I130 Christopher Chant, op.cit, PP. 69-70; Philip Warner, Firepower: From 1
Slings to Stai' Wars. London: Grafton Books, 1988 |
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llîl'oughout the world. It is also known that more than 50 states all over the 
world including Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Afghanistan, Algeria, North Korea, 
and Cuba are employing the SA-7 missile,!^ ! It is a most wonisome fact that a 
large number of SA-7 are in the hands of terrorists and guerilla organizations.!"
V-3-3-4. SA-14 Gremlin Surface-to-Air Missile
The Soviet SA-14 Gremlin missile was introduced in the mid 1980s as a f
replacement for the elderly and limited SA-7 series surface-to-air-missiles.
Unlike most SAMs which have been designed to be fired from the shoulder, this 
system is an ideal weapon for terrorists. The SA-14 Gremlin is only 1,300 
millimeties long and weighs 9.9 kilograms, making it very easy to transport and 
conceal in a trunk. At the same time, it can destroy an aiicraft flying at an altitude 
of around 5,500 meters over a range of 6,000 meters.^ " If terrorists were to 
survey the flight paths of any international airport where aircraft aie flying 
within the range of this system, it would become apparent that an attack could be 
launched from a very large geographical area.
V-3-3-5. RPG-7 Surface-to-Surface Missile
The Soviet-made RPG-7 missile is standard anti-aimour weapon of soviet 
infantry. The RPG-7 is the missile most commonly used by terrorists as they
131 Christopher Chant, Ibid, P. 70
132 Andrew Cockburn, The - J!fat:e.at; Inside-Jhe^ S-oviei Military . .Macfam^,London: Hutchinson, 1983* PP. 132-133
133 Christopher Chant, op.cit, P. 79
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have been lavished Arab states, some of whom pass them on to Arab terrorists 
and also to European ten'orists. The weapon was introduced in 1962 and still 
remains an effective system. Tlie RPG-7 is able to penetrate 320 millimeties of 
armour, with its hollow charge projectile of 85 millimetres calibre weighing 2.25 
kilograms.It is also easy to transport because of its small size and light 
weight. The weapon is 953 millimetres long and not more than 10 kilograms 
including projectile."^  The RPG-7 is in sendee in China, Syria, North Korea and 
Eastern Europe, It is also in the hands of many terrorist organizations. It is 
known that the Palestinian tenorist Organization, Al-Fatah, has its own RPG 
factory.
V-3-3-6. Redeye Surface-to-Air Missile
The U.S. Redeye is a shoulder-fiied guided missile system degined to give 
troops an effective defence against low-flying aircraft. It was the world's first 
operational infantry-caiTied SAM, and development commenced the late 1950s 
in an effort to provide U.S. infantry units with a man-portable system. The 
Redeye SAM entered into service in 1966."* The missile is a very simple first 
generation system guided to its target by passive infra-red homing which limits 
its use to pursuit engagements, the missiles guidance system being capable of 
homing in on the heat from the exhaust emissions of aiicraft. To be effective the 
missile must be able to overtake a retreating aircraft witliin a range of about 3-4
134 R X. Pretty, op.cit, P. 446
135 Ray Bonds (ed), op.cit, P. 193
136 R. T. Pretty, op.cit, P. 97
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kilometres which restricts its use to comparatively low speed targets. The 
Redeye is only 1219 millimetres long and the complete missile and its launcher 
weighs 13 kilograms.!"
V-3-3-7, Stinger Surface to-Air Missile
The U.S. Stinger Suiiace-to-Air missile appeared in the early 1980s as a f
substitute for the General Dynamics FIM-43 Redeye Surface-to-Aii' missile. It is 
a shoulder-fired guided missile system designed to give a soldier an effective I
defence against low-flying aircraft. Advanced propellants were used to ensure î
Stinger performance levels would be appreciably higher than those of the J
Redeye despite the Stinger’s greater weight. One of the most important 
improvements incorporated into the Stinger missile is the greater resistance to 
electronic and other countermeasures."* The operator acquires his tai'get 
visually in the system’s open sight, initiates the missile functions, identifies the 
target with the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) subsystem and, launches the
missile."!) xbe basic shoulder-launched Stinger provides the U.S.A. and its allies IIwith a capable man-portable SAM system. At the same time, it is reported that j
the system has been used by terrorists. The Stinger SAM is 1,520 millimetres 
long and weighs 13.6 kilograms including launcher, making it transportable in a 
small cai'. It is also possible to destroy an aiicraft flying at an altitude of ai ound 
4,800 metres over a range 5,030 metres,!^ ®
137 Chi'istopher Chant, op.cit, PP. 105-106
138 Richai'd Clutterbuck, op.cit, P. 41
139 Ibid, P. 46
1"^ 9 CMstopher Chant, op.cit, PP. 128-133
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V-3-4. Arms Transfer of Missile Weaponry
Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union had been the world's 
largest exporter of arms to Third World states. In fact, arms transfers have been 
a crucial part of Soviet relations with the Third World. Although the Soviet 
Union had tried to establish close ties with the Third World through a variety of 
nonmilitary means including economic assistance, trade and political 
cooperation, it has been unable to sustain its economic aid. Consequently, arms 
transfers became the primary instrument that enabled the Soviet Union to 
compete with Western democratic states and the People’s Republic of China for 
influence in the Third World.^ ^^  At the same time, Soviet arms transfers were 
designed to support guerrilla organizations and terrorist groups fighting pro- 
Western regimes. Although the Soviet Union sometimes provided arms directly 
to subnational groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the African 
National Congress and the Southwest Africa People’s Organization, the usual 
procedure was to provide weapons to terrorists through thiid parties such as 
Libya, Syria, North Korea and Cuba.i*^  The use of intermediaries enabled the 
Soviet authorities to deny that the Soviet Union supported terrorism. On 
October 30, 1987, French authorities seized a ship in French waters off the port 
of Roscoff with 150 tons of arms and ammunition aboard. The huge arms cache
Alan Platt, Aims Transfers to the Middle East: European and Other Suppliers. RAND Corporation, N728686, PP. 1-3; Maik N. Kramer, "Soviet 
Aims Transfer to the Third World", Problems of Communism. September- October 1987, PP. 52-59
142 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1986. March 1986, PP. 
128-129; Pedro Ramet, "The Soviet-Syrian Relationship", Problems of Communism. September-October 1986, P. 36; Facts on File. September 30, 
1988
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aboard the boat included 20 SA-7 missiles and 120 RPG-7 portable rocket 
launchers almost all of which had been provided by the Soviet Union to 
Libya.The weapons, at least some of which were apparently bound for the 
PIRA, were claimed by British and French officials to have been supplied by 
Libya.!** F is clear that the SAM missiles are made available to terrorists by ^
some governments sponsoring terrorism, including North Korea, Cuba, and I
particularly Libya. In fact, the SAM missiles found in September 1972 at Rome |
were supplied to the PFLP by Libya, where massive stocks of modem Russian 
weapons were stored.!*!»
Many international terrorist organizations have also obtained possession of 
modern Western-made SAM missiles through various channels. It is known that f
the United States have supplied Redeye and Stinger SAM missiles to rebel is
movements in Afghanistan and Angola as well as to the Contras in Nicaragua to 
counter Soviet-sponsored subversion.!** The Nicaraguan government I
announced, on July 22, 1987, the capture of a Redeye missile that had been 
pai achuted into Chontales province on July 19, 1987. Defense Minister Ortega, 
criticized the United States for introducing a new missile system into Central 
America, and said that five U.S.-run air drops into Nicaragua had been
intercepted to date in 1987T" The United States was believed to have delivered 
as many as 750 of the shoulder-fiied missiles to Afghan rebels since late 1986."* 
The SAM missiles which were provided to the above-mentioned groups 
appeared on the arms black market and fell into the hands of terrorists.
On May 1, 1987, the Washington Post reported that U.S. lawmakers were 
seeking a congressional audit into how the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
had controlled its deliveries of sophisticated SAM missiles to rebel movements 
in Angola and Afgahnistan. The move, in fact, followed a report that some 
Stinger missiles had been seized from a group of arms-trafficking bandits 
arrested in Zambia, who had obtained the missiles from Jonas Savimbi’s 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola(UNITA) by way of 
Zaire."* Senator Dennis DeConcini released declassified sections of a General 
Accounting Office report on CIA and Defence Department efforts to prevent 
Stinger from falling into the hands of terrorists. Although the report said 
safeguai'ds had been improved recently, it only covered the sale of missiles to 
the U.S. allies and did not deal with those provided covertly to Afghan and 
Angolan insurgents.!^ » With the lack of safeguards on the supply of Stinger 
missiles, it is obvious that some of the missiles might end up on the black 
market, where they could be purchased by terrorists seeking to shoot down civil 
aiicraft. It was also reported that an Afghan resistance group allegedly sold 16 
of a batch of 32 missiles to Iran for $1 million."! On October 9, 1987, U.S.
147 Facts on File, September 11, P. 666
148 Facts on File, September 25, 1987, P. 695
149 Facts on File, May 15, 1987, PP. 344-345
150 Ibid
151 The Sunday Times, September 20, 1987
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Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger made a passing reference to the possible 
presence of Stinger missiles in Iranian hands, and the Pentagon confirmed that 
"equipment recovered aboard the small Iranian craft which we struck is believed 
to be associated with the Stinger system."!" With recognition of the very real 
possibility that the SAMs could fall into the hands of anti-American terrorist 
organizations, some of which had ties to the Afghan resistance, the U.S. 
administration, on Maixh 11, 1989, announced that the U.S. was planning to buy 
back hundreds of sophisticated Stinger surface-to-air missiles that had been 
supplied to the Afghan rebels in recent yeai's.!" However, as no one knows 
where the missiles are or indeed how many of them are missing, it is unlikely 
that this plan will be successful.
In addition to U.S.-made Stinger missiles, there is no doubt that British-made 
Blowpipe missiles are also in the hands of guerrilla and tenorist organizations.
Although Claire Sterling claims that the PIRA has possessed sophisticated 
weapons such as RPG-7 rocket since the early 1970s,"* the great tlireat of using 
SAM missiles caught on in the late 1980s, After the attempted Blowpipe 
smuggling incident mentioned above, on October 30, 1987, a British newspaper 
predicted that the PIRA was about to attack civil aviation with SAM missiles.!^ *
Neai'ly two weeks later the same newspaper reported that the PIRA was j
152 F^ cts on File, October 16, 1987, P. 751
153 Facts on File, April 21, 1989, P. 277
154 ciaiie Sterling, The. Terror Network; The Secret. W ar..,of InternationalTerrori;^ m. London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981, P. 152
155 Tbe Daily Star, December 30,1987
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planning to smuggle SAMs into England for theii* operation."* Early in 1988, 
British officials, finally, revealed that the PIRA were believed to have obtained 
such a modem weapon system.!^ ''^  A serious incident for the British government 
occuiTed on April 21, 1989, when five men including tlnxe Ulster loyalists, a 
South African diplomat, and a U.S. citizen and reputed arms dealer based in 
Geneva, were arrested in Paiis for plotting an illegal arms deal with a Protestant 
paiamilitary group in Northern Ireland. The deal allegedly involved a swap in 
which the Protestant extremists would turn over parts of a British-made 
Blowpipe shoulder-fiied surface-to-air missile in exchange for South African 
money and armsJ" The thiee loyalists were chaiged with arms trafficking and 
conspiracy for the purpose of terrorism. All three belonged to the Ulster Defense 
Association (UDA) and were also said to be members of the Ulster Resistance 
Organization (URO), an extremist splinter group that favoured violence against 
Roman Catholics to preserve Protestant power in Northern Ireland and its union 
with Great B r ita in . ! "  ij^  addition, it was confirmed that the British-made 
Blowpipe missiles were also in the hands of Afghan guemlla groups. On 
January 15, 1987, the Afghan Defence Ministry showed Western reporters a 
shoulder-fired Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles which had been captured from 
the rebels.!*®
5^6 The Daily Star, January 11, 1988
5^7 Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, op.cit, P. 463
158 Facts on File, May 12, 1989, P. 332
159 Ibid
160 Facts on File, January 16, 1987, P. 20
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On the whole the suppHers and producers of aims aie controlled by 
government if not actually government-owned. For this purpose, many states 
introduced the end-user certificate as a means of ensuring that weapons went 
where they were intended. This mechanism, however, has been found to be 
inadequate since it can be easily be ciixumvented by the states which do not use 
such a system. In this situation, there is no real guarantee that the purchasing 
states will use imported arms for the ends declaied in the contract or in the 
certificate. Although most arms contracts stipulate that any transfer of weapons 
to a third party will be subject to the approval of the supplying government, in 
reality this does not occur. There can be no doubt that the Libyan government is 
the chief offender in this paiiicular area. The Libyans have received large supply 
of arms from Soviet bloc states and a great deal of this hardware has found its 
way into the hand of teiTorist organizations."!
It is now clear that Soviet manufactured SAM missile weapomy is no longer 
the main commodity of the illicit aims dealer. It is known that British-made 
Blowpipe, Javelin, and U.S.-made Stinger surface-to-aii' missiles have all been 
offered for sale illegally over the last couple of years by international arms 
d e a le r s . ! * ^  On May 5 ,  1 9 9 0 ,  the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
foiled an attempt by agents of Colombian drug cartels to buy 1 2 0  Stinger 
missiles in Florida and smuggle them to Colombia. The Colombians were said to 
have been willing to pay $ 5  million for the missiles, which sold for $ 1 4 , 0 0 0  
each on the government weapons mai'ket. It was reported that drug caiJel leaders 
had planned to use the Stinger missiles to attack the aircraft of the Colombian
5^1 William Boyes, "The International Aims Trade and the Terrorists", 
■Contemp.Qmy-A£faks. Briefing. Vol. 1, No. 7, 1981, PP. 2-3
^52 Alan Malcher, "Missile available illegally", Flight International. May 20, 
1989, P. 16
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President.!*^  According to Alan Malcher, all the aims dealers have been 
inundated with requests for the Stinger missile which demonstrated its 
superiority in Afghanistan and many purchasers were willing to pay up to 11 
times the manufacturer's price. The arms dealers who were unable to obtain the 
Stinger missiles had offered several alternatives including Blowpipe, Javelin, 
and SA-7 missiles."* Malcher also revealed that without exception, all of the 
aims dealers offered an end-user certificate for an additional 2% of the total 
price of the aims, and delivery to a port of the user’s choice. The dealers were 
not concerned who they sold arms to."!» It was reported that although many 
Aiab states had been able to obtain Soviet arms, they now intended to obtain 
Western-made one because they were no longer willing to accept Soviet 
influence within the Middle East."* It is now clear that Palestinian tenorist 
organizations, which have used missiles to try to shoot down civilian airliners, 
obtained some of the SAM missiles tln ough the arms black market. As long as 
adequate finance is available, anyone can purchase sopliisticated missile 
weaponry.
153 Facts on File, July 20, 1990, P. 542
154 Alan Malcher, "Author Goes on ’’Shopping Spree ” in Illicit Arms Market ”, 
Aimed Forces Journal International. August 1989, P. 40
155 Alan Malcher, ’’Sophisticated Weapons and their Availability’’, The Police Journal. October 1989, P. 338
155 Ibid
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157 Sun Tzu, The Ail of War. Translated and an Introduction by Samuel B. 
Griffith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963, P. 84
158 The Daily Telegraph, October 16, 1984; The Times, December 12, 1984
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V-3-5. Preventive and Counter Measures against Missile Attack
V-3-5-1. Intelligence Gathering
In his classic "Bean Fat" (Art of War) written more than a thousand yeai s 
ago Sun Tzu said that "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles 
you will never be in peril."")" This maxim stresses the importance of intelhgence 
gathering. In other words, good intelligence remains the first line of defense 
against terrorism. It is true that modern technologies clearly aid terrorists in 
terms of weapons and targets. However technology can also be used against the #
terrorists. With the help of computers. Western governments can keep track of ^
terrorist organizations and their movements. At the same time, electronic 
collection methods and signals intelligence give a great possibility to eavesdrop 
on and intercept terrorist communications, and therefore to better predict 
ten'orists' operations. A good example of intelligence gathering by the use of 
high technology aerial reconnaissance occurred in September 1984, when the 4
PIRA spent an estimated £1.5 million in the United States on a massive shipment 
of seven tons of arms. With the help of an informer about a forthcoming 
shipment of weapons, including rockets, to the PIRA from the United States, the i
FBI informed British intelligence, which in turn contacted the Irish, and the ship 
canying arms was tracked by an U.S. satellite 300 kilometres above the earth.
The satellite photographed the transfer of the arms to a trawler. Finally, two Irish 
navy vessels intercepted the trawler and British security forces arrested the 
crew."* This incident shows that intelligence gathering with the help of high 
technology can cut off the transfer of missile and other weaponry to terrorists.
V-3-5-2. The Perimeter Guard
For a successful missile attack against aircraft, the filing position has to be 
located within range of the flightpath. The missiles guidance system is such that 
the weapon has to be fired within a few degrees of flightpath if the infra-red 
guidance is to acquire the tai'get. Accordingly, a possible preventive measure 
would be to prevent the teiTorists from getting into a firing position with their 
missiles. It is a very difficult task to sterilise up to 6 kilometres covering the 
paths of aircraft as they land and take-off. This measure, in fact, is impossible 
and at best impracticable."* However, security patrolling of the outer areas of 
airports in times of stringent security conditions might prevent such tenorist 
attacks. Even in times when no specific thieat warning has been received it is 
within the capacity of most states to monitor those strips of land from which a 
SAM could be launched and thus minimise the risk. At the same time, these 
security operations would deter terrorists from spending vital resources on 
buying SAM's given the limited possibilities for their use.
V-3-5-3. Installation Anti-Missile System
Tlie main possible counter-measure against missile attacks is to install a 
sophisticated anti-missile system similar to that employed on military aircraft to 
divert surface-to-air missiles. Immediately after the discovery of 20 SAM-7 
missiles in the coaster Eksund, intercepted by the French authorities off the coast 
of Brittany in November 1987 when bound for the IRA, all British army
169 Frederick C. Dorey, Aviation Security. London: Granada, 1983, P. 142
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V-3-6. Closing Remarks
So far, the Western states has been very fortunate in preventing terrorist 
missile attacks against civil aviation. The effect of missile attacks on civil 
aviation have been limited. Security forces, with the help of good intelligence,
The Daily Telegraph, Januaiy 7, 1988
Aryeh Lewis and Meir Kaplan(ed), Teiror in the Skies: Aviation Security. Jerusalem, Israel: ISAS, 1990, P. 226; William Alva Crenshaw, Terrorism and 
the Threat to the Civil Aviation. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maimi, 1987, P. 126
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helicopters flying in Northern Ireland were fitted with electronic and other 
decoy systems to confuse the SAM’s heat-seeking guidance system. These 
included the U.S. made Saunders AN/ALG 144. The system, wliich linked to the 
Tracor AN/ALE 40 chaff dispenser, works by jamming the missiles’ homing 
radar, and sending infrared flares and chaff to act as a decoy for the heat seeking 
device.!^ ® The system is in use with both the American and the Israeli armies, 
which have been well-pleased with its performance. Until the British realised 
that the IRA might have the SAMs, the Ministry of Defence hesitated to install 
such a system because of the high cost, and the decision to do so shows the 
seriousness of the threat. The response of El A1 airliners to the threat of such 4
4attack includes the installation of electronic counter-measure equipment similar 4
to that employed on military aircraft to divert surface-to-aii* missiles.!^ )
However, the problem is that these counter-measures at this stage are not a 
100% effective although they could minimise this type of threat. Hence, there is 
a need to press ahead with the development of counter-measure systems which 
are completely able to prevent this type of attack against civil aviation.
have been successful in tracking down and capturing these missiles before they 
could be used. However, it is not unlikely that there will be attempts at using 
suiface-to-aii' missile to attack civil aviation in neai* futuie. As some taigets 
become more difficult for terrorists to attack, it is not difficult to anticipate that 
the ten orist will employ counter-measures to try to overcome enhanced security 
systems as well as a redirecting their efforts towards less secure targets. It can be 
said that the 1960s and the 1970s were the age of aiicraft hijackings, and the 
1980s was the age of sabotage bomb attacks in civil aviation history. What next?
V 4. Conclusion
This Chapter has discussed the potential threats against civil aviation existing 
now and in the future. It cleaiiy shows that terrorists attacks are not the only 
thieat to the safety of air transportation. The shooting down by the Soviet 
military of a KAL 007 which violated the former Soviet airspace by mistake in 
1983 was one of the classical examples. In a sense, the shooting down of 
straying civilian aircraft may fall in the same category as terrorist attacks. The 
great fear is that such attacks can result in tenorist counter attacks. For example, 
approximately 5 months after the shooting down of an Iranian passenger aircraft 
by U.S. naval forces in 1988, a Middle Eastern terrorist group claimed 
responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am 103. It was reported that the attack 
was ordered and financed by Iran to avenge the U.S. shooting down of a Iranian 
aiicraft. Although this claim was dismissed, Iranian connection with the attack 
cannot be ruled out. This Chapter also reveals that there is a great potential threat 
of missile attacks by terrorist organisations. With increased aviation security, the 
possibility of aircraft hijacking and the placing of explosive devices aboard
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aircraft by terrorists is becoming more and more difficult. Consequently, it is not 
difficult to imagine that ten'orists will select other softer taigets to acliieve theii' 
aims. Although not many experts have focused on the possibility of missile 
attack, this form of attack must be seriously considered and the international 
community must take preventive measures. In order to ultimately achieve the 
immunity of air transportation to tenorist attack, governments and the civil 
aviation industry must employ every available method of political statecraft.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION
"... bombs and hijackers still get on civil aircraft with alarming frequency... 
What's the point finding out what's going to happen, how it's going to happen, where it's going to happen, why and when, if those in security at the 
sharp end aren’t smart enough to catch them? To be honest, we're wasting our time, while others waste lives. It’s very disheartening. The public needs to be made aware. There has to be a public outcry, internationally. Only then 
will something be done. Only if the public stop flying in protest will the 
airline industry not only listen, but act and put its house in order: really act. 
Money has to be invested. Not millions, but billions. But it will never happen... We'll totter from one disaster to another. Always the fire brigade 
response; chasing fires instead of preventing them from starting."!
"The battle to protect civil aviation passengers and crew can only be won 
if the liberal democracies have the will and courage to win the broader struggle against the scourge of international terrorism. Our freedom of airways is ultimately dependent on our ability to preserve the freedom of 
society as a whole.
***
VI" 1. Contemporary Perspectives on Acts of Violence Against Civil 
Aviation
VI-1-1, The Changing Nature of Threat
With the vast technological advancement in the field of aviation safety, a 
remarkable degree of safety and regularity has been achieved. However, during 
the past three decades, a new type of threat to civil aviation safety has appeared.
1 Michael Prince, Crash Course: The World of Air Safety. London: Grafton Books, 1990, P. 40
2 Paul Wilkinson, "The Lessons of Lockerbie: A Special Report on Aviation 
Security to mark the first anniversary of the air disaster ", Conflict Studies. No. 226, December 1989, P. 29
i l
Civilian aircraft have been hijacked and bombed in flight. Airline facilities 1
including airline offices, terminals, and passengers have suffered from 3
indiscriminate armed attacks.
The problem of acts of violence against civil aviation only appeared on to the 
international agenda in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the emergence of 
aircraft hijacking on a large scale as a global phenomenon. The international 
community has introduced several measures in an effort to prevent such attacks.
The governments, which regard themselves to be particularly at high risk from 
such acts, have developed their own security measures and policies to cope with 
the problems. Meanwhile, ICAO have also made invaluable efforts to deal with 
acts of violence against civil aviation. The ICAO's principal achievements are 
the preparation, adoption and worldwide acceptance of international 
conventions dealing with problems of air violence; the Tokyo Convention of 
1963, the Hague Convention of 1970, and the Montreal Convention of 1971.
However, the responses of the international communities in the early stage were 
not far-sighted. Nearly all of the national and international efforts were focused 
mainly on the problem of aircraft hijacking. Other acts of violence against civil 
aviation such as sabotage bomb attack in flight were not seriously considered as 
future threats. In fact, the nature of the threat to civil aviation changed from one 
of aircraft hijacking to one of sophisticated sabotage bomb attack in the early 
1980s. Although dramatic aircraft hijackings by politically motivated terrorists 
still occui', such as that of TWA 847 in June 1985, the improved security 
procedures and counter-measures against aircraft hijacking have caused aviation 
terrorists to change their tactics.
The emergence of the sophisticated bomb attack against civil aviation was an 
alarming new development. Such a level of sophistication had never been used |
against civil aviation before. Although the threat of sabotage bomb attack was |
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clearly evident by the mid 1980s, there were no signs of efforts by the 
international community to counter it. In response to the alarming trend toward 
the total destruction of aircraft in flight, such as the Lockerbie disaster of 
December 1988, the international community started to initiate its efforts in 
various ways. One welcome step to tackle sabotage bomb attack was taken 
when ICAO adopted the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for 
the Purpose of Detection at Montreal on March 1,1991.^  This convention should 
have a beneficial effect in the long term. However, international responses, in 
recent year’s, demonstrated that the international community, once again, reacted 
to the terrorist threat rather than anticipating it. It is depressing to note that there 
are thousands of tons of unmarked plastic explosives including Semtex in the 
hands of terrorist organizations.
With increased airport security, the possibility of placing an explosive device 
on an aircraft is becoming more and more difficult. Consequently, it is not 
difficult to anticipate that terrorists are likely to select alternative soft targets to 
achieve their aim. It can be said that the 1960s and the 1970s were the age of 
aircraft hijacking, and the 1980s was the age of sabotage bomb attacks in civil 
aviation history. What comes next? There is little doubt that the potential threat 
to civil aviation at present and in the near future is missile attack. It should be 
remembered that missile attack by terrorists is not a new phenomenon. As 
discussed in Chapter V, there have been more than 20 such attacks since the 
early 1970s. Although not many experts focused on the possibility of missile 
attack against civil aviation in the future, this form of attack must be seriously 
considered and the international community has to take preventive and counter­
measures. At the same time, through the analysis in this thesis, it has been
 ^ ICAO, "Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection", ICAO Doc. 9571
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demonstrated that missile attack by teiTorist groups is not the only threat to civil 
aviation. The shooting down of a KAL 007 by the Soviet military in 1983 and an 
Iranian aeroplane by U.S. naval forces in 1988 heralded yet another tlneat for 
the future. In addition, the international community should pay attention to 
Qantas airliner affaii* in July 14, 1992. A US navy wai'ship, the USS Cowpens, 
the same class of Aegis missile cruiser as the USS Vincennes which shot down 
an Iranian aiiliner in 1988, thieatened to shoot down an Australian airliner with 
more than 300 passengers over the Pacific.^  According to the Qantas 
spokesman, the pilot was given the waining message "You are being taigeted. 
Leave the area or you will be fired upon."^  After a radio call from the Qantas 
pilot, the FAA resolved the crisis by putting the Qantas flight on a course 
bypassing the Cowpens which was participating in a military exercise. It was 
confirmed that the Qantas aircraft was following its predetermined flight path 
and no fault on the part of the pilot or air traffic controllers was apparent. The 
US authorities apologised to Australia by saying that the US navy had 
mistakenly used an international distress frequency, instead of a designated 
exercise frequency, in trying to contact planes taking part in the exercise and the 
Qantas flight was in no danger.^  This incident clearly shows that the potential 
tlireat of shooting down of civilian aircraft still exists and poses a great danger to 
the safety of civil aviation. The international community should learn a 
invaluable lesson from this affair and take measures to ensure the incident will 
not happen again.
^ The Guai'dian, July 15, 1992 
5 The Independent, July 15, 1992 
 ^ The Scotsman, July 15, 1992
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VI-1-2. Regional Aspects
Although, statistically, acts of violence directed at the civil aviation industry 
represent a small percentage of total terrorist incidents, it is clear that acts of 
violence against civil aviation are not limited by geographical or political 
boundaries. Aviation teiTorism has spread throughout the world, becoming a 
global epidemic. In 1975, acts of violence involving civil aviation occuned in 
only 29 countries, but in 1982 such attacks occuiTed in 48 countries.^  It is 
surprising to note that 117 countries have been involved in such attacks. This I
statistic shows that although aviation terrorism afflicts some states more than 4
others, the problem is not confined to certain states. When the geographical |
distribution of the terrorist attacks over time is examined, regional trends suggest |
a gradual change of terrorist target. At the eai ly stage, most attacks occurred in 
the Western Hemisphere and Middle East. In recent years, however, attacks 
against the civil aviation in the Third World states, especially in Asia and Latin 
America where political violence is most frequently manifest, gradually 
increased. Between 1985 and 1990, there were 4 aircraft hijackings in Western 
Europe and 5 in North America. On the contrary, there were 13 aircraft 
hijackings each in Asia and Latin America. This trend reflects the success of 
aviation security measures in the West. With increased attention to airport and 
aviation security and the implementation of anti-terrorism measures by the 
Western states, terrorists have directed their efforts toward soft targets in Third 
World where there is no proper aviation security. The international community 
should leain the valuable lesson from this: that where there is no effective global 
aviation security, there are aviation terrorists. In this respect, states which newly
 ^ U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, Worldwide Criminal Acts 
Involving Civil Aviation: 1975: U.S. Depailment of Transportation, FAA, 
Worldwide Significant Criminal Acys Involving Civil Aviation: 1982
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acquire aviation terrorist target status should learn from the success achieved by 
the United States and Israel in designing an effective aviation security system. In 
spite of the negative reactions from both the aviation industry and the American 
public, the programme of anti-hijack measures adopted by the U.S. government 
in 1972 has produced a remarkable result. The number of aircraft hijackings 
originating in the U.S. shows the value of the new programme. In 1973, the year 
after its introduction, the total of U.S. aircraft hijackings dramatically dropped 
from 26 to 2. The FAA estimated that 118 aircraft hijackings and related attacks 
may have been prevented between 1973 and 1988. At the same time, the 
comprehensive security measures which Israel has applied to its national airline 
have made El A1 safe from hijacking since the early 1970s, Although the 
adoption of the entire package of El Al*s security measures is impossible, there 
is no doubt that the international community can benefit from close examination 
of the Israeli aviation security system. If there is will, nothing is impossible.
Another significant fact about acts of violence has been its political nature. 
The first aircraft hijacking in civil aviation history was committed by politically 
motivated terrorists in the midst of a Peruvian domestic power struggle. Most 
attacks in Eastern Europe after the Cold War were also characterized by their 
political nature. In addition, long standing terrorist movements in the Middle 
East are motivated by political causes. For example, the advent of attacks by 
Palestinians is closely related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Palestinian terrorist 
organizations are motivated by nationalism and their grievance is rooted in 
history, arising from the settlement of those whom they regard as aliens in their 
country. It must be noted that many terrorist attacks on civil aviation stem from 
the various unresolved national and international political uncertainties. It 
becomes evident that "International terrorism against civil aviation is far more
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linked to political aspirations than people suspect".* As political unrest continues 
around the world, it can be expected that the multi-operations of the civil 
aviation industry will bear the brunt of terrorist violence as the perpetrators 
regard them as a attractive targets for their causes. This means that without 
political negotiation which leads to compromise solutions, the fundamental 
causes of such attacks cannot be removed.
VI-2. Considerations for the Future
VI-2-1. Far-Sighted Aviation Security
Trends and cycles have been revealed by examining the many faces of 
aviation terrorism. The deterrent or diversionary effect of tight security 
programmes have been reflected in a perceptible shift of terrorist attention to 
easy targets and to other forms of attack. As security measures have been 
tightened by major civil aviation states, terrorists have turned their attention to 
the Third World states. Furthermore, as aircraft hijacking has become more 
difficult, they have adopted a new tactic such as sabotage bombing and missile 
attacks. However, governments and the civil aviation industry have failed to 
keep ahead of advancing threats. Both Western governments and the civil 
aviation industry upgraded their security capabilities to tackle only the known 
methods of terrorist attacks. They did not adopt new security measures until the 
inadequacies of outdated systems were revealed by a successful terrorist 
operation. As Professor Paul Wilkinson observed, "The most important general
S Peter St. John, Aicfiracy. _Ahj)W Security,. md latemalional Terrorism; Winning the War Against Hijackers. Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1991, P. 189
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lesson we must all leam from the recent history of aviation is never again to 
allow the terrorists to get so far ahead of the world’s airport security system”,’ it 
is now necessary to look ahead. Instead of reacting to terrorist attacks, "The 
emphasis of states must change so as to anticipate, preempt, and preclude 
them”.i® It should be remembered that teiTorists are ever vigilant for any 
opportunity to perpetrate a successful operation. Unless we close every single 
loophole to teiTorists, acts of violence against air transportation will never cease. 
To achieve this object, all parties involved in civil aviation, therefore, have to be 
far-sighted, patient planners to keep pace with the changing threats. It cannot be 
overemphasized that Prevention is better than cure.
VI-2-2, The Need for the Positive Approach by Governments
One of the major obstacles in achieving effective aviation security is that, 
"Governments are capricious and inconsistent in their approach to this matter".^ * 
This governmental attitude was lamented by Professor Paul Wilkinson:
"Yet perhaps the biggest obstacle of all to a strategy of international aviation 
security enhancement is the short-term thinking and sheer complacency of many of the politicians and bureaucrats in positions of responsibility in this field. Bureaucrats and officials tend always to be reluctant to admit any 
major shortcomings in their security systems in case such criticism threatens 
their own position. If a crisis or failure does occur they will point to the plethora of other agencies involved and blame someone else. Politicians will
 ^ Paul Wilkinson, "Putting Lives First?: the problems of creating an effective 
international regime for aviation security”, Inaugural Lecture, October 22, 1991, University of St. Andrews, P. 14
10 Peter St. John, op.cit, P. 171
11 Ibid, P. 182
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be reluctant to override the advice of their own officials and the views of powerful interests in the aviation in d u s t r y ,
Furthermore, once the public outrage surrounding a particular incident involving 
terrorist attacks against civil aviation subsides, governments have always drifted 
into their traditional indolent approach to the matter. Governments hardly ever 
implement innovative measures that prevent future attacks. When there is a 
public outcry following an attack, the implementation of security measures 
usually takes place. However, some governments, having been spared from 
terrorist attack, have a tendency to regard the upgrading of security as 
unnecessary simply because they do not perceive the problem in perspective 
and play down its potential as strategic threat.^ ’ Worst of all, some governments 
have denied their responsibility to respond to terrorist attacks, even when their 
own national airlines and citizens are directly targeted. This misconception of 
aviation security has been an obstruction to effective global aviation security and 
terrorists have been quick to exploit the resulting hiatus. It is depressing to note 
that lack of political will has failed to set civil aviation security on the 
international agenda. In fact, this reality has caused the effects of aviation 
terrorism to extend to political systems. It should be recognised that 
governments have a duty to protect their airlines which are regarded as a 
national symbol. Within the international context, airlines and aviation facilities 
have become symbolic targets of their respective states. Terrorist acts of 
violence against civil aviation are not intrinsically attacks on aircraft or attempts 
to disrupt air transport system per se. The objective of terrorist attacks is to
Paul Wilkinson, "Lessons of Lockerbie", op.cit, PP. 11-12
Christopher Hill, "The political dilemmas for Western governments", in 
Lawrence Freedman et al(ed). Terrorism and , International Order, London; Routledge & Regan Paul Ltd, 1986, PP. 77-100
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Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State. London: Macmillan, 1986, P. 300
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destabilize governments, with civil aviation having been selected as a vulnerable 
target and the means to achieve this end, El A1 and TWA have been targeted 
repeatedly by terrorists harbouring this conception. In the light of this, it should 
be recognised that aviation security is a basic government responsibility.
In addition to the active application of tight security measures, many experts 
believe that terrorist attacks against civil aviation can be curtailed by adopting a 
hardline policy and bringing terrorists to justice. Paul Wilkinson, a strong 
supporter of hardline policy, advocates "All democratic governments must hold 
firm to a strict policy of no deals with terrorists’ and no submission to 
blackmail. Consistent national policies of minimising terrorists’ chances of 
rewards and maximising the probability of punishment are most likely to stem 4
the flow of terrorist killings in the longer term. ”" There are well-documented 
instances that softline approach has invited further terrorist attacks. For example, 
the submission of the Greek government to PFLP terrorists who hijacked an Jaircraft of Olympic Airways in 1970 and demanded the release of 7 convicted |
Arab terrorists encouraged ultimately a number of similar occurrences of this 
kind, and the use of the tactic quickly spread to non-Palestinian terrorists.
Hardline policy includes the use of special counter-terrorism units. Some states, 
including Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and South 
Korea, have formed special anti-terrorist unit for this specific purpose. This 
approach has been proved successful as a deterrence on several occasions 
including Entebbe which was a watershed since it marked the first long-distance 
anti-terrorist strike to rescue hostages and provided hope that similar operations 
in the future would prove feasible. In addition, terrorists must be brought to 
justice and prosecuted under the rule of law. For this purpose, lATA proposed
that "Establishing an international court which would try any captured hijackers 
or other criminals who have perpetrated acts of unlawful interference and an 
international detention centre where terrorists may be held while completing 
their sentence."" Although the adoption of the lATA's proposal is unlikely for 
several reasons, the international community should consider setting up an 
international court. Concomitant with this, terrorists would not be released under 
any circumstances and it would be gradually recognised that there is no use 
seeking to threaten the target state in order to secure the release of terrorists from 
prison since terrorists would be placed in the custody of the international 
court." It is very important to note that, as already discussed, a large number of 
aircraft hijackings were committed to release convicted terrorists and the 
adoption of an international court is a effective way to prevent such attacks. 
Above aU, through this hardline approach, democratic states make terrorists 
understand that they cannot in any circumstances achieve their aims by violent 
attacks against civil aviation whatever their reason may be.
VI-2-3. Active Approach by Civil Aviation Industry
With the increasing number of attacks against civil aviation, alarms were 
being sounded throughout the civil aviation industry. However, the aviation 
indusliy paid them scant heed. In the early 1960s, the problems of aviation 
terrorism became clear. At that moment, more attention should have been paid to 
a new and dangerous phenomenon. Statistics show that there were already 59 
aircraft hijacking attempts between 1931 and 1961 and 12 sabotage bomb
Rodney Wallis, Aviation Security, op.cit, P. 12 
1^  Paul Wilkinson, Lessons of Lockerbie, op.cit, P. 26
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attacks between 1949 and 1961. The civil aviation industry failed to act in this •
matter. They regarded such attacks as a passing phenomenon. Furthermore, the 
dangerous and negligent approach to this matter was spreading as Thomas 
Ashwood pointed out:
"In retrospect, it is fairly understandable why the governments and industry 
adopted a negligent attitude. Essentially, fugitive and extortion hijackings, 
which only demanded transportation and/or money, were cheaper to live with than the expense of providing a preventative security system throughout the entire airline structure".
Although the costs of aviation security are relatively high, the problem is the fact 
that many airlines regard the investment of money in aviation security as 
nonproductive. At the same time, they are reluctant to invest money in aviation 
security on the unconvincing assumption that to do so would cut into their 
profits. One aviation security expert described this attitude as follows:
"But most airlines don’t want to spend money. How much they spend in I
comparison to ticketing or marketing is almost zero. They refuse to do it.They think of only how to make more money ”."
In fact, this tendency has caused great concern for the safety of civil aviation.
Airline authorities should remember that this dangerous approach will bring total 
disaster to their airlines and the aviation industry. A high proportion of frequent 
travellers have shifted in their attitude, now choosing a particular airline for 
safety reasons rather than comfort, punctuality, efficiency and speed, as in the 
past. They are extremely unhappy about the airline standards of safety and
Thomas M. Ashwood, "The Airline Response To Terrorism", in Y. 
Alexander and R. A. Kilmarx(ed), Folifa l Termdsiil..aQd-BusitLess, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979, P. 130
Ibid
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security and have little confidence in the performance of many air caixiers." This 
was demonstrated during the Gulf War. The travelling public, businessmen and 
leisure travellers feaiful of teixorist activity and mistrusting the will and 
capability of the aviation authorities to deter terrorist campaigns against civil 
aviation, were reluctant to fly. The result was a shaip drop in annual world 
airline traffic in 1991, for the first time in history. According to the Flight 
International, the civil aviation industry had lost 25 per cent of traffic in Januaiy 
1991, the month that Gulf War stalled.^ ® This drove the aviation industry into 
financial difficulties. In Januaiy and February 1991, the airlines as a whole 
suffered from a monthly shortfall in revenue of $1 billion. In pailiculai*, airlines 
should learn a salutaiy lesson from the banki'uptcy case of Pan Am, the most 
famous name in world aviation from the days of flying boats to the jumbo-jet 
era. It was reported that the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 by a teixorist bomb 
over Lockerbie was one of the major blows to Pan Am.^ i At the same time, the 
airline industry can leain a valuable lesson from the verdict of the American jury 
over Pan Am 103, which found the aiiiine Pan Am guilty of wilful misconduct 
and of being responsible for allowing a teixorist bomb on board its B-747 jet. 
The jurors also found Alert Management Inc, which ran the aviation security 
operations at Frankfurt and other aii'ports, and Pan Am World Services, guilty 
of wilful misconduct. This verdict has opened the road for a damages awaid 
against the insurers of Pan Am fai' in excess of the $ 75,000 maximum set by 
international aviation treaties. The families of Lockerbie victims expect an award
Michael Prince, op.cit, P. 68 and 70 
Flight International, Januaiy 29-February 4, 1992 
21 The Times, December 5, 1991
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ill compensation totalling more than $300 m i l l i o n .22 The first of this award 
occurred on July 22, 1992, with one family receiving an payment of $9.23 
million.23 The jury’s verdict and the first awai'd which shows enormity of the 
total cost of claims ai e cleai' waiiiing to the civil aviation industry as a whole that 
they face great damages if then security is not tight enough to prevent aviation 
teiTorism. In this respect, all airlines must realize that they have no choice but to 
have an effective security system for the safety of their own aiilines.
VI-2-3. International Efforts on Political Solutions
As Rodney Wallis said: ’’Conflict and political umest are inevitably the 
potential source of attacks against civil aviation’’," many terrorist attacks on civil 
aviation are connected with the various unresolved national and international 
political uncertainties. For example, civil aviation has become militaiy a target in 
the Middle East conflict. In addition, the majority of attacks against civil aviation 
in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa have also been involved 
within wider social and political conflict. There is much well-documented 
evidence to suggest that a lai’ge number of tenorist organizations have 
deliberately chosen civil aviation as a target to bring worldwide public attention 1
to then causes. This has been confirmed by the increasing number of attacks 
against civil aviation by politically motivated tenorist organizations. In fact, well
22 The Scotsman, July 11, 1992
23 The Scotsman, July 23, 1992
24 Rodney Wallis, "Aviation Security", Paper for Discussion at St. Andrews' 
University, October 10,1991, P. 17
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over 50 politically motivated hijacking and sabotage bomb attacks have been 
recorded since 1980. In this respect, the question of governing aviation terrorism 
as a whole must be approached from the angle of settling political problems. 
However, there is no significant sign of progress on this subject. Rodney Wallis 
observes:
It is extremely important to note that with prudent and skilful negotiations led by 
such institutions as the United Nations, many of the underlying causes of 
terrorist attack against civil aviation could be removed. For example, the 
settlement of the Palestinian problem would remove many of the causes and 
thereby enhance the safety of civil aviation. Although rejectionist groups such as 
the Abu Nidal Organization might attempt to run their own courses of bitterness, 
an independent Palestinian State would help to marginalize the extremist groups 
still determined to wage terrorism. One writer advocate this approach as 
follows:
"It is significant that between 1968 and 1988 it was one unresolved political 
issue in the Middle East that dominated the field of hijacking. That issue is 
the question of Palestine. The most fearsome innovators in air hijacking 
have all come from the ranks of the Palestinian National movement. Between 
1968 and 1974 it was George Habash and Wadi Haddad. Between 1974 and
25 Rodney Wallis, "Prevention of Aviation Ten'orism: The Ahlines' Point of 
View", in Aviation Security: How to safeguard International Air Transport? 
Proceedings of a Conference Held on January 22-23, 1987 at the Peace Palace, 
The Hague, P. 94
j
"Terrorism against civil aviation will continue. All the ingredients which exist 
today and on which terrorism breeds will remain with us for the foreseeable 
future. The conflicts in the Middle East show no sign of abatement-and 
governments appear not to have the political will to solve this problem. g
Certainly the solution is outside the scope of airlines, thus the fertile 
incubators of radical young people will continue to be fuelled by distrust and 4?
hatred which has so frequently spilled over into acts of unlawful interference 'y
against civil aviation.^’ : '4
349
_................. _ . ^4:;^
i . f . — ; - û .t   > j-
1983 it was Carlos and the PFLP and its allies in the Japanese Red Army and 
the Baader-Meinhof. After 1983 Abu Nidal and the Islamic fundamentalists 
dominated. It is tempting to suggest that if a negotiated settlement of the 
Palestinian problem were to come about, that cause of much international 
hijacking might be removed."^®
This approach does not necessarily mean to imply capitulation to terrorists or 
even concession and accommodation. The method of global political negotiation 
should be explored to help the tragic divisions of ethnic, religious and 
ideological conflict in all their forms, including aviation terrorism. For an 
effective reduction in the scale of aviation terrorism to be achieved, the 
international community must make progress in negotiations and diplomacy to 
achieve resolution of the key political conflicts in the international system.
VI-2-4. The Need for Shared Responsibility: Aviation Security in the Third 
World States
With the upgrading of civil aviation security by the major Western states, 
terrorists have exploited the weak links in the international aviation network. 
The UTA disaster in September 1989 demonstrated that the fatal weakness of 
aviation security in the Third World states would break the concept of global 
aviation security, and terrorist organisations have exploited that weakness by 
using down line airports in the Third World to attack Western airlines away 
from their main base of operations. In recent years, some aviation security 
experts have expressed a great concern over airport security in Third World 
states which offer easy access to terrorists, A large number of the airports in the 
Third World states including Africa and Asia have no basic security measures 
whatsoever. Many airports in these regions have no perimeter fencing, no
2b Peter St. John, op.cit, PP. 41-42
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security for airplanes, and no screening procedures for passengers. Although the 
weakness of aviation security poses major problems for the safety of air 
transportation, there are no signs of improvement.
The major difficulty with regard to the introduction of standard security 
measures appears to be the expense involved for the less developed states which 
have a serious problem of poverty and external liabilities. Although the 
governments in poor states recognise the serious threat of aviation terrorism, the 
lack of resources prevent priority being given to aviation security. They simply 
cannot afford the outlay required to provide themselves with national aviation 
security systems.
What is to be done to eradicate such weak links? Rodney W allis concluded 
that "There is perhaps a need for shared responsibility - shared between the 
governments of those airlines serving Third World airports and those with the 
obligation devolving from the Tokyo, The Hague and Montreal Conventions."^^ 
International organizations such as ICAO and lATA have been active in the 
establishment of a new mechanism for financial, technical and material assistance 
to their member states for aviation security. Under the coordination of ICAO, the 
voluntary bilateral assistance programme for aviation security was established in 
1986, through this programme a significant number of member states have 
benefited from assistance provided by donor states. Moreover, the ICAO 
Technical Assistance Programme, funded under the United Nations 
Development Programme(UNDP), has for many years encouraged developing 
states to include aviation security in their development programmes. The most 
recent achievement has been in the Asia and Pacific region where a $1.2 million 
regional project was devoted to aviation security. Under this project, aviation
27 Rodney Wallis, "Aviation Security", op.cit, PP. 19-20
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security experts visited over 100 airports in 22 states, advising on needed 
improvements. At the same time, a considerable number of security personnel 
were awarded aviation security training fellowships.^» In addition, in 1984, 
lATA established an aviation security training programme operated jointly with 
International Aeradio(IAL) to assist in providing adequately trained security 
personnel for member airlines of developing states.^’ However, the need of 
developing states for assistance in aviation security requires that more resources 
become available for this purpose. Consequently, this type of programme 
should be continued and expanded as a long term goal. In this respect, the 
international community must take action such as the introduction of 
international aviation security funds which would provide grants and soft loans 
for investment in airport security equipment and airport staff training 
programmes in the developing states.^ » The international community have to 
remember that weak links in aviation security can not be prevented simply by 
adopting new technologies and methods in a few  major civil aviation states. If 
the major civil aviation governments have the intention to protect their airlines 
and passengers from aviation terrorism, it should be borne in mind that airports 
in poor states must first be made safer.
28 William R. Fromme, "ICAO’s Role in the Field of Aviation Security", Flight 
■Safety Foufldatipfl, 1990, PP. 92-93
29 Trevor Chaseling, "Aviation Security and Airlines", in Y. Alexander and E. 
Sochor(ed), Aerial Piracy and Aviation Security. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1990, P. 23
30 Paul Wilkinson, Inaugural Lecture, op.cit, P. 21
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4VI-2-5. Education on Terrorism
Aviation terrorism is a significant problem that affects people all over the 
world. Without a fundamental understanding of terrorism by the public, it is 
virtually impossible to cure such a phenomenon. To achieve this objective, it is 
necessary to launch a programme of education on this matter. This programme 4
should underscore the link between basic human rights, peaceful resolution of I
international conflicts, and the impracticality of terrorism as a strategy to coerce 
the attitude and behaviour of others. The goal of this programme is to make the |
public better aware of the enormity of terrorism as both a direct violation and as 
a long term threat to human rights and thus better able to understand the need to |
deal with it. Within high school classes in social studies and history, for 
instance, governments could encourage the investigation, analysis, and 
discussion of relationship between the norms of general human rights and 
terrorism. Moreover, Jordan J. Paust suggested that "Related educational 
programmes and concerns can be developed for other levels, including more 
general but important cooperative and individual-oriented learning in elementary 
and preschool p r o c e s s .A t  national level, these educational efforts should be 
sponsored by governments with the help of educational groups and institutions 
as well as law enforcement agencies and media groups. At international level, 
several international organizations, such as the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization(UNESCO), United Nations Institute for 
Training and Research(UNITAR), and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross with its headquarters staff and national societies, should be engaged as the
31 Jordan J, Paust, "Nonprotected Persons or Things", in Alona E. Evans and
John F. Murphy(ed), Lëgml_Aspc.cts of M emaliooal Terrorism, Lexington:
Lexington Books, P. 360
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coordinative, promotional, and advisory services directed towards the 
establishment of educational programmes.’^
As Jordan J. Paust observed, "Education is critical in waging an effective 
ideological war against terrorists",”  governments should act in stimulating 
extensive and effective educational programmes concerned with the prevention 
of terrorism and the protection of human rights. This measure is clearly not a 
straight forward process, but such an effort would provide a useful guideline for 
the broader public understanding of such threats, and the necessity to combat 
terrorism. In addition, the formation of a moral consensus and the broadening of 
the working foundation of law will discredit and discourage terrorist activities.
VI-3. Concluding Remarks
It is generally accepted that international terrorism is unlikely to stop until its 
root causes are dealt with. However, the root causes of terrorism may not be 
removed for a long time. There are, across the world, persistent conflicting 
political, social and economic claims. In addition, there will perhaps always be 
frustrated and unstable individuals, delighted to devise an ideological or 
theological excuse to commit acts of violence. Ending the root causes of acts of 
violence on one side could well aggravate the root cause on the other. 
Moreover, for some states, international terrorism has become a useful 
alternative way for achieving their political aims. It might be impossible to 
eradicate acts of violence by resolving political grievances, particularly in the 
short term. However, there is no doubt that many terrorist acts of violence
32 Jordan J, Paust, "Private Measures of Sanctions", in Ibid, PP. 589-590
33 Ibid, P. 606
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against civil aviation can be deterred or prevented if there is national and 
international wül. The problem is that while each state knows what is best for 
itself, there is no political consensus on what is best for all. The international 
community and the civil aviation industry talk of war against aviation terrorism, 
they talk of effective security measures for civil aviation safety, they talk, talk, 
talk, and never act.
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Appendix I*
Protocol
relating to an amendment to the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation
[Article 3 bis]
MONTREAL 
10 May 1984
THE ASSEMBLY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
HAVING MET in its Twenty-fifth Session(Extraordinary) at Montreal on 10 May 1984,
HAVING NOTED that international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preseive friendship 
and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat 
to general security,
HAVING NOTED that it is desirable to avoid friction and promote that cooperation between nations 
and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends,
HAVING NOTED that it is necessary that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and 
orderly manner,
HAVING NOTED that in the Convention on International Civil Aviation done at Chicago on the 
seventh day of December 1944 the contracting States
- recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its 
territory,
- undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for 
the safety of navigation of civil aircraft, and
- agree not to use civil aviation for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of the Convention,
HAVING NOTED the resolve of the contracting States to take appropriate measures designed to 
prevent the violation of other States’ airspace and the use of civil aviation purposes inconsistent 
with the aims of the Convention and to enhance further the safety of international civil aviation,
HAVING NOTED the general desire of contracting States to reaffirm the principle of non-use of 
weapons against civil aircraft in flight,
1. DECIDES that it is desirable therefore to amend the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation done at Chicago on the seventh day of December 1944,
2. APPROVES, in accordance with the provision of Article 94(a) of the Convention aforesaid, 
the following proposed amendment to the said Convention:
Insert, after Article 3, a new Article 3 bis:
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"Article 3 bis
(a) The contracting States recognize that every State must refrain from resorting to the use of 
weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception, the lives of persons 
on board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered. This provision shall not be 
interpreted as modifying in any way the rights and obligations of States set forth in the 
Charter of the United Nations.
(b) The contracting States recognize that every State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, is 
entitled to require the landing at some designated airport of a civil aircraft flying above its 
territory without authority or if there are reasonable grounds to conclude that it is being 
used for any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this Convention; it may also give such 
aircraft any other instructions to put an end to such violations. For this purpose, the 
contracting States may resort to any appropriate means consistent with relevant rules of 
international law, including the relevant provisions of this Convention, specifically 
paragraph (a) of this Article. Each contracting States agrees to publish its regulations in 
force regarding the interception of civil aircraft.
(c) Every civil aircraft shall comply with an order given in conformity with paragraph (b) of this 
Article. To this end each contracting State shall establish all necessary provisions in its 
national laws or regulations to make such complimice mandatory for any civil aircraft 
registered in that State or operated by a person having his principal place of business or 
permanent residence in that State. Each contracting State shall make any violation of such 
applicable laws or regulations punishable by severe penalties and shall submit the case to 
its competent authorities in accordance with its laws or regulations.
(d) Each contracting State shall take appropriate measures to prohibit the deliberate use of any 
civil aircraft registered in that State or operated by an operator who has his principal place 
of business or permanent residence in that State for any purpose inconsistent with the aims 
of this Convention. This provision shWI not affect paragraph (a) or derogate from 
paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Article."
3. SPECIFIES, pursuant to the provision of the said Article 94 (a) of the said Convention, one 
hundred and two as the number of contracting State upon whose ratification the proposed 
amendment aforesaid shall come into force, and
4. REVOLVES that the Secretary General of the International Civil Aviation Organization draw 
up a Protocol, in the English, French, Russian and Spanish languages, each of which shall be of 
equal authenticity, embodying the proposed amendment above-mentioned and the matter hereafter appearing:
a) The Protocol shall be signed by the President of the Assembly and its Secretary General.
b) The Protocol shall be open to ratification by any State which has ratified or adhered to the 
said Convention on International Civil Aviation.
c) The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the International Civil Aviation 
Organization.
d) The Protocol shall come into force in respect of the States which have ratified it on the date 
on which the one hundred and second instrument of ratification is so deposited.
e) The Secretary General shall immediately notify all contracting States of the date of deposit of
each ratification of the Protocol.
f) The Secretary General shall notify all States parties to the said Convention of the date on
which the Protocol comes into force.
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g) With respect to any contracting State ratifying the Protocol after the date aforesaid, the 
protocol shall come into force upon deposit of its instrument of ratification with the 
International Civil Aviation Organization,
CONSEQUENTLY, pursuant to the aforesaid action of the Assembly,
This Protocol has been drawn up by the Secretary General of the Organization.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the President and the Secretary General of the aforesaid Twenty-fifth 4
Session(Extraordinary) of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization, 
being authorized thereto by the Assembly, sign this Protocol,
• Source: International Legal Materials, Vol. 23, 1984
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DONE at Montreal on the 10th day of May of the year one thousand nine hundred and eighty- j.
four, in a single document in the English, French, Russian and Spanish languages, each text 4
being equally authentic. This Protocol shall remain deposited in the archives of the 
International Civil Organization, and certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by the 
Secretary General of the Organization to all States parties to the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation done at Chicago on the seventh day of December 1944.
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Appendix II **
Convention 
on the Marking of Plastic Explosives 
for the Purpose of Detection
MONTREAL 
1 March 1991
THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION,
CONSCIOUS of the implication of acts of terrorism for international security;
EXPRESSING deep concern regarding terrorist acts aimed at destruction of aircraft, other means of transportation and other targets;
CONCERNED that plastic explosives have been used for such terrorist acts;
CONSIDERING that the marking of such explosives for he purpose of detection would contribute 
significantly o the prevention of such unlawful acts;
RECOGNIZING that for the purpose of deterring such unlawful acts there is an urgent need for an
international instrument obliging States to adopt appropriate measures to ensure that plasticexplosives are duly marked;
CONSIDERING United Nations Security Council Resolution 635 of 14 June 1989, and United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 44/29 of 4  December 1989 urging the International Civil Aviation 
Organization to intensify its work on devising an international regime for the marking of plastic or 
sheet explosives for he purpose of detection;
BEARING IN MIND Resolution A27-8 adopted unanimously by the 27th Session of the Assembly of the 
International Civil Aviation Oiganization which endorsed with th highest and overriding priority the 
preparation of a new international instrument regarding the marking of plastic or sheet explosives for detection;
NOTING with satisfaction the role by the Council of the International Civil Aviation Oiganization in the
preparation of the Convention as well as its willingness to assume functions related to its implementation;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Article I
For the purpose of this Convention:
1. "Explosives" mean explosive products, commonly known as "Plastic explosives", including 
explosives in flexible or elastic sheet form, as described in the Technical Annex to this Convention,
2. "Detection agent" means a substance as described in the Technical Annex to this Convention which 
is introduced into an explosive to render it detectable.
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3. "Marking means introducing into an explosive a detection agent in accordance with the Technical 
Annex to this Convention.
4. "Manufacture" means any process, including reprocessing, that produces explosives.
5. "Duly authorized military devices" include, but are not restricted to, shells, bombs, projectiles, 
mines, missiles, rockets, shaped charges, grenades and perforators manufactured exclusively for 
military or police purpose according to the laws and regulations of the State Party concerned.
6 . "Producer State" means any State in whose territory explosives are manufactured.
Article II
Each State Party shall take the necessary and effective measures to prohibit and prevent the manufacture in 
its territory of unmarked explosives.
Article III
1. Each State Party shall take necessary and effective measures to prohibit and prevent the movement 
into or out of its territory of unmarked explosives.
2. The preceding paragraph shall not apply in respect of movements for purpose not inconsistent with the 
objectives of this Convention, by authorities of a State Party performing military or police functions, of 
unmarked explosives under the control of that State Party in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article IV.
Article IV
1. Each State Party shall take the necessary measures to exercise strict and effective control over the 
possession and transfer of possession of unmarked explosives which have been manufactured in or brought 
into its territory prior to the entry into force of this Convention in respect of that State, so as to prevent 
their diversion or use tor purposes with the objectives of this Convention.
2. Each State Party shall take necessary measures to ensure that gdl stocks of those explosives referred to 
in paragraph 1 of this Article not held by its authorities performing military or police functions are 
destroyed or consumed for purposes not inconsistent with the objectives of this Convention, marked or 
rendered permanently ineffective, within a period of three years from entry into force of this Convention in 
respect of that State.
3. Each State Party shall take necessary measures to ensure that all stocks of those explosives referred to 
in paragraph 1 of this Article held by its authorities performing military or police functions and that are not 
incorporated as an integral part of duly authorized military devices are not consumed for the purposes not 
inconsistent with the objectives of this Convention, marked or rendered permanently ineffective, within a 
period of fifteen years from the entiy into force of this Convention in respect of that State.
4. Each State Party shall take necessary measures to ensure the destruction, as soon as possible, in its 
territory of unmarked explosives which may be discovered therein and which are not referred to in the 
preceding paragraph of this Article, other than stocks of unmarked explosives held by its authorities 
performing military or police functions and incorporated as an integral part of duly authorized military 
devices at the date of the entry into force of this Convention in respect of that State.
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5. Each State Party shall take necessary measures to exercise strict and effective control over the 
possession and transfer of possession of the explosives referred to in paragraph II of Part 1 of the Technical 
Annex to this Convention so as to prevent their diversion or use for purposes inconsistent with the 
objectives of this Convention.
6 . Each State Party shall take necessary measures to ensure the destruction, as soon as possible, in its 4
territory of unmarked explosives manufactured since the coming into force of this Convention in respect of 
that State that are not incorporated as specified in paragraph II d) of Part 1 of the Technical Annex to this 
Convention and of unmarked explosives which no longer fall within the scope of any other sub-paragraphs 
of the said paragraph II.
Article V
i1. There is established by this Convention an International Explosives Technical Commission(hereafter 4
referred to as "the Commission") consisting not less than fifteen nor more than nineteen members M
appointed by the Council of the International Civil Aviation Oiganization(hereafter to as "the Council”) -
from among persons nominated by States Parties to this Convention.
2 . The members of the Commission shall be experts having direct and substantial experience in mattem 
relating to the manufacture or detection of, or research in, explosives.
3. Members of the Commission shall serve for a period of three years and shall be eligible for re­
appointment.
4. Sessions of the Commission shall be convened, at least once a year at the Headquarters of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, or at such places and times as may be directed or approved by f
the Council. |
5. The Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure, subject to the approval of the Council.
Article VI
1. The Commission shall evaluate technical developments relating to the manufacture, marking and 
detection of explosives.
2. The Commission, through the Council, shall report its findings to the States Parties and international 
organizations concerned.
3. Whenever necessaiy, the Commission shall take make recommendations to the Council for 
amendments to the Technical Annex to this Convention, the Commission shall endeavour to take its 
decisions on such recommendations by consensus. In the absence of consensus the Commission shall take 
such decisions by a two-thirds majority vote of its members.
4. The Council mat, on the recommendations of the Commission, propose to States Parties amendments 
to the Technical Annex to this Convention.
Article VII
1. Any State Party, within ninety days from the date of notification of a proposed amendment to the 
Technical Annex to this Convention, transmit to the Council its comments. The Council shall communicate 
these comments to the Commission as soon as possible for its consideration. The Council shall invite any 
State Parfy which comments on or objects to the proposed amendment to consult the Commission.
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2. Tlie Commission shall consider the views of States Parties made pursuant to the preceding paragraph 
and report to the Council. The Council, after consideration of the Commission’s report, and taking into 
account the nature of the amendment and the comments of States Parties, including producer States, may 
propose the amendment to all States Parties for adoption.
3. If a proposed amendment has not been objected to by five or more States Parties by means of written 
notification to the Council within ninety days from the date of notification of the amendment by the i
Council, it shall be deemed to have been adopted, and shall enter into force one hundred and eighty days {
thereafter or after such other period as specified in the proposed amendment for States Parties not having 
expressly objected thereto.
4. States Parties having expressly objected to the proposed amendment may, subsequently, by means of I 
deposit of an instrument of acceptance or approval, express their consent to be bound by the provisions of 
the amendment,
5. If five or more States Parties have objected to the proposed amendment, the Council shall refer it to 
the Commission for further consideration.
6 . If the proposed amendment has not been adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, the 
Council may also convene a conference of all States Parties.
Article VIII
1. States Parties shall, if possible, transmit to the Council information that would assist the Commission 
in the discharge of its functions under paragraph 1 of Article VI.
2. States Parties shall keep the Council informed of measures they have taken to implement the 
provisions of this Convention. The Council shall communicate such information to all States Parties and 
international organization concerned.
Article IX
The Council shall, in co-operation with States Parties and international oiganizations concerned, take 
appropriate measures to facilitate the implementation of this Convention, including the provision of 
technical assistance and measures for the exchange of information relating to technical developments in the 
marking and detection of explosives.
Article X
The Technical Annex to this Convention shall form an integral part of this Convention.
Article XI
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted 
to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to 
agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the 
International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
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2. Each State Party may, at the same time of signature, ratification, acceptance or approval of this 
Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by the preceding paragraph. 
The other States Parties shall not be bound by the preceding paragraph with respect to any States Party 
having made such a reservation.
3. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with the preceding paragraph may at any 
time withdraw this reservation by notification o the Depositary.
Article XII
Except as provided in Article XI no reservation may be made to this Convention.
Article XIU
1. This Convention shall be open for signature in Montreal on 1 March 1991 by States participating in 
the International Conference on Air Law held at Montreal from 12 February to 1 March 1991. After 1 
March 1991 the Convention shall be open to all States for signature at the headquarters of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal until it enters into force in accordance with par%raph 3 of this 
Article. Any State which does not sign this Convention may accede to it at any time.
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States. t# 
Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, which is hereby designated the Depositary. When depositing its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, each State shall declare whether or not it is a producer 
State.
3. This Convention shall enter into force on the sixtieth day following the date of deposit of the thirty- |
fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Depositary, provided that no |
fewer than five such States have declared pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article that they are producer 
States. Should thirty-five such instruments he deposited prior to the deposit of their instruments by five 
producer States, this Convention shall enter into force on the sixtieth day following the date of deposit of 
the instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession of the fifth producer State.
4. For other States, this Convention shall enter into force sixty days following the date of deposit of their 
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
Article XIV
The Depositaiy shall promptly notify all signatories and States Parties of;
1. each signature of this Convention and date thereof;
2 . each deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession and date thereof, 
giving special reference to whether the State has identified itself as a producer State;
3. the date of entry into force of this Convention;
4. the date entiy into force of any amendment to this Convention or its Technical Annex;
5. any denunciation made under Article XV; and
6 . any declaration made under paragraph 2 of Article XI.
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Article XV
1. Any State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the Depositary.
2. Denunciation shall take effect one hundred and eighty days following the date on which notification is 
received by the Depositary.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized thereto by their 
Governments, have signed this Convention
DONE at Montreal, this first day of March, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-one, in one original, 
drawn up in five authentic texts in the English, French, Russian, Spanish and Arabic languages.
TECHNICAL ANNEX
PART 1: DESCRIPTION OF EXPLOSIVES
I. The explosives referred to in paragraph 1 of Article I of this Convention are those that:
a) are formulated with one or more high explosives which in their pure form have a vapour pressure 
less than lO"'^  Pa at a temperature of 25^C;
b) are formulated with a binder material; and
c) are, as a mixture, malleable or flexible at normal room temperature,
II. The following explosives, even though meeting the description of explosives in paragraph I of this 
Part, shall not be considered to be explosives as long as they continue to be held or used for the purposes 
specified below or remain incorporated as there specified, namely those explosives that:
a) are manufactured, or held, in limited quantities solely for use in duly authorized research, 
development or testing of new or modified explosives;
b) are manufactured, or held, in limited quantities solely for use in duly authorized training in 
explosives detection and /  or development or testing of explosives detection equipment;
c) are manufactured, or held, in limited quantities solely for duly authorized forensic science purpose; or
d) are destined to be and are incorporated as an integral part of duly authorized military devices in the 
territory of the producer State within three years after the coming into force of this Convention in 
respect of that State. Such devices produced in this period of three years shall be deemed to be duly 
authorized military devices within paragraph 4 of Article IV of this Convention.
III. In this Part;
"duly authorized" in paragraph II a), b) and c) means permitted according to the laws and regulations 
of the State Party concerned; and
"high explosives" include but not restricted to cycIotetramethylenetetranitramine(HMX), 
pentaerythritol tetranitrate(PETN) and cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine(RDX).
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PART 2: DETECTION AGENTS
A detection agents is any one of those substances set out in the following Table. Detection agents 
described in this Table are intended to be used to enhance the detectability of explosives by vapour 
detection means. In each case, the introduction of a detection agent into an explosive shall be done in such 
a manner as to achieve homogeneous distribution in the finished product. The minimum concentration of a 
detection agent in the finished product at the time of manufacture shall be as «hown in the said Table.
Table
Name of detection agent Molecular Molecular Minimum
formula weight concentration
Ethylene glycol dinitrate(EGDN) C2H4(N03)2 152 0 .2% by mass
2,3-Dimethyl-2,3-dinitrobutane(DMNB) C6 Hn(N0 2 )^ 176 0 .1% by mass
para-Mononitrotoluene(p-MNT) C7H7 NO2 137 0.5% by mass
orthO-Mononitrotoluene(o-MNT) C7H7 NO2 137 0.5% by mass
Any explosive which, as a result of its normal formulation, contains any of the designated detection 
agents at or above the required minimum concentration level shall be deemed to be marked.
**Source: ICAO Doc 9571
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Appendix III***
International Standards and Recommended Practices: 
Security-Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of 
Unlawful Inteiference-Annex 17 To The Convention On 
International Civil Aviation
Forth Edition-October 1989
chapter 1. Definitions
Air Side. The movement area of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions thereof, access to 
which is controlled.
Security. A combination of measures and human and material resources intended to safeguard 
international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference.
Security Control. A means by which the introduction of weapons, explosives or articles likely to be 
utilized to commit an act of unlawful interference can be prevented.
Security Programme. Measures adopted to safeguard international civil aviation against acts of 
unlawful interference.
Chapter 2. General
2.1 Aims and objectives
2 .1.1 The aim of aviation security shall be to safeguard international civil aviation operations against acts 
of unlawful interference.
2.1.2 Safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel and the general public shall be the primaiy objective 
of each Contracting State in all matters related to safeguarding against acts of unlawful interference with 
international civil aviation.
2.1.3 Each Contracting State shall establish an organization, develop plans and implement procedures, 
which together provide a standardized level of security for the operation of international flights in normal 
operating conditions and which are capable of rapid expansion to meet any increased security threat.
2.2 Security and facilitation
2.2.1 Recommendation. Each Contracting State should whenever possible arrange for the security 
measures and procedures to cause a minimum of interference with, or delay to the activities of, 
international civil aviation.
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Note.-Guidaiice material on achieving international civil aviation security objectives through application 
of the Standards and Recommended Practices in the following chapters is to be found in the Security 
Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference(Doc 8973)
Chapter 3. Organization
3.1 National organization
3.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish a national civil aviation security programme.
3.1.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the objective of their national aviation security programme 
shall be to protect the safety, regularity and efficiency of international civil aviation by providing, through 
regulations, practices and procedures, safeguards against acts of unlawful interference.
3.1.3 Each Contracting State shall designate an appropriate authority within its administration to be 
responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of the national civil aviation security 
programme.
3.1.4 Each Contracting State shall keep under constant review the level of threat within its territory 
taking into account the international situation and adjust relevant elements of its national civil aviation 
security programme accordingly.
3.1.5 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to establish means of co-ordinating 
activities between the departments, agencies and other organizations of the State concerned with or 
responsible for various aspects of the national civil aviation security programme.
3.1.6 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to define and allocate the tasks for 
implementation of the national civil aviation security programme as between agencies of the State, airport 
administrations, operators and others concerned,
3.1.7 Each Contracting State shall ensure the establishment of an airport security programme, Wequate 
to the needs of international traffic, for each airport serving international civil aviation.
3.1.8 Each Contracting State shall arrange for an authority at each airport serving international civil 
aviation to be responsible for co-ordinating the implementation of security measures.
3.1.9 Each Contracting State shall arrange for the establishment of airport security committees to advise 
on the development and co-ordination of security measures and procedures at each airport serving 
international civil aviation.
3.1.10 Recommendation. Each Contracting State should ensure that arrangements are made for the 
investigation of suspected sabotage devices or other potential hazards at airports serving international civil 
aviation and for their disposal.
3.1.11 Each Contracting State shall ensure that duly authorized and suitably trained officers are readily 
available for deployment at their airports serving international civil aviation to assist in dealing with 
suspected, or actual, cases of unlawful interference with international civil aviation
3.1.12 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the appropriate authority arranges for the supporting 
facilities required by the security services at each airport serving international civil aviation.
3.1.13 Each Contracting State shall ensure that contingency plans are developed and resources made 
available to safeguard airports and ground facilities used in international civil aviation, against acts of 
unlawful interference.
3.1.14 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to ensure the development and 
implementation of training programmes to ensure the effectiveness of its national civil aviation security 
programme.
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3.1.15 Each Contracting State shall require operators providing service from that State to adopt a 
security programme and to apply it in proportion to the threat to international civil aviation and its facilities 
as known to the State.
3.1.16 Recommendation. Each Contracting State should promote whenever possible research and 
development of new security equipment which will better satisfy international civil aviation security 
objectives.
3.2 International co-operation
3.2.1 Each Contracting State shall co-operate wdth other States in order to adapt their respective national 
civil aviation security programmes as necessaiy.
3.2.1.1 Recommendation. Each Contracting State should include in its bilateral agreements on air 
transport a clause related to aviation securify.
3.2.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that requests from other States for special security measures in 
respect of specific flights, as far as may be practicable, are met.
3.2.3 Contracting States shall, as necessaiy, co-operate with esmh other in the development and 
exchange of information concerning training programmes.
3.2.4 Recommendation. Each Contracting State should co-operate with other States in the field of 
research and development of new security equipment which will better satisfy international civil aviation 
security objectives.
Chapter 4. Preventive Security Measures
4.1 General objectives of the measures
4.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to prevent weapons , explosives or any other 
dangerous devices which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference, the carriage or bearing of 
which is not authorized, from being introduced, by any means whatsoever, on board an aircraft engaged in 
international civil aviation.
Note.-In applying this Standard, special attention must be paid to the threat posed by explosive devices 
concealed in, or using electric or battery-operated items carried as hand baggage and/or in checked 
baggage. Guidance on this matter is to be found in the Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation 
Against Acts of Unlawful Interference(Doc 8973).
4.1.2 Recommendation. Contracting States should ensure that the carriage of weapons on board 
aircraft, by law enforcement officers and other authorized persons, acting in the performance of their 
duties, requires special authorization in accordance with the laws of the States involved.
4.1.2.1 Recommendation. Contracting States should ensure that the carriage of weapons in other cases 
is allowed only when an authorized and only qualified person has determined that they are not loaded, if 
applicable, and then only if stowed in a place inaccessible to any person during flight time,
4.1.2.2 Recommendation. Contracting States should ensure that the pilot-in-command is notified as to 
the number of armed persons and their seat location.
4.1.3 Recommendation. Each Contracting State should ensure that pre-flight checks of aircraft 
assigned to international flights include measures to discover weapons, explosives and sabotage or other 
dangerous devices which may have been placed on board.
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4.1.4 Each Contracting State shall establish procedures, which include notification to the operator, for 
inspecting aircraft, when a well-founded suspicion exists that the aircraft may be the object of an act of 
unlawful interferences, for concealed weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices.
4.1.5 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to safeguard aircraft vdien a well-founded 
suspicion exists that the aircraft may be attacked while on the ground and to provide as much prior 
notification as possible of the arrival of such aircraft to airport authorities.
4.1.6 Each Contracting State shall arrange for surveys and inspections of security measures.
4.2 Measures relating to passengers and their cabin baggage
4.2.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that adequate measures are taken to control transfer and 
transit passengers and their cabin baggage to prevent unauthorized articles from being taken on board 
aircraft engaged in international civil aviation operations.
4.2.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that there is no possibility of mixing or contact between - |
passengers subjected to such control after the security screening points at airports serving international 4
civil aviation have been passed; if mixing or contact does take place, the passengers concerned and their 
cabin baggage shall be re-screened before boarding an aircraft.
4.2.3 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that the aircraft operator and the pilot- 
in-command are informed when passengers are obliged to travel because they have been the subject of 
judicial or administrative proceedings, in order that appropriate security measures can be taken.
4.2.4 Recommendation. Each Contracting State should require operators providing service from that 
State, to include in their security programmes, measures and procedures to ensure safety on board their 
aircraft when passengers are to be carried who are obliged to travel because they have been the subject of 
judicial or administrative proceedings.
4.2.5 Recommendation. Each Contracting State should require measures to be taken to ensure that 
disembarking passengers do not leave items on board aircraft.
4.3 Measures relating to checked baggage, cargo and other goods
4,3.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that operators when providing service 
from that State do not transport the baggage of passengers who are not on board the aircraft unless the 
baggage separated from passengers is subjected to other security control measures.
Note.-This Standard has been applicable since 19 December 1987 with respect to the baggage of 
passengers at the point of origin and on-line transfer passengers. With respect to the baggage of other 
categories of passengeis, the Standard became applicable on 1 April 1989.
4J.2 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that consignments of packages and 
checked baggage intended for carriage on passenger flights, and using commercial courier services, are 
also subjected to specific security control, in addition to those provided in 4.3.1.
4.3.3 Recommendation. Each Contracting State should establish measures to ensure that baggage 
intended for carriage on passenger flights, whether accompanied or unaccompanied, when originating from 
places other than airport check-in counters, is subjected to security control.
4.3.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure the implementation of measures at airports serving 
international civil aviation to protect cargo, baggage, mail, stores and operator's supplies being moved 
within an airport and intended for carri%e on an aircraft to safeguard such aircraft against an act of 
unlawful interferences.
4.3.5 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that cargo and mail intended for carriage 
on passenger flights subjected to security controls which depend on the threat situation.
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4,3.6 Recommendation. Each Contracting State should arrange for secure storage areas at airports 
serving international civil aviation, where mishandled baggage may be held until forwarded, claimed or 
disposed of in accordance with local laws.
4.3.7 Recommendation. Each Contracting State should take the necessary measures to ensure that 
unidentified baggage is placW in a protected and isolated area until such time as it is ascertained that it 
does not contain any explosives or other dangerous device.
4.4 Measures relating access control
4.4.1 Each Contracting State shall establish procedures and identification systems to prevent 
unauthorized access by persons or vehicles to:
a) the air side of an airport serving international civil aviation; and
b) other areas important to the security of the airport.
4.4.2 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure Wequate supervision over the movement 
of persons to and from the aircraft and to prevent unauthorized access to aircraft.
Chapter 5. Management of Responses to Acts of Unlawful Interference
5.1 Operational aspects of an act of unlawful interference
5.1.1 Each Contracting State shall take adequate measures for the safety of passengers and crew of an 
aircraft which is subjected to an act of unlawful interference until their journey can be continued.
5.1.2 Each Contracting State responsible for providing air traffic services which is the subject of an act 
of unlawful interference shall collect all pertinent information on the flight of that aircraft and transmit that 
information to all other States responsible for the Air Traffic Services units concerned, including those at 
the airport of known or presumed destination, so that timely and appropriate safeguarding action may be 
taken en route and at the aircraft’s known, likely or possible destination.
5.1.3 Recommendation. Each Contracting State should ensure that information received as a 
consequence of action taken accordance with 5.1.2 is distributed locally to the Air Traffic Services units 
concerned, the appropriate airport administrations, the operator and others concerned as soon as 
practicable.
5.1.4 Each Contracting State shall provide such assistance to an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful 
seizure, including the provision of navigational aids, air traffic services and permission to land as may be 
necessitated by the circumstances.
5.1.5 Each Contracting State shall take measures, as it may find practicable, to ensure that an aircraft 
subjected to an act of unlawful seizure which has landed in its territory is detained On the ground unless its 
departure is necessitated by the overriding duty to protect human life, recognizing the importance of 
consultations, wherever practicable, between the State where that aircraft has landed and the State of the 
operator of the aircraft.
5.2. Reports
5.2.1 Recommendation. Each Contracting State should exchange information with other States as 
considered appropriate, at the same time supplying such information to ICAO, related to plans, designs, 
equipment, methods and procedures for safeguarding international civil aviation against acts of unlawful 
interference.
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5.2.2 A Contracting State in which an mrcraft subjected to an act of unlawful interference has landed 
shall notify by the most expeditious means the State of Registry of the aircraft and the State of the operator 
of the landing and shall similarly transmit by the most expeditious means all other relevant information to:
a) the two above-mentioned States;
b) each State whose citizens suffered fatalities or injuries;
c) each State whose citizens were detained as hostages;
d) each Contracting State whose citizens are known to be on board the aircraft; and
e) the International Civil Aviation Organization
5.2.3 Each Contracting State concerned with an act of unlawful interference shall require its appropriate 
authority to re-evaluate security measures and procedures in respect of international flights which have 
been the subject of unlawful interference and take action necessary to remedy weaknesses so as to prevent 
recurrence.
5.2.4 Each Contracting State concerned with an act of unlawful interference shall provide ICAO with all 
pertinent information concerning the security aspects of the act of unlawful interference as soon as 
practicable after the act is resolved.
5.2.5 Recommendation. Each Contracting State should adopt measures to ensure that persons acting in 
an official capacity do not divulge confidential information concerning an act of unlawful interference if 
such information is likely to jeopardize the safety of international civil aviation.
***8ource: ICAO, International Standards and Recommended Practices; Security-Safeguarding 
International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference-Annex 17 to the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, Montreal; ICAO, 1989
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Appendix IV * * * *
Chronology of Significant Missile Attacks Against Civil Aviation
(1973-1991)
February 21,1973
A Libyan Boeing 727 was shot down by an Israeli Phantom F-4Ë, killing 106 
innocent people aboard. The destruction occurred over Sinai Desert, which 
Israel considered a war zone. Israeli government defended the action, claiming 
that the French pilot of that aircraft had acted strangely and refused to follow  
Israeli instructions to land at the nearest airbase, and justified it by citing 
intelligence report that numerous threats had been made by Black September to 
hijack an airliner and suicide raid on Israel.
September 5,1973
Italian police arrest five Arabs armed SAM-7 surface-to-air missile supplied 
by the Russians to Libya. The terrorists had rented an apartment on the flight 
path to Rome airport and planning to shoot down an El A1 aircraft.
January 5,1974
Two hundred twenty soldiers and two hundred police sealed off five square 
miles around Heathrow International Airport after receiving reports that 
terrorists had smuggled in SAM-7 anti-aircr^t missiles by using the diplomatic 
pouches of Arab embassies, and planned to shoot down an El A1 airliner.
January 13,1975
Members of Carlo's gang try to destroy El A1 airliner at Orly airport using 
hand-held rocket. They missed target, hit Yugoslav airliner instead.
January 19,1975
A man of North African appearance set up rocket launcher on the terrace 
over looking Orly-South ready to open fire on El A1 airliner ready to leave for 
Tel Aviv. This time the Air Police who guard Orly were more alert and a police 
officers who saw him fired off a burst from his submachine gun. Unhurt, the 
terrorist fled and was joined by an accomplice, and as they ran into the main hall
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one threw a grenade and the other fired into the crowd. To cover their retreat 
into the toilets, the terrorists threw more grenades and in the confusion grabbed 4
twenty hostages. After bargaining with the French authorities, the terrorists were '
allowed to leave two days later aboard an Air France flight in return for 
releasing their hostages. The terrorists were never identified.
April 20,1978
A Korean Air Lines aircraft which strayed into Soviet air space by mistake ®
was shot and forced to land. Two passengers were killed and 13 others were 
injured as a result of the attack.
September 3,1978
Black Nationalist guerrillas, using a missile, shot down a Rhodesian airliner 
carrying 56 people near Kariba, Rhodesia. Thirty-eight were killed in the 
ensuing crash and 10 others were killed in a subsequent guerrilla attack launched 
against the surviving passengers.
February 12, 1979
An Air Rhodesia Viscount was shot down by Patriotic Front guerrillas on its 
flight between Kariba and Salisbury, killing all fifty-nine aboard. PF leader ,
Joshua Nkomo, said that the aircraft had been scheduled to carry Lieutenant I
General W alls, Rhodesian Army commander, and that the plane was therefore a 
legitimate military target. The guerrillas apparently used Soviet-made Strela 
heat-seeking missiles, which explode in the jet pipes of turboprop engines.
February 14,1979
An Air Rhodesia Viscount Turboprop was fired upon in the Rhodesia-Zambia 
border area during a flight from Kariba to Salisbury, Rhodesia. Five bullet holes 
were found in the fuselage after the aircraft landed at Salisbury. No injuries 
reported.
September 1, 1983
A Korean Air Lines, Flight 007, which departed from Anchor^e, Alaska, 
and scheduled to land at Kimpo International Airport in S^oul, Korea, was shot 
down by a Soviet fighter. The aircraft strayed over Soviet air space by mistake. 
There were no survivors among the 269 passengers and crew members.
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September 21, 1984
A surface to air missile hit a DC-10 Ariana Airliner with 308 passengers and 
crew aboard. The flight was en route to Kabul from Kandahar. The explosion 
tore through the aircraft’s left engine and damaged its hydraulic system and wing 
containing the fuel tank. The Captain of the aircraft, however, managed to safely 
land the aircraft at Kabul International Airport. Reportedly, Ai’ghan counter­
revolutionaries were responsible for the attack.
April 4, 1985
Fired two R.P.G. rocket at an Alia airliner as it took off from Athens airport 
by Abu Nidal terrorist. Although the rocked did not explode, it left a hole in the 
fuselage.
September 4, 1985
An aircraft of the domestic Baktar Afghan Airlines was shot down with a 
ground to air missiles as it took off from Kandahar Airport in southern 
Afghanistan, killing all 47 passengers and 5 crew members aboard. The aircraft, 
on a scheduled flight from Kabul to the western province of Farah, made a 
stopover at Kandahar. The Hezb-i-Islami guerrilla organization claimed 
responsibility for the shoot down. A spokesman for the Hezb-i-Islami guerilla 
organization reportedly claimed its members shot down the aircraft after 
receiving information that it was carrying Soviet advisers, Afghan secret police, 
and military officials, however, information available indicates that all of the 
passengers killed were civilians.
August 16, 1986
A Sudan Airways twin-engine Fokker F-27 aircraft carrying 57 passengers 
and three crew members was shot down over rebel-held southern Sudan, 
killing all aboard. The aircraft was destroyed by a surface-to-air missile(SA-7) 
minutes after departing the airport in Malakal, Sudan. The attack was committed 
by rebels of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army(SPLA).
May 5,1987
A Cessna 404 operated by Sudanese Aeronautical Services Ltd.(SASCO) 
was shot down as it left Malakal airport en route to Khartoum, Sudan. Eleven
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passengers and two crew were killed. A rebel group, the Sudanese People's 
Liberation Army, claimed responsibility.
November 6, 1987
An Air Malawi Sky van-3 was shot down by Mozambique armed forces as it 
passed over Ulongue while en route from Blantyre to Lilongwe, Malawi. Eight 
passengers and two crew members were killed in the crash. According to 
military officials in Mozambique, the aircraft was flying in violation of 
Mozambican air space.
July 3,1988
An Iran Air A-300 aircraft was shot down by the USS Vincennes over the 
Persian Gulf. The U.S. warship, which had been engaged in combat with small 
surface vessels in the Gulf, mistook the airliner for an attacking fighter aircraft. 
As many as 290 passengers and crew on the aircraft died.
August 8 ,1988
Angolan fighter planes mistakenly fired on and damaged a BAe 125 series 
8000 jet carrying the President of Botswana on a flight. The President was 
slightly injured.
September 23,1988
Nile Safaris B-707, which was landing at Juba, Sudan, was attacked with 
machine guns and rocket propelled grenades by rebels of the SPLA.
December 8, 1988
Two DC-7 aircraft operating under a locust spraying contract for the U.S. 
Agency for International Development were fired on with SA-7 surface-to-air 
missiles in the Western Sahara. One of the aircraft was shot down and five 
people were killed. The second aircraft was damaged but managed to land 
safely at Sidi If ini, Morocco. The Polasario, an insurgent group that opposes 
Moroccan sovereignity over the Western Sahara, admitted that its forces shot 
down the aircraft but claimed that it did so by mistake.
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Septembers, 1989
A U.S. AIR flight en route from the Bahamas to Florida, was hit by a gunshot 
while it was landing. The bullet pierced the aircraft door and grazed a f
passenger's head.
December 21,1989
A Medecines Sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders) French relief aid 
aircraft with four passengers and crew was shot down by a missile after 
departing from Awell en route to Khartoum. The Sudanese People's Liberation 
Army (SPLA), which was fighting with the Sudanese government, is allegedly I
responsible for the incident. There were no survivors from the incident.
February 22, 1991
An unidentified Airlines An-26 passenger flight was shot down by ground- 
launched missile over Cazombo, eastern Angola. A total of 47 fataHties were 
reported.
March 16, 1991
A Transafrik Airlines Lockheed L-lOO aircraft was shot down by UNITA 
guerrillas near Malanje, Angola.
July 10,1991
A group of drunken police fired at the Aerochasqui Airlines C-212 aircraft to 
prevent take-off, intending to inspect it for drugs. As a result of the attack, a 
crew was killed and the aircraft was crashed.
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Appendix V
W orldwide Criminal Acts Involving Civil Aviation: Countries
Involved(1931-1990)
Afghanistan: Algeria; Angola: Argentina: Aruba; Austria: Australia
Bahamas: Bahrain; Bangladesh: Barbados: Belgium: Bolivia: Botswana; Brazil; 
Bulgaria: Burma
Canada: Chile; China; Colombia; Congo: Corsica: Costa Rica; Cuba; Cyprus: 
Czechoslovakia
Denmark: Dominican Rep.; Djibouti Rep.
Egypt: Ethiopia: El Salvador; Ecuador 
France: Finland; Fiji
Great Britain; Greece; Guadeloupe; Guatemala: East and West Germany 
Haiti: Hondras; Hungry
India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Iceland; Israel; Italy; Ivory Coast
Japan; Jamaica; Jordan
Kenya: Kuwait; Korea
Lebanon: Libya; Luxembourg
Morocco: Malta: Mexico; Malaysia
Nicaragua: Netherlands: New Zealand: Norway
Panama: Pakistan: Phillipines; Peru; Poland: Portugal
Qatar
Romania: Rhodesia
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Saudi Arabia; Seychelles; Singarpore; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sweden; 
Switzerland; Syria; Sudan; Somalia
Tanzania; Thailand; Taiwan; Trinidad Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey 
USSR; USA; Uruguay; Uganda; UAE(United Arab Emirate)
Venezuela; Vietnam 
Yemen: Yugoslovia 
Zambia; Zimbabwe
Total; 117
378
 Trading in Death: Weapons, Warfare and the New Arms Race,
London: Hutchinson, 1990
Alexander, Y. and Kilmarx, R. A.(ed), Political Terrorism and Business, New  
York: Praeger Publishers, 1979
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